Iranian Regime tv Channel One hacked while it was airing Khamenie speech

Iranian Regime national tv Channel One hacked about an hour ago. During a broadcast of Khamenie speech, a red crosshair appeared over his face and chanting of Women. Life. Freedom. There was writing to the side saying "Rise up. Join us". Also 4 photos at the bottom of the screen of young people killed and additional writing: "The blood of our youth is dropping from your paws".

Also, there was a huge banner in the middle of Tehran highway today that read: We are no longer afraid of you. We will fight.

Also, attempted attack on IRI ambassador in Denmark. Her bodyguard was stabbed. Diplomatic Security intervened before the attacker could stab the ambassador.

Iran Update, June 29, 2025
Information Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

Iran has likely begun to assess damage and conduct repair operations at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP). Commercially available satellite imagery captured on June 28 and 29 shows Iranian heavy equipment near two clusters of three impact points on ventilation shafts at FFEP that were caused by US GBU-57 bunker-buster bombs.[1] Imagery from June 29 shows an excavator and crane near the northern bunker-buster bomb impact points. Imagery from June 28 showed an excavator near the southern cluster of impact points. A US weapons expert assessed that Iran may be filling the craters and conducting engineering damage assessments and radiological sampling.[2] The US weapons expert also noted that two of the six GBU-57 impact points have been covered by square slabs.[3]

Satellite imagery also shows that Iran has created at least two new paths leading to the two clusters of impacts on the ventilation shafts. Vehicles are visible along the access roads that lead to the impact points. Israel struck access roads leading to FFEP on June 23 in order to “disrupt” access to the site.[4] These strikes may delay Iranian efforts to assess and repair damage at Fordow or move materials from the site to other locations.[5]

Iranian activity at Fordow follows possible repair operations at the Natanz Enrichment Complex.[6] Commercially available satellite imagery captured on June 27 showed that Iran filled a crater that was formed by US GBU-57 bunker-buster bombs.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi said on June 27 that Iran could resume uranium enrichment within “a matter of months.”[7] Grossi stated that Iran could have at most “a few cascades of centrifuges spinning and producing enriched uranium” within months.[8] Iran's highly enriched uranium stockpile reportedly “remains largely intact” following the US and Israeli strikes. CTP-ISW previously noted that the US and Israeli strikes on Fordow and other enrichment facilities could have buried enriched uranium underground to limit access to it, but could not have destroyed the material, given that uranium is an element. US and Israeli strikes targeted centrifuge production facilities and active centrifuges, damaging and destroying thousands of centrifuges.[9] The destruction of so many centrifuges will likely hamper Iran's ability to enrich uranium in the near future. Grossi stressed that Iran had a “vast ambitious [nuclear] program” and that nuclear expertise and industrial capacity remain in Iran despite Israel's decapitation campaign targeting nuclear scientists and US-Israeli strikes on nuclear facilities.[10]

Grossi also stressed that the IAEA needs to be allowed to resume its work in Iran. Iranian Second Deputy Parliament Speaker Hamidreza Haji Babaei announced on June 28 that Iran will no longer allow IAEA cameras in its nuclear facilities.[11] Babaei also said that Grossi is no longer permitted to visit Iran.[12] Iran's Guardian Council approved a bill on June 26 that suspends Iran's cooperation with the IAEA and bars inspectors from accessing Iran's nuclear facilities.[13] The bill requires Iran to suspend cooperation with the IAEA until the IAEA recognizes Iran's right to enrich uranium.[14] Iran has historically restricted IAEA oversight in Iran, including by withdrawing the certifications of several inspectors in September 2023 and barring other top inspectors in November 2024.[15]

Former moderate Iranian President Hassan Rouhani argued that Iran must restore deterrence and rebuild public trust with the Iranian people as part of a revitalized national strategy.[16] Rouhani said in a public statement on June 24 that Iran's losses in the recent Israel-Iran War should encourage the Iranian regime to “restore” and “reconstruct” Iran's national strategy.”[17] Rouhani also cited regional developments “over the past two years,” likely referring to the significant weakening of Iran's proxies and partners in the Gaza Strip, Lebanon, and Syria since October 7, 2023.[18] Rouhani said that Iran must rebuild its “indigenous defense power” while also “listen[ing] to the people” and ”mak[ing] amends” with the Iranian population as part of this strategy.[19] Rouhani claimed that Israel and the United States attempted to weaken Iranian national solidarity and trust in the government.[20] Rouhani’s call for restoring trust with the Iranian people follows a similar call by Iranian Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Shamkhani on June 28. Shamkhani called on regime officials to resolve “disputes” with the Iranian population through “mutual understanding.”[21] Rouhani and Shamkhani’s statements come amid recent steps by the Iranian regime to securitize the country since the Iran-Israel ceasefire went into effect on June 24. Rouhani’s statement is also notable given recent reports that Rouhani may be attempting to use Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s absence to try to play a larger and more meaningful role in regime decision-making.[22] Moderate elements are typically sidelined by hardliners during normal times.

Iranian Armed Forces General Staff-affiliated outlet Defa Press published an article on June 29 expressing support for the purchase of Chinese fighter jets.[38] The article discussed Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh’s recent visit to China on June 26 and 27 and commented on recent rumors about Iran trying to purchase Chinese fighter jets.[39] Defa Press argued that the Iranian Artesh Air Force “needs to employ up-to-date fighter jets” so that the Artesh Air Force can defend Iranian airspace and confront Iran's adversaries “more effectively.” The Israeli Air Force established air superiority over large parts of Iran during the Iran-Israel War, as CTP-ISW previously noted. Defa Press argued that Chinese fighter jets, particularly the Chengdu J-10, can play an “important role” in helping Iran defend its airspace and confront foreign adversaries. Defa Press highlighted that the Chengdu J-10 is designed for air-to-air combat and can destroy targets “with power.” Defa Press also noted that the Chengdu J-10 is cheaper than some Russian, US, and British fighter jets. Iran has for years sought to purchase Russian Sukhoi-35 fighter jets, but Russia has yet to deliver the fighter jets to Iran.[40] Unspecified Iranian sources told Reuters on June 23 that Iran was unsatisfied with Russia's support for Iran during the Iran-Israel War.[41]

Defa Press also reported that Nasir Zadeh visited the Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy's Kaifeng destroyer with the defense ministers of other Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) member states during his visit to China.[42] Nasir Zadeh thanked China for supporting Iran's “legitimate position” in the Israel-Iran War while visiting the Kaifeng.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-29-2025

Iran Update, June 30, 2025

US officials told Western media that Iranian officials said in intercepted communications that the US strikes on Iran's nuclear program were “less devastating” than anticipated, which is inconsistent with previous open-source reporting and the nature of the strikes.[1] Four unspecified US officials familiar with US intelligence said that the intercepted communication included Iranian officials speculating as to why the US airstrikes were not as destructive and extensive as they anticipated.[2] The Western media report did not clarify what the Iranian officials ”anticipated,” which makes it challenging to understand the relative degree of damage Iran sustained due to the relative nature of the statement. It is also unclear when the US intelligence community collected this intelligence, but separate Israeli intelligence suggested that Iranian military officials have been giving false situation reports and downplaying the extent of damage to Iran's political leadership, however.[3] Signals intelligence collected within a day or two of the strike would presumably be less reliable than intelligence collected a week or more after the strike. It is unlikely that any Iranian officials could have executed a complete battle damage assessment within 48 hours because doing so would require seeing the inside of the facility, and all the known access points had collapsed. The Institute for Science and International Security also previously assessed that twelve 30,000lb bombs penetrated Fordow and generated a blast wave that would have destroyed the centrifuges enriching uranium at Fordow.[4] Even small vibrations can destroy centrifuges.

A prominent Iranian cleric, Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi, issued a fatwa that states individuals who threaten Iranian leadership and religious authority are punishable by death.[20] The fatwa declares these individuals “moharebeh” (enmity against god), which is punishable by death. The fatwa defines all individuals and governments who “attack” Iranian leadership to harm the Islamic community as an enemy of God, or “mohareb.” It remains unclear if the fatwa refers to both physical and rhetorical attacks. The Iranian Supreme National Security Council announced on June 16 that pro-Israel actions would face execution under charges of “moharebeh.”[21] These capital charges encompass activities like legitimizing Israel's image and spreading rumors inciting anti-government sentiment. Judiciary Head Gholam Hossein Ejei also instructed the judiciary on June 15 to expedite trials and punishments for those who “cooperate and collude with adversaries.”[22] The Iranian clerical establishment has previously weaponized the term “mohareb” against domestic dissidents, including charging Mahsa Amini protesters with the death penalty in 2022.[23]

Shirazi’s fatwa may be a public rejection of former reformist President Hasan Rouhani’s reported discussions with Shirazi and others that sought to sideline Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei at least temporarily. Rouhani recently met with Shirazi in Qom to encourage Shirazi to persuade Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to drop Iran's demand for uranium enrichment on Iranian soil and accept a ceasefire with Israel.[24] The fatwa could be intended to support Khamanei’s ruling that Iran needs to retain uranium enrichment and reinforce Shirazi’s loyalty to Khamenei. Two other clerics who also met with Rouhani—Ayatollah Zanjani and Khorasani—notably did not issue similar fatwas or messages supporting Shirazi’s moharebeh fatwa, however. Other senior clerics, Ayatollah Noori Hamedani and Ayatollah Ali Reza Arafi, also issued moharebeh fatwas on June 30 that echoed Shirazi‘s earlier moharebeh fatwa on June 29.[25] Hamedani and Arafi did not meet with Rouhani.

Iranian Judiciary spokesperson separately announced on June 30 that Iranian security forces arrested an unspecified number of European nationals in various Iranian provinces on allegations of collaborating with Israel.”[26]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-30-2025

Iran Update July 1, 2025

Iran is continuing to try to assess damage at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP). Commercially available satellite imagery captured on June 29 and 30 showed Iranian heavy equipment, including bulldozers and excavators, near two clusters of impact points at Fordow.[1] CTP-ISW previously reported that imagery from June 28 and 29 showed an excavator and crane near the northern impact points and an excavator near the southern impact points.[2] A US weapons expert assessed on June 30 that Iran may be preparing to send cameras or personnel into the craters to conduct a downhole damage assessment.[3] The expert noted that Iran will likely access the southern cluster of impact points first because US strikes made the ground around the northern impact points “highly unstable.” The expert stated that Iran is likely using a bulldozer at the southern impact points to prepare a platform for downhole access.[4] The expert added that Iran will likely lower cameras into the crater first and then personnel, depending on the site's safety.

Satellite imagery captured on July 1 indicates that Iran has at least partially filled the three southern impact points and covered one of the northern impact points with a temporary cover.[5] It is unclear why Iran would cover or fill the craters. A US weapons expert suggested that Iran may seek to prevent materials and personnel from falling into the craters while Iran conducts battle damage assessments around the site.[6] The expert noted that Iran would need to rebuild the ventilation shafts if it sought to resume operations at Fordow.[7]

Satellite imagery captured on July 1 also shows that Iran has cleared the surroundings of a tunnel entrance near the southern impact points to enable vehicle access to the tunnel.[8] It is unclear how far vehicles will be able to travel in the tunnel system.

Iranian nuclear safety regulators have reportedly stopped sharing information with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), according to two unspecified officials.[9] The IAEA’s Incident and Emergency Center had maintained contact with Iranian regulators since June 13, but two unspecified officials told Bloomberg on July 1 that Iran has stopped sharing information with the IAEA. This report comes after Iran's Guardian Council approved a bill on June 26 that suspends Iran's cooperation with the IAEA and bars inspectors from accessing Iran's nuclear facilities.[10] Iran has historically restricted IAEA oversight in Iran, including by withdrawing the certifications of several inspectors in September 2023 and barring other top inspectors in November 2024.[11] The IAEA has not conducted any inspections in Iran since the Israel-Iran War began.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-1-2025

Iran Update, July 2, 2025

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei reportedly appointed Ali Abdollahi Ali Abadi as the new Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters Commander.[17] Ali Abadi had served as the Armed Forces General Staff coordination deputy since 2016.[18] Coordination deputies in Iran serve in a capacity similar to a chief of staff in the US military. Ali Abadi has held leadership roles in the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and several internal security positions throughout his career.[19] Ali Abadi is originally from Gilan Province and commanded the IRGC Ground Forces 16th Quds Operational Division in the province. He also served as the governor of Gilan and Semnan provinces in northern Iran.[20] Ali Abadi later served as the Law Enforcement Command deputy chief and the Interior Ministry’s deputy minister for security and law enforcement. Ali Abadi’s appointment is consistent with CTP-ISW’s assessment that the Iranian regime is prioritizing regime security in the wake of the Israel-Iran War. The United States sanctioned Ali Abadi in January 2020 for advancing the regime’s “destabilizing objectives” and his involvement in the Iranian ballistic missile attack targeting US forces at Ain al Asad Airbase in Iraq in 2020.[21] Khamenei initially appointed former Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters Coordination Deputy Ali Shadmani to command the headquarters after Israeli strikes killed former Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters Commander Major General Gholam Ali Rashid.[22] Israeli airstrikes killed Shadmani on June 17.[23]

Western countries have maintained their positions on Iran’s nuclear program from before the Israel-Iran War. Iran has also not changed its position on uranium enrichment. The G7, which includes the United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom, issued a joint statement on July 1 reaffirming their stance that Iran “can never have nuclear weapons.”[24] The G7 ministers urged Iran to refrain from reconstituting its “unjustified enrichment activities.”[25] The statement called on Iran to resume nuclear negotiations and full cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), including by providing verifiable information about nuclear material and granting access to nuclear sites.[26] This statement is consistent with previous G7 and E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) statements that emphasized that Iran can never have a nuclear weapon.[27]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-2-2025

Iran Update, July 3, 2025

US and Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities have likely degraded Iran's ability to develop a nuclear arsenal. US and Israeli strikes damaged or destroyed the Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant (FPFP) and Uranium Metal Conversion Plant at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC), both of which are used in the final steps of building a nuclear weapon.[1] These facilities could have supported metallization, which is the process of converting uranium hexafluoride into dense metal for an explosive core.[2] A nuclear analyst at a Washington, D.C.–based think tank reported on July 2 that US and Israeli strikes on Iran's uranium metal conversion facilities at the ENTC did not significantly delay Iran's nuclear timeline.[3] The analyst stated that Iran could still produce enough uranium metal for a nuclear weapon (25 kilograms) in “weeks, perhaps even days” without these facilities.[4] The analyst assessed that Iran likely already knows how to produce uranium metal, citing an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report that stated that Iran produced over 100 kilograms of uranium metal from green salt at a laboratory in Tehran between 1995 and 2002.[5] CTP-ISW previously assessed that, if Iran were to pursue a nuclear weapons program, it would likely pursue a nuclear arsenal rather than a single nuclear weapon. A nuclear arsenal would require more than 25 kilograms of uranium metal and significant amounts of highly enriched uranium. The Institute for Science and International Security previously assessed that US and Israeli airstrikes on Iran's main enrichment facilities, Fordow and Natanz, “effectively destroyed” Iran's enrichment program and that it will take a “long time” for Iran to restore its enrichment capabilities to pre-strike levels.[6] Large enrichment facilities like Fordow and Natanz would likely be necessary for Iran to develop nuclear weapons at scale.

Iran would also need to miniaturize a nuclear warhead to mount it on a ballistic missile. Iran could attempt to build a simple gun-type nuclear bomb, which is similar to the one the United States dropped on Hiroshima. A gun-type nuclear bomb needs 25 kilograms of 90 percent enriched uranium. The New York Times reported in February 2025 that a secret Iranian team may have been working on a faster way to build this type of bomb.[7] US officials said that the design would not fit on a missile and would be less reliable than a modern warhead. Iran would have to use an aircraft or another crude delivery method with this type of nuclear weapon Iran would also need the facilities and expertise to build even a simple gun-type bomb. Israeli killings of Iranian nuclear scientists and US-Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities likely degraded that capability.[8] A US weapons expert noted that US and Israeli strikes have “significantly” increased the time required for Iran to “build even a non-missile deliverable weapon,” such as a gun-type nuclear bomb.[9]

Israel is reportedly drafting a mechanism to prevent Iran from being able to rebuild its nuclear program following the conclusion of the Israel–Iran War, according to Israeli media.[17] The mechanism is reportedly similar to the US-approved Israeli mechanism for monitoring the ceasefire in Lebanon that allows Israel to conduct preemptive operations against Hezbollah if Hezbollah violates the November 2024 Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire agreement.[18] Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz previously stated that Israel would pursue a “policy of enforcement” to prevent Iran from rebuilding its nuclear capabilities, air defenses, and missile production.[19] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will reportedly discuss the draft mechanism with US President Donald Trump next week.[20] Israeli media added that Israel is conducting “under-the-radar” talks with Russia regarding Iran and Syria, but did not specify what Israel has discussed with Russia.[21]

Israel destroyed a large number of Iranian ballistic missile sites during the Israel–Iran War. see text

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-3-2025

Iran Update, July 4, 2025

Senior Iranian officials are reiterating red lines for Iran’s nuclear program ahead of planned nuclear negotiations with the United States. Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Majid Takht Ravanchi told NBC News on July 3 that Iran is open to resuming nuclear negotiations but “has no plans to stop uranium enrichment.”[1] Ravanchi noted that the United States will have to “convince” Iran that it will not use force before Iran agrees to engage in talks.[2] White House Envoy Steve Witkoff is expected to meet with Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi in Oslo, Norway, next week, according to two unspecified sources familiar with the discussion cited by Axios.[3] A Tehran-based Western news correspondent reported that preparations are underway for “indirect” negotiations between Witkoff and Araghchi’s meeting, but noted that the meeting has not been finalized.[4]

Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz stated on July 3 that Israel must maintain its air superiority in Iranian airspace to prevent Iran from rebuilding its nuclear and ballistic missile programs.[5] This statement does not appear to suggest imminent Israeli strikes because Iran would need to acquire new air defense systems to replace those lost to be able to deny Israel control of the air. It is improbable Iran could have acquired or built new systems since the ceasefire on June 24, though it is possible Iran could conduct some redeployments if there are surviving air defenses in the northeast. Katz announced on June 27 that he would pursue a policy of “enforcement” to prevent Iran from rebuilding its nuclear or ballistic missile programs.[6] Araghchi warned on June 26 that Iran would respond to any Israeli violation of the ceasefire and noted that “Iran is not Lebanon.”[7] Israel has conducted airstrikes on Hezbollah across Lebanon since November 2025 as part of a stated effort to prevent Hezbollah from reconstituting and threatening Israel under the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement.[8] Araghchi is suggesting that he believes Israel will attempt to conduct similar strikes in Iran to prevent Iran from reconstructing its nuclear and ballistic missile programs.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) withdrew all IAEA inspectors from Iran, which effectively ends international oversight of Iran’s nuclear program.[16] The IAEA reported on July 4 that its inspectors left Iran due to safety concerns.[17] Iranian officials and regime-linked media have repeatedly threatened IAEA Director Rafael Grossi, including by issuing death threats, in recent weeks.[18] Iran’s Guardian Council approved a law on June 26 that suspends cooperation with the agency and bars inspectors from nuclear facilities.[19] The bill requires the IAEA to recognize Iran’s right to enrich uranium as a precondition before Iran allows the IAEA to resume inspections.[20] Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei accused the IAEA on June 30 of “mistakes” that had “consequences” and made “bilateral cooperation...irrational.”[21]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-4-2025

Iran Update, July 5, 2025

European officials are concerned that Iran may try to develop a nuclear weapon to deter future attacks and that Iran may be able to build a weapon in secret unless a nuclear agreement enables the IAEA to resume inspections.[7] These concerns understate the significant challenges Iran’s nuclear program faces in terms of Israeli penetration and weaponization. Three unspecified European officials cited by The Washington Post assessed that US strikes on Iran have likely strengthened hardline Iranian leaders’ belief that Iran must develop a nuclear weapon to deter future foreign intervention.[8] A former European diplomat suggested that Iran would attempt to develop a nuclear weapon “as secretly as possible.”[9] The IAEA did not have access to all Iranian facilities before the strikes, including multiple facilities associated with the pre-2003 Iranian nuclear weapons program.[10] Israeli intelligence has consistently provided exclusive information about Iran’s nuclear program that the IAEA has not provided (at least publicly).[11] For example, Israeli intelligence—not the IAEA—revealed that Iran was using computer modelling for research at Parchin Military Complex, a site that is linked to the nuclear program and that the IAEA has had difficulty accessing in the past.[12] Computer modelling can be used to model different nuclear weapon designs before producing an arsenal. Israeli intelligence, not IAEA inspections, drove Israeli concerns about Iranian weaponization and the Israeli decision to strike. The loss of IAEA inspections in Iran will certainly decrease the availability of open-source information on Iran’s nuclear program, but it is far from clear that the loss of these inspections would make it possible for Iran to build a weapon in secret.

Iran also faces challenges if it tries to weaponize because Iran will need large-scale production facilities to build a nuclear arsenal. Iran, if it chooses to weaponize, will almost certainly pursue a nuclear arsenal instead of a single nuclear weapon, as CTP-ISW has long assessed.[13] The development of a nuclear arsenal would require extensive rebuilding of Iranian facilities amid a major counterintelligence campaign that will undoubtedly create friction within the nuclear program. The scale of the facilities and time required for their development would make it very difficult for Iran to weaponize in secret. There are also additional challenges associated with miniaturizing a weapon so that it can be used on a nuclear-tipped ballistic missile, rather than deploying the weapon as a bomb. Any Iranian progress to weaponize will presumably be slowed by major Iranian counterintelligence investigations within the program, which could make it more difficult for surviving Iranian nuclear scientists to do their work.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-5-2025

Iran Update, July 6, 2025
Iran is targeting minorities for perceived disloyalty, which will almost certainly reinforce pre-existing anti-regime sentiment and could spark more unrest over time. British media reported on July 6 that armed Iranian “intelligence agents” have conducted dozens of coordinated raids across Iran targeting Bahai religious minority members.[1] Iranian authorities reportedly seized electronic devices, personal belongings, and religious material that is being treated as contraband.[2] Bahai members have frequently been accused of espionage and anti-regime activities.[3] Iran‘s aggressive targeting of minorities for perceived disloyalty may not act as the proximate trigger for major protests, but it will contribute to frustrations that could explode into mass protests after a salient event, as happened during the Mahsa Amini protests. The death of Mahsa Amini in police custody acted as the proximate cause for protests in Tehran that rapidly expanded to Kurdish areas of Iran in Fall 2022. The regime has long oppressed Iranian Kurds, but Mahsa Amini’s death acted as a salient event that caused unexpected unrest.[4]

Iran has arrested over 700 individuals on espionage accusations since the start of the Israel-Iran War on June 12.[5] The arrests include several individuals whom the regime characterized as ”Mossad spies.”[6] Regime authorities, for example, arrested someone they called a Mossad ”associate” on July 6 for collecting information on military sites and attempting to send the information to ”hostile intelligence services.”[7] First Deputy of the Iranian Judiciary Hamzeh Khalili stated on June 27 that the judiciary will pursue Israeli ”spies” and called on Iranians to inform the authorities of any dangerous or suspicious activities.[8] CTP-ISW assessed on June 27 that Iran’s concern about Israeli infiltration and covert operations in Iran may be used as justification for broader crackdowns on society.[9]

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei made his first public appearance since moving to a secure location on June 12. He attended a public religious ceremony for the Shia festival of Ashura at Imam Khomeini Hosseinyeh Mosque in Tehran on July 5.[10] Ashura is an important Shia religious holiday that mourns the Prophet Mohammad’s grandson, Imam Hossein.[11] It would be very significant if Khamenei did not attend the ceremony, and there is much less risk that Israel would attempt to kill Khamenei due to the ceasefire. Khamenei stated that Iran will “never surrender” to Israel during the ceremony, which is consistent with post-war Iranian messaging.[12]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-6-2025

Iran Update, July 7, 2025

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian took advantage of an interview with American media personality Tucker Carlson on July 7 to platform Iran's demands and misrepresent Iran's destabilizing activities and role in the Middle East.[1] Pezeshkian leveraged the interview to falsely present Iran as a peaceful force in the Middle East to a Western audience. Pezeshkian stated that Iran has never sought and will never seek a nuclear weapon.[2] The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed in May 2025 that Iran conducted undeclared nuclear activities that could support the development of nuclear weapons at three locations in Iran until the early 2000s.[3] The IAEA also reported in May 2025 that Iran possessed 408.6 kilograms of 60 percent enriched uranium, which is enough uranium, if enriched further, to produce nearly 10 nuclear weapons.[4] Pezeshkian claimed that Iran has “never shied away from [IAEA] verification” and is “ready for another inspection.”[5] Iran has historically restricted IAEA oversight in Iran, including by withdrawing the certifications of several inspectors in 2023.[6] Iran's Guardian Council approved a bill on June 26 that suspends Iran's cooperation with the IAEA and bars inspectors from accessing Iran's nuclear facilities.[7] Pezeshkian also claimed that Iran has “always been after peace.”[8] Iran has cultivated a transnational coalition of partners and proxies since 1979 to pursue its strategic interests, including expelling the United States from the Middle East and destroying the Israeli state. Iran and the Axis of Resistance have conducted numerous attacks against Israel and US forces across the region. Iran supported the Axis of Resistance against Israel during the October 7 War and has sought to reconstitute its proxies, such as Hezbollah, after the war.

Pezeshkian separately reiterated Iran's demands for nuclear negotiations. Pezeshkian indicated that Iran continues to reject the US demand for zero uranium enrichment and stated that Iran will only resume nuclear negotiations if Israel is not “allowed” to resume attacks on Iran. Senior US and Israeli officials have indicated that they could resume attacks on Iran if Iran attempts to reconstitute its nuclear program.[9]

Senior Iranian officials have claimed that Iran retains a significant missile stockpile that it can use to attack Israel.[10] Israeli airstrikes on Iran between June 12 and 24 likely degraded Iran's missile program, however. Supreme Leader Military Affairs Adviser Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi stated on July 7 that Iran has produced thousands of missiles and drones and warned that Iran still retains the capability to attack Israel.[11] The IDF reported on June 17 that it had destroyed “about half” of Iran's ballistic missile launchers and between 35 to 45 percent of Iran's ballistic missile stockpile.[12] Israeli airstrikes also destroyed at least 20 Iranian missile bases and several factories related to Iran's ballistic missile program.[13]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-7-2025

Iran Update, July 8, 2025

Iran cannot access certain key nuclear facilities, according to the Iranian president. This suggests that leaked Iranian signals intercepts about limited damage at the nuclear facilities were inaccurate. [10]Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian told Tucker Carlson that US airstrikes on June 22 damaged Fordow, Natanz, or Esfahan nuclear sites, but Iran cannot access the facilities to accurately assess the damage in an interview aired on July 7.[11] Pezeshkian did not draw differences in levels of access between the different facilities. Pezeshkian’s statement demonstrates that it would have been almost impossible for Iranian officials to have accurate knowledge within days of the strikes about the extent of damage that the facilities suffered. The statement also suggests that Iran’s understanding of the exact damage within the facilities remains limited.

Israeli officials suggested that the United States would support further Israeli airstrikes against Iran if Iran attempts to either rebuild its nuclear program or move highly enriched uranium from previously targeted nuclear sites.[12] Unspecified US officials reportedly left Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer with the ”impression” that the United States would support further Israeli airstrikes on Iran under certain conditions after Dermer’s meetings in Washington last week. These conditions include Iranian efforts to rebuild its nuclear program or to move highly enriched uranium from Fordow, Natanz, or Esfahan, according to two sources familiar with the matter speaking to Axios on July 7.[13] US airstrikes on these facilities on June 22 “sealed off” the enriched uranium inside the three damaged nuclear sites but did not destroy all the nuclear material or infrastructure, according to unspecified US and Israeli officials speaking to Axios on July 7.[14] The enrichment level of the nuclear material at these sites and whether Iran moved some of the enriched material prior to the strikes is unclear.

The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) harassed a German aircraft supporting the EU mission to defend international shipping in the Red Sea, which could decrease the ability of US partners to defend the freedom of navigation in the Red Sea against the Houthis. The German Foreign Affairs Ministry said on July 8 that a People’s Republic of China (PRC) PLAN ship used a laser to harass a German surveillance aircraft operating in the Red Sea in early July.[15] The German Foreign Affairs Ministry said that the PLAN ship lasered the civilian-contracted German aircraft “without any reason” or prior contact while the aircraft had been operating under the European Union (EU)’s mission to protect merchant vessels from Houthi attacks in the Red Sea.[16] The Ministry added that the aircraft and its crew, which included German army personnel, had resumed operations since the incident. The German aircraft is based in Djibouti, where the PLA has a military base.[17] The PLAN has previously used lasers to harass US aircraft operating from Djibouti, as well.[18] The United States and Australia have previously accused the PLAN of using lasers against US and Australian aircraft in the Pacific Ocean.[19] The PRC does not actively support the Houthis in the Red Sea, but PRC harassment of vessels and assets supporting the defense of international shipping can pull these assets off station and make them unable to fulfill their mission. This result, in turn, would mean that the net effect of PRC behavior supports Houthi operations even if the PRC does not intend to do so.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-8-2025

Iran Update, July 9, 2025

French Director General of External Security Nicolas Lerner told French media on July 8 that Iran’s nuclear program is very seriously damaged and its weaponization timeline is extremely delayed, which is consistent with previous reports.[7] Lerner did note that Iran still retains a significant portion of its enriched uranium stockpile. Lerner stated that the US and Israeli strikes have “very seriously affected, very seriously damaged...and extremely delayed” all aspects of Iran’s nuclear program.[8] Lerner said that the strikes “destroyed” a small part of Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile but claimed that Iran still retains most of its stockpile.[9] He added that France has “indications” of the stockpile’s location but cannot confirm the details until the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) resumes its verification activities at Iranian nuclear facilities.[10] The IAEA did not have access to all of the possible facilities Iran could use to store enriched uranium, so it is unclear how the IAEA is critical to confirming these details. Israeli intelligence, for example, has consistently provided exclusive information about Iran’s nuclear program that the IAEA has not provided (at least publicly). The enrichment level of the enriched material that Iran reportedly retains is unclear.

British Foreign Secretary David Lammy warned on July 8 that the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) could trigger the snapback mechanism if Iran does not cooperate on its nuclear program.[11] Lammy emphasized that Iran needs to “step back” from its “nuclear ambitions,” including by resuming IAEA inspections, to avoid snapback sanctions.[12] The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.”[13] The snapback mechanism would reimpose six United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions on Iran, including bans on the transfer of conventional arms to and from Iran, international support for Iran’s missile program, enrichment-related activities, and the testing and development of nuclear-capable missiles.[14] The snapback mechanism expires in October 2025, after which the UN sanctions cannot be reinstated. The process of triggering the snapback mechanism and completing the UN Security Council can take up to 30 days, which means the E3 would need to start the process well in advance of the deadline. The sanctions, if imposed, would remain in place even after the deadline. These sanctions would increase economic pressure on Iran as it seeks to rebuild its military and economic infrastructure following the Israel-Iran war.

Over 100 prominent Qom clerics stated on July 9 that they declared loyalty to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, likely in response to efforts to sideline him amid his prolonged absence from public view.[37] The clerics described Iran’s retaliatory strikes on Israel as a “historic victory” under Khamenei’s leadership and praised him as the “divine pillar” of the Islamic Republic.[38] They also warned that any “insult or attack” on Khamenei would provoke a severe response.[39] Prominent cleric Ayatollah Naser Makarem Shirazi on June 29 previously declared that individuals who threaten Khamenei or religious authority are “mohareb” (enemies of God) and therefore subject to the death penalty.[40] The statement likely highlights growing efforts by Iranian hardliners to consolidate support for Khamenei amid signs of internal factional tension and attempts by other political actors to sideline Khamenei or regain influence for moderate politicians. Unspecified Iranian leaders reportedly developed a contingency plan during the Israel-Iran War to govern Iran without Khamenei if he is killed or informally sidelined.[41] They considered forming a leadership committee to replace him and negotiate a ceasefire with the United States and Israel.[42] Former President Hassan Rouhani separately lobbied senior clerics in Qom during the war, including Makarem Shirazi, to pressure Khamenei to accept a ceasefire and drop Iran’s demand for uranium enrichment on Iranian soil.[43]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-9-2025

Iran Update, July 10, 2025

A senior Israeli official told Western media on July 10 that Iran did not move its enriched uranium stockpile from the Fordow, Natanz, or Esfahan nuclear sites ahead of the US and Israeli strikes on the sites.[1] The official told Reuters that Iran has not moved the material since the strikes either.[2] Israeli sources stated on June 25 that US and Israeli strikes buried Iran's enriched uranium stockpile under rubble.[3] Israeli strikes on June 13 damaged the Fuel Plate Manufacturing Plant (FPFP) at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center, which stored approximately 85 percent of Iran's 20 percent enriched uranium stockpile and 83 percent of Iran's 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile as of August 2023.[4] It is unclear how much, if any, of Iran's enriched uranium stockpile was at FPFP at the time of US and Israeli strikes. Reuters reported that Iran could gain access to the Esfahan site, but that it will be difficult to remove any of the material stored at the site, according to the senior Israeli official.[5] The New York Times similarly reported on July 10 that the storage facility at the Esfahan site was too deep to be effectively destroyed, but US and Israeli strikes made it significantly harder to access the material by targeting tunnel entrances, according to a senior Israeli official.[6] Uranium is an element, which means that you cannot destroy it with conventional weapons, only scatter it or pulverize it into dust. The Israeli official said that Israel believes Iran stored additional stockpiles at Fordow and Natanz but that these will be too difficult to recover following US and Israeli strikes.[7] The US and Israeli strikes on Fordow and other enrichment facilities could have buried enriched uranium underground to limit access to it. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian stated that Iran cannot access certain key nuclear facilities to accurately assess the damage.[8] Iran's enriched uranium stockpile is effectively inaccessible, assuming that Iran did not move the material and cannot access the facilities it is stored. Senior Israeli intelligence officials said that any Iranian attempts to recover the material would “almost certainly” be detected.[9]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-10-2025

The UK faces a “rising” and unpredictable threat from Iran and the government must do more to counter it, Parliament's intelligence and security committee has warned.

The call comes as it publishes the results of a major inquiry which examined Iranian state assassinations and kidnap, espionage, cyber attacks and its nuclear programme. The report took evidence up to August 2023 so does not assess the impact of heightened tensions since the attack on 7 October that year by Hamas on Israel, or the Iran-Israel conflict - but its authors say the findings remain relevant.

The committee raised particular concern over a “sharp increase” in physical threats against opponents of Iran's regime in the UK. The committee said there have been at least 15 attempts at murder or kidnap against British nationals or UK-based individuals since the beginning of 2022 to August 2023, when the report stopped taking evidence. In October last year, the head of MI5 put the number at 20.

The report's authors said they had been advised the physical threat was “comparable with the threat posed by Russia”.
MI5 said it has seen “persistent targeting” of Iranian media organisations operating in the UK - primarily Iran International - while BBC Persian and Manoto TV, which are broadcast from the UK, were also “prominent targets”. These are seen by Iran as “deeply undermining” of its regime, the committee said.

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c98wjzj4jlpo

The report:

Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament - Iran
Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed on 10 July 2025

The Committee believes that it is important that Parliament and the public should be able to see where information had to be redacted: redactions are clearly indicated in the Report by ***. This means that the published Report is the same as the classified version sent to the Prime Minister (albeit with redactions).

https://isc.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Intelligence-and-Security-Committee-of-Parliament-Iran.pdf

The report provides a good background.

Iran Update, July 11, 2025

The operator of the Liberian-flagged Eternity C told the Wall Street Journal on July 10 that the British Navy and the European Union (EU) naval task force did not have ships near the Eternity C to protect it from a Houthi attack on July 7.[1] The Houthis have conducted two complex attacks on vessels transiting the Red Sea in recent days, sinking both ships. The Houthis attacked the Magic Seas and Eternity C on July 6 and 7, respectively, using small arms, rocket-propelled grenades, and unmanned surface vessels.[2] The Houthis reportedly also used anti-ship missiles to attack the Eternity C.[3] The Houthis launched the small arms, rocket-propelled grenades, and unmanned surface vessels from small attack craft. Ocean swells can hide small attack craft on radars, making them difficult to detect. The large geographic area of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden that the British Navy and the EU naval task force patrol imposes constraints on the navies’ ability to respond to crises. A senior US official told the Wall Street Journal on July 10 that international efforts to protect shipping in the Red Sea have become “less robust” as fewer navies conducting patrols in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden have the capabilities to counter Houthi attacks.[4]

Iran has reportedly asked the United States for support to develop a peaceful nuclear program, which is likely part of a continued Iranian effort to maintain domestic uranium enrichment. An unspecified senior White House official told the Wall Street Journal on July 10 that Iran seeks to secure sanctions relief and US assistance with a civilian nuclear program.[11] Iran would likely seek a US-supported civilian nuclear program to involve uranium enrichment on Iranian soil, given that Iran has not changed its position on the US demand for zero uranium enrichment. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi told French media on July 10, for example, that enrichment is Iran’s “right and need.”[12] The United States sought, before the Israel-Iran War, to establish a regional nuclear consortium outside of Iran that would provide Iran with uranium for civilian nuclear purposes but would not allow enrichment on Iranian soil.[13] Iranian officials stated that Iran was open to the consortium model, but only if the consortium’s enrichment facility was located in Iran.[14] Iran would similarly likely only accept US assistance with its nuclear program if the United States allows Iran to continue enriching uranium on Iranian soil.

The senior White House official said that US demands require Iran to remove remaining nuclear material and enrichment infrastructure, accept strict limits on its missile program, and halt support for the Axis of Resistance.[15] Iran would also need to resume cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency and agree to on-demand inspections of its nuclear facilities.[16] Senior Iranian officials have repeatedly rejected such demands.[17]

The Israel-Iran War has exacerbated pre-existing fissures between reformists and hardliners in the Iranian regime over how to engage the West. A group of 180 reformist-leaning academics, economists, and officials from former President Hassan Rouhani’s administration issued a statement on July 9 that framed the war as a “costly reminder” of governance failures.[18] The statement urged President Masoud Pezeshkian to pursue negotiations with the United States and Europe to prevent renewed conflict and “preserve Iran’s territorial integrity.”[19] The signatories warned that hardliners are fueling enmity and that conflict would have “disastrous consequences” on Iran.[20] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-affiliated Fars News rejected the statement on July 11 as “politically naive” and a “repetition of failed strategies.”[21] Fars News claimed that the statement presented a “false dichotomy of negotiation or war.”[22] Fars News cited the US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) as evidence that the United States is “untrustworthy” and that diplomacy leads to one-sided concessions.[23]

Iranian parliamentarians proposed a bill on July 11 to allocate more funding to Iranian security forces after the Israel-Iran War.[29] An Iranian parliamentarian stated on July 11 that 116 lawmakers signed a bill that would require the government to pay the entire defense budget for the current Persian calendar year (March 2025 to March 2026) in addition to unpaid previous defense allocations and oil revenues.[30] The bill would also require the Iranian Central Bank to liquidate up to 2 billion Euros from “unfrozen foreign assets” or the National Development Fund for “emergency defense projects.”[31] Israeli strikes during the 12-day war destroyed key Iranian military and defense industrial sites, including bases, production facilities, and storage facilities. CTP-ISW has not observed indications that Iranian security forces have developed or presented a coherent plan for rebuilding or modernizing their forces in the wake of the war. It is therefore unclear how Iran plans to allocate these funds.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-11-2025

Iran Update, July 12, 2025

Iranian personnel have not made any visible attempts to access the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC) or Natanz Enrichment Complex, according to satellite imagery originally published on July 9. The lack of access means that Iranian officials cannot assess the extent of the damage to the underground facilities at ENTC and Natanz with accuracy. Iranian personnel have not made visible efforts to rebuild or remove rubble from destroyed aboveground facilities at ENTC.[1] The Institute for Science and International Security (the Institute) reported that it will take Iran time to begin rebuilding the ENTC‘s aboveground facilities, which house the destroyed uranium conversion facility and uranium metal production plant, because the bombing dispersed radiological and chemical material. The dispersion of this material will require Iran to deploy hazardous material (HAZMAT) teams first. Then Iran will need to remove rubble before any large-scale reconstruction can take place. The combination of the HAZMAT requirements and the removal of debris is a “lengthy and complicated“ process that will take Iran “some time” to complete, according to the Institute.
It will also take time for Iran to access ENTC’s underground facilities because it has not delivered any excavation equipment or heavy machinery to the site.[2] The Institute reported that Iran would need to use machinery to remove approximately 20 meters of rubble and backfill from tunnel entrances to access the underground facilities located at the complex.[3]

The Institute reported that satellite imagery captured through July 8 showed that Iranian personnel have not made any visible attempts to access the underground portions of the Natanz nuclear facility.[4] CTP-ISW previously reported that commercially available satellite imagery captured on June 27 showed that Iran has filled in a crater above the enrichment hall caused by the June 21 US strike.[5] Satellite imagery captured on June 8 showed that Iran has placed a cover on the point.[6]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-12-2025

Iran Update July 14, 2025

The Iranian regime is pursuing a relatively unchanged nuclear negotiating position even as hardliners continue to advocate preconditions that would amount to a rejection of renewed negotiations with the United States. The Iranian Supreme Leader’s International Affairs Adviser, Ali Akbar Velayati, stated on July 14 that Iran does not oppose negotiations without “preconditions” if the United States respects Iranian red lines, which include an assurance that Iran can retain its right to enrich uranium.[1] Velayati, as the supreme leader’s adviser, is presumably stating the position of the supreme leader. This policy is the policy that Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi advocated for and are attempting to execute.[2] The current negotiation policy is relatively unchanged from before the Israeli strikes, when the regime insisted that it must be allowed to enrich uranium. This is consistent with the July 13 Washington Post report that noted the “consensus” among Iran’s political class that Iran needs to resume nuclear negotiations with the United States. US President Donald Trump stated on July 4 that the negotiations would not be successful unless Iran agrees to inspections and zero enrichment.[3]

Hardliners have continued to advocate for much more stringent preconditions that would amount to a rejection of renewed negotiations, but the supreme leader does not appear to be heeding their advice. Iranian Armed Forces General Staff-affiliated media and a current parliamentarian and former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) member have supported very stringent preconditions for talks since July 10, including recognition of “Israeli aggression,” investigation of US involvement, payment of war reparations, and binding security guarantees to prevent future attacks.[4] An Iranian expert close to the regime reinforced the hardliner position and told the Washington Post on July 13 that there is “basically no chance“ that Iran will negotiate under threat of US or Israeli attack and that Iran requires guarantees against future Israeli attacks.[5] These preconditions would be non-starters and amount to a rejection of negotiations. The hardliner’s preconditions are not supported by the supreme leader and therefore do not reflect official Iranian policy.

An unspecified French diplomatic source cited by Reuters on July 14 said that the European parties to the JCPOA would need to reimpose snapback sanctions on Iran without a nuclear deal that guarantees European security interests.[26] British Foreign Secretary David Lammy previously warned on July 8 that the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) could trigger the snapback mechanism if Iran does not cooperate on its nuclear program.[27] The E3 repeatedly threatened to trigger snapback sanctions if the United States and Iran do not reach a “substantial deal” by August 2025.[28] The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.”[29]

China’s imports of Iranian crude oil surged in June to the highest level since March, as sellers expedited loadings to preempt potential disruptions from the Israel-Iran conflict, according to energy market intelligence firm Vortexa Ltd.[30] Bloomberg reported on July 14, citing Vortex that crude oil imports averaged over 1.7 million barrels per day in June—up from 1.1 million in May—with a peak of 2.5 million barrels per day in the first 12 days of June before Israeli strikes.[31] A Vortexa analyst noted the surge reflected a faster, more flexible export strategy to mitigate perceived supply threats.[32] The analyst added that ongoing US tanker sanctions have not stopped Iranian flows but warned that the trend may not continue into July as Chinese independent refiners face weaker margins and reduced crude-processing rates.[33] Ample stockpiles of Iranian crude also likely give these Chinese refiners leverage to demand deeper discounts.[34] Current offers for Iranian crude are about four dollars below Brent futures, compared to about two dollars below Brent futures in May. Neither Israel nor the United States targeted Iran’s oil export infrastructure during recent strikes. China remains the largest importer of Iranian oil, helping Iran circumvent US sanctions.[35]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-14-2025

Iran Update, July 15, 2025

Iran may be prioritizing deeper strategic ties with China over its current partnership with Russia, though the extent of China's willingness to support Iran remains unclear. Iranian hardline outlet Farhikhtegan reported on July 15 that Iran is frustrated over Russia's “cautious stance” during the 12-Day War.[1] The outlet stated that Iranian officials believe that Russia misinterpreted the war as a localized conflict between Iran and Israel rather than a “broader NATO confrontation.”[2] Farhikhtegan reported that Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi’s visit to Moscow on June 23 pushed Russia to more strongly condemn Israeli strikes, including at UN Security Council meetings.[3] Iranian experts told Farhikhtegan that Iran will likely maintain ties with Russia but must “rethink parts of the relationship and expand cooperation with other partners,” especially in “sensitive military and strategic areas.”[4] Reuters previously reported on June 23 that Iran was unsatisfied with Russia's support for Iran during the Israel-Iran War, citing unspecified Iranian sources.[5]

Iran appears to be trying to strengthen military and defense cooperation with China following the Israel-Iran War.[6] Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh met with his Chinese counterpart on June 26 during a Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Beijing, reportedly to discuss potential military purchases, including J-10 fighter jets and advanced AWACS systems.[7] Arab media claimed on July 9 that China sent surface-to-air missile systems to Iran in late June to replenish its degraded air defenses after Israeli strikes, although Chinese and Iranian officials denied the report.[8] These developments reflect Iran's efforts to diversify its defense partnerships after dissatisfaction with Russia's limited wartime support and delays in delivering S-400 systems and Su-35 aircraft.[9]

Araghchi held a meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping on July 15 on the sidelines of an SCO ministerial meeting in Beijing.[10] Xi also met with Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Sergei Lavrov on the sidelines of the SCO meeting.[11] Araghchi delivered a speech at the summit and proposed initiatives to strengthen regional cooperation, including the creation of a permanent security mechanism, a center to counter sanctions, and a regional security forum to address shared threats.[12] The permanent security mechanism proposal likely reflects Iran's dissatisfaction with Russia's support during the war. The Russo-Iranian strategic cooperation agreement lacks a mutual defense guarantee, unlike the cooperation agreement between Russia and North Korea.[13]

Iran has lastly signaled that China could play a more significant role in future nuclear negotiations. Farhikhtegan reported on July 14 that Iran would consider Norway or China as mediators to replace Oman in future nuclear talks with the United States.[14] Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Esmail Baghaei separately highlighted China's potential “significant and constructive” role in nuclear diplomacy and in rebuilding Iran's economy under the 25-year partnership agreement, which Iran and China signed in 2020.[15]

Iran is threatening to expand its nuclear program, likely in an attempt to deter snapback sanctions. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.”[16] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-affiliated media published an article on July 15 outlining potential Iranian responses to snapback sanctions.[17] The responses included increasing uranium enrichment levels from 60 percent to 90 percent weapons-grade uranium, deploying more advanced centrifuges, expanding nuclear research and development, and developing uranium metal production chains. These threats come after E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) officials have resurfaced threats to trigger the snapback mechanism if Iran fails to make verifiable commitments related to its nuclear program.[18] French Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot told reporters on July 15 that the E3 will trigger the snapback mechanism “by the end of August at the latest” if Iran fails to make a “firm, tangible, and verifiable commitment.”[19] The snapback mechanism under the JCPOA expires on October 18, 2025. The process to impose snapback sanctions takes between 45 and 65 days from when the initial non-compliance complaint is issued, which means that the E3 would have to initiate the process no later than September 3.[20] The graphic below outlines the processes by which the E3 could impose snapback sanctions on Iran. The quickest process would take a minimum of 45 days, while the lengthiest process would take 65 days.

Each step in the snapback process provides Iran with an opportunity to comply with its JCPOA commitments. The process for imposing snapback sanctions continues so long as Iran continues to fail to comply with its commitments.

US and Israeli airstrikes have likely hindered Iran's ability to carry out these threats to expand its nuclear program, at least in the short term. The Institute for Science and Security assessed that US and Israeli airstrikes on Iran have “effectively destroyed” Iran's enrichment program and that it will take a “long time” for Iran to restore its enrichment capabilities to pre-strike levels.[21] The strikes targeted centrifuge production facilities and active centrifuges, damaging and destroying thousands of centrifuges.[22] Israeli airstrikes also destroyed some of Iran's uranium metal production facilities, which Iran could have used to transform uranium gas into dense metal in a process called metallization.[23] This process is one of the last steps required to form the explosive core of an atomic bomb. Israeli airstrikes also targeted Iranian nuclear scientists, which will likely temporarily disrupt Iran's ability to conduct nuclear research.[24] Iran will likely try to take some of the steps outlined in IRGC-affiliated media, regardless of whether the E3 triggers the snapback mechanism, as part of its effort to rebuild its nuclear program following the Israel-Iran War.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei reappointed senior clerics Ahmad Khatami, Alireza Arafi, and Ahmad Hosseini Khorasani as Guardian Council members on July 15.[58] All three clerics are Assembly of Experts members and belong to the hardline Society of Seminary Teachers of Qom.[59] Khatami is also the interim Tehran Friday prayer leader and has repeatedly called for the execution of US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.[60] Khatami, Arafi, and Hosseini Khorasani were among over 400 Qom clerics who signed a statement on July 13 in support of a recent fatwa that declared threats against Khamenei as acts of “mohareb” (enemies of God).[61] The fatwa also called for jihad and global Muslim mobilization against the United States and Israel.[62] The term of six Guardian Council members, including three jurists and three clerics, ended on July 9.[63] Iran's constitution grants the Supreme Leader authority to appoint six clerics to the Guardian Council, while the Judiciary Chief nominates six legal experts.[64] The three clerics will each serve another six-year term. The Guardian Council plays a key role in Iranian elections and vets candidates and legislation, which gives these clerics significant influence over Iran's political landscape until at least 2031.[65]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-15-2025

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