Iran Update, July 13, 2025
Iran has built new access roads and flattened earth near impact points at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP), likely as part of Iran's efforts to assess the damage at the facility. Commercially available satellite imagery captured on July 8 and July 13 showed that Iran has built additional access roads and flattened earth near the northern and southern impact points at Fordow. Iran has also covered all the impact craters caused by the US GBU-57 Bunker Buster bombs with soil, though it is unclear if the impact craters are all filled in. An expert on Iran's nuclear program assessed on July 1 that Iran had gained access to the eastern tunnel entrance, but it remains unclear whether Iranian personnel could enter the tunnel itself. The expert also assessed that Iran had cleared access to the northern and southern impact points, temporarily covered bombed ventilation shafts, and prepared the site for future repairs or reconstruction of underground infrastructure.[1] The expert also assessed that recovery operations for any salvageable equipment or material would follow the damage assessment.[2] The ventilation shafts at Fordow must be repaired or rebuilt to resume enrichment operations at the site, though the extent of the underground damage to the facility will also determine whether resuming operations is viable.[3]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-13-2025
Iran Update July 14, 2025
The Iranian regime is pursuing a relatively unchanged nuclear negotiating position even as hardliners continue to advocate preconditions that would amount to a rejection of renewed negotiations with the United States. The Iranian Supreme Leader’s International Affairs Adviser, Ali Akbar Velayati, stated on July 14 that Iran does not oppose negotiations without “preconditions” if the United States respects Iranian red lines, which include an assurance that Iran can retain its right to enrich uranium.[1] Velayati, as the supreme leader’s adviser, is presumably stating the position of the supreme leader. This policy is the policy that Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi advocated for and are attempting to execute.[2] The current negotiation policy is relatively unchanged from before the Israeli strikes, when the regime insisted that it must be allowed to enrich uranium. This is consistent with the July 13 Washington Post report that noted the “consensus” among Iran’s political class that Iran needs to resume nuclear negotiations with the United States. US President Donald Trump stated on July 4 that the negotiations would not be successful unless Iran agrees to inspections and zero enrichment.[3]
Hardliners have continued to advocate for much more stringent preconditions that would amount to a rejection of renewed negotiations, but the supreme leader does not appear to be heeding their advice. Iranian Armed Forces General Staff-affiliated media and a current parliamentarian and former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) member have supported very stringent preconditions for talks since July 10, including recognition of “Israeli aggression,” investigation of US involvement, payment of war reparations, and binding security guarantees to prevent future attacks.[4] An Iranian expert close to the regime reinforced the hardliner position and told the Washington Post on July 13 that there is “basically no chance“ that Iran will negotiate under threat of US or Israeli attack and that Iran requires guarantees against future Israeli attacks.[5] These preconditions would be non-starters and amount to a rejection of negotiations. The hardliner’s preconditions are not supported by the supreme leader and therefore do not reflect official Iranian policy.
An unspecified French diplomatic source cited by Reuters on July 14 said that the European parties to the JCPOA would need to reimpose snapback sanctions on Iran without a nuclear deal that guarantees European security interests.[26] British Foreign Secretary David Lammy previously warned on July 8 that the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) could trigger the snapback mechanism if Iran does not cooperate on its nuclear program.[27] The E3 repeatedly threatened to trigger snapback sanctions if the United States and Iran do not reach a “substantial deal” by August 2025.[28] The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.”[29]
China’s imports of Iranian crude oil surged in June to the highest level since March, as sellers expedited loadings to preempt potential disruptions from the Israel-Iran conflict, according to energy market intelligence firm Vortexa Ltd.[30] Bloomberg reported on July 14, citing Vortex that crude oil imports averaged over 1.7 million barrels per day in June—up from 1.1 million in May—with a peak of 2.5 million barrels per day in the first 12 days of June before Israeli strikes.[31] A Vortexa analyst noted the surge reflected a faster, more flexible export strategy to mitigate perceived supply threats.[32] The analyst added that ongoing US tanker sanctions have not stopped Iranian flows but warned that the trend may not continue into July as Chinese independent refiners face weaker margins and reduced crude-processing rates.[33] Ample stockpiles of Iranian crude also likely give these Chinese refiners leverage to demand deeper discounts.[34] Current offers for Iranian crude are about four dollars below Brent futures, compared to about two dollars below Brent futures in May. Neither Israel nor the United States targeted Iran’s oil export infrastructure during recent strikes. China remains the largest importer of Iranian oil, helping Iran circumvent US sanctions.[35]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-14-2025