Iran Update July 14, 2025
The Iranian regime is pursuing a relatively unchanged nuclear negotiating position even as hardliners continue to advocate preconditions that would amount to a rejection of renewed negotiations with the United States. The Iranian Supreme Leader’s International Affairs Adviser, Ali Akbar Velayati, stated on July 14 that Iran does not oppose negotiations without “preconditions” if the United States respects Iranian red lines, which include an assurance that Iran can retain its right to enrich uranium.[1] Velayati, as the supreme leader’s adviser, is presumably stating the position of the supreme leader. This policy is the policy that Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi advocated for and are attempting to execute.[2] The current negotiation policy is relatively unchanged from before the Israeli strikes, when the regime insisted that it must be allowed to enrich uranium. This is consistent with the July 13 Washington Post report that noted the “consensus” among Iran’s political class that Iran needs to resume nuclear negotiations with the United States. US President Donald Trump stated on July 4 that the negotiations would not be successful unless Iran agrees to inspections and zero enrichment.[3]
Hardliners have continued to advocate for much more stringent preconditions that would amount to a rejection of renewed negotiations, but the supreme leader does not appear to be heeding their advice. Iranian Armed Forces General Staff-affiliated media and a current parliamentarian and former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) member have supported very stringent preconditions for talks since July 10, including recognition of “Israeli aggression,” investigation of US involvement, payment of war reparations, and binding security guarantees to prevent future attacks.[4] An Iranian expert close to the regime reinforced the hardliner position and told the Washington Post on July 13 that there is “basically no chance“ that Iran will negotiate under threat of US or Israeli attack and that Iran requires guarantees against future Israeli attacks.[5] These preconditions would be non-starters and amount to a rejection of negotiations. The hardliner’s preconditions are not supported by the supreme leader and therefore do not reflect official Iranian policy.
An unspecified French diplomatic source cited by Reuters on July 14 said that the European parties to the JCPOA would need to reimpose snapback sanctions on Iran without a nuclear deal that guarantees European security interests.[26] British Foreign Secretary David Lammy previously warned on July 8 that the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) could trigger the snapback mechanism if Iran does not cooperate on its nuclear program.[27] The E3 repeatedly threatened to trigger snapback sanctions if the United States and Iran do not reach a “substantial deal” by August 2025.[28] The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.”[29]
China’s imports of Iranian crude oil surged in June to the highest level since March, as sellers expedited loadings to preempt potential disruptions from the Israel-Iran conflict, according to energy market intelligence firm Vortexa Ltd.[30] Bloomberg reported on July 14, citing Vortex that crude oil imports averaged over 1.7 million barrels per day in June—up from 1.1 million in May—with a peak of 2.5 million barrels per day in the first 12 days of June before Israeli strikes.[31] A Vortexa analyst noted the surge reflected a faster, more flexible export strategy to mitigate perceived supply threats.[32] The analyst added that ongoing US tanker sanctions have not stopped Iranian flows but warned that the trend may not continue into July as Chinese independent refiners face weaker margins and reduced crude-processing rates.[33] Ample stockpiles of Iranian crude also likely give these Chinese refiners leverage to demand deeper discounts.[34] Current offers for Iranian crude are about four dollars below Brent futures, compared to about two dollars below Brent futures in May. Neither Israel nor the United States targeted Iran’s oil export infrastructure during recent strikes. China remains the largest importer of Iranian oil, helping Iran circumvent US sanctions.[35]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-14-2025
Iran may be prioritizing deeper strategic ties with China over its current partnership with Russia, though the extent of China's willingness to support Iran remains unclear. Iranian hardline outlet Farhikhtegan reported on July 15 that Iran is frustrated over Russia's “cautious stance” during the 12-Day War.[1] The outlet stated that Iranian officials believe that Russia misinterpreted the war as a localized conflict between Iran and Israel rather than a “broader NATO confrontation.”[2] Farhikhtegan reported that Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi’s visit to Moscow on June 23 pushed Russia to more strongly condemn Israeli strikes, including at UN Security Council meetings.[3] Iranian experts told Farhikhtegan that Iran will likely maintain ties with Russia but must “rethink parts of the relationship and expand cooperation with other partners,” especially in “sensitive military and strategic areas.”[4] Reuters previously reported on June 23 that Iran was unsatisfied with Russia's support for Iran during the Israel-Iran War, citing unspecified Iranian sources.[5]
Iran appears to be trying to strengthen military and defense cooperation with China following the Israel-Iran War.[6] Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh met with his Chinese counterpart on June 26 during a Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Beijing, reportedly to discuss potential military purchases, including J-10 fighter jets and advanced AWACS systems.[7] Arab media claimed on July 9 that China sent surface-to-air missile systems to Iran in late June to replenish its degraded air defenses after Israeli strikes, although Chinese and Iranian officials denied the report.[8] These developments reflect Iran's efforts to diversify its defense partnerships after dissatisfaction with Russia's limited wartime support and delays in delivering S-400 systems and Su-35 aircraft.[9]
Araghchi held a meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping on July 15 on the sidelines of an SCO ministerial meeting in Beijing.[10] Xi also met with Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Sergei Lavrov on the sidelines of the SCO meeting.[11] Araghchi delivered a speech at the summit and proposed initiatives to strengthen regional cooperation, including the creation of a permanent security mechanism, a center to counter sanctions, and a regional security forum to address shared threats.[12] The permanent security mechanism proposal likely reflects Iran's dissatisfaction with Russia's support during the war. The Russo-Iranian strategic cooperation agreement lacks a mutual defense guarantee, unlike the cooperation agreement between Russia and North Korea.[13]
Iran has lastly signaled that China could play a more significant role in future nuclear negotiations. Farhikhtegan reported on July 14 that Iran would consider Norway or China as mediators to replace Oman in future nuclear talks with the United States.[14] Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Esmail Baghaei separately highlighted China's potential “significant and constructive” role in nuclear diplomacy and in rebuilding Iran's economy under the 25-year partnership agreement, which Iran and China signed in 2020.[15]
Iran is threatening to expand its nuclear program, likely in an attempt to deter snapback sanctions. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.”[16] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-affiliated media published an article on July 15 outlining potential Iranian responses to snapback sanctions.[17] The responses included increasing uranium enrichment levels from 60 percent to 90 percent weapons-grade uranium, deploying more advanced centrifuges, expanding nuclear research and development, and developing uranium metal production chains. These threats come after E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) officials have resurfaced threats to trigger the snapback mechanism if Iran fails to make verifiable commitments related to its nuclear program.[18] French Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot told reporters on July 15 that the E3 will trigger the snapback mechanism “by the end of August at the latest” if Iran fails to make a “firm, tangible, and verifiable commitment.”[19] The snapback mechanism under the JCPOA expires on October 18, 2025. The process to impose snapback sanctions takes between 45 and 65 days from when the initial non-compliance complaint is issued, which means that the E3 would have to initiate the process no later than September 3.[20] The graphic below outlines the processes by which the E3 could impose snapback sanctions on Iran. The quickest process would take a minimum of 45 days, while the lengthiest process would take 65 days.
Each step in the snapback process provides Iran with an opportunity to comply with its JCPOA commitments. The process for imposing snapback sanctions continues so long as Iran continues to fail to comply with its commitments.
US and Israeli airstrikes have likely hindered Iran's ability to carry out these threats to expand its nuclear program, at least in the short term. The Institute for Science and Security assessed that US and Israeli airstrikes on Iran have “effectively destroyed” Iran's enrichment program and that it will take a “long time” for Iran to restore its enrichment capabilities to pre-strike levels.[21] The strikes targeted centrifuge production facilities and active centrifuges, damaging and destroying thousands of centrifuges.[22] Israeli airstrikes also destroyed some of Iran's uranium metal production facilities, which Iran could have used to transform uranium gas into dense metal in a process called metallization.[23] This process is one of the last steps required to form the explosive core of an atomic bomb. Israeli airstrikes also targeted Iranian nuclear scientists, which will likely temporarily disrupt Iran's ability to conduct nuclear research.[24] Iran will likely try to take some of the steps outlined in IRGC-affiliated media, regardless of whether the E3 triggers the snapback mechanism, as part of its effort to rebuild its nuclear program following the Israel-Iran War.
Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei reappointed senior clerics Ahmad Khatami, Alireza Arafi, and Ahmad Hosseini Khorasani as Guardian Council members on July 15.[58] All three clerics are Assembly of Experts members and belong to the hardline Society of Seminary Teachers of Qom.[59] Khatami is also the interim Tehran Friday prayer leader and has repeatedly called for the execution of US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.[60] Khatami, Arafi, and Hosseini Khorasani were among over 400 Qom clerics who signed a statement on July 13 in support of a recent fatwa that declared threats against Khamenei as acts of “mohareb” (enemies of God).[61] The fatwa also called for jihad and global Muslim mobilization against the United States and Israel.[62] The term of six Guardian Council members, including three jurists and three clerics, ended on July 9.[63] Iran's constitution grants the Supreme Leader authority to appoint six clerics to the Guardian Council, while the Judiciary Chief nominates six legal experts.[64] The three clerics will each serve another six-year term. The Guardian Council plays a key role in Iranian elections and vets candidates and legislation, which gives these clerics significant influence over Iran's political landscape until at least 2031.[65]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-15-2025