Iran Update, July 4, 2025
Senior Iranian officials are reiterating red lines for Iran’s nuclear program ahead of planned nuclear negotiations with the United States. Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Majid Takht Ravanchi told NBC News on July 3 that Iran is open to resuming nuclear negotiations but “has no plans to stop uranium enrichment.”[1] Ravanchi noted that the United States will have to “convince” Iran that it will not use force before Iran agrees to engage in talks.[2] White House Envoy Steve Witkoff is expected to meet with Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi in Oslo, Norway, next week, according to two unspecified sources familiar with the discussion cited by Axios.[3] A Tehran-based Western news correspondent reported that preparations are underway for “indirect” negotiations between Witkoff and Araghchi’s meeting, but noted that the meeting has not been finalized.[4]
Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz stated on July 3 that Israel must maintain its air superiority in Iranian airspace to prevent Iran from rebuilding its nuclear and ballistic missile programs.[5] This statement does not appear to suggest imminent Israeli strikes because Iran would need to acquire new air defense systems to replace those lost to be able to deny Israel control of the air. It is improbable Iran could have acquired or built new systems since the ceasefire on June 24, though it is possible Iran could conduct some redeployments if there are surviving air defenses in the northeast. Katz announced on June 27 that he would pursue a policy of “enforcement” to prevent Iran from rebuilding its nuclear or ballistic missile programs.[6] Araghchi warned on June 26 that Iran would respond to any Israeli violation of the ceasefire and noted that “Iran is not Lebanon.”[7] Israel has conducted airstrikes on Hezbollah across Lebanon since November 2025 as part of a stated effort to prevent Hezbollah from reconstituting and threatening Israel under the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement.[8] Araghchi is suggesting that he believes Israel will attempt to conduct similar strikes in Iran to prevent Iran from reconstructing its nuclear and ballistic missile programs.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) withdrew all IAEA inspectors from Iran, which effectively ends international oversight of Iran’s nuclear program.[16] The IAEA reported on July 4 that its inspectors left Iran due to safety concerns.[17] Iranian officials and regime-linked media have repeatedly threatened IAEA Director Rafael Grossi, including by issuing death threats, in recent weeks.[18] Iran’s Guardian Council approved a law on June 26 that suspends cooperation with the agency and bars inspectors from nuclear facilities.[19] The bill requires the IAEA to recognize Iran’s right to enrich uranium as a precondition before Iran allows the IAEA to resume inspections.[20] Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei accused the IAEA on June 30 of “mistakes” that had “consequences” and made “bilateral cooperation...irrational.”[21]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-4-2025
Iran Update, July 5, 2025
European officials are concerned that Iran may try to develop a nuclear weapon to deter future attacks and that Iran may be able to build a weapon in secret unless a nuclear agreement enables the IAEA to resume inspections.[7] These concerns understate the significant challenges Iran’s nuclear program faces in terms of Israeli penetration and weaponization. Three unspecified European officials cited by The Washington Post assessed that US strikes on Iran have likely strengthened hardline Iranian leaders’ belief that Iran must develop a nuclear weapon to deter future foreign intervention.[8] A former European diplomat suggested that Iran would attempt to develop a nuclear weapon “as secretly as possible.”[9] The IAEA did not have access to all Iranian facilities before the strikes, including multiple facilities associated with the pre-2003 Iranian nuclear weapons program.[10] Israeli intelligence has consistently provided exclusive information about Iran’s nuclear program that the IAEA has not provided (at least publicly).[11] For example, Israeli intelligence—not the IAEA—revealed that Iran was using computer modelling for research at Parchin Military Complex, a site that is linked to the nuclear program and that the IAEA has had difficulty accessing in the past.[12] Computer modelling can be used to model different nuclear weapon designs before producing an arsenal. Israeli intelligence, not IAEA inspections, drove Israeli concerns about Iranian weaponization and the Israeli decision to strike. The loss of IAEA inspections in Iran will certainly decrease the availability of open-source information on Iran’s nuclear program, but it is far from clear that the loss of these inspections would make it possible for Iran to build a weapon in secret.
Iran also faces challenges if it tries to weaponize because Iran will need large-scale production facilities to build a nuclear arsenal. Iran, if it chooses to weaponize, will almost certainly pursue a nuclear arsenal instead of a single nuclear weapon, as CTP-ISW has long assessed.[13] The development of a nuclear arsenal would require extensive rebuilding of Iranian facilities amid a major counterintelligence campaign that will undoubtedly create friction within the nuclear program. The scale of the facilities and time required for their development would make it very difficult for Iran to weaponize in secret. There are also additional challenges associated with miniaturizing a weapon so that it can be used on a nuclear-tipped ballistic missile, rather than deploying the weapon as a bomb. Any Iranian progress to weaponize will presumably be slowed by major Iranian counterintelligence investigations within the program, which could make it more difficult for surviving Iranian nuclear scientists to do their work.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-5-2025