Free Republic

I experienced this 1st hand in a creative writing 101 prerequisite class.

I defended Thomas Clarence against annita Hill in an essay.

Zero spelling errors, zero punctuation ( and I used every single one in the English language) errors.

The b+ grade ruined my 4.0 16 credit hour semester gpa.

I was marked down for “content”.

Spit.

This was in early 90’s.

I knew then that academia was the marxist gatekeeper of our society.
And my contempt for English Nazis and academia has only grown since.

At least they weren’t teaching grade schools sexual perversion back then, but they are now aren’t they.

Public education must be defunded if our nation is to survive.

The Democrats are a lawless party.

This crap has got to stop. Liberalism is a mental disorder.

Eight Ukrainian children who were kidnapped from their families and held captive in Russia have been returned to Ukraine following back-channel negotiations between Melania Trump and Russian representatives, the First Lady said on Friday.

Trump, a former model who was born in what is now Slovenia when that country was part of what was then Yugoslavia, made the stunning announcement in the Grand Foyer of the White House. She told reporters that “much [had] unfolded” since she sent a letter in August to Russian President Vladimir Putin regarding the fate of the thousands of children who have been taken to Russia after being seized by Russian forces during the invasion of Ukraine.

She said Putin had responded in writing to signal a “willingness to engage” with the First Lady “directly”, and provided her with “details regarding the Ukrainian children residing in Russia.”

Trump also told reporters that “both sides” of the talks had participated in “several back-channel meetings and calls” and had “agreed to cooperate with each other for the benefit of all people involved in this war.”

The Russian Cabinet of Ministers’ Commission on Legislative Activity, on October 13, approved a Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) draft amendment to permit the Russian military to use Russian reservists from Russia’s “human mobilization reserve” (see definition below) in expeditionary deployments outside of Russia without an official Kremlin declaration of mobilization or a state of war.[1] Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairperson Andrei Kartapolov stated on October 13 that the law will allow the Kremlin to deploy reservists outside of Russian territory, including to Ukraine’s Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts.[2] The draft amendment will also allow Russian President Vladimir Putin to mobilize reservists to perform special tasks in armed conflicts and counterterrorism operations. The draft amendment marks a significant inflection in Russian law, which currently forbids the use of reservists in the absence of official mobilization or a formal declaration of war. The draft amendment also creates a new category of force assemblies called “special assemblies,” during which mobilized reservists would train for no more than two months before being deployed abroad.

Understanding Russia’s dual reserve system

Russia has two types of reserves. Russia retains a higher-readiness “human mobilization reserve,” an active reserve, in which Russian citizens sign a contract with the Russian MoD on a voluntary basis to serve in the reserve while remaining civilians except when called up.[3] Russia’s federal law “On Military Duty and Military Service” currently entitles such reservists to financial compensation for being reservists, but legally binds reservists to appear for mandatory drills and report to military enlistment centers in the event of mobilization.[4] Russian officials claim that there are two million members of the active reserve as of October 2025.[5]

Russia also retains an inactive reserve (also known as the human mobilization resource or “zapas” in Russian), which includes Russian men with a military registration age as old as 65-70 (in certain circumstances) who are not actively affiliated with the Russian Armed Forces.[6] The new regulation approved on October 13 only concerns members of Russia’s active reserve, not Russia’s larger ”zapas.”

Pattern

Russia’s main method for generating manpower through high financial incentives and price surging is reportedly losing momentum and hitting diminishing returns as of October 2025.[7] Russian military recruitment offices are failing to increase recruitment rates despite increasing payments – a tactic that had previously raised recruitment rates in 2023 and 2024.[8] The Kremlin’s current method of generating volunteers was already facing financial challenges as of early 2025.[9] The Russian MoD reportedly recruited almost 90,000 personnel during the first three months of 2025 by spending more than the total federal recruitment budget for 2025, for example.[10] ISW forecasted that Putin’s mismanagement of Russia’s war economy and unsustainable force generation system would likely present difficult decision points to Putin in 2026 or 2027.[11]

Russia has reportedly been forming a “strategic reserve” from new recruits since July 2025, likely because Russian manpower losses decreased in the summer of 2025.[12] A Russian insider source that has consistently provided accurate reports about changes in the Russian military command stated on September 21 that roughly 292,000 people signed contracts with the Russian MoD and that some of these recruits are joining the strategic reserve.[13] The new draft amendment adopted on October 13 may provide the legal mechanize to activate elements of this reserve.

Assessment

The Kremlin will likely formally amend restrictions on the use of Russia’s active reserve and will conduct rolling partial mobilization without formally declaring war on Ukraine or formally announcing that it is conducting a partial involuntary call up. Russian State Duma Defense Committee Deputy Chairman Alexei Zhuravlyov signaled that the amendment will allow the Kremlin to call up the reserve in “far more cases than before,” implying that the Kremlin will more actively tap into the Russian active reserve as the new recruitment pool, possibly to supplant the flagging legacy system based on individual payments.[14] The Kremlin will likely misrepresent the mobilized reservists as members of the professional reserve who volunteered to fight in Ukraine to prevent Russian society from opposing increased deployments of mobilized reservists.[15] In reality, the Kremlin will pull these reservists from established pools of reserve forces, whom the Russian state will compel to fight in Ukraine.

The Kremlin will likely use the amendment to involuntarily call up personnel in Russian irregular formations whom Moscow has been treating as an active reserve. The Kremlin has labeled personnel in irregular formations such as Cossacks and private military companies (PMCs) “volunteers” who are supporting the Russian Armed Forces within separate “volunteer formations” in an effort to maintain deniability about any future compulsory military service.[16] Kartapolov specifically denied that the amendment will allow the Kremlin to mobilize PMC elements, in fact, claiming that the amendment only concerns individuals who voluntarily signed military service contracts with the Russian MoD.[17] The Kremlin, however, has been forcing elements of irregular formations to sign military service contracts with the Russian MoD since July 2023, which likely makes them eligible for compulsory call ups under Russian law.[18]

The Kremlin will likely use the amendment to centralize control over the Russian Combat Army Reserve (BARS) units, which have been largely functioning as irregular formations and often under the supervision of Russian businessmen and officials.[19] Russian State Duma Defense Committee member Lieutenant General Viktor Sobolev claimed that the proposed amendment is aimed at “streamlining” the Russian Armed Forces personnel system and structure.[20] Sobolev noted that the amendment will ensure that various units will report to Putin, Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov, and Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov, and observed that there are numerous BARS units in Ukraine with varied organizational structures. The Kremlin first created the active reserve in 2015, which later transformed into BARS in late 2021.[21] The Kremlin delegated control over BARS units to various trusted officials throughout the full-scale invasion, creating a disorganized chain of command and failing to properly integrate the BARS system into the Russian Armed Forces.[22]

The Kremlin remains unlikely to declare general mobilization of the inactive reserve (“zapas”) due to concerns over the impacts on regime stability, the Russian economy, and the administrative capacity of Russia’s military bureaucracy.[23] Russian officials, including Gerasimov, continued to message to the Russian people that the Kremlin will not conduct “large-scale” mobilization and will continue to rely on recruits who signed military service contracts with the Russian MoD.[24] The Kremlin’s rhetorical emphasis on the ”voluntary“ nature of the active reserve and hesitance to officially declare war against Ukraine suggests that the Kremlin continues to seek to avoid overtly asking the Russian people for greater sacrifices.

Implications

The amendment will likely allow the Kremlin to deploy active reservists into combat more rapidly than was possible under the previous mechanism that required a formal declaration of war or mobilization order. The proposed amendment creates “special assemblies” as a third category of military gatherings alongside reservist training and inspection assemblies. The amendment states that such assemblies would be limited to a maximum of two months and are at Putin’s discretion.[25] The Kremlin may decide to shorten or remove the requirement for pre-deployment reservist military drills, given the vagueness of the “special assemblies” clause in the amendment. Zhuravlyov notably recently announced that Russian reservists can receive military ranks without undergoing prior military drills, which are normally necessary to confirm the reservists’ eligibility for military ranks, a change that ISW assessed was part of the Kremlin’s effort to alleviate strains on the Russian training system to facilitate more rapid deployments of replacements to Ukraine.[26] The Kremlin faced significant backlash in September 2022 after failing to provide the legally mandated training to mobilized reservists, and may be trying to avoid similar societal backlash by simply eliminating or significantly curtailing the legal requirement for mandatory training.[27]

Compulsory rolling mobilization of reservists may enable Russia to generate forces more cheaply. Russia’s current method of generating volunteers through high payments has significantly increased Russian government spending, eroded Russia’s sovereign wealth fund, introduced externalities to the Russian domestic labor market, and exacerbated Russian inflation over the last three years.[28] Russia may be able to more sustainably generate forces if Russia uses coercion and legal mechanisms to press reservists into fighting without paying them exorbitant financial compensation that distorts the Russian economy as badly.

Compulsory rolling call ups of reservists may enable the Kremlin to “demobilize” servicemen mobilized in 2022 to appease segments of Russian society and assert that Russian forces in Ukraine are fighting on a fully voluntary basis. Putin and Kremlin officials have repeatedly misrepresented Russian forces fighting in Ukraine as fully professional and volunteer-based since February 2022.[29] The Kremlin is likely trying to eliminate the class of mobilized servicemen whom Putin compulsorily called up in September 2022 to maintain this narrative. The Kremlin and the Russian military command had been conducting surveys about demobilization, coercing mobilized servicemen into signing military service contracts, and forming all “professional” military units by committing mobilized servicemen to assault operations throughout 2025.[30] The Kremlin likely aims to eliminate the involuntarily mobilized class to appease families of mobilized servicemen who have been appealing to the Kremlin for over three years and to alleviate the need to pay mobilized servicemen directly from the Russian Presidential Fund on time.[31]

Compulsory rolling mobilization of reservists may pose greater political risks to the Kremlin, however. The Kremlin will likely invest significant resources in convincing the Russian people that reservists who deploy to Ukraine did so voluntarily. Compulsory military service remains unattractive and controversial, and Putin may face greater domestic political risks if the Kremlin fails to convince the Russian people that mobilized reservists killed in Ukraine went to Ukraine “voluntarily.”

Indicators

Any Russian national information campaign that seeks to socialize the idea of activating reservists, even under the rubric of “special assemblies,” will likely indicate that the Kremlin is preparing to mobilize reservists. Anomalous activity at Russian training grounds would indicate preparations to stand up new training pipelines for reservists. Intensified recruitment campaigns into irregular formations such as BARS, Cossack organizations, PMCs, and other irregular formations may indicate the Kremlin’s efforts to expand the active reserve via informal ways. Russian federal subjects’ disinvestment from or sunsetting of heavy financial incentives for volunteer recruitment would indicate the Kremlin is shifting its recruitment strategy. Any sudden shift in Kremlin narratives towards supporting the need for general mobilization would indicate Russia’s attempt to mobilize the inactive reserve (“zapas”), though such an event remains less likely than the mobilization of other established groups in the active reserve.

This amendment does not likely presage a large-scale involuntary reserve call up similar to the one that brought hundreds of thousands of Russians into the military in 2022. Putin already has the legal mechanisms he needs for a large-scale one-time involuntary mobilization on any scale, and no change would be needed for a call up to expand the Russian military dramatically at this time. The legal adjustments described above facilitate much smaller rolling callups that could sustain Russian manpower at current levels on a continuing basis at lower financial cost. This warning does not, therefore, imply that Putin is preparing to expand the size of the Russian military dramatically or rapidly.

I resemble your remark, Elsie!

Well said.

But remember this.

Some women are not women.

We need the real ones.

The video quickly went viral on social media, with many commenting that the man works for the City Colleges of Chicago system.

“A staff member at Wilbur Wright College is calling for ICE agents to get ‘shot’ and ‘wiped out.’ This is a criminal threat that should be investigated. Cc: @TheJusticeDept.”

https://www.foxnews.com/politics/watch-no-kings-protester-steps-up-mic-calls-ice-agents-shot-wiped-out

I do not blame ICE agents for ramming this idiot’s truck...This guy provided his dashcam footage to local NBC station...He was following the vehicle of ICE agents...The agents’ SUV turned around and rammed this guy’s truck...

He complained to the reporter that the agents were “too aggressive”...

I do not blame what the agents did at all...They might have thought that this guy had a gun and following them to kill them...

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment October 20, 2025

US President Donald Trump's October 17 meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reportedly ended with Trump supporting a ceasefire on the current frontlines and not Russian President Vladimir Putin's demands that Ukraine cede territory in Donetsk Oblast to Russia. Western reporting, citing sources with knowledge of the Trump-Zelensky meeting, indicates that Trump or a “Trump aide” initially supported Putin's demand that Ukraine cede Donetsk Oblast to Russia but that Trump later proposed a ceasefire freezing the current frontline by the end of the meeting.[1] Trump told journalists that he did not tell Zelensky that Ukraine must cede Donetsk Oblast to Russia.[2] Trump has subsequently publicly stated that Ukraine and Russia should freeze the current frontline.[3] Trump reportedly discussed giving security guarantees to both Ukraine and Russia during the October 17 meeting.[4] Some Western media outlets reported that Putin offered to exchange unspecified “small areas” or “parts” of Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts for the rest of Donetsk Oblast during his October 16 call with Trump.[5] It remains unclear if Putin offered to withdraw from parts of Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts that Russian forces currently occupy or if Putin offered to abandon part or all of his demand that Ukraine cede unoccupied parts of the regions to Russia. It is also unclear if Putin was proposing preconditions for leader-level negotiations with Ukraine, a ceasefire, or a final peace settlement and if the parties discussed any additional conditions that Putin attached to such negotiations, ceasefire, or peace settlement.

Kremlin voices clarified Russia's position on negotiations following Western reporting about the October 17 Trump-Zelensky meeting in order to reiterate that Russia remains committed to addressing the alleged “root causes” of the war and is unwilling to agree to a ceasefire. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded to Western media reports about Trump's proposal for a ceasefire along the current frontline, stating that Russia has responded to the many repeated statements on this matter and that Russia's position is “well known” and “consistent.”[6] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed that Russia has discussed the “root causes” of the war in order to ensure that a resolution to the war guarantees peace.[7] Zakharova reiterated that Putin, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, and “the Russian leadership as a whole” have spoken about the need to eliminate the “root causes” and that Russia is oriented around this position. Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa claimed that there should not be a ceasefire along the current lines and rejected assertions that a ceasefire would allow for diplomatic negotiations to end the war.[8] Chepa claimed that Russia should conclude an agreement on building the “future world order in Ukraine” before agreeing to halt military actions. Chepa claimed that the upcoming Trump-Putin meeting in Budapest could compel Ukraine to accept the terms of a peace settlement and then Russia can finalize a ceasefire on the frontline.[9] Chepa claimed that Russia also needs security guarantees at the end of the war from the United States and alluded to Russia's ultimatums to the United States in 2021 about NATO.[10] Chepa claimed that there are “a lot of issues,” including demands for Ukrainian neutrality, the cessation of NATO expansion, and the reduction of “certain types of weapons” (possibly referring to Russian demands for significant reductions to the Ukrainian military or the resumption of US-Russian arms control treaties).

The Kremlin has repeatedly referenced the need to eliminate the alleged “root causes” of the war in Ukraine, which Kremlin officials have defined as NATO's eastward expansion and Ukraine's alleged discrimination against Russian-speakers.[11] The Kremlin uses discussions about these root causes to forward Russia's original war demands for Ukrainian neutrality, the removal of the legitimate government in Ukraine, the installation of a pro-Russian government, and changes to NATO's Open Door Policy. Kremlin officials have also repeatedly rejected Trump's and Zelensky’s proposals for a ceasefire on the grounds that negotiations for a final peace settlement must come first.[12] The Kremlin is likely reemphasizing Russia's commitment to its original war aims against the backdrop of Western reporting about the October 17 Trump-Zelensky meeting in order to clarify that Trump's position coming out of that meeting is unacceptable for the Kremlin, particularly ahead of the meeting between Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio.

The Kremlin is priming the Russian people for a full victory in Ukraine whatever the cost — a domestic effort that is at odds with Putin's reported willingness to make territorial concessions. The Kremlin has consistently reiterated throughout the war that Russia's war demands remain unchanged and has communicated to the Russian people that Russia will achieve all these goals in Ukraine, whether militarily or diplomatically.[13] The Kremlin has not prepared Russian society to accept anything less than these demands. Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu, who served as defense minister throughout much of the war, claimed in an interview to Kremlin newswire TASS on October 20 that occupied Ukrainian areas should not be considered “new regions” of Russia but are instead Russia's “old regions” that have “historically” been Russian.[14] TASS framed Shoigu’s claim as referring to Donbas and “Novorossiya” — an amorphous invented region in southern and eastern Ukraine that the Kremlin has claimed is “integral” to Russia.[15] The Kremlin has conditioned Russians to expect that Russia's illegal annexation of parts of Ukraine is permanent and that Russia cannot make any territorial concessions to Ukraine. Western media broadly reported around the August 2025 Alaska summit that Putin had offered territorial concessions in exchange for the Ukrainian surrender of the unoccupied portion of Donetsk Oblast, prompting ire from Russian officials and ultranationalist voices in the information space.[16] Russian officials and pro-Kremlin voices downplayed or dismissed the prospect of territorial concessions following Western reporting that Putin recently made a similar offer for territorial concessions to Trump.[17] Putin's refusal to prepare the Russian people, including the important ultranationalist constituency, to make any concessions in the war in Ukraine is another indicator that he does not intend to diverge from his long-held demands in any future peace talks.

The Kremlin is leaning into its cognitive warfare effort to portray Russian forces as relentlessly advancing and a Russian victory as inevitable. This effort aims to obscure the reality that Russian forces are only making minimal gains at disproportionately high manpower costs and that Russia is unlikely to obtain its strategic objectives by force in the short- or medium-term. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha stated on October 20 that Russia is increasing its federal spending on propaganda in the 2026 budget by 54 percent compared to the 2025 federal budget.[18] ISW has also observed reports indicating that the Kremlin is significantly investing in state television outlets and traditional means of propaganda in the 2026 budget.[19] The Kremlin's increase in state funding for mass media and propaganda notably comes as Russian federal subjects are cutting down on one-time signing bonuses for new military recruits, likely at the Kremlin's direction and in response to struggles to maintain voluntary recruitment and the negative effects these payments are having on the Russian economy as a whole.[20] The Kremlin is trying to use the information space to portray a Russian victory in Ukraine as certain in order to push Ukraine and the West to concede to Russia's demands. The Kremlin is heavily investing in its cognitive warfare capabilities and efforts to try to achieve its unrealistic war goals through diplomatic means. ISW has observed no indications that the Kremlin remains willing to accept anything less than Ukrainian capitulation to all of its original war demands, and the Kremlin remains willing to expend considerable amounts of manpower, materiel, time, and other resources to achieving these demands on the battlefield if needed.

The Kremlin is advancing several informational lines falsely inflating reports of Russian military advances and offensive capabilities in order to push the West and Ukraine into conceding to Russia's territorial demands. Russian forces have been conducting infiltration missions and raising Russian flags in porous areas of the frontline in eastern Ukraine, particularly in Kupyansk, Kharkiv Oblast and in Donetsk Oblast, as part of a concerted effort to claim that these infiltration missions are actually enduring Russian territorial gains.[21] Putin and senior Russian defense officials have artificially inflated the extent of Russian gains in Ukraine in recent weeks, particularly following the August 2025 Alaska summit, using these infiltration missions and exaggerated qualitative data to lend legitimacy to their claims.[22] The Kremlin aims for these claims to penetrate the Western information space to falsely portray Russia as capable of making rapid gains on the battlefield and overwhelming Ukrainian forces, even though Russian advances are constrained to slow footpace, dependent upon large numbers of infantry, and incur heavy casualties.

Russian officials are also attempting to falsely portray ongoing limited Russian operations in the Kherson direction as the start of a new major Russian offensive in the province. Russian officials and pro-Kremlin sources have begun pushing the narrative that Russian forces have begun efforts to seize Kherson City, claiming without evidence that limited sabotage and reconnaissance activity is actually a significant offensive and that Russia occupies areas of Kherson City.[23] Kherson City's administrative boundaries are limited to the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River, and Russian forces have not occupied areas of west bank Kherson Oblast since the successful Ukrainian counteroffensive in November 2022 that drove Russian forces to withdraw across the Dnipro River to the east (left) bank.[24] ISW has not observed indications that Russian forces are preparing for or have launched a concerted offensive effort to cross the Dnipro River and advance into west bank Kherson Oblast — an operation that would require significant manpower and materiel that Russia has not concentrated in the Kherson direction.[25] The Kremlin likely seeks to convince Ukraine and the West that Russia's recapture of Kherson City and all of Kherson Oblast is inevitable such that Ukraine should cede these areas to Russia. The Kremlin may also seek to posture that a Russian “decision” to not seize these areas in exchange for Ukrainian withdrawal from unoccupied Donetsk Oblast would be a significant Russian concession. The Kremlin is attempting to use all available informational avenues to convince the United States, Europe, and Ukraine to acquiesce to the Kremlin's demands by convincing them that a Russian victory in Ukraine is certain when it is anything but.

Kremlin officials are attempting to present Ukraine as the obstacle to peace to obfuscate how Putin himself has been impeding the process by insisting that Ukraine cede more territory than Russian forces currently occupy. Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO and key Kremlin negotiator Kirill Dmitriev claimed on October 19 that Ukraine and Europe are undermining the US-led peace process.[26] Zelensky has agreed to each of Trump's proposed immediate ceasefires along the current front in recent months, whereas Putin has rejected every one.[27] The Kremlin has been pushing a false narrative that Russia will inevitably seize the territory it is demanding and that Ukraine therefore is responsible for protracting the war by refusing to surrender preemptively. Russian forces in reality, however, have been making creeping, marginal territorial advances at very high casualty rates because Putin has repeatedly rejected American and Ukrainian ceasefire proposals and remains determined to fight for more territory than Russia now controls.[28] Russia, not Ukraine, has repeatedly demonstrated that its refusal to compromise or engage in good faith negotiations is the reason for the lack of peace.

The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced that the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) Indestructible Brotherhood-2025 and Barrier-2025 military exercises began in Tajikistan on October 20.[121] Military contingents from Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan are participating.

more + maps:
https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-20-2025/

The Canucks have made their bed. Now they can lie in it. The issues with First Nations and other Native American sovereignty claims made through a system of laws the Canadian government created are among a number of very good reasons that no Canadian province should ever become part of the US

Who will pay off the bank mortgages on homes seized? The mortgages are now worthless. I’m sure the banks are thrilled.

It was the Canadian government who approved all this back in the day. If anyone is liable for losses its the government.

The Canadians call them First Nations people.

I know. I watch Hudson & Rex and the show takes place in Canada. Well, the Canadians can say what they want but those folks are still GENETICALLY Oriental Asians.
"First Nations people"?? Hmmmm.

DENIAL.
The U.S. Indian population hasn't done so well for themselves. They have a problem with alcohol. That very problem with alcohol proved that all the indigenous folks in the Americas are originally Oriental Asian.
From the Internet
Alcohol has been a major public health issue for many American Indian communities, leading to disproportionately high rates of alcohol-related deaths, injuries, and diseases compared to other racial groups.

==============================

When I discovered that I had a small part Oriental Asian (less than 8%) I also discovered that I could CURE the problem. I went to an allergy doctor and for TWO years I took "the cure." Every month I would go on a VERY specific diet, I can hardly remember it as it's been so long.
But for FIVE days a month, for two years, I ate food that NO ONE on the planet was allergic to. All I can recall is lamb, cooked carrots, BOTTLED water...and I canNOT remember the other few things that I was allowed to eat. I ate only NINE things.

However, it worked. I could eat anything. I still can.
I ate only those NINE foods.

The basic problem that ALL Oriental Asians have is a deficiency in acetyl dehydrogenase...an enzyme that allows people to drink alcohol with no side effects.
People who are NOT Oriental Asian, that is, Caucasian, white and African sub-Saharan people, do not have this deficiency and can drink all they want.

I am sure that TODAY the cure is much easier and simpler,

I’ve tried AT&T, TMobile, and Verizon. None offer home 5G here. I haven’t tried the cable company - if I keep having problems with Frontier, I might need to. The last repair seems to have taken.

Gotcha, thanks. It’s a neato little carry piece for sure.

Freegards

Anyone remember what happened to Walnut Grove on the last day
?

Likewise that is what should happen there.

“I listened to the Fox News report and was horrified. There is no recourse to deal with these judges?”

There is, but unfortunately, it means waiting for them to die off of natural causes because they’ll never resign.

five corrupt kings milking the swamp.

Bkmk

soon it will be YOUR children coming home in rubber bags.