Posted on 02/24/2024 5:59:01 AM PST by SpeedyInTexas
This list only includes destroyed vehicles and equipment of which photo or videographic evidence is available. Therefore, the amount of equipment destroyed is significantly higher than recorded here. Loitering munitions, drones used as unmanned bait, civilian vehicles and derelict equipment are not included in this list. All possible effort has gone into avoiding duplicate entries and discerning the status of equipment between captured or abandoned. Many of the entries listed as 'abandoned' will likely end up captured or destroyed. Similarly, some of the captured equipment might be destroyed if it can't be recovered. When a vehicle is captured and then lost in service with its new owners, it is only added as a loss of the original operator to avoid double listings. When the origin of a piece of equipment can't be established, it's not included in the list. The Soviet flag is used when the equipment in question was produced prior to 1991. This list is constantly updated as additional footage becomes available.
(Excerpt) Read more at oryxspioenkop.com ...
Speedy has given us an interesting evaluation of the status of the Ukraine/Russia war by “The Economist” of 10/17/25 from the link provided. Having read almost every day’s worth of comments at this long thread for around 2 years, plus others found while using Search for Ukraine, Russia, Putin, and other related topics, I have come to certain conclusions. One is that even without strong support from our leader, Ukraine still has a decent chance of winning. Several topics are being evaluated including but not limited to:
1) What our leader is doing and trying to achieve
2) On what he is basing his choices and actions
3) The status of forces in Ukraine and Russia
4) Likely future events in Ukraine and Russia
5) Likely future events in US and NATO countries
1) I have the impression that our leader would much prefer to have a world where business can be conducted without a war, but by vigorous competition of a commercial nature. He has tried to promote hotels and other projects in Moscow, Turkey, and other countries. He has encouraged his son-in-law to engage in important activities in the Middle East. His recent suggestion that Gaza has a great seacoast for tourism and vacation development was quite a surprise. He appears to have changed his mind on Gaza, but I wonder if he is considering the potential of the Crimean coastline? The question is whether he understands that Russia’s goals are currently controlled by the idea of ongoing perpetual conquest and expansion as promoted by Alexander Dugin in his 1997 book which Putin has adopted for Russia’s war colleges. On the other hand we have actually seen a pro Russia/Putin commenter at this site proclaim repeatedly, with photo, that our leader is in fact a registered Russian agent. The final decisions by our leader are yet to play out to give us a more likely reading of his possible goals and motives.
2) People in the US and many other places have no doubt been puzzled, surprised, and angered by our leader’s pattern of jumping from opposite sides of decisions, sometimes in the matter of days. Sometimes this seems to be planned efforts at confusion, other times changes in circumstances, and new information from the latest person spoken with. Many times these switches could be part of ongoing business/negotiating strategy. Or they could be part of new information whether well understood, or misunderstood. It is very visible that his contacts with Putin are an influence. After his Alaska meeting with Putin, he backed off of sanctions talk until Putin angered him by massive harsh drone strikes against many Ukraine civilian targets. He may have mixed feelings about letting Ukraine have access to Tomahawk Missiles with the scary ability to carry either conventional explosives or nuclear ones. This is especially concerning as Russia is already using missiles on Ukraine that have this dual ability.
On the front lines there are many small bits of Ukraine land listed as controlled by Russia. However, all these maps list distances in kilimeters (km)m. For a person unlikely to be well versed in the difference between kms and miles, I suspect he may have been unduely influenced by viewing something like the ISW maps on war in Ukraine. On the front lines there are many small bits of Ukraine land listed as controlled by Russia. However, all these maps list distances in kilimeters (km). For a person unlikely to be well versed in the difference between kms and miles, it is easy to overestimate the amount of territory Russia has recently overrun. A 10 km distance is only 6 miles, a 5km square area is not 25 square miles, it is only around 6 square miles. It is enough to make someone who just hopes for peace and business activity to throw up their hands in frustration and disgust. Thus ending up saying something like, “You start a truce at current battle lines, and figure it out yourselves.”
I will continue with items 3, 4, and 5 after more thought.
Born June 14, 1946, President Trump is a Gemini and ...
“Gеmіnіѕ аrе кnоwn tо hаvе duаl реrѕоnаlіtіеѕ оr dоublе-mіndѕ, whісh frеquеntly mакеѕ thеm wаvеrіng іn thеіr dеѕіrеѕ аnd сhоісеѕ.”
Yep. That’s him. While I do think there is method to his madness and purpose to his ploys, it is confusing sometimes.
I suspect this switching behavior was something he developed early as a way to defend himself from an extremely domineering father. In past writings, he has stated his opinion that his father caused his brother’s alcoholism and death. He developed more effective strategies to survive his father. i just hope these strategies will be strong enough to survive the much smoother but domineering actions of his “former” friend Putin. It seems he was initially fooled by Putin’s veneer of politeness and reasonableness.
I doubt he is even aware of Alexandr Dugins opus from 1997 on how to conquer Europe to create a Russian ruled Eurasia, and how to control most of the rest of the world even including China: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foundations_of_Geopolitics
I just hope our Secretaries of State and War know about this book which Putin has assigned to all Russian war colleges and hopes to place in all high schools. There is a reason that Dugin has been called “Putin’s Brain.” It is important to note that Putin’s initial efforts to at least appear to be cooperative toward Europe and NATO was fundamentally changing by 2000, only 3 years after Dugin published his totalitarian opus as THE guide for Russia’s future.
Russia is on track for $100 Billion deficit for 2025. (Biggest this century - so far)
The financial buffers they have been relying on through this war (like the National Wealth Fund) aren’t there anymore to contribute significantly for next year, and other financial risks appear likely to hit them as well. Ruble printing presses going “Brrrr”.
Kyiv Independent (20 Oct):
“Ukraine expects Russia to face a nearly $100 billion budget deficit by next year (January 1st, 2026), President Volodymyr Zelensky said on Oct. 19, underscoring Moscow’s growing economic challenges amid the war.
The news comes as Russia grapples with empty coffers as the costs of its all-out war against Ukraine mount...
...The president said that the deficit stood at $71 billion one month ago (Russia books a lot of annual costs in December). He promised to share more detailed analytics from Ukrainian intelligence in November.
Zelensky also noted that the 50% tariffs imposed by the U.S. against India could further exacerbate Russia’s economic troubles if they force New Delhi to reduce purchases of Russian oil...
...Moscow has been forced to adopt several painful measures to tackle the shortfall, including increasing the value-added tax (VAT). Some Russian companies are also reducing salaries by shortening working weeks.
While cutting subsidies to fuel distributors also remains an option, this measure has already led to shortages in some regions in 2023... With several Russian regions and occupied Crimea again facing fuel shortages this year, exacerbated by Ukrainian strikes against refineries, the Kremlin is moving in the opposite direction – by loosening restrictions on subsidies to support the suppliers.
(Ivan Us, chief consultant of the Center for Foreign Policy Studies of the Kyiv-based National Institute for Strategic Studies) also said that curbing the deficit by printing more money could lead to hyperinflation, as the Russian central bank has already begun increasing the money supply and inflation levels remain high.”
I wonder if heavy printing of money in Russia could lead to the kind of hyper-inflation that led to Hitler’s success in harnessing the German political space.
Oh, wait, in Russia that has already happened.
US President Donald Trump's October 17 meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reportedly ended with Trump supporting a ceasefire on the current frontlines and not Russian President Vladimir Putin's demands that Ukraine cede territory in Donetsk Oblast to Russia. Western reporting, citing sources with knowledge of the Trump-Zelensky meeting, indicates that Trump or a “Trump aide” initially supported Putin's demand that Ukraine cede Donetsk Oblast to Russia but that Trump later proposed a ceasefire freezing the current frontline by the end of the meeting.[1] Trump told journalists that he did not tell Zelensky that Ukraine must cede Donetsk Oblast to Russia.[2] Trump has subsequently publicly stated that Ukraine and Russia should freeze the current frontline.[3] Trump reportedly discussed giving security guarantees to both Ukraine and Russia during the October 17 meeting.[4] Some Western media outlets reported that Putin offered to exchange unspecified “small areas” or “parts” of Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts for the rest of Donetsk Oblast during his October 16 call with Trump.[5] It remains unclear if Putin offered to withdraw from parts of Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts that Russian forces currently occupy or if Putin offered to abandon part or all of his demand that Ukraine cede unoccupied parts of the regions to Russia. It is also unclear if Putin was proposing preconditions for leader-level negotiations with Ukraine, a ceasefire, or a final peace settlement and if the parties discussed any additional conditions that Putin attached to such negotiations, ceasefire, or peace settlement.
Kremlin voices clarified Russia's position on negotiations following Western reporting about the October 17 Trump-Zelensky meeting in order to reiterate that Russia remains committed to addressing the alleged “root causes” of the war and is unwilling to agree to a ceasefire. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded to Western media reports about Trump's proposal for a ceasefire along the current frontline, stating that Russia has responded to the many repeated statements on this matter and that Russia's position is “well known” and “consistent.”[6] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed that Russia has discussed the “root causes” of the war in order to ensure that a resolution to the war guarantees peace.[7] Zakharova reiterated that Putin, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, and “the Russian leadership as a whole” have spoken about the need to eliminate the “root causes” and that Russia is oriented around this position. Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa claimed that there should not be a ceasefire along the current lines and rejected assertions that a ceasefire would allow for diplomatic negotiations to end the war.[8] Chepa claimed that Russia should conclude an agreement on building the “future world order in Ukraine” before agreeing to halt military actions. Chepa claimed that the upcoming Trump-Putin meeting in Budapest could compel Ukraine to accept the terms of a peace settlement and then Russia can finalize a ceasefire on the frontline.[9] Chepa claimed that Russia also needs security guarantees at the end of the war from the United States and alluded to Russia's ultimatums to the United States in 2021 about NATO.[10] Chepa claimed that there are “a lot of issues,” including demands for Ukrainian neutrality, the cessation of NATO expansion, and the reduction of “certain types of weapons” (possibly referring to Russian demands for significant reductions to the Ukrainian military or the resumption of US-Russian arms control treaties).
The Kremlin has repeatedly referenced the need to eliminate the alleged “root causes” of the war in Ukraine, which Kremlin officials have defined as NATO's eastward expansion and Ukraine's alleged discrimination against Russian-speakers.[11] The Kremlin uses discussions about these root causes to forward Russia's original war demands for Ukrainian neutrality, the removal of the legitimate government in Ukraine, the installation of a pro-Russian government, and changes to NATO's Open Door Policy. Kremlin officials have also repeatedly rejected Trump's and Zelensky’s proposals for a ceasefire on the grounds that negotiations for a final peace settlement must come first.[12] The Kremlin is likely reemphasizing Russia's commitment to its original war aims against the backdrop of Western reporting about the October 17 Trump-Zelensky meeting in order to clarify that Trump's position coming out of that meeting is unacceptable for the Kremlin, particularly ahead of the meeting between Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio.
The Kremlin is priming the Russian people for a full victory in Ukraine whatever the cost — a domestic effort that is at odds with Putin's reported willingness to make territorial concessions. The Kremlin has consistently reiterated throughout the war that Russia's war demands remain unchanged and has communicated to the Russian people that Russia will achieve all these goals in Ukraine, whether militarily or diplomatically.[13] The Kremlin has not prepared Russian society to accept anything less than these demands. Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu, who served as defense minister throughout much of the war, claimed in an interview to Kremlin newswire TASS on October 20 that occupied Ukrainian areas should not be considered “new regions” of Russia but are instead Russia's “old regions” that have “historically” been Russian.[14] TASS framed Shoigu’s claim as referring to Donbas and “Novorossiya” — an amorphous invented region in southern and eastern Ukraine that the Kremlin has claimed is “integral” to Russia.[15] The Kremlin has conditioned Russians to expect that Russia's illegal annexation of parts of Ukraine is permanent and that Russia cannot make any territorial concessions to Ukraine. Western media broadly reported around the August 2025 Alaska summit that Putin had offered territorial concessions in exchange for the Ukrainian surrender of the unoccupied portion of Donetsk Oblast, prompting ire from Russian officials and ultranationalist voices in the information space.[16] Russian officials and pro-Kremlin voices downplayed or dismissed the prospect of territorial concessions following Western reporting that Putin recently made a similar offer for territorial concessions to Trump.[17] Putin's refusal to prepare the Russian people, including the important ultranationalist constituency, to make any concessions in the war in Ukraine is another indicator that he does not intend to diverge from his long-held demands in any future peace talks.
The Kremlin is leaning into its cognitive warfare effort to portray Russian forces as relentlessly advancing and a Russian victory as inevitable. This effort aims to obscure the reality that Russian forces are only making minimal gains at disproportionately high manpower costs and that Russia is unlikely to obtain its strategic objectives by force in the short- or medium-term. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha stated on October 20 that Russia is increasing its federal spending on propaganda in the 2026 budget by 54 percent compared to the 2025 federal budget.[18] ISW has also observed reports indicating that the Kremlin is significantly investing in state television outlets and traditional means of propaganda in the 2026 budget.[19] The Kremlin's increase in state funding for mass media and propaganda notably comes as Russian federal subjects are cutting down on one-time signing bonuses for new military recruits, likely at the Kremlin's direction and in response to struggles to maintain voluntary recruitment and the negative effects these payments are having on the Russian economy as a whole.[20] The Kremlin is trying to use the information space to portray a Russian victory in Ukraine as certain in order to push Ukraine and the West to concede to Russia's demands. The Kremlin is heavily investing in its cognitive warfare capabilities and efforts to try to achieve its unrealistic war goals through diplomatic means. ISW has observed no indications that the Kremlin remains willing to accept anything less than Ukrainian capitulation to all of its original war demands, and the Kremlin remains willing to expend considerable amounts of manpower, materiel, time, and other resources to achieving these demands on the battlefield if needed.
The Kremlin is advancing several informational lines falsely inflating reports of Russian military advances and offensive capabilities in order to push the West and Ukraine into conceding to Russia's territorial demands. Russian forces have been conducting infiltration missions and raising Russian flags in porous areas of the frontline in eastern Ukraine, particularly in Kupyansk, Kharkiv Oblast and in Donetsk Oblast, as part of a concerted effort to claim that these infiltration missions are actually enduring Russian territorial gains.[21] Putin and senior Russian defense officials have artificially inflated the extent of Russian gains in Ukraine in recent weeks, particularly following the August 2025 Alaska summit, using these infiltration missions and exaggerated qualitative data to lend legitimacy to their claims.[22] The Kremlin aims for these claims to penetrate the Western information space to falsely portray Russia as capable of making rapid gains on the battlefield and overwhelming Ukrainian forces, even though Russian advances are constrained to slow footpace, dependent upon large numbers of infantry, and incur heavy casualties.
Russian officials are also attempting to falsely portray ongoing limited Russian operations in the Kherson direction as the start of a new major Russian offensive in the province. Russian officials and pro-Kremlin sources have begun pushing the narrative that Russian forces have begun efforts to seize Kherson City, claiming without evidence that limited sabotage and reconnaissance activity is actually a significant offensive and that Russia occupies areas of Kherson City.[23] Kherson City's administrative boundaries are limited to the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River, and Russian forces have not occupied areas of west bank Kherson Oblast since the successful Ukrainian counteroffensive in November 2022 that drove Russian forces to withdraw across the Dnipro River to the east (left) bank.[24] ISW has not observed indications that Russian forces are preparing for or have launched a concerted offensive effort to cross the Dnipro River and advance into west bank Kherson Oblast — an operation that would require significant manpower and materiel that Russia has not concentrated in the Kherson direction.[25] The Kremlin likely seeks to convince Ukraine and the West that Russia's recapture of Kherson City and all of Kherson Oblast is inevitable such that Ukraine should cede these areas to Russia. The Kremlin may also seek to posture that a Russian “decision” to not seize these areas in exchange for Ukrainian withdrawal from unoccupied Donetsk Oblast would be a significant Russian concession. The Kremlin is attempting to use all available informational avenues to convince the United States, Europe, and Ukraine to acquiesce to the Kremlin's demands by convincing them that a Russian victory in Ukraine is certain when it is anything but.
Kremlin officials are attempting to present Ukraine as the obstacle to peace to obfuscate how Putin himself has been impeding the process by insisting that Ukraine cede more territory than Russian forces currently occupy. Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO and key Kremlin negotiator Kirill Dmitriev claimed on October 19 that Ukraine and Europe are undermining the US-led peace process.[26] Zelensky has agreed to each of Trump's proposed immediate ceasefires along the current front in recent months, whereas Putin has rejected every one.[27] The Kremlin has been pushing a false narrative that Russia will inevitably seize the territory it is demanding and that Ukraine therefore is responsible for protracting the war by refusing to surrender preemptively. Russian forces in reality, however, have been making creeping, marginal territorial advances at very high casualty rates because Putin has repeatedly rejected American and Ukrainian ceasefire proposals and remains determined to fight for more territory than Russia now controls.[28] Russia, not Ukraine, has repeatedly demonstrated that its refusal to compromise or engage in good faith negotiations is the reason for the lack of peace.
The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced that the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) Indestructible Brotherhood-2025 and Barrier-2025 military exercises began in Tajikistan on October 20.[121] Military contingents from Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan are participating.
more + maps:
https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-20-2025/
Russia has two types of reserves. Russia retains a higher-readiness “human mobilization reserve,” an active reserve, in which Russian citizens sign a contract with the Russian MoD on a voluntary basis to serve in the reserve while remaining civilians except when called up.[3] Russia’s federal law “On Military Duty and Military Service” currently entitles such reservists to financial compensation for being reservists, but legally binds reservists to appear for mandatory drills and report to military enlistment centers in the event of mobilization.[4] Russian officials claim that there are two million members of the active reserve as of October 2025.[5]
Russia also retains an inactive reserve (also known as the human mobilization resource or “zapas” in Russian), which includes Russian men with a military registration age as old as 65-70 (in certain circumstances) who are not actively affiliated with the Russian Armed Forces.[6] The new regulation approved on October 13 only concerns members of Russia’s active reserve, not Russia’s larger ”zapas.”
Russia’s main method for generating manpower through high financial incentives and price surging is reportedly losing momentum and hitting diminishing returns as of October 2025.[7] Russian military recruitment offices are failing to increase recruitment rates despite increasing payments – a tactic that had previously raised recruitment rates in 2023 and 2024.[8] The Kremlin’s current method of generating volunteers was already facing financial challenges as of early 2025.[9] The Russian MoD reportedly recruited almost 90,000 personnel during the first three months of 2025 by spending more than the total federal recruitment budget for 2025, for example.[10] ISW forecasted that Putin’s mismanagement of Russia’s war economy and unsustainable force generation system would likely present difficult decision points to Putin in 2026 or 2027.[11]
Russia has reportedly been forming a “strategic reserve” from new recruits since July 2025, likely because Russian manpower losses decreased in the summer of 2025.[12] A Russian insider source that has consistently provided accurate reports about changes in the Russian military command stated on September 21 that roughly 292,000 people signed contracts with the Russian MoD and that some of these recruits are joining the strategic reserve.[13] The new draft amendment adopted on October 13 may provide the legal mechanize to activate elements of this reserve.
The Kremlin will likely formally amend restrictions on the use of Russia’s active reserve and will conduct rolling partial mobilization without formally declaring war on Ukraine or formally announcing that it is conducting a partial involuntary call up. Russian State Duma Defense Committee Deputy Chairman Alexei Zhuravlyov signaled that the amendment will allow the Kremlin to call up the reserve in “far more cases than before,” implying that the Kremlin will more actively tap into the Russian active reserve as the new recruitment pool, possibly to supplant the flagging legacy system based on individual payments.[14] The Kremlin will likely misrepresent the mobilized reservists as members of the professional reserve who volunteered to fight in Ukraine to prevent Russian society from opposing increased deployments of mobilized reservists.[15] In reality, the Kremlin will pull these reservists from established pools of reserve forces, whom the Russian state will compel to fight in Ukraine.
The Kremlin will likely use the amendment to involuntarily call up personnel in Russian irregular formations whom Moscow has been treating as an active reserve. The Kremlin has labeled personnel in irregular formations such as Cossacks and private military companies (PMCs) “volunteers” who are supporting the Russian Armed Forces within separate “volunteer formations” in an effort to maintain deniability about any future compulsory military service.[16] Kartapolov specifically denied that the amendment will allow the Kremlin to mobilize PMC elements, in fact, claiming that the amendment only concerns individuals who voluntarily signed military service contracts with the Russian MoD.[17] The Kremlin, however, has been forcing elements of irregular formations to sign military service contracts with the Russian MoD since July 2023, which likely makes them eligible for compulsory call ups under Russian law.[18]
The Kremlin will likely use the amendment to centralize control over the Russian Combat Army Reserve (BARS) units, which have been largely functioning as irregular formations and often under the supervision of Russian businessmen and officials.[19] Russian State Duma Defense Committee member Lieutenant General Viktor Sobolev claimed that the proposed amendment is aimed at “streamlining” the Russian Armed Forces personnel system and structure.[20] Sobolev noted that the amendment will ensure that various units will report to Putin, Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov, and Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov, and observed that there are numerous BARS units in Ukraine with varied organizational structures. The Kremlin first created the active reserve in 2015, which later transformed into BARS in late 2021.[21] The Kremlin delegated control over BARS units to various trusted officials throughout the full-scale invasion, creating a disorganized chain of command and failing to properly integrate the BARS system into the Russian Armed Forces.[22]
The Kremlin remains unlikely to declare general mobilization of the inactive reserve (“zapas”) due to concerns over the impacts on regime stability, the Russian economy, and the administrative capacity of Russia’s military bureaucracy.[23] Russian officials, including Gerasimov, continued to message to the Russian people that the Kremlin will not conduct “large-scale” mobilization and will continue to rely on recruits who signed military service contracts with the Russian MoD.[24] The Kremlin’s rhetorical emphasis on the ”voluntary“ nature of the active reserve and hesitance to officially declare war against Ukraine suggests that the Kremlin continues to seek to avoid overtly asking the Russian people for greater sacrifices.
The amendment will likely allow the Kremlin to deploy active reservists into combat more rapidly than was possible under the previous mechanism that required a formal declaration of war or mobilization order. The proposed amendment creates “special assemblies” as a third category of military gatherings alongside reservist training and inspection assemblies. The amendment states that such assemblies would be limited to a maximum of two months and are at Putin’s discretion.[25] The Kremlin may decide to shorten or remove the requirement for pre-deployment reservist military drills, given the vagueness of the “special assemblies” clause in the amendment. Zhuravlyov notably recently announced that Russian reservists can receive military ranks without undergoing prior military drills, which are normally necessary to confirm the reservists’ eligibility for military ranks, a change that ISW assessed was part of the Kremlin’s effort to alleviate strains on the Russian training system to facilitate more rapid deployments of replacements to Ukraine.[26] The Kremlin faced significant backlash in September 2022 after failing to provide the legally mandated training to mobilized reservists, and may be trying to avoid similar societal backlash by simply eliminating or significantly curtailing the legal requirement for mandatory training.[27]
Compulsory rolling mobilization of reservists may enable Russia to generate forces more cheaply. Russia’s current method of generating volunteers through high payments has significantly increased Russian government spending, eroded Russia’s sovereign wealth fund, introduced externalities to the Russian domestic labor market, and exacerbated Russian inflation over the last three years.[28] Russia may be able to more sustainably generate forces if Russia uses coercion and legal mechanisms to press reservists into fighting without paying them exorbitant financial compensation that distorts the Russian economy as badly.
Compulsory rolling call ups of reservists may enable the Kremlin to “demobilize” servicemen mobilized in 2022 to appease segments of Russian society and assert that Russian forces in Ukraine are fighting on a fully voluntary basis. Putin and Kremlin officials have repeatedly misrepresented Russian forces fighting in Ukraine as fully professional and volunteer-based since February 2022.[29] The Kremlin is likely trying to eliminate the class of mobilized servicemen whom Putin compulsorily called up in September 2022 to maintain this narrative. The Kremlin and the Russian military command had been conducting surveys about demobilization, coercing mobilized servicemen into signing military service contracts, and forming all “professional” military units by committing mobilized servicemen to assault operations throughout 2025.[30] The Kremlin likely aims to eliminate the involuntarily mobilized class to appease families of mobilized servicemen who have been appealing to the Kremlin for over three years and to alleviate the need to pay mobilized servicemen directly from the Russian Presidential Fund on time.[31]
Compulsory rolling mobilization of reservists may pose greater political risks to the Kremlin, however. The Kremlin will likely invest significant resources in convincing the Russian people that reservists who deploy to Ukraine did so voluntarily. Compulsory military service remains unattractive and controversial, and Putin may face greater domestic political risks if the Kremlin fails to convince the Russian people that mobilized reservists killed in Ukraine went to Ukraine “voluntarily.”
Any Russian national information campaign that seeks to socialize the idea of activating reservists, even under the rubric of “special assemblies,” will likely indicate that the Kremlin is preparing to mobilize reservists. Anomalous activity at Russian training grounds would indicate preparations to stand up new training pipelines for reservists. Intensified recruitment campaigns into irregular formations such as BARS, Cossack organizations, PMCs, and other irregular formations may indicate the Kremlin’s efforts to expand the active reserve via informal ways. Russian federal subjects’ disinvestment from or sunsetting of heavy financial incentives for volunteer recruitment would indicate the Kremlin is shifting its recruitment strategy. Any sudden shift in Kremlin narratives towards supporting the need for general mobilization would indicate Russia’s attempt to mobilize the inactive reserve (“zapas”), though such an event remains less likely than the mobilization of other established groups in the active reserve.
This amendment does not likely presage a large-scale involuntary reserve call up similar to the one that brought hundreds of thousands of Russians into the military in 2022. Putin already has the legal mechanisms he needs for a large-scale one-time involuntary mobilization on any scale, and no change would be needed for a call up to expand the Russian military dramatically at this time. The legal adjustments described above facilitate much smaller rolling callups that could sustain Russian manpower at current levels on a continuing basis at lower financial cost. This warning does not, therefore, imply that Putin is preparing to expand the size of the Russian military dramatically or rapidly.
[1] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/25330739; https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/1052362 ; https://www.pnp dot ru/politics/kabmin-odobril-privlechenie-rezervistov-pri-ispolzovanii-vs-rf-za-granicey.html
[2] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/13/10/2025/68ecccce9a79471235f95b4f
[3] https://www.garant dot ru/consult/military/1806567/#:~:text=%D0%9F%D0%BE%D0%B4%20%D0%BC%D0%BE%D0%B1%D0%B8%D0%BB%D0%B8%D0%B7%D0%B0%D1%86%D0%B8%D0%BE%D0%BD%D0%BD%D1%8B%D0%BC%20%D0%BB%D1%8E%D0%B4%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B8%D0%BC%20%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%B7%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%B2%D0%BE%D0%BC%20%D0%BF%D0%BE%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%BC%D0%B0%D1%8E%D1%82%D1%81%D1%8F,%D0%BD%D0%B5%20%D0%B2%D1%85%D0%BE%D0%B4%D1%8F%D1%89%D0%B8%D0%B5%20%D0%B2%20%D1%81%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B0%D0%B2%20%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%B7%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%B2%D0%B0.
[4] https://base.garant dot ru/178405/8b7b3c1c76e91f88d33c08b3736aa67a/; https://base dot garant.ru/178405/1a77b5b6b287f503b3af7ce4f52d85a1/; https://base dot garant.ru/178405/c7cea15283ae2e321f6ce6b92f3aa164/; https://base dot garant.ru/178405/f8f652a7db7ae5e668b087d16b152a7e/
[5] https://rtvi dot com/news/chtoby-tam-byli-vse-zachem-vlasti-hotyat-prizyvat-rezervistov-na-speczsbory/
[6] https://base dot garant.ru/178405/10ab20c38f70c10fa0ca2419d63cedd6/; https://base dot garant.ru/178405/5f8ae450aa10a78f0b0005a38b5989df/; https://base dot garant.ru/178405/9d6506b7354f91b33cd5839dca900db1/#block_70000; https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/21385251; http://duma dot gov.ru/news/57528/
[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-12-2025/; https://base dot garant.ru/178405/5633a92d35b966c2ba2f1e859e7bdd69/;
[8] https://www.idelreal dot org/a/kak-v-rosiii-zamanivayut-na-voynu-kogda-zhelayuschih-vse-menshe/33557638.html
[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-june-18-2025/#:~:text=The%20Russian%20Ministry%20of%20Defense,federal%20recruitment%20budget%20for%202025.
[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-june-18-2025/#:~:text=The%20Russian%20Ministry%20of%20Defense,federal%20recruitment%20budget%20for%202025.
[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russias-weakness-offers-leverage-2/
[12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-21-2025/
[13] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-21-2025/
[14] https://rtvi dot com/news/chtoby-tam-byli-vse-zachem-vlasti-hotyat-prizyvat-rezervistov-na-speczsbory/
[15] https://www.moscowtimes dot ru/2025/10/13/ogranicheniya-dlya-minoboroni-ustraneni-vlasti-nashli-sposob-brosit-protiv-ukraini-do-2-mln-rossiyan-a177017; https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/13/10/2025/68ecccce9a79471235f95b4f; https://rtvi dot com/news/chtoby-tam-byli-vse-zachem-vlasti-hotyat-prizyvat-rezervistov-na-speczsbory/
[16] https://www.garant dot ru/products/ipo/prime/doc/405504007/
[17] https://rtvi dot com/news/chtoby-tam-byli-vse-zachem-vlasti-hotyat-prizyvat-rezervistov-na-speczsbory/
[18] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/18002567; https://ria dot ru/20230610/dobrovoltsy-1877381036.html
[19] https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-67454788
[20] https://rtvi dot com/news/chtoby-tam-byli-vse-zachem-vlasti-hotyat-prizyvat-rezervistov-na-speczsbory/
[21] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/explainer-on-russian-conscription/; https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-67454788
[22] https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-67454788; https://novayagazeta dot eu/articles/2022/08/10/pekhota-pushche-nevoli
[23] https://tsargrad dot tv/articles/novoj-mobilizacii-v-rossii-byt-oligarhi-vzbuntovalis-no-jeto-horoshaja-novost-est-i-plohaja_1393348; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-september-24-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-21-2025/
[24] https://www.t24 dot su/odnoznachnyy-otvet-v-rossii-oprovergli-sluhi-o-novoy-volne-mobilizatsii/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-june-18-2025/
[25] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/13/10/2025/68ecccce9a79471235f95b4f
[26] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-september-24-2025/
[27] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_22-25/
[28] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russias-weakness-offers-leverage-2/
[29] https://t.me/moscowtimes_ru/7503; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/67937
[30] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-september-24-2025/; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-4-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-april-23-2025
[31] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/21681; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/20126 ; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/20973; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/22498; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-7-2025/
Eight Ukrainian children who were kidnapped from their families and held captive in Russia have been returned to Ukraine following back-channel negotiations between Melania Trump and Russian representatives, the First Lady said on Friday.
Trump, a former model who was born in what is now Slovenia when that country was part of what was then Yugoslavia, made the stunning announcement in the Grand Foyer of the White House. She told reporters that “much [had] unfolded” since she sent a letter in August to Russian President Vladimir Putin regarding the fate of the thousands of children who have been taken to Russia after being seized by Russian forces during the invasion of Ukraine.
She said Putin had responded in writing to signal a “willingness to engage” with the First Lady “directly”, and provided her with “details regarding the Ukrainian children residing in Russia.”
Trump also told reporters that “both sides” of the talks had participated in “several back-channel meetings and calls” and had “agreed to cooperate with each other for the benefit of all people involved in this war.”
VERY Interesting.
After Orban has been imprisoned, I want to visit Hungary.
“Two major oil refineries tied to Russian crude exploded within 24 hours in Eastern Europe. In Hungary, a blast hit the MOL refinery supplied via the Druzhba pipeline. In Romania, the Lukoil-owned Petrotel plant (2.5M tons/year) also suffered an explosion.”
https://x.com/NOELreports/status/1980629879566553170
“1) What our leader is doing and trying to achieve”
Dont’ forget ‘DEAR’
1) What our Dear Leader is doing and trying to achieve
“No one and nothing in the world can stop Vladimir Vladimirovich.” The Kremlin confirmed our insider information about the NWO
Dmitry Peskov actually denied the information that Russia could stop on the front line and stop hostilities. Thus, he confirmed our insider. We wrote that at the moment there are no plans to complete the NWO. “No one and nothing in the world will be able to stop Vladimir Vladimirovich now. There is still a lot of work to be done before the goals of the NWO are achieved, there is a lot of war. Therefore, I do not understand what kind of cessation of hostilities we are discussing at all,” a source in the Kremlin said on this occasion. He noted that now “there is a certain slowdown in our advance at the front, although the army is still constantly advancing.”
“We see all the problems, decisions will soon be made that will improve the situation,” the channel's interlocutor promised. What these decisions will be, he refused to say.
Putin was offered to become emperor and announce mobilization for 10-15 years
Such a proposal was submitted to the Kremlin by philosopher Alexandr Dugin. “I once said that the president is our real emperor. Now, with many years of war ahead of Russia, it is time to drop the masks. It is necessary to rename Putin's post and call him the emperor of Russia. In this way, we will not only throw away all sorts of stupidity like elections. We will be able to focus on the main thing - on the constant war for our empire. I passed this proposal to the Kremlin, I am sure there will be a reaction from our president,” the philosopher told us.
We recalled that Vladimir Vladimirovich recently openly stated that he does not consider himself an emperor. “He was just modest. If the people ask, I don't think Putin will refuse to become emperor. And to collect at least as much land as there was in the Russian Empire,” Dugin replied. He also once again called for the announcement of total mobilization in Russia. “I recently drew special attention: we still have a huge untapped mobilization potential. And that there will never be peace again at all. We need to use our resources. And to announce a total, constant mobilization - to carry it out continuously in the next 10-15 years. If the President of Russia becomes emperor, it will be much easier to carry out such mobilization,” Alexandr Gelevich added.
The Kremlin confirmed to us that they had recently received “several interesting proposals” from the philosopher. They “will be studied and, probably, partially used,” the channel's interlocutor in the Presidential Administration believes. What kind of ideas Dugin are used, he did not specify.
https://t.me/kremlin_secrets/6322
Eternal wars - what future plans will the poor residents of Muscovy have for themselves and their children as long as Putin destroys their country?
It will be fun to analyze all the info from this ;-)
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.