Free Republic

The upcoming one-on-one summit between Presidents Trump and Putin is unlikely to produce a lasting peace because Ukraine, the primary combatant, is not at the table. The bilateral format plays into Vladimir Putin’s imperial mindset, creating visuals of great-power parity and evoking historical comparisons to the disastrous Yalta and Munich conferences where smaller nations’ fates were decided for them.

While a new Pentagon policy makes it easier for Marines to acquire and experiment with small drones, the U.S. military faces a catastrophic drone gap with Russia and China. A recent exercise highlighted the poor performance of the few approved, American-made models. The root of the problem is a nearly extinct domestic manufacturing base, leaving the U.S. unable to produce drones at scale without relying on Chinese components.

The U.S. Air Force’s plan to procure “at least 100” B-21 Raider stealth bombers is dangerously insufficient for an era of simultaneous great-power competition with Russia and China. Credible deterrent and the ability to fight a protracted, two-theater war requires a much larger fleet, in the range of 200 to 400 aircraft.

Eighty years after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, this analysis explores Operation Downfall, the massive Allied invasion of Japan that was averted by Tokyo’s surrender. The two-stage plan, Operations Olympic and Coronet, would have involved more than twice the forces of the Normandy landings and was expected to be unimaginably costly.

Air superiority is no longer just a matter of the capabilities of individual aircraft. It’s a question of posture, doctrine, and overall warfighting infrastructure. And in that domain, the contest is no longer so lopsided. The West can no longer take comfort in its F-35 fleet. The J-20 has evolved into its operational equal—if not its superior.

After decades of neglect left its stockpiles “far too shallow,” the United States is undertaking a massive revitalization of its munitions industrial base. Spurred by the demands of supporting allies like Ukraine and Israel, Congress is pouring billions into the effort.

Despite cheap drones devastating tanks in recent conflicts, the U.S. Army is developing the next-generation AbramsX. This move isn’t a return to old ways but a necessary evolution for modern warfare. The lighter, hybrid-electric AbramsX is designed as a networked “combat node,” integrating AI, advanced sensors, and an Active Protection System to survive on a drone-saturated battlefield. While drones have changed warfare, they cannot hold ground.

The U.S. Air Force’s plan to buy “at least 185” F-47 sixth-generation fighters is “dangerously delusional” and inadequate for a future war. To maintain air dominance against peer competitors like China, the U.S. needs a fleet of at least 400-500 F-47s. The current plan repeats the historic mistake made with the F-22 Raptor, where a small, boutique fleet was procured that proved insufficient for global demands.

Decades before the rumored SR-72 “Darkstar,” America had already conquered hypersonic flight with the X-15 rocket plane. In 1967, this remarkable experimental aircraft, developed by North American Aviation, reached a stunning speed of Mach 6.7, a record for a crewed, powered aircraft that remains unbroken to this day.

Following the fall of the Assad regime, Israel has established a new “red line” in Syria, launching major airstrikes on Damascus on July 16 to warn the new government against attacking the Druze minority in the south. The strikes, which targeted military headquarters, came after clashes erupted between Druze and other armed groups near Suwayda.

The U.S. Navy’s next-generation F/A-XX fighter is not a luxury but a critical necessity for countering the long-range missile threat posed by China. The current carrier air wing, reliant on the aging F/A-18 and the stealth-focused but range-limited F-35C, cannot “out-stick” Chinese defenses.

Ukraine joining NATO would be viewed by Russia as an existential threat, likely triggering a severe and multifaceted military escalation that could lead to a broader European war. The Kremlin has consistently framed NATO’s eastward expansion as the primary justification for its aggression, meaning Kyiv’s accession would be a direct challenge to Russia’s perceived sphere of influence.

The dominant Western narrative that Europe can arm Ukraine to victory against Russia is a “dangerous fantasy.” Europe’s defense industrial base is too hollowed out, its weapons production timelines too long, and its political will too fragile to offset Russia’s formidable military and industrial might.

Following US strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, Russian official Dmitry Medvedev hinted that countries like Russia or North Korea might supply Iran with nuclear warheads directly. This threat should be met with a firm US response based on strategic brinksmanship. If Russia or its allies provide nuclear weapons to Iran, a state that has serially violated the Non-Proliferation Treaty, President Trump should make it clear that the United States will, in turn, provide nuclear weapons or station intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Russia’s own neighboring countries, such as Ukraine, Poland, or Kazakhstan, to re-establish deterrence.

Despite media reports on a deal with Russia for the advanced fourth-generation fighter jets, they’re nowhere to be seen in Iran, despite Israel’s devastating air campaign. Russia’s much-vaunted Su-35 jets, fourth-generation aircraft that are, on paper at least, formidable, are nowhere to be seen in the skies above Iran despite the intense and ongoing Israeli air campaign. This is despite several reports over the previous two years that Iran would soon accept the Russian jets into service.

Israel’s surprise attack on Iran in the early morning hours of June 13 saw more than 200 aircraft strike more than 100 targets in Iran. Among the targets were key Iranian commanders, including the head of the Iranian army and also the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. This type of decapitation strike is how Israel dismantled Hezbollah, Iran’s ally in Lebanon.

The literature on Chinese warfare is replete with descriptions of how the country will annex Taiwan. The date usually bandied about by China watchers is 2027 for a successful amphibious attack on the island. This would be preceded by a shock and awe bombardment campaign aimed at bringing the city of Taipei to its knees. But another Chinese gambit would provide less violence but still do significant damage to the Taiwanese government and its residents. I am referring to a blockade or quarantine by the Chinese navy and a no-fly zone executed by its air force.

What needs to happen is simple, but, at least for now, looks pretty suspect if you ask me. Russia would need to get so exhausted from the war that its lines collapse. After losing 1 million casualties, thousands of tanks and artillery pieces, and billions of dollars in bombers and drones, Moscow would one day see its war effort collapse in a mix of exhaustion, anger about the overall direction of the conflict, and a society that had had enough. This would allow Ukraine to reclaim the initiative and retake large swaths of territory. But from here, things get even...

Summary and Key Points: The nearly $9 billion cost increase for Canada’s F-35 acquisition, bringing the total to $27.7 billion, is not the real scandal; it is a symptom of a deeper “strategy shock.” According to a recent Auditor-General’s report, this “sticker shock” is less concerning than the fact that Canada lacks a coherent plan to support the jets. Key basing infrastructure for the F-35s will not be ready until 2029, years after the first jets arrive in 2026, and the Royal Canadian Air Force already faces a severe pilot shortage, raising serious questions about the nation’s ability to operate...

Ukraine’s successful use of cheap, commercially available drones to destroy high-value Russian military assets serves as a stark warning that US air bases could be similarly vulnerable. Veteran Navy SEAL Brandon Webb, invoking the legacy of the 1980s “Red Cell” security-testing unit, argues that a modern adversary could use inexpensive drones, 3D printers, and readily available technology to cause catastrophic damage to US air power.