Iranian Regime tv Channel One hacked while it was airing Khamenie speech

Iranian Regime national tv Channel One hacked about an hour ago. During a broadcast of Khamenie speech, a red crosshair appeared over his face and chanting of Women. Life. Freedom. There was writing to the side saying "Rise up. Join us". Also 4 photos at the bottom of the screen of young people killed and additional writing: "The blood of our youth is dropping from your paws".

Also, there was a huge banner in the middle of Tehran highway today that read: We are no longer afraid of you. We will fight.

Also, attempted attack on IRI ambassador in Denmark. Her bodyguard was stabbed. Diplomatic Security intervened before the attacker could stab the ambassador.

Iran Update, January 17, 2026

The regime's plan to limit most internet and communication access in Iran to trusted Iranians demonstrates that the regime does not believe that the threat from this protest movement has passed and that the regime sees the protesters as enemies who will challenge its survival. The regime is implementing a phased plan that will lift the internet shutdown, but will not restore unfettered access for all Iranians. The regime will begin its restoration plan by restoring SMS services, then national internet and domestic messaging platforms, and then international internet access.[1] Messaging apps will only be available to verified and authorized users, which will enable security forces to blacklist certain individuals or groups from using the platforms.[2] It is not clear on what timeline these phases will be implemented, but a regime spokesperson said on January 16 that the regime would not restore internet access until the 40-day mourning period has passed and may not restore it before Nowruz on March 20, 2026.[3] A prominent Shia tradition is holding a mourning ceremony 40 days after a death; that the regime killed so many protesters means that thousands of 40-day mourning ceremonies are approaching, which could drive more protests. A US-based digital rights organization focused on Iran corroborated these regime media reports, adding that the regime is implementing a plan to make the international internet accessible only for whitelisted individuals.[4] Regime officials, including Supreme Cyberspace Councilmember Mahdi Akhavan Bahabadi and SCC Secretary Mohammad Amin Aghamiri, are developing and implementing plans to make international internet and messaging platforms only accessible to people with a high-level security clearance.[5] These plans demonstrate that the regime continues to view Iran's general population as a threat and that the regime believes the protest movement could resume if given an opportunity to do so.

The regime likely hopes to control the narrative outside of the country by only allowing regime supporters access to the international internet. Regime supporters could echo regime talking points in the international media and on social media, while the opposition is less able to successfully report the reality on the ground. Regime officials and media have repeatedly referred to protesters as “terrorists,” and would likely try to frame the protests as a counterterrorism fight to lessen international opposition to its brutal crackdowns.[6] The regime calls the protesters ”terrorists” to justify its use of lethal force to the international community while refusing to address the protesters’ legitimate grievances. The regime‘s internet blackout also enables its ability to conceal its use of lethal force because it restricts independent reporting and limits the circulation of evidence about the regime's crackdown on protesters.[7]

The regime's response to the decrease in protests indicates that the regime has no intention of solving the root causes of the protest movement, which will make the next round of protests almost a certainty. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has continued to claim that the United States and Israel are supporting the protests to deflect responsibility for the root causes of the protests.[8] He said protesters were either funded and trained by US and Israeli intelligence services or were “naïve teenagers” influenced by US- and Israeli-trained agents.[9] Other Iranian officials have similarly blamed external “terrorists” and deflected responsibility.[10] Khamenei’s words are reflective of the regime's long-running inability to recognize and respond to the demands of its population.

Khamenei did acknowledge that Iran's economic situation “is not good” and called on the government to take serious steps to address the issues, but these comments are insufficient. Khamenei would need to change the fundamental character of his regime and its political economy in order to respond to the protesters’ demands.[11] Transparency International ranked Iran 151 out of 180 countries in its Corruption Perceptions Index, which indicates that corruption remains widespread in Iran's public sector.[12] The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its subordinate institutions, such as Khatam ol Anbia Construction Headquarters, have dominance across key sectors and revenue streams, including control over up to half of Iran's oil exports, which further limits the government's capacity to deliver economic relief.[13] The Khatam ol Anbia Construction Headquarters is an IRGC-controlled civil engineering and construction firm that dominates broad swaths of the economy.[14] Iranian leaders would need to fundamentally restructure the economy in order to resolve the issues driving protesters’ concerns. The regime has yet to demonstrate any willingness to do so.

Khamenei could begin to solve some of these issues if he prioritized improving Iran's economic situation over the nuclear program, among other issues. Iran's leadership long prioritized its nuclear position over sanctions relief.[15] Senior Iranian officials repeatedly reject core US demands to halt its domestic uranium enrichment, stop funding the Axis of Resistance, and limit its missile capabilities, which consequently sustained the international sanction pressure that constrains government finances.[16] The regime faces severe fiscal constraints that US-led sanctions and chronic mismanagement intensify, and recent reporting ties the Iranian rial's sharp depreciation and high inflation to those pressures.[17] These constraints and structural drivers, which caused the protests, will likely persist and could fuel renewed protests.

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-january-17-2026/

Iran Update, January 18, 2026

Elements of the Iranian regime leaked information about purported plans to moderate regime behavior domestically and internationally.[1] The leak is likely meant to dissuade the United States from attacking Iran in response to the brutal regime crackdown on protests. A former regime official close to Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani told an English-language diaspora outlet that Larijani is pushing to moderate regime policies and conduct major economic and social reforms.[2] The source alleged that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei backs Larijani in that effort.[3] The source added that Larijani’s success depends on the United States and Israel, implying that attacks on Iran would disrupt efforts to moderate and reform.[4] The leakers likely seek to portray the regime as rehabilitating itself and to imply that attacking the regime would be counterproductive.

Serious regime moderation depends entirely on Supreme Leader Khamenei, however, who has continued to signal his commitment to the hardline positions that he has maintained for decades. Khamenei gave a speech on January 17 during which he reiterated his uncompromising stance toward the protests, labeling them as foreign agents and terrorists.[5] Khamenei also emphasized the need to improve the economy but articulated no novel thoughts on how to do so.[6] Khamenei would have a strong incentive to debut major reforms if he were seriously considering them. That he did not raise doubt about the extent to which Khamenei supports reforms and, in fact, indicates that he will more likely retain his previously held hardline views.

The leakers separately tried to validate relatively moderate regime figures and frame them as influential voices.[7] The leakers claimed that Khamenei and Larijani enthusiastically support Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi. That selective disclosure of information is likely meant to empower Araghchi, especially before foreign officials who doubt the extent to which he speaks with serious authority. The leakers further tried to connect Larijani and Araghchi to former moderate President Hassan Rouhani and his foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, to reinforce the idea that the band of pragmatic leaders is resurgent in Iran.

The portrayal of Larijani as a pragmatic reformer clashes with his record as SNSC secretary. Larijani has overseen the most brutal crackdown that the regime has ever conducted, which the leakers acknowledged and likened to the Tiananmen Square massacre.[8] The extent of the crackdown has become clearer, as more information has become available. An unspecified Iranian official told Reuters that at least 5,000 people had died, including 500 security officers.[9] The actual death count could be significantly higher, however. Iranian doctors using Starlink told The Times that around 16,500 protesters had died and around 330,000 were injured.[10] This is consistent with an Iranian cultural activist who described the circumstances as “urban warfare.”[11]

The regime is conducting a large-scale arrest campaign following the protests and signaling its plans to execute some of the arrested. The Iranian intelligence apparatus has announced hundreds of arrests across the country in recent days.[12] Judiciary spokesperson Ashagr Jahangir announced that the Judiciary will quickly hand out sentences tantamount to moharebeh — enmity against God — that carry the charge of the death penalty and “deterrent punishments that we will soon witness.”[13] Supreme Court Head Mohammad Jafar Montazeri stated that the Supreme Court is prioritizing “terrorist and rioting” cases and “no slightest leniency.”[14]

The regime is continuing and increasing its oppression against the Iranian public in order to prevent any protest activity, even short of going out to the street, which indicates the regime believes that the threat it faced from this protest wave has not passed. Tehran residents told the Wall Street Journal on January 18 that Basij members have patrolled Tehran’s streets on motorbikes in recent days, with some shouting, “Don’t come out! We’ll shoot you!”[15] The Basij also warned residents to stay away from the windows.[16] Those Basij may belong to the elite Imam Ali battalions, which are an elite, anti-riot force that is known for its common use of motorbikes for crowd control and intimidation. The regime most likely does not want protesters chanting anti-regime slogans from the window as an alternative to protesting on the street, which could maintain the protests’ momentum, especially because the regime has continued to claim that the protests are over.[17] The pervasive security presence is preventing protesters from coming into the streets–rather than the citizens’ lack of desire to protest the regime.

The Iranian regime has allowed Iranians access to domestic websites on the internet as part of the phase planned to resume internet access. The regime shut down the internet in response to the protests on January 8.[18] The Iranian regime began its gradual plan to lift internet restrictions on January 18, with users reporting the return of access to search engines, such as Google, but only with access to Iranian websites.[19] Ordinary internet connectivity in Iran remained disrupted on January 18, however.[20] Iranian state media reported on January 18 that users had access to local messaging platforms.[21]

Iranian state media acknowledged that there were some dissenting voices over the internet shutdown when it was first implemented on January 8.[22] IranCell Communications Services Company’s Board of Directors replaced Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Alireza Rafiei, who had been in the position for a year, with Mohammad Hossein Soleimani on January 18.[23] Iranian state media reported that the reason for the change was that the operator had violated the regime-imposed internet and communications shutdown on January 8, which facilitated the protests, according to unspecified sources.[24]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-january-18-2026/

Iran Update, January 19, 2026

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, and Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei have rhetorically favored leniency toward protesters but continue to support the regime's normal hardline approach to protesters, including executions. Pezeshkian, Ghalibaf, and Ejei called for “Islamic compassion and leniency to those who were deceived and did not play a major role in terrorist incidents” in a joint statement on January 19.[25] This statement notably does not say that all protesters should be pardoned and continues to refer to protests as “terrorist incidents,” echoing the regime's characterization of protesters as “seditionists” and “foreign-backed armed terrorists.”[26] The Judiciary announced that it will hand out sentences tantamount to moharabeh—enmity against God—that carry the charge of the death penalty for protesters deemed to be ”terrorists.”[27] The regime has historically responded to wide-scale anti-regime protests with mass arbitrary arrests, sentencing some protesters to death or life imprisonment while informally releasing others or freeing them through Khamenei’s pardons.[28] A US-based human rights organization reported that Iranian security forces have arrested at least 24,669 people as of January 19.[29] The regime cannot detain nearly 25,000 people and will almost certainly have to release thousands, issue life sentences, and execute others. Khamenei pardoned more than 22,000 detainees, and the Judiciary sentenced at least 25 protesters to death and executed at least seven protesters after the 2022 Mahsa Amini protests.[30] It is unsurprising that Pezeshkian, Ghalibaf, and Ejei signaled ”leniency” toward some protesters, since many would likely be released or pardoned under the regime's standard crackdown policy. The joint statement signals support for the regime's plans to execute some protesters by affirming the regime narrative that some protesters are responsible for terrorist acts. The regime has yet to publicly execute protesters from the January 2026 protests, but a human rights organization reported that regime jailers have committed lethal abuse at the detention centers.[31]

The regime will likely continue its internet shutdown despite indications that Pezeshkian and members of his administration may support lifting restrictions on the internet. Pezeshkian advised Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani on January 18 to lift internet and communications restrictions to facilitate online business.[32] Science, Technology, and Knowledge-Based Economy Vice President Hossein Afshin stated on January 19 that internet access is expected to be restored ”today, tomorrow, or by the end of the week.”[33] Afshin added that authorities may grant fixed IP access to large companies if disruptions continue, but emphasized that this would not entirely address the challenges facing the digital economy.[34] The Pezeshkian administration may seek to restore internet access because it recognizes the economic toll that sustaining the internet shutdown has on the Iranian economy. Internet monitor NetBlocks estimates that country-wide internet shutdowns cost over $1.5 million USD per hour.[35] The shutdown, however, enables the regime to hide the extent of its brutal protest crackdown from its people and the international community. The regime has signaled that it continues to believe that the threat it faced from this protest wave has not passed and, therefore, may be reticent to significantly ease internet restrictions in the near future if it continues to fear renewed large-scale protests.

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-january-19-2026/

Iran Update, January 20, 2026

The Iranian regime has expanded its crackdown beyond protesters by targeting merchants and businesses that supported the protests, which risks exacerbating tensions between the regime and a part of the Iranian population that the regime has long relied on for support. Merchants in Tehran began protesting on December 28, 2025, in response to worsening economic conditions and the rapid devaluation of the Iranian rial.[62] Shopkeepers and merchants across Iran subsequently went on strike in support of the protests.[63] Engaging in economic strikes is typically less dangerous than participating in protests, given that security forces are less likely to violently confront business owners who go on strike but do not participate in protests. The Tehran Prosecutor's Office announced on January 20 that it has opened cases against 60 businesses that directly or indirectly supported calls for protests on January 8 and 9.[64] Tehran Prosecutor Ali Salehi previously signaled a hardline judicial approach to the protests, dismissing US President Donald Trump's statements about canceled executions as “baseless nonsense” and emphasizing that the judiciary's response to protesters will be “decisive, deterrent, and swift.”[65] Iranian Supreme Court Head Mohammad Jafar Montazeri similarly stated on January 20 that the judiciary must file “special cases” against individuals who incited “riots,” including individuals who closed their shops or stopped conducting business during the protests.[66] Anti-regime media separately reported on January 19 that the regime has frozen the bank accounts of several business owners who went on strike in Esfahan Province.[67] Iranian authorities also arrested and seized the assets of Mohammad Saedinia, who is the owner of a popular cafe chain in Qom Province, on January 13 for “inciting unrest” after he joined the national strike.[68] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media claimed on January 19 that the value of Saedinia’s assets “is almost equal to the financial damage caused” by protesters in Tehran.[69] The Iranian regime has previously arrested and threatened to execute merchants who went on strike during past protest waves in order to stop protest activity.[70] The regime's current crackdown on merchants will likely exacerbate the grievances of the demographic that initiated the current protest movement, particularly as the regime has not signaled any willingness or intention to implement fundamental economic reforms to address the underlying issues that plague the Iranian economy.

The Iranian regime has threatened to attack US strategic assets in the Middle East if the United States strikes Iran, very likely to try to deter any US action against the regime. Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS)-affiliated outlet Defa Press listed on January 20 several US bases in the Middle East that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force could target.[71] Defa Press claimed that the IRGC Aerospace Force could target these bases with Fateh-110 and Khalij-e Fars missiles and Shahed, Arash, and Hadid 110 drones.[72] Iran previously attacked al Udeid Airbase in Qatar during the June 2025 Israel-Iran War.[73] AFGS Cultural Deputy Brigadier General Abolfazl Shekarchi separately warned on January 20 that Iran would respond to any attempt to harm Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei with a strong retaliation.[74] These threats came after an adviser to Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf suggested on January 19 that Iran did not use its maximum capabilities during the Israel-Iran War because the regime was anticipating a larger conflict in the future.[75]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-january-20-2026/

Iran Update, January 21, 2026

Some Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) elements do not approve of the regime's internet shutdown. An IRGC-affiliated Telegram channel said that the Iranian regime's decision to maintain the internet shutdown is counterproductive to Iran's “national security interest” because the shutdown has fueled public resentment.[58] The account is run by IRGC “fans,” so it is likely not speaking directly for IRGC commanders but may be speaking on behalf of some IRGC elements. Iranians have had some access to some domestic sites and messaging platforms for the past few days, according to a regime cybersecurity spokesperson. The IRGC-affiliated Telegram channel highlighted on January 20 how this limited access is not enough to resolve the shutdown's negative economic impact on the Iranian “digital middle class.”[59] A Tehran shopkeeper separately told Western media on January 20 that their business had gone down by 90 percent because of the internet shutdown and the protests, and noted that the limited internet access has not alleviated these effects.[60] Iranian Internet monitor NetBlocks estimates that the country-wide internet shutdowns cost over $37 million USD per day.[61] The Telegram channel's concern is consistent with CTP-ISW’s independent and ongoing assessment that the regime is unlikely to address the underlying economic factors that triggered the recent protest movement and is rather fueling these economic drivers, which makes it possible that protests could resume.[62]

This is not the first time that this Telegram channel has criticized the regime's internet shutdown. CTP-ISW observed that the channel published and then quickly removed a message on January 19, which criticized the Iranian government for the mixed signals it has given on lifting internet restrictions.[63] The channel's January 19 post voiced an opinion that contradicts the regime's official position.[64] Regime officials previously announced that it would ”gradually” lift the internet shutdown when, in reality, the regime's plan will make international internet and messaging platforms only accessible to vetted and trusted individuals.[65] Regime officials have also given different information on the plan‘s timeline, with some officials stating that the regime is implementing this plan and others stating that the internet would not be restored until the end of the 40-day mourning period.[66] It is unclear why the Telegram channel deleted its first post criticizing the regime, but later posted and did not delete a similar critique. The Telegram channel may have felt more comfortable publishing criticism of the regime‘s internet shutdown on January 21 compared to January 19, or Iran's deteriorating socio-economic situation may have reached a point that IRGC elements felt obliged to speak out. These two conclusions are not mutually exclusive.

The IRGC-affiliated Telegram channel's criticism of the regime's internet shutdown could be an indication of the IRGC’s parochial economic interests in restoring the internet. The internet shutdown has almost certainly disproportionately affected the regime's security apparatus and the IRGC writ large since their commercial and business work relies heavily on having access to international websites.[67] The IRGC is heavily involved in the Iranian economy. The regime's plan to relax the internet shutdown allows regime members to access the internet, but would not allow most Iranians to access the internet. This plan indicates that the regime seeks to allow regime insiders to benefit from internet access while still being able to control the narrative within Iran and use repressive measures despite the shutdown's economic costs for the average Iranian.[68]

The Iranian regime reportedly acknowledged on January 20 the first reported Artesh casualty of the recent protests. The Artesh is Iran's conventional military, in contrast to the IRGC, which is an ideological institution. US-based human rights activists reported on January 20 that Iranian regime-linked outlets stated that First Lieutenant Amin Salimi was shot and killed “while on mission” in Khavaran neighborhood, eastern Tehran, on January 10, which is when protests peaked.[69] The regime did not provide any details about Salimi‘s assignment, which makes it unclear what role he might have played in the protests. Salimi’s collar insignia indicates that he served in an Artesh electronic warfare unit, though the regime could have digitally altered the collar insignia. An Artesh electronic warfare unit would probably be responsible for supporting communications disruption efforts, including internet shutdown.[70] The Artesh previously issued a statement on January 10 in which it vowed to protect national interests, strategic infrastructure, and public property.[71] Artesh Commander Major General Amir Hatami also noted on January 14 that security forces, including the Law Enforcement Command, Basij, and Artesh, ”neutralized the enemy‘s plot“ during the protests.[72]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi intentionally obscured the violent reality of the regime's crackdown on protests, in which the regime killed thousands of protesters and arrested thousands more, in a January 20 op-ed in the Wall Street Journal.[73]Araghchi may have also published this op-ed in an attempt to dissuade the United States from taking any punitive actions against the regime. Araghchi reiterated the regime's talking point that the protests began peacefully but that ”foreign and domestic terrorist[s]” then attacked police officers and civilians.[74] Araghchi claimed that the regime had to respond to the ”terrorists” to protect its citizens facing ”horrors.”[75] There is substantial evidence that the regime killed civilians intentionally, and many eyewitnesses have reported that the government forces indiscriminately fired into crowds of protesters.[76] The regime has engaged in an unprecedented level of brutality against the protesters, with death toll estimates ranging from 2,000 to 20,000 dead and around 19,000 arrested.[77] The regime also instituted a nationwide internet shutdown, which suggests that it was trying to hide its brutal crackdown on protesters.[78] A regime trying to argue that ”terrorists” caused the killing would presumably want footage of the ”terrorists” broadcast to the world. Araghchi blamed ”Israel and its proxies in the White House” for causing the protests and for trying to provoke the United States into striking Iran.[79]

The Iranian regime continues to conduct counterterrorism operations in southeastern Iran, where it faces internal threats from anti-regime armed groups. The Iranian Intelligence Ministry announced on January 21 that IRGC Quds Headquarters and Law Enforcement Command (LEC) officers killed a leader of Ansar al Furqan (a Salafi-jihadi group linked to al Qaeda) and arrested 11 members of the group in three joint operations near Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[80] The Ministry claimed that the fighters were preparing to conduct ”terrorist operations.”[81] The Iranian security forces also seized a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG), two Kalashnikov rifles, six pistols, improvised explosive device (IED) equipment, and ammunition.[82] Ansar al Furqan spokesperson Nasrallah Baloch denied on January 21 that the Iranian regime arrested its fighters and killed one of its leaders, adding that the group is “prepared to punish” the regime.[83] Ansar al Furqan has previously conducted attacks targeting Iranian security forces, such as its December 16 attack on an Iranian checkpoint in Kerman Province that killed at least 16 Iranian intelligence and LEC personnel.[84]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-january-21-2026/

Iran Update, January 22, 2026

The Iranian regime is trying to downplay the scale of its brutal crackdown on the protests, despite implicitly admitting its crackdown has been the deadliest in Iran’s modern history. The Iranian National Security Council (NSC) claimed on January 21 that the death toll of the recent protests is 3,117 and that 2,427 of those are the deaths of security forces and “innocent” civilians who were caught in the crosshairs of “terrorist attacks.”[29] The regime killed about 1,500 and 550 people during the 2019 and 2022 Mahsa Amini protests, respectively.[30] The regime’s claimed death toll for the current wave of protests exceeds the previous two protest death tolls combined, even if the regime’s numbers are accurate. The regime’s numbers are almost certainly lower than the real death toll, however. United Nations Special Representative for Human Rights in Iran Mai Soto estimated on January 19 that the death toll is at least 5,000, adding that reports from doctors inside Iran stated that the number could be 20,000 or more.[31] The regime is also trying to inflate the number of security force deaths by conflating civilians with police. Anti-regime media reported on January 21 that security forces compelled the family of a deceased protester to claim that their son was a Basij member in exchange for his body, which allows the regime to portray itself as the victims of “terrorists.”[32] The regime is also concerned with controlling the outflow of information regarding the death tolls. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian stated during a meeting with Iranian medical professionals on January 21 that it is very important to “convince” the medical community about the regime’s narrative on the protests because it would help reduce tensions and control “social consequences.”[33] Iranian doctors and hospitals can correctly assess the true death toll in Iran and have reported it to Western media.[34]

Some Iranian security personnel have been reluctant or refused to violently suppress protests. Security forces’ willingness to suppress protests will be a determining factor in the regime’s ability to contain future unrest. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Intelligence Organization previously issued a statement on January 9 that it is “dealing with possible acts of abandonment,” which may indicate concerns about refusal of orders, desertion, or defection.[35] Anti-regime media, citing unspecified sources in Iran, reported on January 22 that “many” Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) members are “unhappy with the situation,” and are being forced to show up at work under threat of harm.[36] The LEC is Iran’s national police force and is the regime’s first line of defense during unrest.[37] Recent reporting also suggests some Iranian security personnel have refused orders, including reports that authorities arrested “dozens” of security forces in Kermanshah Province for refusing to fire on protesters, according to Norway-based human rights group Hengaw on January 8.[38] An Israeli media outlet separately reported on January 20 that hundreds of junior and mid-level IRGC and Basij officers have defected, according to Western intelligence agencies.[39] It is unclear why these Western intelligence sources would give information to an Israeli outlet before giving this information to a Western outlet, though it is not implausible that they would do so. Norway-based Human Rights media reported on January 21 that Iranian authorities sentenced conscript Javid Khales to death for refusing an order to shoot at protesters, which suggests an effort by the regime to deter others from refusing similar orders.[40] The regime is unlikely to lose the ability to deploy the LEC, Basij, and IRGC forces, but it could lose the willingness of some personnel to use lethal force, which could make repression less consistent across different locations in the future.

Iranian regime decision-making bodies have not yet agreed on the timing or terms of lifting the internet shutdown amid the regime’s continued concerns that restoring internet access could reignite future protests. The regime’s apprehension about restoring internet access aligns with CTP-ISW’s ongoing assessment that the regime’s refusal to address the protesters’ demands for economic reform risks future protests.[64] The Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) and the SNSC’s sub-committee, National Security Council (NSC), are prioritizing “security” over the economy, according to the NSC Secretary and Deputy Interior Minister for security and law enforcement matters, Ali Akbar Pourjamshidian, on January 21.[65] He made this comment as he discussed the internet shutdown, which suggests that the regime will continue to prioritize security by maintaining the internet shutdown rather than lifting the internet shutdown to alleviate Iran’s economic challenges. The NSC ordered the internet shutdown on January 8, and the SNSC has overseen this policy.[66] Pourjamshidian is almost certainly referring to the regime prioritizing the prevention of future protests. Pourjamshidian did not provide a timeline for when the NSC would lift the shutdown.[67] Regime officials are reportedly planning to provide full internet access only to Iranian personnel with top security clearances, according to information acquired by an anti-regime censorship platform on January 15, however.[68] President Masoud Pezeshkian and two of his political appointees, in contrast, recently signaled support for easing internet restrictions, largely due to concerns about the shutdown’s negative economic impact.[69] Pezeshkian serves as the SNSC chairman.[70] Some Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) elements similarly expressed support for lifting the shutdown due to economic concerns on January 21.[71] These elements are also possibly concerned about shutdown limitations on IRGC activities.

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-template-body-102425/

Iran Update, January 23, 2026

The Iranian regime has decided to restore international internet access nationwide over the next 24 hours, according to Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media on January 23.[59] The regime may assess that the internet shutdown’s negative economic consequences are more likely to reignite protests than allowing Iranian citizens to access the internet. IRGC-affiliated media reported that the regime began restoring international internet access in unspecified locations in Esfahan and Fars provinces on January 22 and would “gradually” restore internet in other provinces.[60] Internet monitor NetBlocks also observed a “slight rise” in internet connectivity in Iran on January 22.[61] Regime elements, including President Masoud Pezeshkian, previously indicated the regime’s awareness of the internet shutdown’s negative impact on the Iranian economy.[62] An IRGC-affiliated Telegram channel warned on January 21 that the economic consequences of the shutdown risked “stirring discontent.” Netblocks estimates that the countrywide internet shutdown costs the Iranian economy over $37 million USD per day.[63] The secretary of the Iranian National Security Council told Iranian media on January 21 that this council and the Supreme National Security Council were prioritizing “security” over the economy in regard to the shutdown.[64] These decision-making bodies may have concluded that continuing the internet shutdown poses a greater threat to Iran’s internal security than restoring internet access.

It remains unclear whether the regime will restore international internet access to the whole population, however. Internet monitor Filterwatch reported on January 15 that the Iranian regime is planning to provide international internet access only to individuals with “security clearance.”[65] Such a plan would significantly limit the number of Iranian citizens who could interact with internet users outside Iran. Filterwatch added that “users’ access to international internet will never return to its previous form,” which suggests that the regime may restrict who can access the international internet or further restrict the content that Iranians can view online even after it has claimed to “reopen” the international internet.[66]

The Iranian regime is continuing to fail to provide its population with basic services, such as water and energy, which could increase the population’s grievances toward the regime. Iran continues to face a nationwide shortage of natural gas, which is essential for heating systems during winter months. Several provinces across Iran announced the closure of schools, government offices, and banks on January 24 to conserve natural gas.[67] The regime-owned National Iranian Gas Company reported that natural gas consumption reached a record high and called on Iranians to manage their national gas consumption, particularly in northern and northeastern Iran, on January 23.[68] Gas shortages during the winter have previously triggered protests in northern Iran.[69]

The regime has also failed to address ongoing water shortages. Reservoirs across Iran are, on average, 35 percent full.[70] Iran’s water crisis is particularly acute in Tehran, where four of the reservoirs that provide water to the city are six percent full and therefore unusable..[71] Commercially available satellite imagery between September 2024 and January 2026 corroborates Iranian media reports about decreasing water levels at the Karaj and Latyan reservoirs near Tehran City.[72] The regime attempted to source more water in August 2025 by connecting eastern Tehran City to the Taleghan Reservoir in Alborz Province via a pipeline.[73] The Taleghan Reservoir’s water levels remain low too, however. Regime-affiliated media reported on January 23 that the reservoir’s water levels have decreased by 56 percent since 2024 and is only 23 percent full.[74] The only solution that regime officials have provided for the water crisis in Tehran City has been to evacuate residents to another location. Evacuating Tehran’s almost 15 million residents would be a tremendous undertaking and would require the regime to have a place to send citizens that has water, energy, and other basic necessities. The regime has neither stated where it would send Tehran residents nor presented a plan or made visible preparations to evacuate the city. The regime’s continued failure to address the energy and water crises sets Iran on a trajectory toward a possible humanitarian crisis and further popular unrest.

Prominent Iranian Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid directly challenged the regime’s narrative about the recent protests in his sermon on January 23 by confirming that the regime killed thousands of Iranian civilians during the protests.[80] Abdol Hamid stated that the death toll from the recent protests has “astonished and stunned” Iranians and the world.[81] Abdol Hamid added that the protesters whom the regime killed were Iranians, not “foreigners,” which challenges the regime’s narrative that the individuals who participated in the protests were “terrorists” backed by foreign actors.[82] Abdol Hamid also called for the release of detained protesters and the immediate restoration of the international internet.[83] Abdol Hamid often criticizes the regime in his weekly sermons and has been a catalyst for protests in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province. Zahedan residents started conducting weekly protests after Abdol Hamid’s sermons after the regime violently cracked down on protesters in September 2022 in an incident that became known as “Bloody Friday.”[84] Zahedan residents continued to hold weekly protests long after the Mahsa Amini movement had culminated in other parts of Iran.[85] CTP-ISW did not record any protests in Zahedan on January 23. A human rights organization that monitors developments in Sistan and Baluchistan Province reported on January 23 a large presence of military and security forces near Makki Mosque, where Abdol Hamid leads Friday prayers.[86]

An anti-regime social media account that has monitored the recent protests in Iran and a BBC Persian reporter reported on January 22 that Iranian authorities executed Ali Rahbar, presumably for participating in the protests.[87] The BBC Persian journalist reported that Iranian authorities arrested Rahbar 10 days ago, citing information he obtained from Rahbar’s relatives.[88] Rahbar’s relatives told the journalist that they do not have any details about the charges that led to his execution.[89] CTP-ISW can neither verify these reports nor confirm that Rahbar was arrested for participating in the protests.

The US Treasury Department sanctioned eight shipping companies and nine shadow fleet vessels for transporting “hundreds of millions of dollars” worth of Iranian oil to foreign markets [90] US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent emphasized that the new US sanctions target a “critical component of how Iran generates the funds used to repress its own people.”[91] The US Treasury Department stated that it is increasing pressure on Iran’s shadow fleet because this fleet generates revenue that the Iranian regime uses to fund the Axis of Resistance, its weapons programs, and Iranian security services.[92]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-january-23-2026/

Anti-regime media claimed on January 24 that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has moved into an underground shelter in Tehran Province.[35] Two unspecified sources close to the regime told the outlet that Khamenei relocated to a “fortified site with interconnected tunnels” after senior Iranian officials assessed that the risk of a potential US attack had increased.[36] The sources added that Khamenei’s third son, Masoud, has assumed day-to-day oversight of the Supreme Leader's office and is now the primary conduit for coordination with the government's executive institutions.[37] It is plausible that Khamenei has moved into an underground shelter, given that he similarly did so during the Israel-Iran War. The New York Times reported in June 2025 that Khamenei had relied on a “trusted aide” and suspended electronic communications while “ensconced in a bunker” during the Israel-Iran War.[38] These security measures would likely restrict access to Khamenei and disrupt regular communications within the regime. An opposition outlet previously reported that some Iranian officials, including former President Hassan Rouhani, Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani, and Expediency Discernment Council Chairman Sadegh Amoli Larijani, reportedly attempted to contact Khamenei to advocate for a ceasefire in June 2025 but were unsuccessful.[39]

Iranian officials are continuing to try to deter potential US military action against Iran amid the United States’ military buildup in the Middle East. An unspecified senior Iranian official told Reuters on January 23 that Iran would treat any attack “as an all-out war.” His statement comes as a US carrier strike group and other assets will arrive in the Middle East “in the coming days.”[40] The official added that Iran hopes that the carrier strike group will not be used to confront Iran, but that the Iranian armed forces are ready for the “worst-case scenario.”[41] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRCG) Commander Major General Mohammad Pakpour and IRGC Deputy Commander Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi separately warned on January 24 that Iran is “more ready than ever” and has its “finger on the trigger.”[42] An IRGC-affiliated outlet threatened on January 24 that Iran could close the Strait of Hormuz if the United States disrupts Iranian and regional security.[43] These warnings come after senior Iranian officials have threatened in recent days to attack US bases in the region if the United States attacks Iran.[44]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-january-24-2026/

Iran Update, January 25, 2026

Some Iranian officials have continued to leak damning information about the regime’s brutal crackdown to Western media, which indicates that some regime personnel may oppose the regime’s crackdown. The New York Times reported on January 25 that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei ordered the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) on January 9 to crush the protests “by any means necessary,” citing two Iranian officials briefed on Khamenei’s directive.[1] The officials stated that security forces were ordered to shoot to kill and “show no mercy.” Anti-regime media similarly reported on January 13 that Khamenei had issued a direct order to kill protesters and that the SNSC had issued an order for security forces to use live fire against protesters.[2] Khamenei’s directive to the SNSC and the SNSC’s order to security forces to use live fire are consistent with reports that SNSC Secretary Ali Larijani played a leading role in the regime’s crackdown.[3] The United States Treasury Department sanctioned Larijani on January 15 and reported that he was “responsible for coordinating the response to the protests on behalf of the Supreme Leader of Iran.”[4] Two senior Iranian officials separately told TIME on January 25 that 30,000 people may have been killed on January 8 and 9.[5] Other Iranian sources, including sources from the SNSC and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), have previously reported high protest death counts to Western media.[6] Leaks of high protester death counts by regime officials suggest that some members of the regime may oppose the regime’s brutal crackdown on the protests. The leaks also undermine the regime’s ongoing information operation that seeks to portray itself and Iranian security forces as victims of “terrorism” and conceal its use of lethal force.[7]

The Iranian regime has not restored international internet access, and there continues to be an internal debate within the regime about restoring it. The debate primarily seems to be between regime factions that assess that restoring the internet could cause a resumption of protests and factions that assess that the economic toll of the internet shutdown could cause internal unrest. The regime shut down the internet on January 8 to prevent Iranians from being able to organize protests and to conceal the regime’s brutal crackdown on the protests.[8] Internet monitor Netblocks reported on January 25 that the internet shutdown in Iran has continued despite “brief connectivity spikes.”[9] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media reported on January 23 that international internet access would be restored across all provinces by January 24.[10] The Iranian Information and Communications Technology Ministry denied this report on January 25 and stated that the ministry “is diligently pursuing improvements in the accessibility situation.”[11] Conflicting messaging from IRGC-affiliated outlets suggests that there are divisions within the IRGC over whether to restore internet access. IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency criticized on January 25 individuals who support restoring internet access for economic reasons and argued that a safe security environment is necessary for economic activity.[12] An IRGC-affiliated Telegram channel conversely said on January 21 that the Iranian regime’s decision to maintain the internet shutdown undermines Iran’s “national security interest” because the economic consequences of the shutdown risk fueling public resentment.[13]

A political analyst close to the Iranian regime stated on January 24 that the recent protests were “one of the most alarming incidents of the past century” and represented a crisis that is “slowly deepening.””[14] These statements are consistent with CTP-ISW’s assessment that protests could resume because the regime has neither addressed nor indicated a willingness to address its population’s grievances.[15] The analyst, Mostafa Najafi, assessed that the recent protests represented an “escalating trend” and described large scale protests in 2017, 2019, 2022, and 2025 as “successive eruptions of an unresolved structural dissatisfaction.”[16] Najafi stated that the periods between each of these protest waves were periods of “condensed anger and expectation.” He stated that each protest wave in Iran “accumulates the unanswered demands” of previous waves, which reflects Najafi’s awareness that the regime’s failure to address its population’s grievances or provide concessions after protests only further deepens the population’s dissatisfaction with the regime. Najafi also assessed that the size and intensity of the recent protests compared to past waves reflect the Iranian population’s “eroding trust” in the regime.[17] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the recent protests were the most serious domestic unrest the regime has faced, and that the regime responded to this unrest with an unprecedented level of brutality.[18] Najafi’s statements are consistent with CTP-ISW’s assessment that the regime’s refusal to address the underlying grievances that triggered the recent and previous protest movements could cause protests to reemerge in the future.[19]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-january-25-2026/

Iran Update, January 26, 2026

Several members of Iran's Axis of Resistance have threatened to retaliate if the United States attacks Iran, likely to try to deter the United States from attacking Iran. These militias are very likely observing and reacting to ongoing discussions in Western and Israeli media about US concerns about a protracted conflict in the Middle East and likely seek to exploit these concerns by threatening to expand a potential conflict. Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah Secretary General Abu Hussein al Hamidawi stated on January 25 that the Axis of Resistance would support Iran against Israel and the United States and called on Kataib Hezbollah fighters to “prepare” themselves.[38] Unspecified Iraqi sources similarly told Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media that Iraqi groups have “sounded the trumpet of war” and that “all personnel are being armed and are ready” to attack US bases.[39] The Houthis separately posted a video on January 25 of its January 2024 attack on a British oil tanker with the caption “soon.”[40] The Houthis likely posted this video to implicitly threaten to resume its attacks against international shipping or US military vessels if the United States attacks Iran. Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem additionally stated on January 26 that Hezbollah would not remain “neutral” if the United States attacks Iran and, more specifically, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.[41] These statements are likely a response to recent media reports that the United States does not want a wider regional war.[42] These groups are likely threatening to get involved and expand a potential conflict in order to try to deter a US attack against Iran.

It is unclear if the Axis of Resistance would react to a US strike on Iran in the same way that it did during the June 2025 Israel-Iran War because these groups may assess that the United States’ current objectives against Iran are different from the objectives it pursued during the war. Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias previously threatened to intervene in the June 2025 Israel-Iran War if the United States attacked Iran.[43] Those threats aimed to deter US participation in the war. The Axis of Resistance failed to meaningfully intervene and impose costs on Israel or the United States for their attacks against Iran despite its threatening statements.[44] The Axis of Resistance may assess that the United States’ objectives in a potential attack against Iran are different from the United States’ objective in June 2025 to degrade the Iranian nuclear program.[45] The Axis of Resistance may therefore react differently than it did in June 2025, particularly if it perceived that a US attack posed an existential threat to the Iranian regime. US officials suggested to Israeli media on January 26 that a US strike on Iran would seek to facilitate regime change.[46]

Some members of the Axis of Resistance, particularly Lebanese Hezbollah and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, face domestic constraints that may limit their ability to retaliate if the United States attacks Iran. Lebanese Hezbollah has continuously prioritized reconstitution and avoided direct conflict with Israel and the United States following the November 2024 Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire agreement.[47] Hezbollah has not responded militarily to any Israeli strikes targeting Hezbollah military infrastructure and personnel in recent months, including Israel's killing of Hezbollah's “de facto chief of staff” and senior commander Haitham Ali Tabatabai in November 2025.[48] Hezbollah likely opposes any intervention in a potential US-Iran conflict that would threaten the Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire agreement because such action would undermine Hezbollah's objectives of limiting Israel's presence and operational scope in Lebanon. A US or Israeli response against Hezbollah would also likely disrupt Hezbollah's current efforts to reconstitute its forces and weapons stockpiles. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias like Kataib Hezbollah may also be hesitant to intervene in a renewed conflict because the militias’ participation could have repercussions on their domestic political efforts. The ongoing Iraqi government formation process is important for Iraqi militias because it will determine the ability of Iranian-backed actors to dominate Iraq and support Iranian interests within the country.[49] An Iraqi militia attack on the United States could prompt some Iraqi political parties to distance themselves from Iranian-backed militias, particularly if militia actions risk dragging Iraq into a conflict with the United States. Militia operations that trigger US action in Iraq are generally unpopular domestically.[50]

Iran has covered the anti-drone cage at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) at the Natanz Nuclear Complex with panels, which the Institute for Science and International Security previously assessed are meant to allow Iran to explore the rubble at the site discreetly.[51] It is unclear if Iran has repaired the anti-drone cage under the panels. Commercially available satellite imagery from January 26 shows that Iran has completely covered the PFEP’s anti-drone cage with panels.[52] Israeli airstrikes destroyed the PFEP during the Israel-Iran War.[53] The PFEP housed over 1,700 centrifuges, including IR-2m, IR-4, and IR-6 centrifuges, which Iran used to enrich uranium, including 60 percent enriched uranium.[54] The Israeli airstrikes almost certainly destroyed or rendered inoperable most, if not all, of the centrifuges at the facility.[55] Damage to the anti-drone cage and the internal structure was still visible in imagery from December 12, 2025.[56] It is unclear if Iran completed rebuilding the anti-drone cage before covering the facility with panels.

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-january-26-2026/

Iran Update, January 27, 2026

The Iranian regime's ongoing crackdown is exacerbating the economic collapse that spurred the Winter 2026 protests. The crackdown will therefore fail to address the underlying causes of the protests and could create more grievances that drive future protests. The Iranian regime's ongoing securitization measures, which include a costly and prolonged internet shutdown, are accelerating Iran's economic collapse. The country's economic collapse was the initial trigger for these demonstrations in late December 2025.[1] The crackdown's economic consequences have struck individual Iranians and businesses alike. The Iranian rial again fell to an all-time low on January 27 (see graphic below), and the price of basic goods has increased 60 percent since mid-December.[2] The internet shutdown costs the regime about $37 million USD daily.[3] Iranian online businesses, which are a major part of Iran's digital economy and generate $1 billion USD annually, have incurred at least $2 million USD in losses daily during the shutdown.[4] The shutdown has lasted 20 days and is the third-longest internet shutdown globally in history, according to regional media.[5] The regime has made only isolated efforts to compensate businesses, such as by announcing an eight-stage compensation plan for online businesses on January 27.[6] It is unclear how the government intends to pay for this or future compensation packages, given that the regime is already struggling to generate government revenue. The regime's challenges in generating revenue have also contributed to protester grievances because the challenges have forced the regime to raise taxes.[7] The regime's response prioritizes securitization over addressing root economic causes, which makes future protests more likely.[8]

The regime's decision to persist with its crackdown indicates that the regime continues to fear protests and understands that protests only temporarily stopped due to the widespread securitization and fear caused by the regime's extreme violence.[9] The violent crackdown may slow or stop protests temporarily, but it will not stop protests from occurring again in the future. This violence will temporarily deter people from protesting, but anger and frustration with the regime remain. Anecdotal reports from protester funerals and other commemorations in recent weeks indicate that Iranians continue to detest the regime and could protest if security pressure were lifted.[10] The regime has killed thousands of protesters, and security forces have arrested 41,880 people—more than double the number arrested in the 2022 Mahsa Amini protests.[11] Iranian judiciary officials have meanwhile threatened to show “no leniency” towards the arrested protesters.[12] The internet shutdown demonstrates that the regime recognizes the fundamental reality that the unrest remains an existential threat due to the widespread nature of frustration at the economic situation and anger at the extreme violence the regime employed.[13]

The internet shutdown is also liable to contribute to political grievances. The long-lasting internet shutdown has stripped the Iranian people of long-running modern conveniences that they have become accustomed to, including access to an internet-based economy and the ability to communicate relatively easily. The continued imposition of the shutdown will likely continue to aggravate the Iranian people and can create the conditions that can lead to further uprisings. Many Egyptians during the 2011 Tahrir Square protests—according to one study, as many as 27.5% of protesters—only became active protesters after the internet shutdown, for example.[14]

The Iranian regime announced several appointments to military and security positions on January 27, which indicates that the regime may have been dissatisfied with the incumbents’ performances during the January 2026 protests. The regime made the following appointments on January 27:

Brigadier General Jafar Motamed replaced Rear Admiral Mehdi Khajeh Amiri as Iran's Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics deputy coordinator.[61] The defense ministry is responsible for foreign arms sales and defense agreements. Coordination deputies in Iran serve in a similar capacity to the chief of staff of a formation in the US military.
Brigadier General Hossein Maroufi was appointed as the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps’ (IRGC) Cultural, Social, and Media Affairs deputy.[62] Maroufi has an extensive military background and previously held positions within the IRGC Ground Forces in Sistan and Baluchistan, Golestan, and Kerman provinces. He also previously served as Basij deputy coordinator. The United States sanctioned Maroufi in December 2022 for his role in the regime's violent suppression of the 2019 and 2022 protest waves.[63]
Iranian Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) head Peyman Jebelli appointed Ahmad Pahlavanian as IRIB deputy speaker and appointed former IRIB deputy speaker Ali Bakhshizadeh as an adviser.[64] Pahlavanian has previously held several media-related positions, including Qom Central Radio and Television director general. The new appointments within IRIB follow a January 18 cyberattack on IRIB that aired footage of Reza Pahlavi, son of former Iranian Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, calling on Iranian security forces to side with the public, as well as images of anti-government protests in Tehran.[65]
All three positions contribute to the regime's ability and capacity to repress the protests, and the previous incumbents were likely involved in supporting the crackdown on the January 2026 protests. The timing of these appointments suggests that their replacement may have been related to the regime's ongoing crackdown. It is unclear why the regime may have been dissatisfied with the incumbents, but some Iranian officials did not comply with orders to enforce the shutdown. The IranCell Communications Services Company Board of Directors replaced CEO Alireza Rafiei with Mohammad Hossein Soleimani on January 18, reportedly accusing Rafiei of “treason” after he was “delaying orders to cut connectivity.”[66]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-january-27-2026/

USD/IRR
https://www.bonbast.com/graph/usd

Iran Update, January 28, 2026

US President Donald Trump condemned on January 27 the Shia Coordination Framework's nomination of State of Law Coalition head and former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki as prime minister designate.[1] It is unclear if the framework will insist on Maliki’s nomination or bow to US pressure against Maliki. The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. Trump stated on January 27 that Iraq experienced “poverty and total chaos” when Maliki was prime minister between 2006 and 2014.[2] Trump threatened that the United States “will no longer help Iraq” if Maliki becomes prime minister again but did not provide further details.[3] Maliki, as well as many Iranian-backed Iraqi actors, condemned Trump's statement as a violation of Iraqi sovereignty.[4] Three framework sources told Iraqi media on January 28 that multiple unspecified framework leaders held bilateral and small group meetings to “formulate an initial position” regarding Trump's statement prior to an official framework meeting later on January 28.[5] One group of unspecified framework leaders wants to move forward with Maliki’s nomination, while the other group is concerned about the potential loss of international support or Iraq's “isolation,” according to the framework sources.[6] It is unclear which framework members are in each group, but Asaib Ahl al Haq head Qais al Khazali, National State Forces Alliance head Ammar al Hakim, and former Prime Minister Haider al Abadi all originally opposed Maliki’s nomination as prime minister designate.[7] Trump's statement on January 27 is reportedly not the first time the United States has expressed its opposition to another term for Maliki. The United States sent a message to the framework via embassy channels that caused “sharp internal debate” and “physical friction” between unspecified framework leaders during a meeting on January 24, according to a senior framework official speaking to Iraqi media.[8] The message reportedly included calls to disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and exclude them from Iraqi government formation while noting that the United States views Maliki’s previous terms “in a negative light.”[9] A Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)-affiliated journalist reported on January 28 that the January 24 US message did not “veto” Maliki’s nomination but highlighted unspecified risks if the framework selected Maliki.[10] The framework ultimately pushed through Maliki via a majority vote, despite objections from at least Khazali, Hakim, and Abadi.[11]

The Iranian regime is very unlikely to accede to the United States’ demands regarding nuclear negotiations despite US pressure on the regime to agree to a nuclear deal. US President Donald Trump stated on January 28 that a “massive armada” is heading toward Iran and urged Iran to “make a deal,” warning that a potential US attack on Iran would be “far worse” than the United States’ attack on Iranian nuclear facilities in June 2025.[29] Unspecified officials told the New York Times on January 28 that US-Iran talks have made no progress over the past week and that there are no indications that Iran plans to accede to President Trump's demands.[30] The United States has demanded that Iran cease uranium enrichment, limit the range and size of its ballistic missile stockpile, and cease support for the Axis of Resistance.[31] Iran has historically relied on its ballistic missile program and the Axis of Resistance as its main forms of deterrence and defense against Israel and the United States, and Iranian officials have repeatedly emphasized that Iran will not negotiate on these issues.[32] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi stated on January 28 that Iran welcomes a “mutually beneficial, fair, and equitable” nuclear deal that ensures Iran's right to “peaceful nuclear technology,” which is a reference to uranium enrichment.[33] Araghchi’s remark indicates that Iran has not softened its position on domestic uranium enrichment. Araghchi’s emphasis on a “nuclear” deal also suggests that Iran will not accede to broader demands that extend beyond the nuclear issue.

The Iranian regime has offered incentives for conscripts, possibly to try to increase the size of the Iranian armed forces amid reports of some security forces members’ disaffection with the regime's brutal crackdown on the recent protests. The Law Enforcement Command's (LEC) Public Service Organization announced on January 28 that it is reducing mandatory service time, allowing deployment delays, assigning recruits to units based on skill sets, and forgiving absences from mandatory service.[34] The LEC oversees Iran's nationwide mandatory conscription system.[35] The announcement of incentives for conscripts comes amid reports of some security forces opposing the regime's crackdown on the recent protests. A senior LEC officer from an unspecified Kurdish city in northwestern Iran told TIME on January 9 that his family had urged him to leave the LEC and that he opposed having to use live fire against protesters.[36] Anti-regime media, citing unspecified sources in Iran, similarly reported on January 22 that many LEC members are “unhappy with the situation” and are being forced to go to work under threat.[37] Iranian authorities previously arrested “dozens” of security forces in Kermanshah Province who refused to fire on protesters, according to a Norway-based human rights group on January 8.[38] The regime could be trying to increase the size of its armed forces in order to compensate for security forces members who could be reticent to use lethal force or could defect in future waves of domestic unrest.

The Iranian regime is cracking down on Iranian medical professionals who treated injured protesters. Anti-regime media reported on January 27 that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Intelligence Organization arrested a doctor at a hospital in Gorgan, Golestan Province, for treating injured protesters and objecting to security forces’ use of the hospital's roof to shoot at protesters, citing unspecified sources.[49] Iranian security forces targeted multiple hospitals, such as the Imam Khomeini Hospital in Ilam Province, during the protests to prevent doctors from treating injured protesters, arrest wounded protesters, and pressure medical professionals to prioritize treating injured security forces.[50] The regime has also pressured medical personnel to align with the regime's narrative about the protests. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian stated during a meeting with Iranian medical professionals on January 21 that “convincing” the medical community about the regime's narrative about the protests will “reduce tensions and control social consequences.”[51] The regime likely seeks to prevent medical professionals from sharing information about the true scale of the regime's violent crackdown on the protests. Two senior Iranian Health Ministry officials recently told TIME on January 25 that 30,000 individuals may have been killed on January 8 and 9.[52]

The regime continued to reshuffle media personnel on January 28. Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) appointed Hamed Fatehi Poladi as the Lorestan Province IRIB Director General on January 28.[53] IRIB is a regime mouthpiece that the regime uses to disseminate propaganda.[54] Poladi replaced Alireza Shiravi. Poladi’s appointment as the Lorestan Province IRIB Director General is notable given that Lorestan Province witnessed the sixth most protest activity by province between December 28, 2025, and January 13, 2026, according to CTP-ISW’s data. Poladi’s replacement comes after IRIB head Peyman Jebelli appointed Ahmad Pahlavanian as IRIB deputy speaker and appointed former IRIB deputy speaker Ali Bakhshizadeh as an adviser on January 27.[55] CTP-ISW assessed on January 27 that the appointment of new individuals to these positions indicates that the regime may be dissatisfied with the incumbents’ performances during the recent protests.[56]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-january-28-2026/

Iran Update, January 29, 2026

Iran is likely trying to deter US military action against Iran by deploying forces and conducting naval exercises in the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS)-affiliated outlet Defa Press claimed on January 29 that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy deployed “hundreds of fast, missile-launching, and support vessels in close proximity” to the USS Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier, which is operating in the Arabian Sea.[1] Commercially available satellite imagery also showed that the IRGC Navy's “Shahid Bagheri” drone carrier is currently six kilometers off the coast of Bandar Abbas, a major port city that is located on the Strait of Hormuz.[2] The IRGC Navy's deployment of fast attack craft (FAC) and “missile-launching” vessels is consistent with Iran's asymmetric naval strategy that counters larger and more technologically advanced naval forces through high speed and short-range missile capabilities.[3] Western media outlets separately reported on January 29 that the IRGC Navy will conduct a two-day, live-fire exercise in the Strait of Hormuz on February 1 and 2.[4] The IRGC Navy's upcoming live-fire exercise is likely a response to the USS Abraham Lincoln's arrival in the Middle East and is likely meant to deter the United States from attacking Iran. The deployment of naval assets and the upcoming exercise are also notable because Iran did not use any naval assets during the June 2025 Israel-Iran War. IRGC Spokesperson Ali Mohammad Naeini claimed in November 2025 that Iran did not use its naval forces during the war because there was “no need” to expand the war.[5]

Iran could respond to potential US military action by threatening US naval assets and obstructing international shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian officials have long threatened to disrupt shipping in the Strait as a way to deter the United States from implementing sanctions or taking military action against Iran.[6] One of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s advisers to the Defense Council, Ali Shamkhani, warned Iranian adversaries in October 2025 that Iran's response to any escalation in the Strait would not be “limited.”[7] Some regime-affiliated outlets have expressed support for disrupting international shipping to inflict an economic cost on the United States.[8] One such outlet claimed that Iran could increase the price of oil to such a degree that it would “collapse” the US economy.[9] Iran responded to the United States’ maximum pressure campaign in 2019 by threatening international shipping, including by seizing a British oil tanker, harassing vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz, and conducting an attack targeting Saudi oil facilities.[10]

Iranian media outlets circulated a January 29 Al Jazeera report that claimed that the Iranian Navy will hold a joint military exercise with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Russia in the Sea of Oman and the Indian Ocean “in the coming days.”[11] The reports did not specify whether the Artesh or the IRGC Navy will participate in the exercise. Iran, the PRC, and Russia have held annual naval exercises in the Gulf of Oman in recent years, usually in the month of March.[12] Russian and Chinese media have not confirmed the exercise at the time of this writing.

Iran is continuing to rebuild its nuclear facilities and trying to fortify them against future attacks. Recent US intelligence found that Iran is trying to rebuild its nuclear facilities “deeper underground,” according to a person familiar with recent US intelligence speaking to CNN on January 29. [13] It is unclear which specific nuclear facilities Iran is trying to rebuild “deeper underground.” It is possible that the facilities include the Mount Kolang Gaz La (Pickaxe Mountain) facility near the Natanz Nuclear Facility in Esfahan Province, although the United States and Israel have not targeted this facility, and Iran would therefore not need to “rebuild” it. Unspecified analysts told the Washington Post in September 2025 that the Mount Kolang Gaz La facility's underground halls may be between 260 and 330 feet deep, which is deeper than Fordow.[14] The International Atomic Energy Agency has never inspected this facility, which indicates that Iran could seek to limit international visibility into the site's purpose.[15] The Iranian regime is likely rebuilding its nuclear facilities deeper underground to reduce their vulnerability to deep-penetration munitions, such as the GBU-57 massive ordnance penetrator (MOP). The United States dropped 12 30,000-pound GBU-57 MOPs on Fordow in June 2025, targeting the site's ventilation shafts that led to a centrifuge cascade hall located at least 200 feet underground.[16]

The CNN report comes as Iran has taken steps to rebuild parts of its nuclear program that could potentially support the development of a nuclear weapon. Iran is encasing a newly built facility at Taleghan 2 at the Parchin Military Complex with a concrete “sarcophagus” to harden the facility against potential airstrikes, according to the Institute for Science and International Security. [17] Iran previously used Taleghan 2 to test explosives that are needed to detonate a nuclear device before it suspended its nuclear weapons program in 2003.[18] Iran's efforts to rebuild its nuclear facilities come as the 2026 National Defense Strategy noted that the Iranian regime has “left open the possibility that [it] will try again to obtain a nuclear weapon.”[19]

Iran likely seeks Chinese support to strengthen its domestic security and repressive capabilities, which signals the regime's continued concern about renewed unrest. AFGS-affiliated media reported that Law Enforcement Command (LEC) Commander Brigadier General Ahmad Reza Radan met with the PRC ambassador to Iran in Tehran on January 29 to finalize a security memorandum of understanding (MoU) between the LEC and the PRC's Public Security Ministry.[20] The LEC serves as Iran's primary internal security force and acts as the regime's first line of defense against unrest. The MoU aims to strengthen bilateral cooperation between the two institutions on public and political security.[21] Iran has repeatedly sought Chinese assistance to expand its domestic repression apparatus. The US Department of Justice announced in February 2020 that the Chinese company Huawei has supported Iran's domestic surveillance efforts since at least the 2009 Green Movement protests.[22] Radan met with Chinese Public Security Minister Wang Xiaohong in 2023 and 2024 and signed a law enforcement cooperation MoU during their 2024 meeting.[23] CTP previously assessed that Iran also likely modeled its digital authoritarian practices on the Chinese Communist Party's approach to social control.[24] The Iranian regime imposed a nationwide internet shutdown on January 8 to conceal its unprecedentedly brutal crackdown on protests and prevent Iranians from being able to organize protests.[25] The regime has sustained its extreme securitization efforts, which reflects its concerns over renewed protests.[26]

Iranian Artesh Commander Major General Amir Hatami announced the allocation of 1,000 drones to the Artesh’s four service branches on January 29.[38] Iranian media reported that the drones include reconnaissance and electronic warfare drones designed to target fixed and mobile objects on land, in the air, and at sea.[39] Hatami claimed that the Artesh will continue to enhance its “strategic advantages” to enable rapid combat operations and to respond to “any aggressor.”[40] Israel previously intercepted around 99.99 percent of Iranian drones during the June 2025 Israel-Iran War.[41] Iranian drones could be more effective in different circumstances, such as shorter-range shore-to-sea attacks, however.

The European Union designated the IRGC as a terrorist organization on January 29.[42] This designation requires the European Union to “ensure that funds, financial assets or economic resources…will not be made available, directly or indirectly” to the IRGC.[43] The European Union also sanctioned 15 Iranian individuals and six entities on January 29 for their involvement in the regime's brutal crackdown on protesters.[44] The sanctioned individuals include Interior Minister Eskandar Momeni, Prosecutor General Mohammad Movahedi Azad, as well as several IRGC commanders and senior LEC officers. The sanctioned entities include companies involved in the regime's censorship and misinformation efforts.[45]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-january-29-2026/

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