Several members of Iran's Axis of Resistance have threatened to retaliate if the United States attacks Iran, likely to try to deter the United States from attacking Iran. These militias are very likely observing and reacting to ongoing discussions in Western and Israeli media about US concerns about a protracted conflict in the Middle East and likely seek to exploit these concerns by threatening to expand a potential conflict. Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah Secretary General Abu Hussein al Hamidawi stated on January 25 that the Axis of Resistance would support Iran against Israel and the United States and called on Kataib Hezbollah fighters to “prepare” themselves.[38] Unspecified Iraqi sources similarly told Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media that Iraqi groups have “sounded the trumpet of war” and that “all personnel are being armed and are ready” to attack US bases.[39] The Houthis separately posted a video on January 25 of its January 2024 attack on a British oil tanker with the caption “soon.”[40] The Houthis likely posted this video to implicitly threaten to resume its attacks against international shipping or US military vessels if the United States attacks Iran. Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem additionally stated on January 26 that Hezbollah would not remain “neutral” if the United States attacks Iran and, more specifically, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.[41] These statements are likely a response to recent media reports that the United States does not want a wider regional war.[42] These groups are likely threatening to get involved and expand a potential conflict in order to try to deter a US attack against Iran.
It is unclear if the Axis of Resistance would react to a US strike on Iran in the same way that it did during the June 2025 Israel-Iran War because these groups may assess that the United States’ current objectives against Iran are different from the objectives it pursued during the war. Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias previously threatened to intervene in the June 2025 Israel-Iran War if the United States attacked Iran.[43] Those threats aimed to deter US participation in the war. The Axis of Resistance failed to meaningfully intervene and impose costs on Israel or the United States for their attacks against Iran despite its threatening statements.[44] The Axis of Resistance may assess that the United States’ objectives in a potential attack against Iran are different from the United States’ objective in June 2025 to degrade the Iranian nuclear program.[45] The Axis of Resistance may therefore react differently than it did in June 2025, particularly if it perceived that a US attack posed an existential threat to the Iranian regime. US officials suggested to Israeli media on January 26 that a US strike on Iran would seek to facilitate regime change.[46]
Some members of the Axis of Resistance, particularly Lebanese Hezbollah and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, face domestic constraints that may limit their ability to retaliate if the United States attacks Iran. Lebanese Hezbollah has continuously prioritized reconstitution and avoided direct conflict with Israel and the United States following the November 2024 Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire agreement.[47] Hezbollah has not responded militarily to any Israeli strikes targeting Hezbollah military infrastructure and personnel in recent months, including Israel's killing of Hezbollah's “de facto chief of staff” and senior commander Haitham Ali Tabatabai in November 2025.[48] Hezbollah likely opposes any intervention in a potential US-Iran conflict that would threaten the Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire agreement because such action would undermine Hezbollah's objectives of limiting Israel's presence and operational scope in Lebanon. A US or Israeli response against Hezbollah would also likely disrupt Hezbollah's current efforts to reconstitute its forces and weapons stockpiles. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias like Kataib Hezbollah may also be hesitant to intervene in a renewed conflict because the militias’ participation could have repercussions on their domestic political efforts. The ongoing Iraqi government formation process is important for Iraqi militias because it will determine the ability of Iranian-backed actors to dominate Iraq and support Iranian interests within the country.[49] An Iraqi militia attack on the United States could prompt some Iraqi political parties to distance themselves from Iranian-backed militias, particularly if militia actions risk dragging Iraq into a conflict with the United States. Militia operations that trigger US action in Iraq are generally unpopular domestically.[50]
Iran has covered the anti-drone cage at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) at the Natanz Nuclear Complex with panels, which the Institute for Science and International Security previously assessed are meant to allow Iran to explore the rubble at the site discreetly.[51] It is unclear if Iran has repaired the anti-drone cage under the panels. Commercially available satellite imagery from January 26 shows that Iran has completely covered the PFEP’s anti-drone cage with panels.[52] Israeli airstrikes destroyed the PFEP during the Israel-Iran War.[53] The PFEP housed over 1,700 centrifuges, including IR-2m, IR-4, and IR-6 centrifuges, which Iran used to enrich uranium, including 60 percent enriched uranium.[54] The Israeli airstrikes almost certainly destroyed or rendered inoperable most, if not all, of the centrifuges at the facility.[55] Damage to the anti-drone cage and the internal structure was still visible in imagery from December 12, 2025.[56] It is unclear if Iran completed rebuilding the anti-drone cage before covering the facility with panels.
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-january-26-2026/
Iran’s 2026 Massacre: Inside the Kahrizak Morgue presents, for the first time, unfiltered footage from inside the Kahrizak Legal Medicine Organization in southern Tehran, showing the bodies of those killed during the Islamic Republic’s violent crackdown on Iranian protesters.
The film includes:
Explicit images of deceased victims
Uncensored scenes from the morgue
Accounts describing the role of Tehran security forces in the massacre
These images are being released as historical evidence, documenting the mass killing of more than 36,500 Iranians, most of whom were murdered on January 8–9, 2026 under orders of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, carried out by the Revolutionary Guard, Basij paramilitary units, the police, and the Ministry of Intelligence.
This content may be deeply upsetting.
Viewer discretion is strictly advised.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7gypdxRyQlk
The Iranian regime's ongoing crackdown is exacerbating the economic collapse that spurred the Winter 2026 protests. The crackdown will therefore fail to address the underlying causes of the protests and could create more grievances that drive future protests. The Iranian regime's ongoing securitization measures, which include a costly and prolonged internet shutdown, are accelerating Iran's economic collapse. The country's economic collapse was the initial trigger for these demonstrations in late December 2025.[1] The crackdown's economic consequences have struck individual Iranians and businesses alike. The Iranian rial again fell to an all-time low on January 27 (see graphic below), and the price of basic goods has increased 60 percent since mid-December.[2] The internet shutdown costs the regime about $37 million USD daily.[3] Iranian online businesses, which are a major part of Iran's digital economy and generate $1 billion USD annually, have incurred at least $2 million USD in losses daily during the shutdown.[4] The shutdown has lasted 20 days and is the third-longest internet shutdown globally in history, according to regional media.[5] The regime has made only isolated efforts to compensate businesses, such as by announcing an eight-stage compensation plan for online businesses on January 27.[6] It is unclear how the government intends to pay for this or future compensation packages, given that the regime is already struggling to generate government revenue. The regime's challenges in generating revenue have also contributed to protester grievances because the challenges have forced the regime to raise taxes.[7] The regime's response prioritizes securitization over addressing root economic causes, which makes future protests more likely.[8]
The regime's decision to persist with its crackdown indicates that the regime continues to fear protests and understands that protests only temporarily stopped due to the widespread securitization and fear caused by the regime's extreme violence.[9] The violent crackdown may slow or stop protests temporarily, but it will not stop protests from occurring again in the future. This violence will temporarily deter people from protesting, but anger and frustration with the regime remain. Anecdotal reports from protester funerals and other commemorations in recent weeks indicate that Iranians continue to detest the regime and could protest if security pressure were lifted.[10] The regime has killed thousands of protesters, and security forces have arrested 41,880 people—more than double the number arrested in the 2022 Mahsa Amini protests.[11] Iranian judiciary officials have meanwhile threatened to show “no leniency” towards the arrested protesters.[12] The internet shutdown demonstrates that the regime recognizes the fundamental reality that the unrest remains an existential threat due to the widespread nature of frustration at the economic situation and anger at the extreme violence the regime employed.[13]
The internet shutdown is also liable to contribute to political grievances. The long-lasting internet shutdown has stripped the Iranian people of long-running modern conveniences that they have become accustomed to, including access to an internet-based economy and the ability to communicate relatively easily. The continued imposition of the shutdown will likely continue to aggravate the Iranian people and can create the conditions that can lead to further uprisings. Many Egyptians during the 2011 Tahrir Square protests—according to one study, as many as 27.5% of protesters—only became active protesters after the internet shutdown, for example.[14]
The Iranian regime announced several appointments to military and security positions on January 27, which indicates that the regime may have been dissatisfied with the incumbents’ performances during the January 2026 protests. The regime made the following appointments on January 27:
Brigadier General Jafar Motamed replaced Rear Admiral Mehdi Khajeh Amiri as Iran's Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics deputy coordinator.[61] The defense ministry is responsible for foreign arms sales and defense agreements. Coordination deputies in Iran serve in a similar capacity to the chief of staff of a formation in the US military.
Brigadier General Hossein Maroufi was appointed as the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps’ (IRGC) Cultural, Social, and Media Affairs deputy.[62] Maroufi has an extensive military background and previously held positions within the IRGC Ground Forces in Sistan and Baluchistan, Golestan, and Kerman provinces. He also previously served as Basij deputy coordinator. The United States sanctioned Maroufi in December 2022 for his role in the regime's violent suppression of the 2019 and 2022 protest waves.[63]
Iranian Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) head Peyman Jebelli appointed Ahmad Pahlavanian as IRIB deputy speaker and appointed former IRIB deputy speaker Ali Bakhshizadeh as an adviser.[64] Pahlavanian has previously held several media-related positions, including Qom Central Radio and Television director general. The new appointments within IRIB follow a January 18 cyberattack on IRIB that aired footage of Reza Pahlavi, son of former Iranian Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, calling on Iranian security forces to side with the public, as well as images of anti-government protests in Tehran.[65]
All three positions contribute to the regime's ability and capacity to repress the protests, and the previous incumbents were likely involved in supporting the crackdown on the January 2026 protests. The timing of these appointments suggests that their replacement may have been related to the regime's ongoing crackdown. It is unclear why the regime may have been dissatisfied with the incumbents, but some Iranian officials did not comply with orders to enforce the shutdown. The IranCell Communications Services Company Board of Directors replaced CEO Alireza Rafiei with Mohammad Hossein Soleimani on January 18, reportedly accusing Rafiei of “treason” after he was “delaying orders to cut connectivity.”[66]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-january-27-2026/