The Iranian regime's ongoing crackdown is exacerbating the economic collapse that spurred the Winter 2026 protests. The crackdown will therefore fail to address the underlying causes of the protests and could create more grievances that drive future protests. The Iranian regime's ongoing securitization measures, which include a costly and prolonged internet shutdown, are accelerating Iran's economic collapse. The country's economic collapse was the initial trigger for these demonstrations in late December 2025.[1] The crackdown's economic consequences have struck individual Iranians and businesses alike. The Iranian rial again fell to an all-time low on January 27 (see graphic below), and the price of basic goods has increased 60 percent since mid-December.[2] The internet shutdown costs the regime about $37 million USD daily.[3] Iranian online businesses, which are a major part of Iran's digital economy and generate $1 billion USD annually, have incurred at least $2 million USD in losses daily during the shutdown.[4] The shutdown has lasted 20 days and is the third-longest internet shutdown globally in history, according to regional media.[5] The regime has made only isolated efforts to compensate businesses, such as by announcing an eight-stage compensation plan for online businesses on January 27.[6] It is unclear how the government intends to pay for this or future compensation packages, given that the regime is already struggling to generate government revenue. The regime's challenges in generating revenue have also contributed to protester grievances because the challenges have forced the regime to raise taxes.[7] The regime's response prioritizes securitization over addressing root economic causes, which makes future protests more likely.[8]
The regime's decision to persist with its crackdown indicates that the regime continues to fear protests and understands that protests only temporarily stopped due to the widespread securitization and fear caused by the regime's extreme violence.[9] The violent crackdown may slow or stop protests temporarily, but it will not stop protests from occurring again in the future. This violence will temporarily deter people from protesting, but anger and frustration with the regime remain. Anecdotal reports from protester funerals and other commemorations in recent weeks indicate that Iranians continue to detest the regime and could protest if security pressure were lifted.[10] The regime has killed thousands of protesters, and security forces have arrested 41,880 people—more than double the number arrested in the 2022 Mahsa Amini protests.[11] Iranian judiciary officials have meanwhile threatened to show “no leniency” towards the arrested protesters.[12] The internet shutdown demonstrates that the regime recognizes the fundamental reality that the unrest remains an existential threat due to the widespread nature of frustration at the economic situation and anger at the extreme violence the regime employed.[13]
The internet shutdown is also liable to contribute to political grievances. The long-lasting internet shutdown has stripped the Iranian people of long-running modern conveniences that they have become accustomed to, including access to an internet-based economy and the ability to communicate relatively easily. The continued imposition of the shutdown will likely continue to aggravate the Iranian people and can create the conditions that can lead to further uprisings. Many Egyptians during the 2011 Tahrir Square protests—according to one study, as many as 27.5% of protesters—only became active protesters after the internet shutdown, for example.[14]
The Iranian regime announced several appointments to military and security positions on January 27, which indicates that the regime may have been dissatisfied with the incumbents’ performances during the January 2026 protests. The regime made the following appointments on January 27:
Brigadier General Jafar Motamed replaced Rear Admiral Mehdi Khajeh Amiri as Iran's Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics deputy coordinator.[61] The defense ministry is responsible for foreign arms sales and defense agreements. Coordination deputies in Iran serve in a similar capacity to the chief of staff of a formation in the US military.
Brigadier General Hossein Maroufi was appointed as the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps’ (IRGC) Cultural, Social, and Media Affairs deputy.[62] Maroufi has an extensive military background and previously held positions within the IRGC Ground Forces in Sistan and Baluchistan, Golestan, and Kerman provinces. He also previously served as Basij deputy coordinator. The United States sanctioned Maroufi in December 2022 for his role in the regime's violent suppression of the 2019 and 2022 protest waves.[63]
Iranian Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) head Peyman Jebelli appointed Ahmad Pahlavanian as IRIB deputy speaker and appointed former IRIB deputy speaker Ali Bakhshizadeh as an adviser.[64] Pahlavanian has previously held several media-related positions, including Qom Central Radio and Television director general. The new appointments within IRIB follow a January 18 cyberattack on IRIB that aired footage of Reza Pahlavi, son of former Iranian Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, calling on Iranian security forces to side with the public, as well as images of anti-government protests in Tehran.[65]
All three positions contribute to the regime's ability and capacity to repress the protests, and the previous incumbents were likely involved in supporting the crackdown on the January 2026 protests. The timing of these appointments suggests that their replacement may have been related to the regime's ongoing crackdown. It is unclear why the regime may have been dissatisfied with the incumbents, but some Iranian officials did not comply with orders to enforce the shutdown. The IranCell Communications Services Company Board of Directors replaced CEO Alireza Rafiei with Mohammad Hossein Soleimani on January 18, reportedly accusing Rafiei of “treason” after he was “delaying orders to cut connectivity.”[66]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-january-27-2026/
US President Donald Trump condemned on January 27 the Shia Coordination Framework's nomination of State of Law Coalition head and former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki as prime minister designate.[1] It is unclear if the framework will insist on Maliki’s nomination or bow to US pressure against Maliki. The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. Trump stated on January 27 that Iraq experienced “poverty and total chaos” when Maliki was prime minister between 2006 and 2014.[2] Trump threatened that the United States “will no longer help Iraq” if Maliki becomes prime minister again but did not provide further details.[3] Maliki, as well as many Iranian-backed Iraqi actors, condemned Trump's statement as a violation of Iraqi sovereignty.[4] Three framework sources told Iraqi media on January 28 that multiple unspecified framework leaders held bilateral and small group meetings to “formulate an initial position” regarding Trump's statement prior to an official framework meeting later on January 28.[5] One group of unspecified framework leaders wants to move forward with Maliki’s nomination, while the other group is concerned about the potential loss of international support or Iraq's “isolation,” according to the framework sources.[6] It is unclear which framework members are in each group, but Asaib Ahl al Haq head Qais al Khazali, National State Forces Alliance head Ammar al Hakim, and former Prime Minister Haider al Abadi all originally opposed Maliki’s nomination as prime minister designate.[7] Trump's statement on January 27 is reportedly not the first time the United States has expressed its opposition to another term for Maliki. The United States sent a message to the framework via embassy channels that caused “sharp internal debate” and “physical friction” between unspecified framework leaders during a meeting on January 24, according to a senior framework official speaking to Iraqi media.[8] The message reportedly included calls to disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and exclude them from Iraqi government formation while noting that the United States views Maliki’s previous terms “in a negative light.”[9] A Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)-affiliated journalist reported on January 28 that the January 24 US message did not “veto” Maliki’s nomination but highlighted unspecified risks if the framework selected Maliki.[10] The framework ultimately pushed through Maliki via a majority vote, despite objections from at least Khazali, Hakim, and Abadi.[11]
The Iranian regime is very unlikely to accede to the United States’ demands regarding nuclear negotiations despite US pressure on the regime to agree to a nuclear deal. US President Donald Trump stated on January 28 that a “massive armada” is heading toward Iran and urged Iran to “make a deal,” warning that a potential US attack on Iran would be “far worse” than the United States’ attack on Iranian nuclear facilities in June 2025.[29] Unspecified officials told the New York Times on January 28 that US-Iran talks have made no progress over the past week and that there are no indications that Iran plans to accede to President Trump's demands.[30] The United States has demanded that Iran cease uranium enrichment, limit the range and size of its ballistic missile stockpile, and cease support for the Axis of Resistance.[31] Iran has historically relied on its ballistic missile program and the Axis of Resistance as its main forms of deterrence and defense against Israel and the United States, and Iranian officials have repeatedly emphasized that Iran will not negotiate on these issues.[32] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi stated on January 28 that Iran welcomes a “mutually beneficial, fair, and equitable” nuclear deal that ensures Iran's right to “peaceful nuclear technology,” which is a reference to uranium enrichment.[33] Araghchi’s remark indicates that Iran has not softened its position on domestic uranium enrichment. Araghchi’s emphasis on a “nuclear” deal also suggests that Iran will not accede to broader demands that extend beyond the nuclear issue.
The Iranian regime has offered incentives for conscripts, possibly to try to increase the size of the Iranian armed forces amid reports of some security forces members’ disaffection with the regime's brutal crackdown on the recent protests. The Law Enforcement Command's (LEC) Public Service Organization announced on January 28 that it is reducing mandatory service time, allowing deployment delays, assigning recruits to units based on skill sets, and forgiving absences from mandatory service.[34] The LEC oversees Iran's nationwide mandatory conscription system.[35] The announcement of incentives for conscripts comes amid reports of some security forces opposing the regime's crackdown on the recent protests. A senior LEC officer from an unspecified Kurdish city in northwestern Iran told TIME on January 9 that his family had urged him to leave the LEC and that he opposed having to use live fire against protesters.[36] Anti-regime media, citing unspecified sources in Iran, similarly reported on January 22 that many LEC members are “unhappy with the situation” and are being forced to go to work under threat.[37] Iranian authorities previously arrested “dozens” of security forces in Kermanshah Province who refused to fire on protesters, according to a Norway-based human rights group on January 8.[38] The regime could be trying to increase the size of its armed forces in order to compensate for security forces members who could be reticent to use lethal force or could defect in future waves of domestic unrest.
The Iranian regime is cracking down on Iranian medical professionals who treated injured protesters. Anti-regime media reported on January 27 that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Intelligence Organization arrested a doctor at a hospital in Gorgan, Golestan Province, for treating injured protesters and objecting to security forces’ use of the hospital's roof to shoot at protesters, citing unspecified sources.[49] Iranian security forces targeted multiple hospitals, such as the Imam Khomeini Hospital in Ilam Province, during the protests to prevent doctors from treating injured protesters, arrest wounded protesters, and pressure medical professionals to prioritize treating injured security forces.[50] The regime has also pressured medical personnel to align with the regime's narrative about the protests. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian stated during a meeting with Iranian medical professionals on January 21 that “convincing” the medical community about the regime's narrative about the protests will “reduce tensions and control social consequences.”[51] The regime likely seeks to prevent medical professionals from sharing information about the true scale of the regime's violent crackdown on the protests. Two senior Iranian Health Ministry officials recently told TIME on January 25 that 30,000 individuals may have been killed on January 8 and 9.[52]
The regime continued to reshuffle media personnel on January 28. Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) appointed Hamed Fatehi Poladi as the Lorestan Province IRIB Director General on January 28.[53] IRIB is a regime mouthpiece that the regime uses to disseminate propaganda.[54] Poladi replaced Alireza Shiravi. Poladi’s appointment as the Lorestan Province IRIB Director General is notable given that Lorestan Province witnessed the sixth most protest activity by province between December 28, 2025, and January 13, 2026, according to CTP-ISW’s data. Poladi’s replacement comes after IRIB head Peyman Jebelli appointed Ahmad Pahlavanian as IRIB deputy speaker and appointed former IRIB deputy speaker Ali Bakhshizadeh as an adviser on January 27.[55] CTP-ISW assessed on January 27 that the appointment of new individuals to these positions indicates that the regime may be dissatisfied with the incumbents’ performances during the recent protests.[56]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-january-28-2026/