Iran Update, January 22, 2026
The Iranian regime is trying to downplay the scale of its brutal crackdown on the protests, despite implicitly admitting its crackdown has been the deadliest in Iran’s modern history. The Iranian National Security Council (NSC) claimed on January 21 that the death toll of the recent protests is 3,117 and that 2,427 of those are the deaths of security forces and “innocent” civilians who were caught in the crosshairs of “terrorist attacks.”[29] The regime killed about 1,500 and 550 people during the 2019 and 2022 Mahsa Amini protests, respectively.[30] The regime’s claimed death toll for the current wave of protests exceeds the previous two protest death tolls combined, even if the regime’s numbers are accurate. The regime’s numbers are almost certainly lower than the real death toll, however. United Nations Special Representative for Human Rights in Iran Mai Soto estimated on January 19 that the death toll is at least 5,000, adding that reports from doctors inside Iran stated that the number could be 20,000 or more.[31] The regime is also trying to inflate the number of security force deaths by conflating civilians with police. Anti-regime media reported on January 21 that security forces compelled the family of a deceased protester to claim that their son was a Basij member in exchange for his body, which allows the regime to portray itself as the victims of “terrorists.”[32] The regime is also concerned with controlling the outflow of information regarding the death tolls. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian stated during a meeting with Iranian medical professionals on January 21 that it is very important to “convince” the medical community about the regime’s narrative on the protests because it would help reduce tensions and control “social consequences.”[33] Iranian doctors and hospitals can correctly assess the true death toll in Iran and have reported it to Western media.[34]
Some Iranian security personnel have been reluctant or refused to violently suppress protests. Security forces’ willingness to suppress protests will be a determining factor in the regime’s ability to contain future unrest. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Intelligence Organization previously issued a statement on January 9 that it is “dealing with possible acts of abandonment,” which may indicate concerns about refusal of orders, desertion, or defection.[35] Anti-regime media, citing unspecified sources in Iran, reported on January 22 that “many” Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) members are “unhappy with the situation,” and are being forced to show up at work under threat of harm.[36] The LEC is Iran’s national police force and is the regime’s first line of defense during unrest.[37] Recent reporting also suggests some Iranian security personnel have refused orders, including reports that authorities arrested “dozens” of security forces in Kermanshah Province for refusing to fire on protesters, according to Norway-based human rights group Hengaw on January 8.[38] An Israeli media outlet separately reported on January 20 that hundreds of junior and mid-level IRGC and Basij officers have defected, according to Western intelligence agencies.[39] It is unclear why these Western intelligence sources would give information to an Israeli outlet before giving this information to a Western outlet, though it is not implausible that they would do so. Norway-based Human Rights media reported on January 21 that Iranian authorities sentenced conscript Javid Khales to death for refusing an order to shoot at protesters, which suggests an effort by the regime to deter others from refusing similar orders.[40] The regime is unlikely to lose the ability to deploy the LEC, Basij, and IRGC forces, but it could lose the willingness of some personnel to use lethal force, which could make repression less consistent across different locations in the future.
Iranian regime decision-making bodies have not yet agreed on the timing or terms of lifting the internet shutdown amid the regime’s continued concerns that restoring internet access could reignite future protests. The regime’s apprehension about restoring internet access aligns with CTP-ISW’s ongoing assessment that the regime’s refusal to address the protesters’ demands for economic reform risks future protests.[64] The Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) and the SNSC’s sub-committee, National Security Council (NSC), are prioritizing “security” over the economy, according to the NSC Secretary and Deputy Interior Minister for security and law enforcement matters, Ali Akbar Pourjamshidian, on January 21.[65] He made this comment as he discussed the internet shutdown, which suggests that the regime will continue to prioritize security by maintaining the internet shutdown rather than lifting the internet shutdown to alleviate Iran’s economic challenges. The NSC ordered the internet shutdown on January 8, and the SNSC has overseen this policy.[66] Pourjamshidian is almost certainly referring to the regime prioritizing the prevention of future protests. Pourjamshidian did not provide a timeline for when the NSC would lift the shutdown.[67] Regime officials are reportedly planning to provide full internet access only to Iranian personnel with top security clearances, according to information acquired by an anti-regime censorship platform on January 15, however.[68] President Masoud Pezeshkian and two of his political appointees, in contrast, recently signaled support for easing internet restrictions, largely due to concerns about the shutdown’s negative economic impact.[69] Pezeshkian serves as the SNSC chairman.[70] Some Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) elements similarly expressed support for lifting the shutdown due to economic concerns on January 21.[71] These elements are also possibly concerned about shutdown limitations on IRGC activities.
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Iran Update, January 23, 2026
The Iranian regime has decided to restore international internet access nationwide over the next 24 hours, according to Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media on January 23.[59] The regime may assess that the internet shutdown’s negative economic consequences are more likely to reignite protests than allowing Iranian citizens to access the internet. IRGC-affiliated media reported that the regime began restoring international internet access in unspecified locations in Esfahan and Fars provinces on January 22 and would “gradually” restore internet in other provinces.[60] Internet monitor NetBlocks also observed a “slight rise” in internet connectivity in Iran on January 22.[61] Regime elements, including President Masoud Pezeshkian, previously indicated the regime’s awareness of the internet shutdown’s negative impact on the Iranian economy.[62] An IRGC-affiliated Telegram channel warned on January 21 that the economic consequences of the shutdown risked “stirring discontent.” Netblocks estimates that the countrywide internet shutdown costs the Iranian economy over $37 million USD per day.[63] The secretary of the Iranian National Security Council told Iranian media on January 21 that this council and the Supreme National Security Council were prioritizing “security” over the economy in regard to the shutdown.[64] These decision-making bodies may have concluded that continuing the internet shutdown poses a greater threat to Iran’s internal security than restoring internet access.
It remains unclear whether the regime will restore international internet access to the whole population, however. Internet monitor Filterwatch reported on January 15 that the Iranian regime is planning to provide international internet access only to individuals with “security clearance.”[65] Such a plan would significantly limit the number of Iranian citizens who could interact with internet users outside Iran. Filterwatch added that “users’ access to international internet will never return to its previous form,” which suggests that the regime may restrict who can access the international internet or further restrict the content that Iranians can view online even after it has claimed to “reopen” the international internet.[66]
The Iranian regime is continuing to fail to provide its population with basic services, such as water and energy, which could increase the population’s grievances toward the regime. Iran continues to face a nationwide shortage of natural gas, which is essential for heating systems during winter months. Several provinces across Iran announced the closure of schools, government offices, and banks on January 24 to conserve natural gas.[67] The regime-owned National Iranian Gas Company reported that natural gas consumption reached a record high and called on Iranians to manage their national gas consumption, particularly in northern and northeastern Iran, on January 23.[68] Gas shortages during the winter have previously triggered protests in northern Iran.[69]
The regime has also failed to address ongoing water shortages. Reservoirs across Iran are, on average, 35 percent full.[70] Iran’s water crisis is particularly acute in Tehran, where four of the reservoirs that provide water to the city are six percent full and therefore unusable..[71] Commercially available satellite imagery between September 2024 and January 2026 corroborates Iranian media reports about decreasing water levels at the Karaj and Latyan reservoirs near Tehran City.[72] The regime attempted to source more water in August 2025 by connecting eastern Tehran City to the Taleghan Reservoir in Alborz Province via a pipeline.[73] The Taleghan Reservoir’s water levels remain low too, however. Regime-affiliated media reported on January 23 that the reservoir’s water levels have decreased by 56 percent since 2024 and is only 23 percent full.[74] The only solution that regime officials have provided for the water crisis in Tehran City has been to evacuate residents to another location. Evacuating Tehran’s almost 15 million residents would be a tremendous undertaking and would require the regime to have a place to send citizens that has water, energy, and other basic necessities. The regime has neither stated where it would send Tehran residents nor presented a plan or made visible preparations to evacuate the city. The regime’s continued failure to address the energy and water crises sets Iran on a trajectory toward a possible humanitarian crisis and further popular unrest.
Prominent Iranian Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid directly challenged the regime’s narrative about the recent protests in his sermon on January 23 by confirming that the regime killed thousands of Iranian civilians during the protests.[80] Abdol Hamid stated that the death toll from the recent protests has “astonished and stunned” Iranians and the world.[81] Abdol Hamid added that the protesters whom the regime killed were Iranians, not “foreigners,” which challenges the regime’s narrative that the individuals who participated in the protests were “terrorists” backed by foreign actors.[82] Abdol Hamid also called for the release of detained protesters and the immediate restoration of the international internet.[83] Abdol Hamid often criticizes the regime in his weekly sermons and has been a catalyst for protests in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province. Zahedan residents started conducting weekly protests after Abdol Hamid’s sermons after the regime violently cracked down on protesters in September 2022 in an incident that became known as “Bloody Friday.”[84] Zahedan residents continued to hold weekly protests long after the Mahsa Amini movement had culminated in other parts of Iran.[85] CTP-ISW did not record any protests in Zahedan on January 23. A human rights organization that monitors developments in Sistan and Baluchistan Province reported on January 23 a large presence of military and security forces near Makki Mosque, where Abdol Hamid leads Friday prayers.[86]
An anti-regime social media account that has monitored the recent protests in Iran and a BBC Persian reporter reported on January 22 that Iranian authorities executed Ali Rahbar, presumably for participating in the protests.[87] The BBC Persian journalist reported that Iranian authorities arrested Rahbar 10 days ago, citing information he obtained from Rahbar’s relatives.[88] Rahbar’s relatives told the journalist that they do not have any details about the charges that led to his execution.[89] CTP-ISW can neither verify these reports nor confirm that Rahbar was arrested for participating in the protests.
The US Treasury Department sanctioned eight shipping companies and nine shadow fleet vessels for transporting “hundreds of millions of dollars” worth of Iranian oil to foreign markets [90] US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent emphasized that the new US sanctions target a “critical component of how Iran generates the funds used to repress its own people.”[91] The US Treasury Department stated that it is increasing pressure on Iran’s shadow fleet because this fleet generates revenue that the Iranian regime uses to fund the Axis of Resistance, its weapons programs, and Iranian security services.[92]
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