Iran Update, January 25, 2026
Some Iranian officials have continued to leak damning information about the regime’s brutal crackdown to Western media, which indicates that some regime personnel may oppose the regime’s crackdown. The New York Times reported on January 25 that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei ordered the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) on January 9 to crush the protests “by any means necessary,” citing two Iranian officials briefed on Khamenei’s directive.[1] The officials stated that security forces were ordered to shoot to kill and “show no mercy.” Anti-regime media similarly reported on January 13 that Khamenei had issued a direct order to kill protesters and that the SNSC had issued an order for security forces to use live fire against protesters.[2] Khamenei’s directive to the SNSC and the SNSC’s order to security forces to use live fire are consistent with reports that SNSC Secretary Ali Larijani played a leading role in the regime’s crackdown.[3] The United States Treasury Department sanctioned Larijani on January 15 and reported that he was “responsible for coordinating the response to the protests on behalf of the Supreme Leader of Iran.”[4] Two senior Iranian officials separately told TIME on January 25 that 30,000 people may have been killed on January 8 and 9.[5] Other Iranian sources, including sources from the SNSC and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), have previously reported high protest death counts to Western media.[6] Leaks of high protester death counts by regime officials suggest that some members of the regime may oppose the regime’s brutal crackdown on the protests. The leaks also undermine the regime’s ongoing information operation that seeks to portray itself and Iranian security forces as victims of “terrorism” and conceal its use of lethal force.[7]
The Iranian regime has not restored international internet access, and there continues to be an internal debate within the regime about restoring it. The debate primarily seems to be between regime factions that assess that restoring the internet could cause a resumption of protests and factions that assess that the economic toll of the internet shutdown could cause internal unrest. The regime shut down the internet on January 8 to prevent Iranians from being able to organize protests and to conceal the regime’s brutal crackdown on the protests.[8] Internet monitor Netblocks reported on January 25 that the internet shutdown in Iran has continued despite “brief connectivity spikes.”[9] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media reported on January 23 that international internet access would be restored across all provinces by January 24.[10] The Iranian Information and Communications Technology Ministry denied this report on January 25 and stated that the ministry “is diligently pursuing improvements in the accessibility situation.”[11] Conflicting messaging from IRGC-affiliated outlets suggests that there are divisions within the IRGC over whether to restore internet access. IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency criticized on January 25 individuals who support restoring internet access for economic reasons and argued that a safe security environment is necessary for economic activity.[12] An IRGC-affiliated Telegram channel conversely said on January 21 that the Iranian regime’s decision to maintain the internet shutdown undermines Iran’s “national security interest” because the economic consequences of the shutdown risk fueling public resentment.[13]
A political analyst close to the Iranian regime stated on January 24 that the recent protests were “one of the most alarming incidents of the past century” and represented a crisis that is “slowly deepening.””[14] These statements are consistent with CTP-ISW’s assessment that protests could resume because the regime has neither addressed nor indicated a willingness to address its population’s grievances.[15] The analyst, Mostafa Najafi, assessed that the recent protests represented an “escalating trend” and described large scale protests in 2017, 2019, 2022, and 2025 as “successive eruptions of an unresolved structural dissatisfaction.”[16] Najafi stated that the periods between each of these protest waves were periods of “condensed anger and expectation.” He stated that each protest wave in Iran “accumulates the unanswered demands” of previous waves, which reflects Najafi’s awareness that the regime’s failure to address its population’s grievances or provide concessions after protests only further deepens the population’s dissatisfaction with the regime. Najafi also assessed that the size and intensity of the recent protests compared to past waves reflect the Iranian population’s “eroding trust” in the regime.[17] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the recent protests were the most serious domestic unrest the regime has faced, and that the regime responded to this unrest with an unprecedented level of brutality.[18] Najafi’s statements are consistent with CTP-ISW’s assessment that the regime’s refusal to address the underlying grievances that triggered the recent and previous protest movements could cause protests to reemerge in the future.[19]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-january-25-2026/
Several members of Iran's Axis of Resistance have threatened to retaliate if the United States attacks Iran, likely to try to deter the United States from attacking Iran. These militias are very likely observing and reacting to ongoing discussions in Western and Israeli media about US concerns about a protracted conflict in the Middle East and likely seek to exploit these concerns by threatening to expand a potential conflict. Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah Secretary General Abu Hussein al Hamidawi stated on January 25 that the Axis of Resistance would support Iran against Israel and the United States and called on Kataib Hezbollah fighters to “prepare” themselves.[38] Unspecified Iraqi sources similarly told Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media that Iraqi groups have “sounded the trumpet of war” and that “all personnel are being armed and are ready” to attack US bases.[39] The Houthis separately posted a video on January 25 of its January 2024 attack on a British oil tanker with the caption “soon.”[40] The Houthis likely posted this video to implicitly threaten to resume its attacks against international shipping or US military vessels if the United States attacks Iran. Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem additionally stated on January 26 that Hezbollah would not remain “neutral” if the United States attacks Iran and, more specifically, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.[41] These statements are likely a response to recent media reports that the United States does not want a wider regional war.[42] These groups are likely threatening to get involved and expand a potential conflict in order to try to deter a US attack against Iran.
It is unclear if the Axis of Resistance would react to a US strike on Iran in the same way that it did during the June 2025 Israel-Iran War because these groups may assess that the United States’ current objectives against Iran are different from the objectives it pursued during the war. Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias previously threatened to intervene in the June 2025 Israel-Iran War if the United States attacked Iran.[43] Those threats aimed to deter US participation in the war. The Axis of Resistance failed to meaningfully intervene and impose costs on Israel or the United States for their attacks against Iran despite its threatening statements.[44] The Axis of Resistance may assess that the United States’ objectives in a potential attack against Iran are different from the United States’ objective in June 2025 to degrade the Iranian nuclear program.[45] The Axis of Resistance may therefore react differently than it did in June 2025, particularly if it perceived that a US attack posed an existential threat to the Iranian regime. US officials suggested to Israeli media on January 26 that a US strike on Iran would seek to facilitate regime change.[46]
Some members of the Axis of Resistance, particularly Lebanese Hezbollah and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, face domestic constraints that may limit their ability to retaliate if the United States attacks Iran. Lebanese Hezbollah has continuously prioritized reconstitution and avoided direct conflict with Israel and the United States following the November 2024 Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire agreement.[47] Hezbollah has not responded militarily to any Israeli strikes targeting Hezbollah military infrastructure and personnel in recent months, including Israel's killing of Hezbollah's “de facto chief of staff” and senior commander Haitham Ali Tabatabai in November 2025.[48] Hezbollah likely opposes any intervention in a potential US-Iran conflict that would threaten the Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire agreement because such action would undermine Hezbollah's objectives of limiting Israel's presence and operational scope in Lebanon. A US or Israeli response against Hezbollah would also likely disrupt Hezbollah's current efforts to reconstitute its forces and weapons stockpiles. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias like Kataib Hezbollah may also be hesitant to intervene in a renewed conflict because the militias’ participation could have repercussions on their domestic political efforts. The ongoing Iraqi government formation process is important for Iraqi militias because it will determine the ability of Iranian-backed actors to dominate Iraq and support Iranian interests within the country.[49] An Iraqi militia attack on the United States could prompt some Iraqi political parties to distance themselves from Iranian-backed militias, particularly if militia actions risk dragging Iraq into a conflict with the United States. Militia operations that trigger US action in Iraq are generally unpopular domestically.[50]
Iran has covered the anti-drone cage at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) at the Natanz Nuclear Complex with panels, which the Institute for Science and International Security previously assessed are meant to allow Iran to explore the rubble at the site discreetly.[51] It is unclear if Iran has repaired the anti-drone cage under the panels. Commercially available satellite imagery from January 26 shows that Iran has completely covered the PFEP’s anti-drone cage with panels.[52] Israeli airstrikes destroyed the PFEP during the Israel-Iran War.[53] The PFEP housed over 1,700 centrifuges, including IR-2m, IR-4, and IR-6 centrifuges, which Iran used to enrich uranium, including 60 percent enriched uranium.[54] The Israeli airstrikes almost certainly destroyed or rendered inoperable most, if not all, of the centrifuges at the facility.[55] Damage to the anti-drone cage and the internal structure was still visible in imagery from December 12, 2025.[56] It is unclear if Iran completed rebuilding the anti-drone cage before covering the facility with panels.
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-january-26-2026/