The regime's plan to limit most internet and communication access in Iran to trusted Iranians demonstrates that the regime does not believe that the threat from this protest movement has passed and that the regime sees the protesters as enemies who will challenge its survival. The regime is implementing a phased plan that will lift the internet shutdown, but will not restore unfettered access for all Iranians. The regime will begin its restoration plan by restoring SMS services, then national internet and domestic messaging platforms, and then international internet access.[1] Messaging apps will only be available to verified and authorized users, which will enable security forces to blacklist certain individuals or groups from using the platforms.[2] It is not clear on what timeline these phases will be implemented, but a regime spokesperson said on January 16 that the regime would not restore internet access until the 40-day mourning period has passed and may not restore it before Nowruz on March 20, 2026.[3] A prominent Shia tradition is holding a mourning ceremony 40 days after a death; that the regime killed so many protesters means that thousands of 40-day mourning ceremonies are approaching, which could drive more protests. A US-based digital rights organization focused on Iran corroborated these regime media reports, adding that the regime is implementing a plan to make the international internet accessible only for whitelisted individuals.[4] Regime officials, including Supreme Cyberspace Councilmember Mahdi Akhavan Bahabadi and SCC Secretary Mohammad Amin Aghamiri, are developing and implementing plans to make international internet and messaging platforms only accessible to people with a high-level security clearance.[5] These plans demonstrate that the regime continues to view Iran's general population as a threat and that the regime believes the protest movement could resume if given an opportunity to do so.
The regime likely hopes to control the narrative outside of the country by only allowing regime supporters access to the international internet. Regime supporters could echo regime talking points in the international media and on social media, while the opposition is less able to successfully report the reality on the ground. Regime officials and media have repeatedly referred to protesters as “terrorists,” and would likely try to frame the protests as a counterterrorism fight to lessen international opposition to its brutal crackdowns.[6] The regime calls the protesters ”terrorists” to justify its use of lethal force to the international community while refusing to address the protesters’ legitimate grievances. The regime‘s internet blackout also enables its ability to conceal its use of lethal force because it restricts independent reporting and limits the circulation of evidence about the regime's crackdown on protesters.[7]
The regime's response to the decrease in protests indicates that the regime has no intention of solving the root causes of the protest movement, which will make the next round of protests almost a certainty. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has continued to claim that the United States and Israel are supporting the protests to deflect responsibility for the root causes of the protests.[8] He said protesters were either funded and trained by US and Israeli intelligence services or were “naïve teenagers” influenced by US- and Israeli-trained agents.[9] Other Iranian officials have similarly blamed external “terrorists” and deflected responsibility.[10] Khamenei’s words are reflective of the regime's long-running inability to recognize and respond to the demands of its population.
Khamenei did acknowledge that Iran's economic situation “is not good” and called on the government to take serious steps to address the issues, but these comments are insufficient. Khamenei would need to change the fundamental character of his regime and its political economy in order to respond to the protesters’ demands.[11] Transparency International ranked Iran 151 out of 180 countries in its Corruption Perceptions Index, which indicates that corruption remains widespread in Iran's public sector.[12] The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its subordinate institutions, such as Khatam ol Anbia Construction Headquarters, have dominance across key sectors and revenue streams, including control over up to half of Iran's oil exports, which further limits the government's capacity to deliver economic relief.[13] The Khatam ol Anbia Construction Headquarters is an IRGC-controlled civil engineering and construction firm that dominates broad swaths of the economy.[14] Iranian leaders would need to fundamentally restructure the economy in order to resolve the issues driving protesters’ concerns. The regime has yet to demonstrate any willingness to do so.
Khamenei could begin to solve some of these issues if he prioritized improving Iran's economic situation over the nuclear program, among other issues. Iran's leadership long prioritized its nuclear position over sanctions relief.[15] Senior Iranian officials repeatedly reject core US demands to halt its domestic uranium enrichment, stop funding the Axis of Resistance, and limit its missile capabilities, which consequently sustained the international sanction pressure that constrains government finances.[16] The regime faces severe fiscal constraints that US-led sanctions and chronic mismanagement intensify, and recent reporting ties the Iranian rial's sharp depreciation and high inflation to those pressures.[17] These constraints and structural drivers, which caused the protests, will likely persist and could fuel renewed protests.
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-january-17-2026/
Iran Update, January 18, 2026
Elements of the Iranian regime leaked information about purported plans to moderate regime behavior domestically and internationally.[1] The leak is likely meant to dissuade the United States from attacking Iran in response to the brutal regime crackdown on protests. A former regime official close to Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani told an English-language diaspora outlet that Larijani is pushing to moderate regime policies and conduct major economic and social reforms.[2] The source alleged that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei backs Larijani in that effort.[3] The source added that Larijani’s success depends on the United States and Israel, implying that attacks on Iran would disrupt efforts to moderate and reform.[4] The leakers likely seek to portray the regime as rehabilitating itself and to imply that attacking the regime would be counterproductive.
Serious regime moderation depends entirely on Supreme Leader Khamenei, however, who has continued to signal his commitment to the hardline positions that he has maintained for decades. Khamenei gave a speech on January 17 during which he reiterated his uncompromising stance toward the protests, labeling them as foreign agents and terrorists.[5] Khamenei also emphasized the need to improve the economy but articulated no novel thoughts on how to do so.[6] Khamenei would have a strong incentive to debut major reforms if he were seriously considering them. That he did not raise doubt about the extent to which Khamenei supports reforms and, in fact, indicates that he will more likely retain his previously held hardline views.
The leakers separately tried to validate relatively moderate regime figures and frame them as influential voices.[7] The leakers claimed that Khamenei and Larijani enthusiastically support Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi. That selective disclosure of information is likely meant to empower Araghchi, especially before foreign officials who doubt the extent to which he speaks with serious authority. The leakers further tried to connect Larijani and Araghchi to former moderate President Hassan Rouhani and his foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, to reinforce the idea that the band of pragmatic leaders is resurgent in Iran.
The portrayal of Larijani as a pragmatic reformer clashes with his record as SNSC secretary. Larijani has overseen the most brutal crackdown that the regime has ever conducted, which the leakers acknowledged and likened to the Tiananmen Square massacre.[8] The extent of the crackdown has become clearer, as more information has become available. An unspecified Iranian official told Reuters that at least 5,000 people had died, including 500 security officers.[9] The actual death count could be significantly higher, however. Iranian doctors using Starlink told The Times that around 16,500 protesters had died and around 330,000 were injured.[10] This is consistent with an Iranian cultural activist who described the circumstances as “urban warfare.”[11]
The regime is conducting a large-scale arrest campaign following the protests and signaling its plans to execute some of the arrested. The Iranian intelligence apparatus has announced hundreds of arrests across the country in recent days.[12] Judiciary spokesperson Ashagr Jahangir announced that the Judiciary will quickly hand out sentences tantamount to moharebeh — enmity against God — that carry the charge of the death penalty and “deterrent punishments that we will soon witness.”[13] Supreme Court Head Mohammad Jafar Montazeri stated that the Supreme Court is prioritizing “terrorist and rioting” cases and “no slightest leniency.”[14]
The regime is continuing and increasing its oppression against the Iranian public in order to prevent any protest activity, even short of going out to the street, which indicates the regime believes that the threat it faced from this protest wave has not passed. Tehran residents told the Wall Street Journal on January 18 that Basij members have patrolled Tehran’s streets on motorbikes in recent days, with some shouting, “Don’t come out! We’ll shoot you!”[15] The Basij also warned residents to stay away from the windows.[16] Those Basij may belong to the elite Imam Ali battalions, which are an elite, anti-riot force that is known for its common use of motorbikes for crowd control and intimidation. The regime most likely does not want protesters chanting anti-regime slogans from the window as an alternative to protesting on the street, which could maintain the protests’ momentum, especially because the regime has continued to claim that the protests are over.[17] The pervasive security presence is preventing protesters from coming into the streets–rather than the citizens’ lack of desire to protest the regime.
The Iranian regime has allowed Iranians access to domestic websites on the internet as part of the phase planned to resume internet access. The regime shut down the internet in response to the protests on January 8.[18] The Iranian regime began its gradual plan to lift internet restrictions on January 18, with users reporting the return of access to search engines, such as Google, but only with access to Iranian websites.[19] Ordinary internet connectivity in Iran remained disrupted on January 18, however.[20] Iranian state media reported on January 18 that users had access to local messaging platforms.[21]
Iranian state media acknowledged that there were some dissenting voices over the internet shutdown when it was first implemented on January 8.[22] IranCell Communications Services Company’s Board of Directors replaced Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Alireza Rafiei, who had been in the position for a year, with Mohammad Hossein Soleimani on January 18.[23] Iranian state media reported that the reason for the change was that the operator had violated the regime-imposed internet and communications shutdown on January 8, which facilitated the protests, according to unspecified sources.[24]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-january-18-2026/