Iranian Regime tv Channel One hacked while it was airing Khamenie speech

Iranian Regime national tv Channel One hacked about an hour ago. During a broadcast of Khamenie speech, a red crosshair appeared over his face and chanting of Women. Life. Freedom. There was writing to the side saying "Rise up. Join us". Also 4 photos at the bottom of the screen of young people killed and additional writing: "The blood of our youth is dropping from your paws".

Also, there was a huge banner in the middle of Tehran highway today that read: We are no longer afraid of you. We will fight.

Also, attempted attack on IRI ambassador in Denmark. Her bodyguard was stabbed. Diplomatic Security intervened before the attacker could stab the ambassador.

Iran Update, September 24, 2025

Iran has begun reconstructing several ballistic missile facilities as part of a broader effort to rebuild its degraded ballistic missile program after the Israel-Iran War. Iran has begun rebuilding the Parchin and Shahroud missile production facilities since August 28 and September 5, respectively, according to satellite imagery analyzed by the Associated Press.[1] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) struck the Parchin and Shahroud military sites in October 2024 and during the Israel-Iran War.[2] Satellite imagery of the Parchin missile site from August 28 and of the Shahroud missile site from September 5 showed that Iran has begun reconstructing buildings that housed solid fuel mixers, which are essential to producing solid fuel for ballistic missiles.[3] The Associated Press assessed that Iran still does not have mixers at Parchin or Shahroud to produce solid fuel, however.[4] The IDF previously destroyed Iranian solid fuel mixers during its October 2024 attack on Iran. Israeli sources stated in October 2024 that Iran could not domestically produce solid fuel mixers and would need to purchase them from China, which could take at least a year.[5] China previously assisted Iran in rebuilding its ballistic missile program after the October 2024 Israeli attack on Iran by supplying Iran with sodium perchlorate, which is a component of solid fuel.[6] The Associated Press report comes after Iran tested an unspecified ballistic missile in Semnan Province on September 18.[7] The report also comes after the Iranian Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Commission approved on September 7 a bill to increase the Iranian armed forces’ “defense capabilities,” which include Iranian missile capabilities.[8]

An Iranian parliamentarian who is affiliated with the ultraconservative Paydari (Stability) Front and a member of the Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Commission claimed on September 23 that Russia delivered MiG-29 fighter jets to Iran.[9] CTP-ISW cannot verify this claim, but if the claim is true, Iran's acquisition of MiG-29 aircraft would almost certainly not help Iran defend against Israeli or US aircraft in a future conventional conflict. Abolfazl Zohrevand claimed that Russian MiG-29 fighter jets have arrived in Shiraz, Iran, as part of Iran's efforts to strengthen its air force.[10] Russia has not confirmed this report. CTP-ISW cannot independently confirm whether Russia has delivered MiG-29 fighter jets to Iran at the time of this writing. The MiG-29 is an antiquated system and would not be able to confront more advanced Israeli and US aircraft, such as F-35 fighter jets. Zohrevand also claimed that Russian Su-35 fighter jets are “gradually entering” Iran and that Russia will supply Iran with S-400 air defense systems.[11] Iranian officials have repeatedly claimed in recent years that Russia will provide Iran with Su-35 fighter jets and S-400 air defense systems, but Russia has not yet delivered any such systems to Iran.[12] CTP-ISW continues to assess that Russia is unable to divert critical systems like the Su-35 and S-400 away from its war effort in Ukraine. Zohrevand further claimed that China would supply Iran with HQ-9 long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs).[13] Chinese HQ-9 SAMs bear similarities to Russian S-300s. Senior Iranian officials have expressed openness to expanding military cooperation with China, but it is unclear whether China is willing to provide Iran with the advanced systems that it seeks.[14]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-24-2025/

Iran Update, September 25, 2025

Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf emphasized on September 24 the strategic importance of maintaining an Iranian presence near Israel's borders to defend against Israel.[13] Ghalibaf claimed that Israel's recent campaign against Iran would “definitely not have occurred” and that Iran would have “confronted” Israel on its border with Syria if Iran still retained a presence in Syria.[14] Ghalibaf may have been arguing that Iran could have opened another front against Israel in Syria and thereby detracted Israel's attention and diverted its resources away from Iran during the Israel-Iran War if Iran maintained its foothold in Syria. Iranian-backed groups in southern Syria, including Lebanese Hezbollah and Palestinian militias, often launched munitions targeting Israel and the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights in the months following October 7, 2023. Iran's network in Syria remains extremely limited after the fall of Assad in December 2024, and Iranian-aligned militias in Syria did not participate in the Israel-Iran war.[15] Ghalibaf also claimed that Israel would advance to Iran's border if Iran does not “stand against [Israel] in the Golan [Heights].”[16] Ghalibaf’s comments reflect Iran's long-held objective to encircle Israel and to prevent conflicts with Israel from reaching Iran.

Ghalibaf also emphasized the need for Iran to strengthen its air power. Ghalibaf claimed that Iran's Bavar-373, Khordad, Sayyad, and Majid air defense systems operated effectively during the Israel-Iran War, but called on the regime to prioritize purchasing fighter jets.[17] Israel achieved air superiority in Iran within a few days of the start of the Israel-Iran War.[18] Ghalibaf’s statements come amid reports that Iran may have acquired Russian MiG-29 fighter jets from Russia.[19] Ghalibaf’s statements also come after Iranian armed forces-affiliated Defa Press expressed support for the purchase of Chinese fighter jets in June.[20]

The United States is continuing to pressure the Iraqi federal government to limit Iranian influence in the Iraqi federal government. Three unnamed Iraqi officials told UK-based, Qatari-owned media on September 24 that the United States asked the Iraqi federal government to reform the Iraqi judiciary and improve financial oversight as part of an effort to reduce Iranian influence over Iraqi state institutions.[21] Iranian-backed Iraqi actors have co-opted the Iraqi judicial system to issue rulings favorable to militia interests.[22] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have also exploited loopholes within the Iraqi financial system to commit fraud and obtain funds to support Iranian and militia operations, including attacks on US forces and allies.[23] The US demand for improved financial oversight comes after Iraq's Rafidain Bank signed a “professional partnership agreement” with a US-based financial consulting firm on August 15 to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.[24] The Iraqi government previously used Rafidain Bank to process and distribute salaries to members of the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces.[25]

Iran is preparing economic measures to try to withstand the likely reimposition of UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on September 27. UNSC Resolution 2231 endorsed the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and terminated six earlier UNSC resolutions.[26] The E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggered the 30-day JCPOA snapback process on August 28.[27] The UNSC will reimpose the six suspended resolutions, which include sanctions on Iranian military and nuclear entities, on September 27 unless Iran meets its obligations laid out under the JCPOA. Iranian Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad claimed on September 24 that the Iranian government has developed contingency plans to counter snapback sanctions and claimed that oil sales will continue at their current rate despite sanctions.[28] Paknejad added that snapback sanctions will not directly target Iranian oil sales but could affect trade, finance, and shipping.[29] Central Bank Governor Mohammad Reza Farzin similarly stated on September 24 that the bank will stabilize the Iranian currency if UNSC sanctions are reimposed.[30] Farzin also claimed that the Central Bank will sell more gold coins and bullion to keep the gold market stable and control inflation.[31] The Iranian rial reached 1,085,000 rials per one US dollar on September 25, reflecting Iranian anticipation about imminent snapback sanctions.[32]

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi stated on September 23 that Iran still retains the capacity to advance its nuclear program after US and Israeli strikes targeted Iranian nuclear facilities in June 2025.[33] Grossi stated that the strikes may not have damaged all Iranian centrifuges and that Iran retains facilities to manufacture centrifuge components.[34] Grossi also stated that it would take Iran only “weeks” to enrich its uranium stockpile to 90 percent.[35] Israel struck the Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (TESA) workshop in Karaj, west of Tehran, and the Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC) in Tehran Province during the Israel-Iran War.[36] Iran manufactured centrifuge components at TESA and manufactured and tested advanced centrifuge rotors at the TNRC.[37]

Iran showcased its nuclear technology at the 2025 Atom Expo in Moscow on September 25.[38] Atomic Energy Organization of Iran head Mohammad Eslami presented advancements in Iran's nuclear technology on September 25.[39] China, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan also participated in the exhibition.[40] Eslami met with Russian President Vladimir Putin and IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi on the sidelines of the event.[41] Eslami announced that Iran plans to develop large nuclear power plants and small modular reactors (SMRs) with the help of Russian state-owned atomic energy corporation Rosatom.[42] Eslami and the Rosatom director general signed a memorandum of understanding on September 24 for Russia to build eight SMRs in Iran, including four at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant.[43]

Indian officials recently discussed the possibility of purchasing oil from Iran and Venezuela in exchange for reducing Russian oil imports with the Trump administration.[44] An anonymous source with knowledge of the discussion told Bloomberg on September 25 that an Indian delegation visiting the United States emphasized to the Trump administration that India must receive oil from Iran and Venezuela in order to be able to suspend oil imports from Russia without causing a spike in global oil prices. India has not purchased oil from Iran since 2019.

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-25-2025/

Iran Update, September 26, 2025

The E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) will reimpose UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on Iran on September 27 despite a last-ditch Iranian effort to delay the snapback mechanism. A UK-based media outlet reported on September 26 that Iran offered to immediately grant International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors full access to the Natanz Nuclear Facility. Iran, in return, called for the UNSC to adopt a Russian-Chinese resolution to extend the snapback mechanism's deadline by six months.[1] The UNSC rejected the Russian-Chinese resolution in a vote on September 26, which means the UNSC sanctions will automatically be reimposed on September 27.[2] The E3 offered in July 2025 to extend the snapback mechanism's deadline if Iran fully cooperated with the IAEA, resumed nuclear talks with the United States, and accounted for its 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile.[3] Iran failed to meet the E3’s conditions.

Iran has continued to expand its nuclear infrastructure at the Mount Kolang Gaz La facility in Esfahan Province, which was not damaged or targeted during the Israel–Iran War in June 2025.[4] The Washington Post, citing satellite imagery, reported on September 26 that Iran has made key changes at the site since the war.[5]

Security perimeter: Iran completed construction on roughly 4,000 feet of wall on the western edge and graded a parallel road, which brings the enclosure close to completion.
Tunnel entrance: Iran reinforced one eastern entrance with dirt and rock to prevent damage or potential collapse in future airstrikes.
Excavation spoil: The pile of rock and soil outside the eastern tunnels has modestly increased, indicating continued tunneling inside the mountain.
Unspecified analysts told the Washington Post that the facility's underground halls may be 260 to 330 feet deep, which is deeper than the underground halls at Iran's Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant.[6] The depth of the facility's underground halls has fueled suspicions that the site could serve not only as a centrifuge assembly plant, as Iran announced in 2020, but also as a covert enrichment facility or secure storage for near-weapons-grade uranium.[7] The Institute for Science and International Security reported in April 2025 that Iran had already begun building a security wall with new roads and space for fences, lights, and cameras at the facility.[8] The institute's report noted that the facility could house an advanced centrifuge assembly plant or potentially a small undeclared enrichment plant.[9] The IAEA has never inspected the Mount Kolang Gaz La facility, which illustrates the limitations that the IAEA faces in obtaining a complete picture of Iran‘s nuclear program. Iran also barred IAEA inspectors from accessing the site's tunnels in April 2025 and told the agency that “it is none of [their] business.”[10]

Animated gif: https://x.com/TheStudyofWar/status/1971717640931398091

Iran is attempting to exploit anti-Israel sentiments in Saudi Arabia in order to protect Hezbollah from its looming disarmament. Iran's attempts to exploit anti-Israel sentiment in the Saudi government will most likely fail due to Iran's long history of attacking Saudi Arabia with proxies and partners trained by Hezbollah. Iranian officials appear to have grown increasingly concerned about Hezbollah's ability to retain its weapons amid the Lebanese state's current efforts to disarm the group following Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani’s trip to Riyadh on September 16.[11] Two unspecified Iranian sources told Reuters on September 26 that Hezbollah's disarmament was one of the “main topics” of Larijani’s visit and that Larijani attempted to convince Riyadh that Hezbollah's disarmament would benefit neither Lebanon nor the region.[12] Saudi Arabia has positioned itself in recent months as one of the principal regional powers supporting the Lebanese state's efforts to disarm Hezbollah.[13] Larijani urged Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem to reach out and show “goodwill” to Saudi Arabia after his trip, according to the two Iranian sources and an unspecified source with “knowledge of Hezbollah's thinking.“[14] Qassem—in acquiescence to Larijani’s request—called on Saudi Arabia to “open a new page” with Hezbollah during a speech on September 19.[15] Qassem argued that both parties have a common enemy in Israel.[16]

Qassem’s reasoning is consistent with Iranian diplomatic efforts and rhetoric that have attempted to exploit regional anti-Israel sentiments in the wake of Israel's strikes on Doha, Qatar, on September 9.[17] Iran has aimed these efforts at Gulf states, such as Saudi Arabia, and has called for Arab, Islamic, and international responses since Israel's strikes in Doha.[18] Iranian officials have framed Israel's strikes as an opportunity to unite regional powers—particularly the Gulf states—in an anti-Israel, anti-United States regional coalition.[19]

Such an Iranian effort to exploit anti-Israel sentiments in Saudi Arabia is highly unlikely to weaken Saudi support for Hezbollah's disarmament. Hezbollah has trained several Iranian proxy and partner groups—including Kataib Hezbollah in Iraq and other Iraqi militias and the Houthis—that have targeted Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia, in addition to other Gulf states, has promised significant economic aid to Lebanon that is contingent on Hezbollah's disarmament, likely as an economic incentive to pressure the Lebanese government to implement its disarmament plan.[20] Saudi Arabia is unlikely to ease pressure on the partner of its regional rival, Iran, based on shared anti-Israel sentiment alone.

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-26-2025/

Iran Update, September 29, 2025

The European Union (EU) reimposed sanctions on Iran on September 29 that it had lifted under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The EU’s reimposition of sanctions comes after the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) reimposed snapback sanctions on Iran on September 27.[1] The EU froze the Iranian Central Bank and other major Iranian banks’ assets, banned the import of Iranian oil, and banned the export of technologies or materials that Iran could use for uranium enrichment, among other measures.[2] The EU reimposed sanctions on Iranian economic institutions, such as the Khatam ol Anbia Construction Headquarters, that play an outsized role in the Iranian economy.[3] The Khatam ol Anbia Construction Headquarters is controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and has built power plants, oil vessels, and transportation infrastructure on behalf of the IRGC. The EU also reimposed sanctions on Iranian banks, such as Bank Sepah and Bank Melli, that have supported Iran’s defense industry.[4] Iranian banks reportedly held at least 1.9 billion euros in assets in Europe as of March 2024.[5] The reimposition of EU sanctions on Iran may further isolate Iran from international financial networks and reduce the volume of EU-Iran trade. The EU was Iran’s fifth largest trading partner in 2024.[6] The full impact of the EU sanctions is currently unclear, however. The United States’ imposition of maximum pressure sanctions against Iran in 2018 has already significantly diminished the volume of EU-Iran trade in recent years.[7] The EU’s reimposition of sanctions on September 29 follows the UNSC’s reimposition of snapback sanctions on Iran on September 27, which are similarly designed to politically and economically isolate Iran due to its failure to fulfill its obligations in the JCPOA.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s website framed snapback sanctions as “psychological warfare” and called on the regime to expand ties with neighboring countries and pursue a “Look East” policy to mitigate the impact of sanctions.[8] A newspaper run by Khamenei’s website argued on September 28 that Iran must rely on its domestic strength and work with neighbors, “countries in the Global South,” and countries that are part of Iran’s “Look East” policy to mitigate the impact of Western sanctions. Iran’s “Look East” policy seeks to counter US pressure by building ties with countries such as China and Russia.[9] This editorial is consistent with recent statements from Khamenei in May 2025 in which he framed Iran’s participation in multilateral institutions like BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as “opportunities” for Iran.[10] Iran joined BRICS in January 2024. Iranian officials have emphasized that Iran’s participation in BRICS provides opportunities for Iran to reduce its reliance on the US dollar and develop alternative financial platforms.[11] Iran has also deepened economic, political, and security ties with Russia in recent years and recently joined the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).[12] Iran likely seeks to use its membership in multilateral institutions to reduce the impact of Western sanctions and to secure alternative trade routes, energy partners, and financial channels.

Iranian officials are concerned that the reimposition of snapback sanctions may trigger economic unrest. Four unspecified Iranian officials and two unspecified “insiders” told Reuters on September 27 that the reimposition of sanctions will deepen Iran’s economic isolation and fuel public anger.[13] An Iranian official said that the regime is increasingly concerned that discontent over economic difficulties may lead to mass protests. Several Iranian officials framed the reimposition of snapback sanctions as “psychological warfare” against Iran, which likely reflects Iranian officials’ belief that Iran’s adversaries seek to increase public disillusionment by increasing economic pressure on Iran.[14] Iranian Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei warned on September 29 that Iranian authorities will take legal action against individuals who undermine public morale or disrupt markets in ways that “serve enemy objectives.”[15] Khamenei categorically rejected negotiations with the United States on September 23, which makes it very unlikely that Iran will receive economic relief in the near term.[16] The regime’s concerns about potential internal unrest come as inflation has risen above 40 percent, and the Iranian rial fell to a record low of 1,121,000 rials per one US dollar on September 29.[17]

Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani conducted his second visit to Beirut since becoming SNSC secretary on August 5.[37] Larijani’s multiple visits to Beirut in recent months highlight the extent to which Iran is prioritizing retaining its influence in Lebanon amid Lebanese state efforts to disarm Hezbollah. Larijani met with Lebanese Parliament Speaker and Hezbollah ally Nabih Berri and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, who is currently leading the Lebanese state‘s disarmament efforts, on September 27.[38] Larijani previously visited Beirut in August 2025 and similarly met with Lebanese officials, including Salam and Lebanese President Joseph Aoun.[39] Larijani’s previous visit reportedly aimed to “prevent a complete shift in Lebanon’s internal power balance to the detriment of Hezbollah,” according to an Iranian analyst close to the regime.[40] Larijani’s multiple visits to Beirut in recent months are likely part of an Iranian effort to prevent Hezbollah’s disarmament, although it remains unclear how specifically Iran intends to achieve this objective.

Larijani overstated the degree of Iranian support to Hezbollah and Lebanon during his visit to Beirut on September 26 and 27. Larijani met with Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem on September 26 and told Qassem that Iran is prepared to back Lebanon and Hezbollah at “all levels.”[41] Larijani did not specify what types of support Iran is prepared to give Hezbollah moving forward. Larijani’s vow of support for Hezbollah is largely performative, particularly given that Iran failed to support Hezbollah during the Israeli campaign in Lebanon in late 2024 and sustained significant damage during the Israel-Iran War. Iran has provided Hezbollah with limited support since the end of the Israel-Hezbollah conflict, which has included some financial support for reconstruction. Qassem previously claimed in December 2024 that Iran had allocated at least $50 million to reconstruct damaged households in Lebanon.[42] Larijani noted that he traveled to Beirut to follow up on Hezbollah’s reconstruction efforts.[43] Iran’s claimed economic support is unlikely to help Lebanon make any meaningful progress in its reconstruction. The World Bank estimated in March 2025 that Lebanon would need approximately $11 billion for its reconstruction and recovery needs following the Israel-Hezbollah conflict in late 2024.[44] $50 million from Iran is minuscule in comparison to the economic support that the Lebanese state requires for its post-war reconstruction.

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-29-2025/

Iran Update, September 30, 2025

Senior Iranian officials appear to be preparing for potential military conflict. Iranian officials continue to believe that the current ceasefire between Israel and Iran will collapse and fighting will resume at some point in the future. Iranian Deputy Interior Minister for Security and Law Enforcement and National Security Council (NSC) Secretary Ali Akbar Pour Jamshidian stated on September 27 that the Supreme National Security Council (SCNC) had directed all Iranian military and civilian officials to designate several successors to ensure continuity of governance in the event of leadership disruption.[1] Pour Jamshidian added that the Interior Ministry adopted the same decision and designated several individuals, down to provincial governors, as successors within the Interior Ministry.[2] The SNSC rejected Pour Jamshidian’s statement on September 27 and denied holding any meeting on this issue.[3] The SNSC likely pursued succession planning as a part of the Iranian government's attempts to amend issues it faced during the 12-day war, including those posed by the Israeli decapitation campaign that targeted senior Iranian officials. Israeli strikes destroyed the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force command bunker on June 13 and killed senior IRGC commanders.[4] The death of these commanders disrupted Iran's command-and-control and made responding to Israeli attacks extremely difficult.[5] The SNSC’s succession planning also comes after Khamenei’s absence during the war, which prevented his principal subordinates from reaching him for rapid decisions.[6] Khamenei also reportedly named three senior clerics as potential successors during the war and directed the Iranian Assembly of Experts to choose from those clerics to ensure an orderly wartime transition.[7] The rare decision to take steps to ensure a smooth succession suggests that senior officials have already considered succession plans, even before the SNSC’s reported order.

Senior Iranian military commanders also continue to inspect military and air defense units across Iran. Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard inspected the Dezful Air Defense Group on September 29 and assessed its combat readiness.[8] Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi separately inspected Artesh and IRGC naval, commando, and aviation units in Hormozgan Province on September 30.[9] Mousavi assessed the capabilities of different units, met with commanders and personnel, and emphasized that both navies have achieved full readiness ”for a possible future conflict.”[10]

Iran's worsening water and energy crisis could gradually increase the Iranian public's frustrations with the regime and compound existing challenges to regime legitimacy. The Karaj Dam's water reserves decreased from 111 million cubic meters to 28 million cubic meters between September 2024 and September 2025, making the dam incapable of generating electricity for Tehran. The dam is currently only 15 percent full. The Karaj Dam is one of five dams that supply Tehran with drinking water. CTP assessed in August 2025 that the regime will likely not be able to meaningfully improve its water crisis if it does not address underlying issues, including mismanagement and unsustainable development.[11] The water and electricity shortages reflect the regime's inability to meet the basic needs of its citizens, which could generate potential internal instability.

The United Kingdom imposed sanctions on over 70 Iranian individuals and organizations linked to Iran's nuclear program on September 30 after the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) reimposed snapback sanctions on September 27.[13] The United Kingdom froze the assets of Iranian banks, such as Bank Sepah and Bank Melli, that have supported Iran's defense industry.[14] Iranian banks reportedly held at least 1.9 billion euros in assets in Europe, with a large part being in the UK, as of March 2024.[15] UK sanctions also targeted Iranian oil, nuclear engineering, and shipping companies that contribute to the funding of and projects for Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).[16] The United Kingdom imposed sanctions after the European Union imposed similar sanctions on September 29 that are designed to politically and economically isolate Iran due to its failure to fulfill its obligations under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).[17]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-30-2025/

Iran Update, October 1, 2025

The Iranian regime appears to be trying to mitigate internal economic pressure by taking steps to remove itself from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) blacklist, which currently hampers Iran's access to the international financial system. FATF is the global body that sets international standards to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.[2] The FATF blacklisted Iran in February 2020 for failing to implement anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing policies. An FATF blacklist designation requires all FATF member states to sanction and restrict international financial interactions with Iran.[3] The Iranian Expediency Discernment Council approved Iran's accession to the Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) convention on October 1, which is the final convention required for Iran to exit the FATF blacklist.[4] The Expediency Discernment Council approved Iran's accession to the other required convention, the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, in May 2025.[5] The CFT is a set of international policies and measures that prevent terrorist groups from accessing and using financial resources.[6] The Expediency Council is an administrative assembly appointed by the Supreme Leader to resolve differences between the Iranian Parliament and the Guardian Council.[7] Sadegh Amoli Larijani, who is Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani’s brother, heads the Expediency Discernment Council. Amoli Larijani has historically opposed Iran joining the FATF, but Ali Larijani and other pragmatic figures, such as former President Hassan Rouhani, have supported taking actions to remove Iran from the FATF blacklist.[8] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian previously stated in September 2024 that his government has “no choice but to resolve FATF” and emphasized that addressing the FATF designation is essential to improving Iran's economy.[9] It is very unlikely that Iran will halt financial support for the Axis of Resistance, which makes its removal from the blacklist doubtful even if it has adopted international treaties on transnational crime and terrorist financing. Iranian officials have repeatedly framed support of the Axis of Resistance as a core national security policy.

The Expediency Discernment Council may have also advanced CFT accession to calm Iran's domestic markets, which have faced sharp currency depreciation following the reimposition of UN Security Council snapback sanctions on September 27.[10] The European Union (EU) also reimposed sanctions on Iran on September 29 that it had lifted under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).[11] Several Iranian officials framed the reimposition of snapback sanctions as “psychological warfare” against Iran and downplayed the sanctions’ economic impact.[12] These remarks come after four unspecified Iranian officials and two unspecified “insiders” told Reuters on September 27 that the reimposition of sanctions will deepen Iran's economic isolation and fuel public anger.[13] The Iranian rial lost 14.5 percent of its value after the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggered snapback sanctions on August 28, falling from 1,013,000 rials to a US dollar to its lowest value at 1,160,000 rials on October 1.[14]

The US Department of Defense announced on September 30 that it reduced the US military presence in Iraq.[15] The United States and Iraq agreed in September 2024 that hundreds of US forces would withdraw from Iraq by September 2025 and that remaining forces would withdraw by the end of 2026.[16] The Department of Defense said that the mission reduction is “an effort to transition to a lasting US-Iraq security partnership.”[17] An unspecified US official told Reuters on September 30 that the United States will reduce its military personnel from 2,500 to less than 2,000, most of whom will be redeployed to the Iraqi Kurdistan Region from federal Iraq.[18] The official added that the United States is in the process of transferring control of Ain al Asad Airbase in Anbar Province to the Iraqi federal government.[19] A Shia Coordination Framework member said on October 1 that the framework “welcomes” the Department of Defense's announcement.[20] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Iraqi Shia parties, most of which Iran backs. A US Embassy in Baghdad spokesperson characterized the force reduction as a transition to a “more traditional bilateral security partnership.”[21] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have repeatedly threatened to attack US forces if the United States postpones its military withdrawal from Iraq.[22] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have not responded to the Department of Defense's announcement at the time of this writing.

US President Donald Trump issued an executive order on September 29 declaring that the United States will consider “any armed attack” on Qatar as a “threat to the peace and security” of the United States.[23] President Trump's executive order also obligates the United States to take all “appropriate” measures, including “diplomatic, economic, and, if necessary, military” measures to defend US and Qatari interests.”[24] Qatar is a major non-NATO US ally, which provides it with military and economic privileges but does not entail any security commitments from the United States.[25] Trump‘s order marks the most significant declaration of US commitment to defend Qatar since 1992 and follows Israel's September 9 strikes on Hamas leaders in Doha.[26] Both the United States and Qatar have expressed their public dissatisfaction with Israel for its strikes in Qatar. The largest US military base in the Middle East is in Qatar.[27] Trump's executive order comes shortly after US Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced that Qatar and the United States are finalizing an ”enhanced defense cooperation agreement” during a trip to Doha on September 16.[28] The United States and Qatar have concluded several defense cooperation agreements since 1992 that have addressed US military access to Qatari facilities, US training of Qatari forces, and US arms sales to Qatar.[29] None of these agreements, including the Trump executive order, explicitly commits the United States to defending Qatar from external attacks with military force.

Trump renewed the United States’ commitment to defend Qatar on the same day that he publicized his 20-point plan for a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.[30] Qatar, which had acted as the primary mediator between Hamas on one hand and Israel and the United States on the other from Fall 2023 to early September 2025, suspended its role as a mediator following Israel‘s strikes on Doha.[31] Qatari Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al Thani announced on September 30 that Qatar would return to its role as mediator after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called him and apologized on September 29 for striking Hamas leaders in Doha.[32] Thani confirmed on October 1 that Doha had passed Trump's ceasefire plan to Hamas negotiators.[33]

The Iranian Guardian Council ratified a law on October 1 to harshen punishments for espionage and cooperation with Israel and other “hostile countries.”[34] The Iranian parliament approved the bill on June 29.[35] The Guardian Council ratified another law on October 1 to regulate non-military drones. The Iranian parliament likely passed these bills in an attempt to address counterintelligence concerns and protect against drone attacks after the Israel-Iran War.[36] Israel smuggled small drones into Iran and then launched them from secret locations to target Iranian ballistic missile infrastructure in the opening hours of the Israel-Iran War.[37] The Iranian regime has arrested hundreds of purported ”Israeli spies” since the beginning of the Israel-Iran War to address the regime's fear of real and perceived Israeli penetration in Iran.[38]

A high-ranking Iranian delegation may have briefly visited Minsk, Belarus, on September 30. An Iranian media outlet shared Flight Radar screenshots that show a plane registered to the Iranian regime departed Minsk on October 1, flying toward Iran.[39] Unverified social media posts claimed that Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani may have been aboard the plane as part of an Iranian delegation to Minsk.[40] The SNSC is a body responsible for deciding Iran's national security and defense policies within the stated intent of the supreme leader.[41] Iranian regime-affiliated media did not confirm the diplomatic visit.[42] Larijani’s travel could be related to earlier agreements between the two countries. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian signed 12 memoranda of understanding on bilateral trade and military technology cooperation with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko on August 20.[43] Iran seeks Belarusian help to restore Iranian air defense systems and electronic warfare equipment that Israel damaged during the Israel-Iran War, according to an August 2025 Ukrainian Foreign Intelligence Service assessment.[44]

The United States sanctioned 22 entities and 22 individuals on October 1 for supporting Iran's defense industry and nuclear and missile programs. The US sanctions come after the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) reimposed snapback sanctions on Iran on September 27. The US Treasury Department sanctioned 21 entities and 17 individuals involved in the acquisition of goods and technology for Iran's Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry and for supporting Iran's missile and military aircraft production.[45] The State Department sanctioned five other individuals and one other entity.[46] The US Treasury Department sanctioned the following entities, among others:

Beh Joule Pars Commercial Engineering Company: This company coordinates the procurement of accelerometers, gyroscopes, and microelectromechanical system components for entities that are subordinate to the Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO), including the Shahid Hemmat Space Group. AIO oversees Iran's ballistic missile program.[47]
Tamin Sanat Amen Company: This company is subordinate to Beh Joule Pars and operates in Iran's oil, gas, petrochemical, and steel manufacturing sectors.
Abzar-e Daghigh-e Taha Company: This company procures gyroscopes and provides services to the Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group (SBIG), which is subordinate to AIO.
Pasargad Helicopter Company (PHC): This company has attempted to procure American helicopters and spare parts for the Iran Helicopter Support and Renewal Company (PANHA).[48] The United States sanctioned PANHA in 2018 for providing maintenance, overhaul, and manufacturing support for military helicopters used by the Iranian armed forces.[49]
The US State Department separately sanctioned five Iranian individuals and one Iranian entity affiliated with Iran's Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND) on October 1.[50] The SPND played a leading role in Iran's nuclear weapons research program before 2003. [51]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-1-2025/

Iran Update, October 2, 2025

Former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy Commander Hossein Alaei emphasized the role that Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities and national unity played in its “success” during the Israel-Iran War in June 2025.[1] Alaei claimed that Iran demonstrated the strength of its ballistic missiles and national unity during the war in an interview with Nour News on October 1.[2] Alaei claimed that Iran‘s demonstration of these strengths caused the United States and Israel to call for a ceasefire.[3] Alaei also claimed that Iranian missiles became more precise throughout the war and that no segment of the Iranian population chose to side with Israel in support of internal division.[4] Alaei’s reflections almost certainly reflect only some segments of the regime’s national security community, and CTP-ISW cannot determine whether Alaei’s statements are reflective of a broader trend in Iranian strategic thought or if it is isolated to only a small number of thinkers.

Alaei’s statements regarding Iran‘s ballistic missiles and national unity suggest that some elements of the regime’s national security community believe that the regime has enough domestic support to engage in a prolonged conflict with Israel and could inflict more damage through continued missile strikes.[5] These reflections indicate that some Iranian officials believe that at least some elements of its previous efforts to deter and defend against Israeli strikes could be successful in the future, presumably with some modifications. Israel accomplished its campaign objectives—the degradation of Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs—in the Israel-Iran War, but it needed to end the war rapidly and at a moment of its own choosing.[6] Israel forced Iran to rapidly end the war by creating the perception of a credible existential threat to the Iranian regime.[7] Israel struck Iranian institutions and other assets used by the Iranian regime to ensure regime stability.[8] A series of strikes against these institutions and assets that the Israelis design to demonstrate a credible threat to the regime’s stability could be expanded or contracted depending on how the regime responds and Israel’s desire for a ceasefire. Israel calculated that the Iranian regime’s overwhelming interest in ensuring regime survival would compel it to agree to a ceasefire. Alaei appears to be implying that the war illustrated that, in the future, Iranian missiles could be more successful if Israeli interceptor stockpiles are depleted. Alaei also suggests that national unity would have sustained a longer war, but it is unclear if expanded Israeli strikes would change Iranian calculations about regime stability.

Alaei’s assumptions that the ballistic missile attack campaign and national unity were part of Iran’s “success” seem to disregard the reality that Israeli operations did not intend to collapse the regime or even seriously threaten it. Israel only aimed to demonstrate its military capability to destroy Iran’s ability to control its population. Israel retains that capability, and as noted above, could decide to expand or contract its military campaign against regime targets and threaten regime stability as it deems necessary to accomplish its objectives.

Alaei also emphasized that Iran can strike the United States and Israel due to its geographic position in the Persian Gulf.[9] Alaei described Iran’s location in the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman as the security and military “center of gravity of the region.” Alaei’s statement may be attempting to highlight the potential threat that Iran could pose to US forces and allied partners.[10] The IRGC Navy has historically harassed commercial and military vessels in the Persian Gulf to signal its ability to disrupt maritime traffic and pressure the United States and its partners.[11]

Notably, Nour News chose to interview Alaei as the first guest in its new “Pathway” series, given that Alaei has historically criticized the regime and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Nour News is affiliated with the Iranian Supreme Leader Adviser to the Defense Council, Ali Shamkhani. Alaei served as the first IRGC Navy Commander from 1985 to 1990 and later as IRGC chief of staff from 1997 to 1999.[12] Shamkhani similarly served as the IRGC Navy Commander from 1990 to 1997 and then as Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister from 1997 and 2005.[13] Shamkhani would have probably coordinated with Alaei in both roles. Alaei has repeatedly challenged the regime’s policies, including in his 2009 letter about the regime’s prison abuses, a 2011 editorial that indirectly criticized Khamenei, and his opposition to Iran’s support for former Syrian President Bashar al Assad.[14] Alaei also publicly sympathized with anti-regime protesters in 2020 and suggested abolishing Iran’s morality patrol.[15] Alaei’s criticism of the regime was underscored in his interview with Nour News. Alaei noted that both Iranian reformists and hardliners had managed the nuclear file but emphasized that all negotiations occurred under the Supreme Leader’s supervision, placing ultimate responsibility on Khamenei.[16] Alaei dismissed Iran’s foreign policy as no better than “acceptable” on the nuclear issue, which implicitly faulted Khamenei for the failure to achieve a resolution.[17]

Iran is attempting to improve and fix vulnerabilities in its air defense systems that Israel exploited during the Israel-Iran War. An Iranian Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS)-controlled outlet reported on October 1 that the Iranian army has replaced and strengthened its air defense systems and short-range air defenses to counter drones.[18] It is unclear what type of short-range systems the Iranians have strengthened or whether these systems include electronic warfare systems. The outlet also claimed that Iran is attempting to acquire HQ-9 long-range surface-to-air missile (SAMs) batteries to counter Israeli F-35 fighter jets. Iranian Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Commission head Abolfazl Zohrevand previously claimed in September 2025 that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) would supply Iran with HQ-9 SAMs.[19] CTP-ISW has observed no evidence that the PRC delivered these systems. It is unlikely that an HQ-9 SAM could shoot down an F-35 fighter jet, however.[20] Israel destroyed the target engagement radars of four Russian S-300s, which bear technical similarities to Chinese HQ-9 SAMs, in Iran in April and October 2024.[21] The IRGC Ground Forces also conducted an air defense drill in its eastern air defense zone south of Mashhad, Khorasan Razavi Province, on October 2 to bolster its air defenses.[22] Iran conducted a similar exercise in northwestern Iran on September 24.[23]

Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh met with Turkish Defense Minister General Yasar Guler in Ankara on October 1.[34] Nasir Zadeh and Guler discussed bilateral cooperation and unspecified regional security issues. Guler emphasized Turkey’s readiness to work with Iran to enhance regional stability and border security. Nasir Zadeh invited Guler to Tehran to follow up on the agreements that they reached. Nasir Zadeh noted that developing and strengthening defense relations with neighboring countries is one of Iran’s priorities.

Turkey sanctioned and froze the assets of 18 Iranian entities and 20 Iranian individuals on October 1 for supporting Iran’s nuclear program.[35] The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Bank Sepah, and Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center are among the sanctioned entities.[36] The sanctions come after the United Nations Security Council reimposed snapback sanctions on Iran on September 27.[37]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-2-2025/

Iran Update, October 3, 2025

A Syrian militia sympathetic to the Iranian-led Axis of Resistance claimed an attack on a US base in northeastern Syria on October 2.[1] This attack marks the first time that the militia has claimed to attack US forces. The Syrian Popular Resistance announced that it and “allied forces” targeted US forces with unspecified weapons south of Hasakah City.[2] Syrian social media accounts posted videos purporting to show US air defense systems activating over al Shaddadi Base, Hasakah Province, on October 2.[3] The United States has not confirmed the attack at the time of this writing, and CTP-ISW is unable to independently verify the group’s claim.

The Syrian Popular Resistance previously limited its attacks to entities associated with the Syrian transitional government and had not targeted US forces, despite its opposition to the US force presence in Syria.[4] Unspecified US officials told US-based al Monitor on October 2 that the United States has paused its planned reduction of forces in Syria due to concerns about the Syrian transitional government’s stability.[5] The Syrian Popular Resistance warned in August 2025 that it would expand its target bank and operational reach because of its opposition to the United States, Israel, and the Syrian transitional government.[6] The Syrian Popular Resistance formed immediately after the fall of Assad in December 2024 to oppose the Syrian transitional government.[7] The group’s last claimed attack was in March 2025, when it claimed to poison the meals and water of Syrian government soldiers using a “biological weapon.”[8] The Syrian Popular Resistance has venerated former Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah and former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani on its channel in addition to its regular pro-Assad content, suggesting that the group is ideologically aligned with the Axis of Resistance.[9] The Syrian Popular Resistance celebrated Iran’s attack on US forces in Qatar during the Israel-Iran War in June 2025, further underscoring the group’s ideological alignment with Iran.[10]

Iranian Artesh Navy Commander Rear Admiral Shahram Irani inspected the combat and operational readiness of units deployed on Kharg Island in the Persian Gulf on October 2.[11] Irani emphasized the critical position of Kharg Island in Iran’s maritime domain and added that the Artesh Navy plays an important role in ensuring the security of the Persian Gulf and open waters. Iran exports around 90 percent of its crude oil from Kharg Island.[12]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-3-2025/

Iran Update, October 6, 2025

Hamas agreed to a ceasefire with Israel on October 3 but called for negotiating other aspects of US President Donald Trump’s plan for peace in the Gaza Strip. Trump proposed a 20-point plan to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on September 29 that laid out a broad vision for the end of the Israel-Hamas War and the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip.[1] Trump warned that Hamas would face “all hell” if it did not agree to his peace plan by October 5.[2] Hamas leaders agreed on October 3 to release all living and deceased Israeli hostages as part of the ceasefire and expressed openness to engaging in negotiations on other elements of Trump’s plan.[3] Hamas endorsed one point of Trump’s plan that calls for a Palestinian body of independent technocrats to govern the Gaza Strip, but did not explicitly agree that an international transitional body chaired by Trump should have oversight and supervision over the Palestinian technocratic body.[4] Hamas’ statement also did not acknowledge that Trump’s plan requires Hamas and other Palestinian factions to disarm.[5] US, Israeli, and Hamas negotiators held indirect negotiations on the ceasefire plan in Egypt on October 6.[6] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has continued offensive operations and airstrikes in the Gaza Strip, but halted its major offensive into Gaza City due to the ceasefire agreement.[7] Hamas and other Palestinian factions have continued to target Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip since Hamas agreed to the proposal on October 3.[8]

Elements of Trump’s plan require Hamas to concede on many of its long-held ceasefire demands, which raises questions about the viability of a long-term ceasefire agreement. Hamas and Israel last observed a ceasefire between January and March 2025. The ceasefire ended after Israel accused Hamas of delaying the release of hostages and failing to negotiate on next steps to end the war.[9] Hamas has consistently demanded a full Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and a “permanent ceasefire,” but Trump’s plan only requires the IDF to fully withdraw after a set of undefined ”standards, milestones, and timeframes linked to demilitarization” are met in the opinion of the IDF, the United States, and additional guarantors.[10] Hamas previously demanded a “permanent” ceasefire in exchange for releasing Israeli hostages due to skepticism that the IDF would resume hostilities once Israel received the hostages.[11] Hamas has seemingly conceded on this demand by agreeing to release all living and deceased Israeli hostages before receiving a guarantee of a full IDF withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. Hamas has also not yet addressed US and Israeli demands that it disarm and disband under Trump’s plan. Netanyahu remains adamant that Hamas will be disarmed either through diplomatic means with Trump’s plan or through IDF military action if the plan fails.[12] Hamas would receive some elements of its long-held demands, namely aid, reconstruction, and the release of prisoners held in Israel, under the proposal.[13]

It is unclear if an end to the war in the Gaza Strip would impact how Hamas’ partners in the Axis of Resistance engage with Israel. Both Iran and Hezbollah supported Hamas’ agreement to the ceasefire and implicit rejection of the full US plan.[14] Iran and Hezbollah’s endorsement of Hamas’ objection to the later stages of Trump’s plan surrounding the political administration of the Gaza Strip suggests that both support Hamas continuing the war. The Houthis have justified their missile and drone campaign against Israel and international shipping as a response to Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip.[15] It is unclear if the Houthis would halt these campaigns in response to a lasting Israel-Hamas ceasefire. The Houthis have continued to attack Israel since Hamas agreed to the ceasefire with Israel on October 3.[16] Houthi Political Bureau member Mohammad al Bukhaiti said on October 6 that international mediators should not focus on disarming Hamas “because our weapon is Hamas’ weapon, and our theater of operations is Hamas’ theater of operations,” suggesting that the Houthis will continue to support Hamas even if the group is disarmed.[17]

Iran and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have used barter systems that avoid monetary transactions on the international market to circumvent US sanctions on Iran since at least 2018, according to two US media reports published on October 5.[42] PRC companies began exporting motor vehicles to Iran in exchange for Iranian metals, including copper and zinc, around 2018 after US President Donald Trump launched his “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran, according to individuals with knowledge of the trade speaking to Bloomberg.[43] Hong Kong-registered PRC front companies have also recently paid PRC contractors to build infrastructure in Iran in exchange for Iranian crude oil exports to the PRC, according to current and former Western officials speaking to the Wall Street Journal.[44] Some of the officials stated that the PRC transmitted $8.4 billion in oil payments via this barter arrangement to finance PRC contracted infrastructure projects in Iran in 2024.[45] Iran and the PRC previously conducted negotiations in 2023 over a similar barter agreement in which Iran would provide the PRC with crude oil in exchange for the PRC’s assistance in constructing the Tehran-North freeway, which connects Tehran to the Caspian Sea.[46] It is unclear whether Iran and the PRC signed the agreement in 2023. These transactions do not require Chinese or Iranian companies to trade on the international market using the US dollar and are not subject to US sanctions, according to the Wall Street Journal and Bloomberg reports.[47] The PRC does not acknowledge the United States’ unilateral sanctions and subsequent secondary sanctions on Iran, claiming that PRC-Iran trade complies with international law.[48]

Iran appears to be prioritizing strengthening its air power by purchasing foreign fighter jets to address weaknesses that Israel exploited during the Israel-Iran War. Iran allegedly agreed to buy 48 Su-35 fighter jets from Russia with electronic warfare components and avionic enhancements, according to documents from Russian military conglomerate Rostec that were leaked by the Ukrainian hacker group “Black Mirror.”[49] CTP-ISW cannot independently verify the authenticity of the leaked documents. Iran would allegedly receive the first shipment of Su-35s as early as 2026, although Iran has previously experienced difficulties acquiring Russian military systems given Russia’s constraints and preoccupation with its war in Ukraine.[50] Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf advocated on September 24 for Iran to enhance its air power through the purchase of fighter jets.[51] The supposed Iran-Russia deal also comes amid reports that Iran may have acquired MiG-29 fighter jets from Russia.[52] Iranian Armed Forces General Staff-controlled Defa Press previously expressed support for the purchase of Chinese J-10 fighter jets in June 2025.[53] Iran has sought advanced fighter jets from its partners because Israel achieved air superiority in Iran within the first few days of the Israel-Iran War, which helped Israel to achieve its objectives of degrading the Iranian nuclear and ballistic missile programs.[54]

Iranian military commanders have recently increased inspections of naval units in the Persian Gulf. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Mohammad Pak Pour inspected the combat and operational readiness of Iranian naval units deployed on the Nazeat Islands in the Persian Gulf on October 5.[63] The Nazeat Islands, which include the Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, Abu Musa, and Siri islands, are key positions for Iran’s ability to control maritime access to the Persian Gulf.[64] Pak Pour’s visit comes after other Iranian military commanders, including Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi and Artesh Navy Commander Rear Admiral Shahram Irani, conducted inspections of southern Iranian naval units in recent weeks.[65] Former IRGC Navy Commander Hossein Alaei separately stated on October 1 that Iran has the ability to strike the United States and Israel due to its geographic position near the Persian Gulf.[66] Alaei described Iran’s location near the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman as the security and military “center of gravity of the region.”[67]

Iranian Artesh Navy Commander Rear Admiral Shahram Irani visited Russia on October 6 to attend a meeting for Caspian littoral state navy commanders.[68] Irani met with Iranian Ambassador to Russia Kazem Jalali and Russian Navy Deputy Commander Vladimir Zemtsov in Saint Petersburg. Irani emphasized that Iran’s cooperation with Caspian littoral states aims not only to safeguard security but also to bolster economic growth and address shared environmental concerns.[69] Irani is expected to meet with the Azerbaijani and Kazakh navy commanders during his visit to Russia.[70]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-6-2025/

Iran Update, October 7, 2025

Iran is pursuing alternative mechanisms, which may include barter systems, to mitigate the impact of snapback sanctions. Iranian Government Spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani stated on October 7 that the Iranian government aims to counter snapback sanctions by deepening ties with neighboring countries and international blocs such as the Eurasian Economic Union, BRICS, and Shanghai Cooperation Organization.[1] Mohajerani added that the Iranian government will also use barter mechanisms to sustain trade.[2] An Iranian trade official similarly stated on October 7 that the Iranian government is preparing alternative ”mechanisms“ to reduce the impact of snapback sanctions on Iran’s trade agreements.[3] The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) reimposed snapback sanctions on Iran on September 27, and the European Union (EU) reimposed sanctions on Iran on September 29.[4]

These alternative mechanisms may include barter systems that bypass sanctions. US media previously reported on October 5 that Iran and China have used barter systems that bypass dollar transactions to evade US sanctions since at least 2018, including via the exchange of Iranian oil and metals for Chinese goods and infrastructure projects.[5] Unspecified officials told the Wall Street Journal on October 5 that China funded infrastructure projects in Iran in 2024 in exchange for 8.4 billion US dollars of Iranian oil.[6]

Iran’s moves to mitigate sanctions are probably driven by concerns that sanctions on the Iranian economy will trigger an economic downturn. The World Bank forecasted in its October report that Iran will face an economic downturn over the next two years.[7] The World Bank stated that the Iranian economy will shrink by 1.7 percent in 2025 and 2.8 percent in 2026, which is a change from the World Bank’s April 2025 forecast of 0.7 percent growth in 2026.[8] The World Bank attributed this decline to reduced oil exports and non-oil economic activity due to the reimposition of UNSC sanctions and economic disruptions that followed the Israel-Iran War. The World Bank’s assessment comes amid the reimposition of sanctions on Iran and after several countries, including Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and Turkey, stated that they would abide by UNSC measures.[9]

The Hamas-Israel ceasefire in the Gaza Strip is a framework ceasefire agreement and not a comprehensive agreement to end the war. Hamas and Israel continued to hold indirect negotiations on US President Donald Trump’s ceasefire plan in Egypt on October 7, which demonstrates that both sides view the plan as a starting point or framework for further negotiations rather than a comprehensive agreement to end the war.[10] Hamas leaders agreed on October 3 to release all living and deceased Israeli hostages during the ceasefire and expressed openness to negotiate on other elements of the US plan.[11] Hamas and Israeli officials first held talks on October 6 to discuss the roadmap for future negotiations and ceasefire mechanisms.[12] The officials discussed an Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and a timetable for a hostage exchange during talks on October 7.[13] Hamas and Israeli officials have not discussed other key aspects of the US plan for peace in the Gaza Strip, such as governance over the Gaza Strip and Hamas’ disarmament.[14] Israeli and Hamas officials are expected to continue negotiations for several days, with US officials joining the talks on October 8.[15]

Anti-regime fighters killed two Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) security personnel and wounded three others in an attack on an IRGC operational base near Iraqi Kurdistan on October 6.[45] Kurdish anti-regime armed groups may be responsible for the attack due to the location and demographics of the area. Iranian and Iraqi officials agreed in March 2023 that Iraqi authorities would disarm and relocate members of Kurdish opposition groups away from the Iran-Iraq border to address Iranian concerns about the groups’ activities.[46] The Iranian regime has historically accused Israel of using Iraqi Kurdistan and Kurdish opposition groups to conduct operations against Iran.[47]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-7-2025/

Iran Update, October 8, 2025

Iranian officials have threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz, likely to try to discourage the United States from enforcing sanctions that target Iranian oil exports. An Iranian parliamentarian warned on October 4 that Iran would close the Strait of Hormuz if the United States or its allies prevent Iranian oil exports.[1] The head of the Iranian Armed Forces Judicial Organization similarly warned on October 5 that Iran would not allow a US presence in the Persian Gulf to threaten Iran’s economic or military security.[2] US President Donald Trump reinstated his maximum pressure campaign against Iran in February 2025 to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon and curb its influence abroad.[3] Trump’s maximum pressure campaign seeks to drive Iranian oil exports “to zero.”[4] The United States previously seized Iranian oil tankers and weapons shipments between May 2018 and January 2021 as part of the first Trump administration’s maximum pressure campaign.[5] Reuters reported in March 2025 that the United States was considering a plan for the United States and its allies to halt and inspect Iranian oil tankers at sea.[6] Iran previously attempted to close the strait in 2019 in response to the US maximum pressure campaign by sabotaging Emirati tankers, seizing British ships, and launching cruise missiles at Saudi oil facilities.[7] Iranian officials’ threats to close the Strait of Hormuz come as Iranian military commanders have recently increased inspections of naval units in the Persian Gulf, including naval units deployed at the Nazeat Islands.[8] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) deployed naval mines, ballistic and anti-ship cruise missiles, and fast attack craft to these islands in May 2025.[9] Iranian state-controlled outlet Mehr News detailed Iran’s anti-ship missile capabilities on October 7 and highlighted Iran’s development of new cruise missiles that reportedly have fully automated guidance systems.[10] These capabilities could support a potential Iranian effort to close the Strait of Hormuz.

The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) arrested several unidentified individuals in Anbar and Dhi Qar Provinces on October 2 and 8 for suspected Baath Party ties in what appear to be instances of sectarian targeting.[11] The PMF Intelligence and Information Department launched a campaign on October 2 to pursue Baath Party remnants.[12] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes several Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, some of which report to Iran instead of the Iraqi Prime Minister.[13] The 27th PMF Brigade, which the Iranian-backed Badr Organization controls, arrested a man in Karma District, Anbar Province, on October 2 for promoting Baath Party ideology.[14] PMF intelligence units separately arrested several alleged “senior” Baath Party members in Nasiriyah, Dhi Qar Province, on October 8.[15] Prominent Iraqi Shia politicians have commonly conflated Sunnism with membership in the Sunni-dominated Baathist government under Saddam Hussein and have abused de-Baathification measures to target Sunnis.[16]

It is unclear if these arrests are related to the upcoming November 2025 parliamentary elections, but the arrests come as multiple Iranian-backed Iraqi actors have sought to disqualify alleged Baath Party remnants ahead of the elections.[17] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iraqi Shia politicians are likely attempting to sideline Sunni political opposition ahead of the November 2025 elections by accusing their opponents of having Baathist ties.[18] Iraqi law prohibits Baath Party members from participating in political activities, including competing in elections.[19] Iraqi Shia political parties have weaponized this law and other de-Baathification mechanisms to target Sunnis, particularly Sunni political opposition.[20]

Iranian, Azerbaijani, Russian, and Kazakh naval commanders signed a strategic cooperation agreement in Russia on October 8 in response to concerns about external influence in the region.[21] The agreement stipulates that “no foreign country or extra-regional power” shall intervene in Caspian Sea affairs. Turkmenistan, which also borders the Caspian Sea, did not sign the document. Iranian leaders have raised concerns about extra-regional influence in the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea in response to discussions about the construction of the Zangezur Corridor.[22] The Zangezur Corridor is a Turkish and Azerbaijani-proposed transit route that would grant Turkey access to the Caspian Sea.[23]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-8-2025/

Iran Update, October 9, 2025

Hamas and Israel agreed on October 8 to the first phase of US President Donald Trump’s plan for peace in the Gaza Strip.[1] The first phase will not be implemented until the Israeli cabinet approves it.[2] The first phase stipulates that Israeli forces will immediately cease military operations in the Gaza Strip and withdraw to an agreed-upon line within 24 hours after the cabinet approves the plan.[3] Israeli forces will retain control of approximately 53 percent of the Gaza Strip during the first phase.[4] Hamas will release all 20 living hostages within 72 hours after Israel completes its withdrawal.[5] Hamas will also release all deceased hostages, and Israel will release 2,000 Palestinian prisoners within an unspecified timeframe. At least 400 truckloads of humanitarian aid will enter the Gaza Strip each day during the first phase.[6] Both Israel and Hamas have reportedly begun initial preparations to implement the ceasefire agreement. Israeli Army Radio reported that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has halted offensive operations in the Gaza Strip and begun preparing to withdraw its forces.[7] Hamas has reportedly started to transfer hostages to locations where medical care is available in preparation for their release.[8] The Israeli government has convened to vote on the agreement, but has not made an official decision at the time of this writing. Israeli media reported that the Israeli cabinet is expected to approve the deal.[9]

The Hamas-Israel ceasefire in the Gaza Strip is a framework ceasefire agreement and not a comprehensive agreement to end the war. Hamas and Israel ended negotiations on Trump’s plan after both parties agreed to the first phase, and will not resume negotiations on outstanding issues until the first phase is implemented.[10] Hamas and Israeli officials have not discussed key outstanding aspects of the US plan, including governance over the Gaza Strip and Hamas’ disarmament.[11] Western and Arab officials met in Paris on October 9 to discuss these issues.[12] Hamas and Israeli officials did not participate in the talks in Paris.

It remains unclear if the Hamas-Israel ceasefire will impact how Hamas’ partners in the Axis of Resistance engage with Israel. The Houthis have justified their missile and drone campaign against Israel and international shipping as a response to Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip.[13] Houthi Political Bureau member Mohammad al Bukhaiti stated on October 6 that international mediators should not focus on disarming Hamas “because our weapon is Hamas’ weapon, and our theater of operations is Hamas’ theater of operations,” which suggests that the Houthis will continue to support Hamas even if Hamas is disarmed.[14] The Houthis have continued to attack Israel since Hamas agreed to the ceasefire on October 3.[15] It is unclear if the Houthis would halt such attacks if the Hamas-Israel ceasefire holds. The Houthis would retain the ability to resume attacks against Israel or international shipping at any time and for any reason in the future, even if they suspended attacks due to a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.

Iranian news outlet Nour News highlighted the economic consequences of the Israel-Iran War in the second episode of its “Pathway” series, which aims to present perspectives on how Iran can navigate post-war challenges.[16] Nour News is affiliated with Ali Shamkhani, who is one of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s advisers to the Defense Council. Iranian economist Hamid Reza Fartouk Zadeh told Nour News on October 8 that sustained “external pressure” pushes Iranians to convert their savings into gold and foreign currency to preserve “purchasing power.”[17] Fartouk Zadeh added that this “outflow of capital” reduces demand for domestic goods, such as furniture, clothing, and leather, and weakens industries that produce these goods. Fartouk Zadeh argued that Iran must restructure small, labor-intensive industries and focus on non-oil exports to regional countries to counter these “destructive” trends.[18] Fartouk Zadeh’s remarks are consistent with the regime’s long-standing effort to diversify exports in response to international sanctions on oil sales.[19]

The United States sanctioned over 90 individuals, entities, and vessels on October 9 for facilitating the illicit trade of Iranian oil and gas. The sanctions are part of US President Donald Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign against Iranian energy exports.[20] The US Treasury Department designated three individuals, 28 entities, and 23 vessels, including a Chinese “teapot” oil refinery in Shandong Province, People’s Republic of China (PRC).[21] The US State Department concurrently sanctioned seven individuals, 10 vessels, and 21 entities, including a Chinese petrochemical terminal operator in Jiangyin, the PRC.[22] Approximately 90 percent of Iranian oil exports go to the PRC.[23]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-9-2025/

Iran Update, October 10, 2025

Israel and Hamas implemented a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip at 5:00 AM ET on October 10.[1] The ceasefire agreement does not address outstanding issues that were initially included in US President Donald Trump's plan for peace in the Gaza Strip, such as Hamas’ disarmament, a full Israeli withdrawal, or Gaza's future governance.[2] The Israeli government approved the ceasefire and hostage release resolution during a cabinet meeting on October 9 after two weeks of negotiations.[3] Trump said that he would not permit Israel to abandon the deal.[4] Axios reported that Trump's assurances were a “key factor” in convincing Hamas to accept the ceasefire agreement, citing two US officials.[5]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) withdrew to the eastern half of the Gaza Strip before the ceasefire began and has assured Hamas it will not reenter the western areas of the Strip if Hamas meets its ceasefire and hostage release obligations.[6] Israeli forces retain control of approximately 53 percent of the Gaza Strip.[7] The IDF also halted all aerial surveillance over Palestinian-controlled areas of the Gaza Strip.[8] Hamas agreed to release all 20 living Israeli hostages within three days of the ceasefire's implementation.[9] Hamas will also return the remains of all deceased hostages the group has in its possession in the first three days.[10] The agreement stipulates that 600 truckloads of humanitarian aid will enter the Gaza Strip each day.[11] US, Qatari, Egyptian, and Turkish officials will coordinate the ceasefire implementation between Israel and Hamas.[12] Two hundred US military personnel will be in Israel to assist with the ceasefire implementation, but they will not enter the Gaza Strip.[13]

Hamas’ partners in the Axis of Resistance welcomed the ceasefire but expressed skepticism that Israel would adhere to its terms. Iraqi militia leaders welcomed the ceasefire as a “victory.”[14] Iraqi militias launched a support campaign in November 2023 for Palestinians by attacking Israel and US bases with drones and rockets.[15] The Iranian supreme leader warned on October 10 that Israel is not trustworthy and that there is no guarantee that Israel will not resume the war against Hamas.[16] An Iranian government spokesperson said on October 10 that Iran will support every step toward a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, however.[17] Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi threatened on October 9 that the Houthis would continue to provide “backup” for Gazans if Israel does not fulfill its obligations under the ceasefire.[18] The Houthis have launched hundreds of drones and ballistic missiles targeting Israel since October 2023.[19] The Houthis would retain the ability to resume attacks against Israel or international shipping at any time and for any reason in the future, even if they suspended attacks due to a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.

The United States sanctioned two Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF)-owned commercial entities, three Iraqi bank executives, and three Kataib Hezbollah officials on October 9.[20] Iran has long used partners in Iraq to circumvent US and international sanctions. The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that is primarily comprised of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, some of which report to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister.[21] The US Treasury Department sanctioned the PMF-owned Muhandis General Company and Baladna Agricultural Investments on October 9.[22] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias such asKataib Hezbollah use the Muhandis General Company to generate revenue by diverting funds from Iraqi government contracts.[23] US-designated Popular Mobilization Commission Chief of Staff and Kataib Hezbollah leader Abd al Aziz (Abu Fadak) al Muhammadawi controls the Muhandis General Company.[24] Baladna Agricultural Investments is a commercial front for the Muhandis Company.[25]

The United States sanctioned Iraqi bank executives Ali Ghulam, Ali Meften, and Aqeel Meften for using their positions within Iraq's banking sector to generate revenue and launder money for the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force and Iranian-backed militias, including US-designated foreign terrorist organizations Kataib Hezbollah and Asaib Ahl al Haq.[26] Ghulam owns three Iraqi banks and has given the IRGC Quds Force “some degree of control” over his banks, which allows the IRGC Quds Force to generate millions of dollars in revenue for itself and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[27] The US Treasury Department and Federal Reserve reportedly blocked all three of Ghulam’s banks from engaging in dollar transactions in 2022 due to “suspicious transactions,” presumably with the IRGC or other Iranian institutions.[28] Ali Meften chairs the Board of Directors for the Union Bank of Iraq, which Iraq's Central Bank banned from engaging in dollar transactions in 2024.[29] The US Treasury Department also sanctioned Kataib Hezbollah leader Hassan Qahtan al Saidi and two members of his “source network” for gathering intelligence—including on US forces in Iraq—on behalf of the IRGC.[30]

These US sanctions are part of an effort to isolate Iran from the international financial system and hinder transnational Iranian smuggling efforts. The United States recently sanctioned two Iraqi businessmen and their companies on July 3 and September 2 for smuggling Iranian oil as part of a broader effort to curb Iraq's role in helping Iran evade international sanctions, for example.[31] Iran and its Iraqi partners have historically tried to evade international sanctions on Iranian banks and oil exports through the exploitation of Iraq's financial system and smuggling Iranian oil in Iraqi territorial waters.[32] Sanctioning Iraqi bank officials could further isolate Iran from the international banking system and hinder its ability to evade sanctions. These new US sanctions on Iraqi entities follow the recent reimposition of European Union (EU) and United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on Iran in September 2025 that the EU and UNSC had lifted under the 2015 nuclear deal.[33]

Iran increased its oil exports in September 2025 by 37 percent, according to Iran-focused advocacy group United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI), which UANI assessed was likely in response to the reimposition of United Nations (UN) sanctions on Iran on September 27.[34] Iran's oil exports in September 2025 totaled 63.2 billion barrels in total (worth $4.26 billion USD), according to UANI. UANI also reported that Iran increased its exports from an average of 1.45 million barrels per day (bpd) to 2.1 million bpd in September, which is Iran's highest daily average export in 2025.[35] The UN and the United States recently imposed sanctions on October 9 targeting UAE-based shipping firms and Chinese port terminals, and refineries for facilitating Iran's illicit oil trade.[36] UN and US sanctions would presumably make some actors less likely to support Iran's ability to transport and sell Iranian oil and generate export revenue.

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-10-2025/

Iran Update, October 13, 2025

Hamas and Israel have continued to implement the October 9 ceasefire agreement. Hamas and Israel agreed to a ceasefire and hostage-prisoner exchange on October 9, and the Israeli government approved the agreement on October 10.[1] The agreement called for Hamas to release all remaining hostages and Israel to release Palestinian prisoners held in Israel.[2] Hamas released all 20 living hostages and the bodies of four deceased hostages on October 13.[3] It is unclear when Hamas will release the remaining 24 deceased hostages.[4] Israel previously stated that an unspecified international organization would help locate the remaining deceased hostages if Hamas did not release them by October 13.[5] Israel released at least 1,700 Palestinian prisoners on October 13.[6] The ceasefire agreement also calls for humanitarian aid to be delivered to the Gaza Strip.[7] Egypt sent approximately 400 aid trucks to the Gaza Strip on October 12.[8] The aid will be distributed after Israel inspects the trucks.[9] Humanitarian organizations are expected to deliver approximately 600 trucks of aid per day to the Gaza Strip.[10]

US President Donald Trump traveled to Israel and Egypt to discuss the ceasefire with regional leaders. Trump addressed the Israeli Knesset on October 13 and told reporters that “the war is over.”[11] Trump departed Israel to attend a summit in Sharm al Sheikh, Egypt, on October 13 to discuss outstanding aspects of the US plan with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al Sisi and other Arab and regional leaders, including Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas.[12] Trump, Sisi, Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad al Thani, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan signed a ceasefire plan during the summit.[13] Trump said that the document, which the White House referred to as the “Gaza Peace Plan,” will “spell out rules and regulations” for the ceasefire.[14] The US plan calls for representatives from the United States, Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey to coordinate the implementation of the ceasefire between Israel and Hamas.[15] Two hundred US military personnel will deploy to Israel to assist with the implementation of the ceasefire alongside forces from Egypt, Qatar, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates.[16] The ceasefire agreement does not address key outstanding issues between Hamas and Israel, such as Hamas’ disarmament, a full Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, and future governance in the Gaza Strip.[17] Hamas and Israel concluded talks on Trump’s peace plan after both parties agreed to the first phase of the plan, and will not resume negotiations on outstanding issues until the first phase is implemented.[18]

Senior Iranian officials have continued to threaten to close the Strait of Hormuz, likely to try to deter the United States and its allies from enforcing UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1929 and sanctions on Iranian oil exports.[19] UNSC Resolution 1929 calls on UN member states to “inspect any [Iranian] vessel on their territory suspected of carrying prohibited cargo, including banned conventional arms or sensitive nuclear or missile items.”[20] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi warned on October 10 that Iran would respond “in a reciprocal and appropriate manner” if UN member states use UNSC Resolution 1929 to seize Iranian vessels.[21] Iranian Supreme Leader Adviser to the Defense Council Ali Shamkhani similarly warned Iranian adversaries on October 10 that Iran has not decided to close the Strait of Hormuz, but that Iran’s response to unspecified escalation in the strait would not be “limited.”[22] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Navy Commander Rear Admiral Ali Reza Tangsiri separately stated on October 11 that Iran’s decision to close the Strait of Hormuz would depend on “the pressure on Iranian exports,” most likely referring to Iranian oil exports.[23] The United States recently sanctioned over 90 individuals, entities, and vessels on October 9 for facilitating the illicit trade of Iranian oil and gas.[24] The sanctions are part of Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign, which seeks to drive Iranian oil exports to zero.[25] The United States previously seized Iranian oil tankers and weapons shipments between May 2018 and January 2021 as part of the first Trump administration’s maximum pressure campaign.[26] Iran responded to the maximum pressure campaign in 2019 by threatening international shipping, including by seizing a British oil tanker, harassing vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz, and conducting an attack targeting Saudi oil facilities.[27] Iranian officials’ concern about Iran’s ability to continue exporting Iranian oil comes after Reuters reported in March 2025 that the United States was considering a plan in which the United States and its allies would halt and inspect Iranian oil tankers at sea.[28] Oil exports are Iran’s economic lifeline and are critical to keeping the Iranian economy afloat, particularly amid increased Western economic pressure on Iran in recent weeks. Iranian military commanders have recently increased inspections of naval units in the Persian Gulf, including naval units stationed at Kharg Island, which is home to Iran’s main oil export terminal.[29]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-13-2025/

Iran Update, October 14, 2025

Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Commander Mazloum Abdi said on October 11 that he and the Syrian transitional government reached a “preliminary agreement” last week to integrate the SDF and Kurdish internal security forces into the state’s defense and interior ministries, respectively.[1] Abdi met with Syrian President Ahmed al Shara, Defense Minister Major General Marhaf Abu Qasra, and US officials in Damascus on October 7 to agree to a ceasefire following an outbreak of violence between government forces and the SDF in Aleppo City.[2] Abdi previously agreed to integrate all forces in northeastern Syria into state security forces in a framework agreement that he reached with Shara in March, but neither side has implemented most of the terms of the agreement.[3] Abdi referred to the new agreement as a “preliminary agreement” and “oral agreement,” which suggests that the new agreement may represent a renewed commitment by the SDF to integrate its forces into the state and will probably necessitate further negotiations on specific implementation mechanisms.[4] A prominent People’s Protection Units (YPG) commander led a delegation of SDF and Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) officials to discuss “joint military and security cooperation” with Abu Qasra and Syrian Interior Minister Anas Khattab in Damascus on October 13.[5] The Kurdish and Syrian government officials presumably discussed mechanisms to implement the new agreement.[6]

Shara and Abdi appear to have reached at least a partial agreement about certain elements of the SDF’s integration into the new Syrian army. Abdi told AFP that the SDF will be “restructured through its integration” into the Defense Ministry but did not provide further details.[7] Shara and Abdi have disagreed thus far over how the SDF would join the military. The SDF has consistently demanded that it integrate into the Syrian army as a “bloc” and retain its attributes, including its female units and commanders.[8] It is unclear if Shara and Abdi have fully addressed this issue. An unspecified “informed” source told Syria TV on October 13 that Shara and Abdi agreed to establish three divisions and several brigades “from the SDF” as army units in Hasakah, Raqqa, and Deir ez Zor provinces.[9] CTP-ISW cannot confirm this claim, but such an agreement would be consistent with the SDF’s demand to remain deployed in northeastern Syria.[10] Abdi may also have been referring to a recent US proposal to form a joint SDF-government force to fight the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS).[11] Abdi said that the SDF accepted this proposal.[12]

The Syrian transitional government and the SDF have not yet agreed on a model for decentralized governance in Syria, however. Such disagreements may continue to delay or prevent the SDF’s integration into the Syrian state. Abdi said that he and the Syrian government share an “understanding on the principle of decentralization” but that the SDF and government “have not agreed on it” and are “still discussing finding a common formula acceptable to all.”[13] The Syrian transitional government has consistently rejected decentralization and federalism and has accused the SDF of promoting “separatism.”[14] The two parties’ disagreement over decentralization has been one of the principal disagreements that has delayed the SDF’s integration into the Syrian state.

Senior Syrian officials likely discussed the status of talks with the SDF and Turkish support for the Syrian army with Turkish officials in Ankara on October 12.[15] Syrian Defense Minister Major General Marhaf Abu Qasra, intelligence head Hussein al Salama, and Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani discussed counterterrorism, border control, and joint training with their Turkish counterparts in Ankara.[16] The officials very likely discussed the progress of talks with the SDF, given Turkey’s role in pressuring the Syrian government to increase political and military pressure on the SDF to integrate into the Syrian state in recent months. Abdi told AFP on October 11 that successful negotiations with the Syrian government would depend on whether Turkey plays a “supportive and contributing role.”[17] Turkish Defense Minister Yaser Guler called on the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and “all affiliated groups…especially in Syria” to “surrender weapons immediately” in a statement on October 11 prior to the Syrian delegation’s visit.[18] Turkey often conflates the SDF with the PKK and uses “PKK” to refer to the entire SDF. Abu Qasra separately thanked Guler on October 12 for Turkey’s “concrete efforts” to build the Syrian army.[19] Turkey and Syria signed a defense agreement in August 2025 that commits Turkey to assisting Syria with military training and equipment procurement.[20]

Iran reportedly turned on the automatic identification systems (AIS) of most of its oil tankers on October 13, according to Tanker Trackers.[21] This incident marks the first time that Iranian tankers have turned on their AIS signals since 2018.[22] Iranian oil tankers keep their AIS signals turned off to obfuscate their identity and location while illicitly transporting Iranian oil. It is unclear why Iran would turn on its tankers’ AIS signals, but this report notably comes amid Iranian threats to close the Strait of Hormuz if the international community enforces UNSC and US sanctions against illicit Iranian exports.[23]

Unspecified gunmen attacked a vehicle carrying engineers and contractors who were working on the Chabahar–Mashhad water transfer project in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on October 12.[24] The Chabahar–Mashhad water transfer project aims to supply drinking and industrial water to Iran’s eastern provinces by transporting water from the Sea of Oman to eastern Iran.[25] No group has claimed responsibility for the attack at the time of this writing.

Former reformist President Hassan Rouhani proposed a series of diplomatic, military, and economic reforms to address challenges after the Israel-Iran War during a meeting with former provincial governors on October 12.[26] Rouhani urged the Iranian regime to strengthen its military and diplomatic capabilities to avoid further conflict. Rouhani advocated for negotiations but noted that negotiations under current circumstances would be “complex.”[27] Rouhani called on Iranian officials to stop inflation growth by implementing liquidity control measures and supporting investments. Rouhani additionally urged the regime to implement legal and institutional changes, including reforming the Iranian election law to reflect public preferences.

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-14-2025/

Iran Update, October 15, 2025

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Mohammad Pakpour appointed Brigadier General Seyyed Musa Hosseini to command the IRGC Ground Forces Neynava Unit in Golestan Province on October 15.[23] The Neynava Unit is an IRGC Ground Forces provincial unit.[24] CTP-ISW cannot confirm the size or composition of provincial units, and it is unclear how they fit into the IRGC Ground Forces order of battle. Brigadier generals second class usually command provincial units, though sometimes colonels or brigadier generals first class.[25] The IRGC Ground Forces Ghadir Operational Base, which is based in Sari, Mazandaran Province, oversees IRGC Ground Forces units in Golestan, Gilan, and Mazandaran provinces. Hosseini previously served as the Deputy Commander of the Neynava Unit and replaced Brigadier General Ali Malek Shahkouhi.[26]

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) continues to receive Iranian oil exports at Chinese port terminals despite five rounds of US sanctions that have targeted Chinese port terminals and oil refineries for receiving illicit Iranian crude oil.[27] Trading firms diverted at least six crude oil tankers from a crude oil import terminal in Shandong Province that the United States sanctioned on October 9 to other eastern Chinese port terminals, according to shipping data and trading sources who spoke to Reuters on October 13 and 15.[28] The PRC could, if it chose to do so, demand that these terminals and the ships entering them adhere to US sanctions and refuse to import Iranian oil. The PRC’s refusal to issue these demands illustrates that it continues to repudiate US sanctions against Iranian energy exports by accepting the ships at other terminals.[29] The PRC imports around 90 percent of Iranian crude oil exports, which remain an economic lifeline for Iran amid increased Western sanctions.[30] Shandong Province port authorities have issued notices previously banning terminal operators from receiving US-sanctioned or non-registered vessels, but these notices have had limited effects.[31] These notices have not directly impacted the PRC’s ability to offload Iranian oil exports because sanctioned vessels carrying Iranian crude oil conduct ship-to-ship transfers with non-sanctioned vessels that then offload at Chinese ports.[32] Iranian oil exports to the PRC have remained high, averaging 1.8 million barrels per day in the first half of 2025, despite US President Donald Trump’s second round of ”maximum pressure” campaign sanctions that seek to drive Iranian oil exports to zero.[33]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-15-2025/

Iran Update, October 16, 2025

Iranian-backed Iraqi fighters likely assassinated Iraqi Sunni Sovereignty Alliance candidate and Baghdad Provincial Council member Safaa al Mashhadani on October 14 with an explosive device in al Dhubat neighborhood, Tarmiyah district, Iraq.[1] The perpetrators remotely detonated an explosive device on Mashhadani’s car, killing Mashhadani and injuring four others.[2] Both the Iraqi parliament speaker and the prime minister announced investigations into the assassination.[3] Iraqi Security Media Cell head Lieutenant General Saad Maan said on October 15 that unspecified actors had previously tried to assassinate Safaa al Mashhadani.[4] No group has claimed responsibility for either incident at the time of this writing, which suggests the involvement of Iranian-backed actors.

ranian-backed militias likely assassinated Safaa al Mashhadani. Iranian-backed Shia militias have long maintained a presence in Tarmiyah and other predominantly agricultural areas north of Baghdad, where they have murdered Sunni civilians and advocated sectarian cleansing of Sunni areas.[5] Both Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada and Kataib Hezbollah have explicitly and implicitly called for Sunnis in Tarmiyah to be displaced and presumably replaced with Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) facilities or other populations.[6] Iranian-backed militias previously cleansed Jurf al Sakhr, a formerly Sunni area south of Baghdad, and replaced the Sunni town there with a PMF base that is inaccessible to the Iraqi government.[7] These militias also recently denied the capable, apolitical, and US-trained Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS) access to Tarmiyah.[8] Mashhadani continuously advocated for the removal of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias from Tarmiyah, which these groups would have perceived as a threat to their dominance north of Baghdad.[9] Mashhadani’s assassination followed his October 14 announcement that the Baghdad Provincial Council voted to suspend the allocation of investment licenses for projects in the Baghdad Belts following reports of unspecified violations against local farmers and landowners.[10]

ISIS almost certainly did not conduct this attack. Several Iranian-backed Iraqi actors released statements on October 15 and 16 that deflected responsibility for the assassination and implied that ISIS was responsible.[11] ISIS conducted three attacks in all of September, none of which occurred in or around Baghdad or demonstrated any tactical sophistication.[12] ISIS’s lack of tactical ability in Iraq suggests that it would be incapable of conducting an assassination of this sort. This assassination required a pattern-of-life assessment and capable bomb-makers. ISIS in Iraq has resorted to small arms harassment and relatively simple IEDs, not well-orchestrated assassinations.[13] ISIS in Iraq has previously assassinated ISF and PMF leadership in Tarmiyah, but it has almost always claimed these attacks.[14] ISIS would almost certainly claim this attack, given its high-profile nature, if it conducted the attack to present itself as capable and relevant even as its attack rates have fallen.

The Houthis confirmed on October 16 that Israeli airstrikes killed Houthi Chief of General Staff Mohammad Abd al Karim al Ghamari.[15] Ghamari is the most senior Houthi official who has been killed since 2004, according to a Yemeni analyst.[16] Ghamari served as the Houthi military chief of staff since 2016.[17] Ghamari was responsible for overseeing Houthi military operations and directing the procurement of various weapons.[18] Ghamari reportedly had close ties to Hezbollah and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).[19] The United States designated Ghamari a Specially Designated National and Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) in May 2021.[20] The Houthis will almost certainly not immediately retaliate for Ghamari’s death. The Houthis did not specify when Ghamari was killed, but Israeli airstrikes in June and August 2025 reportedly targeted him.[21] The Houthis have likely announced his death now because they view the recent Hamas-Israel ceasefire agreement as an end to the October 7 War.[22] Other Axis of Resistance groups have similarly delayed confirming the death of leaders. Israel killed former Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip, Mohammad Sinwar, in May 2025, but Hamas only confirmed his death months later in August 2025.[23]

The Houthis appointed Major General Yousuf Hassan al Madani to replace Ghamari.[24] Madani previously commanded the Houthis’ Fifth Military Region, which is headquartered in Hudaydah City and oversees Hudaydah, Hajjah, Raymah, and Mahwit governorates.[25] The United States also designated Madani as an SDGT in May 2021.[26] Basha reported that Madani studied under Houthi cleric Majd al Din al Muayyad in Saada Governorate and joined the Houthis under Hussein al Houthi’s Believing Youth movement, the predecessor to the Houthi Movement.[27] Madani trained under the IRGC in 2002 and later returned to Yemen to train Houthi forces and send them to IRGC training camps in Iran and Syria, which suggests that Madani has well-established connections with other members of the Axis of Resistance.

Iranian Supreme Leader Adviser to the Defense Council Ali Shamkhani’s recent remarks on Iran’s missile doctrine and nuclear posture highlight an ongoing internal debate about the regime’s military strategies. This debate has focused on strategic missteps that led to the Israel–Iran War and the flaws in Iranian ideas about deterring Israel and the United States. Shamkhani gave an interview on October 12 to the Iranian podcast “Story of the War,” which features various senior Iranian officials’ perspectives on the Israel-Iran War.[28] Shamkhani expressed retrospective regret that he did not advocate more for the development of Iran’s nuclear capability as defense minister and said that he would advocate for building a nuclear capability if he could return to the 1990s again.[29] Shamkhani was Iran’s Minister of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics from 1997 to 2005.

Shamkhani also acknowledged shortcomings in Iran’s use of ballistic missiles, which contrasts sharply with the analysis of other Iranian leaders. Former IRGC Navy Commander Hossein Alaei claimed that Iran’s demonstration of missile capabilities caused the United States and Israel to call for a ceasefire in an interview on October 1.[30] Shamkhani acknowledged early operational errors during Iran’s missile strikes on Israel in April and October 2024 and stated that Iran’s shortcomings encouraged Israel to conclude that a large-scale attack on Iran ”with reasonable costs is possible.”[31] Shamkhani described Iran’s April and October 2024 strikes as part of a learning process that exposed gaps in Iran’s understanding of Israeli air defenses and improved its missile performance during the 12-day war.[32] Iran launched 500 to 550 ballistic missiles and over 1,000 drones during its Operation True Promise III in June 2025.[33] Israeli defenses intercepted 80 to 90 percent of Iran’s missiles and 99.99 percent of its drones, however.

The IRGC has reportedly appointed Seyed Jabar Hosseini as the new IRGC Quds Force Unit 190 commander, according to anti-regime hacktivist group Lab Dookhtegan.[34] Lab Dookhtegan has previously used language that suggests it sympathizes with Mojahedin-e-Khalq (MEK), an exiled Iranian opposition group based in Albania.[35] ISW-CTP cannot independently verify whether Hosseini is the new Unit 190 commander at this time. Israel killed the former Unit 190 commander, Behnam Shahriari, during the Israel-Iran War in June 2025.[36] Unit 190 is a specialized branch within the IRGC Quds Force that is involved in oil smuggling and money laundering.[37] The unit also oversees Iran’s covert arms transfers and smuggling to Hezbollah and other members of the Axis of Resistance.[38]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-16-2025/

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