Iranian Regime tv Channel One hacked while it was airing Khamenie speech

Iranian Regime national tv Channel One hacked about an hour ago. During a broadcast of Khamenie speech, a red crosshair appeared over his face and chanting of Women. Life. Freedom. There was writing to the side saying "Rise up. Join us". Also 4 photos at the bottom of the screen of young people killed and additional writing: "The blood of our youth is dropping from your paws".

Also, there was a huge banner in the middle of Tehran highway today that read: We are no longer afraid of you. We will fight.

Also, attempted attack on IRI ambassador in Denmark. Her bodyguard was stabbed. Diplomatic Security intervened before the attacker could stab the ambassador.

Iran Update, September 24, 2025

Iran has begun reconstructing several ballistic missile facilities as part of a broader effort to rebuild its degraded ballistic missile program after the Israel-Iran War. Iran has begun rebuilding the Parchin and Shahroud missile production facilities since August 28 and September 5, respectively, according to satellite imagery analyzed by the Associated Press.[1] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) struck the Parchin and Shahroud military sites in October 2024 and during the Israel-Iran War.[2] Satellite imagery of the Parchin missile site from August 28 and of the Shahroud missile site from September 5 showed that Iran has begun reconstructing buildings that housed solid fuel mixers, which are essential to producing solid fuel for ballistic missiles.[3] The Associated Press assessed that Iran still does not have mixers at Parchin or Shahroud to produce solid fuel, however.[4] The IDF previously destroyed Iranian solid fuel mixers during its October 2024 attack on Iran. Israeli sources stated in October 2024 that Iran could not domestically produce solid fuel mixers and would need to purchase them from China, which could take at least a year.[5] China previously assisted Iran in rebuilding its ballistic missile program after the October 2024 Israeli attack on Iran by supplying Iran with sodium perchlorate, which is a component of solid fuel.[6] The Associated Press report comes after Iran tested an unspecified ballistic missile in Semnan Province on September 18.[7] The report also comes after the Iranian Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Commission approved on September 7 a bill to increase the Iranian armed forces’ “defense capabilities,” which include Iranian missile capabilities.[8]

An Iranian parliamentarian who is affiliated with the ultraconservative Paydari (Stability) Front and a member of the Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Commission claimed on September 23 that Russia delivered MiG-29 fighter jets to Iran.[9] CTP-ISW cannot verify this claim, but if the claim is true, Iran's acquisition of MiG-29 aircraft would almost certainly not help Iran defend against Israeli or US aircraft in a future conventional conflict. Abolfazl Zohrevand claimed that Russian MiG-29 fighter jets have arrived in Shiraz, Iran, as part of Iran's efforts to strengthen its air force.[10] Russia has not confirmed this report. CTP-ISW cannot independently confirm whether Russia has delivered MiG-29 fighter jets to Iran at the time of this writing. The MiG-29 is an antiquated system and would not be able to confront more advanced Israeli and US aircraft, such as F-35 fighter jets. Zohrevand also claimed that Russian Su-35 fighter jets are “gradually entering” Iran and that Russia will supply Iran with S-400 air defense systems.[11] Iranian officials have repeatedly claimed in recent years that Russia will provide Iran with Su-35 fighter jets and S-400 air defense systems, but Russia has not yet delivered any such systems to Iran.[12] CTP-ISW continues to assess that Russia is unable to divert critical systems like the Su-35 and S-400 away from its war effort in Ukraine. Zohrevand further claimed that China would supply Iran with HQ-9 long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs).[13] Chinese HQ-9 SAMs bear similarities to Russian S-300s. Senior Iranian officials have expressed openness to expanding military cooperation with China, but it is unclear whether China is willing to provide Iran with the advanced systems that it seeks.[14]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-24-2025/

Iran Update, September 25, 2025

Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf emphasized on September 24 the strategic importance of maintaining an Iranian presence near Israel's borders to defend against Israel.[13] Ghalibaf claimed that Israel's recent campaign against Iran would “definitely not have occurred” and that Iran would have “confronted” Israel on its border with Syria if Iran still retained a presence in Syria.[14] Ghalibaf may have been arguing that Iran could have opened another front against Israel in Syria and thereby detracted Israel's attention and diverted its resources away from Iran during the Israel-Iran War if Iran maintained its foothold in Syria. Iranian-backed groups in southern Syria, including Lebanese Hezbollah and Palestinian militias, often launched munitions targeting Israel and the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights in the months following October 7, 2023. Iran's network in Syria remains extremely limited after the fall of Assad in December 2024, and Iranian-aligned militias in Syria did not participate in the Israel-Iran war.[15] Ghalibaf also claimed that Israel would advance to Iran's border if Iran does not “stand against [Israel] in the Golan [Heights].”[16] Ghalibaf’s comments reflect Iran's long-held objective to encircle Israel and to prevent conflicts with Israel from reaching Iran.

Ghalibaf also emphasized the need for Iran to strengthen its air power. Ghalibaf claimed that Iran's Bavar-373, Khordad, Sayyad, and Majid air defense systems operated effectively during the Israel-Iran War, but called on the regime to prioritize purchasing fighter jets.[17] Israel achieved air superiority in Iran within a few days of the start of the Israel-Iran War.[18] Ghalibaf’s statements come amid reports that Iran may have acquired Russian MiG-29 fighter jets from Russia.[19] Ghalibaf’s statements also come after Iranian armed forces-affiliated Defa Press expressed support for the purchase of Chinese fighter jets in June.[20]

The United States is continuing to pressure the Iraqi federal government to limit Iranian influence in the Iraqi federal government. Three unnamed Iraqi officials told UK-based, Qatari-owned media on September 24 that the United States asked the Iraqi federal government to reform the Iraqi judiciary and improve financial oversight as part of an effort to reduce Iranian influence over Iraqi state institutions.[21] Iranian-backed Iraqi actors have co-opted the Iraqi judicial system to issue rulings favorable to militia interests.[22] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have also exploited loopholes within the Iraqi financial system to commit fraud and obtain funds to support Iranian and militia operations, including attacks on US forces and allies.[23] The US demand for improved financial oversight comes after Iraq's Rafidain Bank signed a “professional partnership agreement” with a US-based financial consulting firm on August 15 to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.[24] The Iraqi government previously used Rafidain Bank to process and distribute salaries to members of the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces.[25]

Iran is preparing economic measures to try to withstand the likely reimposition of UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on September 27. UNSC Resolution 2231 endorsed the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and terminated six earlier UNSC resolutions.[26] The E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggered the 30-day JCPOA snapback process on August 28.[27] The UNSC will reimpose the six suspended resolutions, which include sanctions on Iranian military and nuclear entities, on September 27 unless Iran meets its obligations laid out under the JCPOA. Iranian Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad claimed on September 24 that the Iranian government has developed contingency plans to counter snapback sanctions and claimed that oil sales will continue at their current rate despite sanctions.[28] Paknejad added that snapback sanctions will not directly target Iranian oil sales but could affect trade, finance, and shipping.[29] Central Bank Governor Mohammad Reza Farzin similarly stated on September 24 that the bank will stabilize the Iranian currency if UNSC sanctions are reimposed.[30] Farzin also claimed that the Central Bank will sell more gold coins and bullion to keep the gold market stable and control inflation.[31] The Iranian rial reached 1,085,000 rials per one US dollar on September 25, reflecting Iranian anticipation about imminent snapback sanctions.[32]

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi stated on September 23 that Iran still retains the capacity to advance its nuclear program after US and Israeli strikes targeted Iranian nuclear facilities in June 2025.[33] Grossi stated that the strikes may not have damaged all Iranian centrifuges and that Iran retains facilities to manufacture centrifuge components.[34] Grossi also stated that it would take Iran only “weeks” to enrich its uranium stockpile to 90 percent.[35] Israel struck the Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (TESA) workshop in Karaj, west of Tehran, and the Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC) in Tehran Province during the Israel-Iran War.[36] Iran manufactured centrifuge components at TESA and manufactured and tested advanced centrifuge rotors at the TNRC.[37]

Iran showcased its nuclear technology at the 2025 Atom Expo in Moscow on September 25.[38] Atomic Energy Organization of Iran head Mohammad Eslami presented advancements in Iran's nuclear technology on September 25.[39] China, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan also participated in the exhibition.[40] Eslami met with Russian President Vladimir Putin and IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi on the sidelines of the event.[41] Eslami announced that Iran plans to develop large nuclear power plants and small modular reactors (SMRs) with the help of Russian state-owned atomic energy corporation Rosatom.[42] Eslami and the Rosatom director general signed a memorandum of understanding on September 24 for Russia to build eight SMRs in Iran, including four at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant.[43]

Indian officials recently discussed the possibility of purchasing oil from Iran and Venezuela in exchange for reducing Russian oil imports with the Trump administration.[44] An anonymous source with knowledge of the discussion told Bloomberg on September 25 that an Indian delegation visiting the United States emphasized to the Trump administration that India must receive oil from Iran and Venezuela in order to be able to suspend oil imports from Russia without causing a spike in global oil prices. India has not purchased oil from Iran since 2019.

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-25-2025/

Iran Update, September 26, 2025

The E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) will reimpose UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on Iran on September 27 despite a last-ditch Iranian effort to delay the snapback mechanism. A UK-based media outlet reported on September 26 that Iran offered to immediately grant International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors full access to the Natanz Nuclear Facility. Iran, in return, called for the UNSC to adopt a Russian-Chinese resolution to extend the snapback mechanism's deadline by six months.[1] The UNSC rejected the Russian-Chinese resolution in a vote on September 26, which means the UNSC sanctions will automatically be reimposed on September 27.[2] The E3 offered in July 2025 to extend the snapback mechanism's deadline if Iran fully cooperated with the IAEA, resumed nuclear talks with the United States, and accounted for its 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile.[3] Iran failed to meet the E3’s conditions.

Iran has continued to expand its nuclear infrastructure at the Mount Kolang Gaz La facility in Esfahan Province, which was not damaged or targeted during the Israel–Iran War in June 2025.[4] The Washington Post, citing satellite imagery, reported on September 26 that Iran has made key changes at the site since the war.[5]

Security perimeter: Iran completed construction on roughly 4,000 feet of wall on the western edge and graded a parallel road, which brings the enclosure close to completion.
Tunnel entrance: Iran reinforced one eastern entrance with dirt and rock to prevent damage or potential collapse in future airstrikes.
Excavation spoil: The pile of rock and soil outside the eastern tunnels has modestly increased, indicating continued tunneling inside the mountain.
Unspecified analysts told the Washington Post that the facility's underground halls may be 260 to 330 feet deep, which is deeper than the underground halls at Iran's Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant.[6] The depth of the facility's underground halls has fueled suspicions that the site could serve not only as a centrifuge assembly plant, as Iran announced in 2020, but also as a covert enrichment facility or secure storage for near-weapons-grade uranium.[7] The Institute for Science and International Security reported in April 2025 that Iran had already begun building a security wall with new roads and space for fences, lights, and cameras at the facility.[8] The institute's report noted that the facility could house an advanced centrifuge assembly plant or potentially a small undeclared enrichment plant.[9] The IAEA has never inspected the Mount Kolang Gaz La facility, which illustrates the limitations that the IAEA faces in obtaining a complete picture of Iran‘s nuclear program. Iran also barred IAEA inspectors from accessing the site's tunnels in April 2025 and told the agency that “it is none of [their] business.”[10]

Animated gif: https://x.com/TheStudyofWar/status/1971717640931398091

Iran is attempting to exploit anti-Israel sentiments in Saudi Arabia in order to protect Hezbollah from its looming disarmament. Iran's attempts to exploit anti-Israel sentiment in the Saudi government will most likely fail due to Iran's long history of attacking Saudi Arabia with proxies and partners trained by Hezbollah. Iranian officials appear to have grown increasingly concerned about Hezbollah's ability to retain its weapons amid the Lebanese state's current efforts to disarm the group following Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani’s trip to Riyadh on September 16.[11] Two unspecified Iranian sources told Reuters on September 26 that Hezbollah's disarmament was one of the “main topics” of Larijani’s visit and that Larijani attempted to convince Riyadh that Hezbollah's disarmament would benefit neither Lebanon nor the region.[12] Saudi Arabia has positioned itself in recent months as one of the principal regional powers supporting the Lebanese state's efforts to disarm Hezbollah.[13] Larijani urged Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem to reach out and show “goodwill” to Saudi Arabia after his trip, according to the two Iranian sources and an unspecified source with “knowledge of Hezbollah's thinking.“[14] Qassem—in acquiescence to Larijani’s request—called on Saudi Arabia to “open a new page” with Hezbollah during a speech on September 19.[15] Qassem argued that both parties have a common enemy in Israel.[16]

Qassem’s reasoning is consistent with Iranian diplomatic efforts and rhetoric that have attempted to exploit regional anti-Israel sentiments in the wake of Israel's strikes on Doha, Qatar, on September 9.[17] Iran has aimed these efforts at Gulf states, such as Saudi Arabia, and has called for Arab, Islamic, and international responses since Israel's strikes in Doha.[18] Iranian officials have framed Israel's strikes as an opportunity to unite regional powers—particularly the Gulf states—in an anti-Israel, anti-United States regional coalition.[19]

Such an Iranian effort to exploit anti-Israel sentiments in Saudi Arabia is highly unlikely to weaken Saudi support for Hezbollah's disarmament. Hezbollah has trained several Iranian proxy and partner groups—including Kataib Hezbollah in Iraq and other Iraqi militias and the Houthis—that have targeted Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia, in addition to other Gulf states, has promised significant economic aid to Lebanon that is contingent on Hezbollah's disarmament, likely as an economic incentive to pressure the Lebanese government to implement its disarmament plan.[20] Saudi Arabia is unlikely to ease pressure on the partner of its regional rival, Iran, based on shared anti-Israel sentiment alone.

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-26-2025/

Iran Update, September 29, 2025

The European Union (EU) reimposed sanctions on Iran on September 29 that it had lifted under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The EU’s reimposition of sanctions comes after the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) reimposed snapback sanctions on Iran on September 27.[1] The EU froze the Iranian Central Bank and other major Iranian banks’ assets, banned the import of Iranian oil, and banned the export of technologies or materials that Iran could use for uranium enrichment, among other measures.[2] The EU reimposed sanctions on Iranian economic institutions, such as the Khatam ol Anbia Construction Headquarters, that play an outsized role in the Iranian economy.[3] The Khatam ol Anbia Construction Headquarters is controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and has built power plants, oil vessels, and transportation infrastructure on behalf of the IRGC. The EU also reimposed sanctions on Iranian banks, such as Bank Sepah and Bank Melli, that have supported Iran’s defense industry.[4] Iranian banks reportedly held at least 1.9 billion euros in assets in Europe as of March 2024.[5] The reimposition of EU sanctions on Iran may further isolate Iran from international financial networks and reduce the volume of EU-Iran trade. The EU was Iran’s fifth largest trading partner in 2024.[6] The full impact of the EU sanctions is currently unclear, however. The United States’ imposition of maximum pressure sanctions against Iran in 2018 has already significantly diminished the volume of EU-Iran trade in recent years.[7] The EU’s reimposition of sanctions on September 29 follows the UNSC’s reimposition of snapback sanctions on Iran on September 27, which are similarly designed to politically and economically isolate Iran due to its failure to fulfill its obligations in the JCPOA.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s website framed snapback sanctions as “psychological warfare” and called on the regime to expand ties with neighboring countries and pursue a “Look East” policy to mitigate the impact of sanctions.[8] A newspaper run by Khamenei’s website argued on September 28 that Iran must rely on its domestic strength and work with neighbors, “countries in the Global South,” and countries that are part of Iran’s “Look East” policy to mitigate the impact of Western sanctions. Iran’s “Look East” policy seeks to counter US pressure by building ties with countries such as China and Russia.[9] This editorial is consistent with recent statements from Khamenei in May 2025 in which he framed Iran’s participation in multilateral institutions like BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as “opportunities” for Iran.[10] Iran joined BRICS in January 2024. Iranian officials have emphasized that Iran’s participation in BRICS provides opportunities for Iran to reduce its reliance on the US dollar and develop alternative financial platforms.[11] Iran has also deepened economic, political, and security ties with Russia in recent years and recently joined the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).[12] Iran likely seeks to use its membership in multilateral institutions to reduce the impact of Western sanctions and to secure alternative trade routes, energy partners, and financial channels.

Iranian officials are concerned that the reimposition of snapback sanctions may trigger economic unrest. Four unspecified Iranian officials and two unspecified “insiders” told Reuters on September 27 that the reimposition of sanctions will deepen Iran’s economic isolation and fuel public anger.[13] An Iranian official said that the regime is increasingly concerned that discontent over economic difficulties may lead to mass protests. Several Iranian officials framed the reimposition of snapback sanctions as “psychological warfare” against Iran, which likely reflects Iranian officials’ belief that Iran’s adversaries seek to increase public disillusionment by increasing economic pressure on Iran.[14] Iranian Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei warned on September 29 that Iranian authorities will take legal action against individuals who undermine public morale or disrupt markets in ways that “serve enemy objectives.”[15] Khamenei categorically rejected negotiations with the United States on September 23, which makes it very unlikely that Iran will receive economic relief in the near term.[16] The regime’s concerns about potential internal unrest come as inflation has risen above 40 percent, and the Iranian rial fell to a record low of 1,121,000 rials per one US dollar on September 29.[17]

Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani conducted his second visit to Beirut since becoming SNSC secretary on August 5.[37] Larijani’s multiple visits to Beirut in recent months highlight the extent to which Iran is prioritizing retaining its influence in Lebanon amid Lebanese state efforts to disarm Hezbollah. Larijani met with Lebanese Parliament Speaker and Hezbollah ally Nabih Berri and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, who is currently leading the Lebanese state‘s disarmament efforts, on September 27.[38] Larijani previously visited Beirut in August 2025 and similarly met with Lebanese officials, including Salam and Lebanese President Joseph Aoun.[39] Larijani’s previous visit reportedly aimed to “prevent a complete shift in Lebanon’s internal power balance to the detriment of Hezbollah,” according to an Iranian analyst close to the regime.[40] Larijani’s multiple visits to Beirut in recent months are likely part of an Iranian effort to prevent Hezbollah’s disarmament, although it remains unclear how specifically Iran intends to achieve this objective.

Larijani overstated the degree of Iranian support to Hezbollah and Lebanon during his visit to Beirut on September 26 and 27. Larijani met with Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem on September 26 and told Qassem that Iran is prepared to back Lebanon and Hezbollah at “all levels.”[41] Larijani did not specify what types of support Iran is prepared to give Hezbollah moving forward. Larijani’s vow of support for Hezbollah is largely performative, particularly given that Iran failed to support Hezbollah during the Israeli campaign in Lebanon in late 2024 and sustained significant damage during the Israel-Iran War. Iran has provided Hezbollah with limited support since the end of the Israel-Hezbollah conflict, which has included some financial support for reconstruction. Qassem previously claimed in December 2024 that Iran had allocated at least $50 million to reconstruct damaged households in Lebanon.[42] Larijani noted that he traveled to Beirut to follow up on Hezbollah’s reconstruction efforts.[43] Iran’s claimed economic support is unlikely to help Lebanon make any meaningful progress in its reconstruction. The World Bank estimated in March 2025 that Lebanon would need approximately $11 billion for its reconstruction and recovery needs following the Israel-Hezbollah conflict in late 2024.[44] $50 million from Iran is minuscule in comparison to the economic support that the Lebanese state requires for its post-war reconstruction.

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-29-2025/

Iran Update, September 30, 2025

Senior Iranian officials appear to be preparing for potential military conflict. Iranian officials continue to believe that the current ceasefire between Israel and Iran will collapse and fighting will resume at some point in the future. Iranian Deputy Interior Minister for Security and Law Enforcement and National Security Council (NSC) Secretary Ali Akbar Pour Jamshidian stated on September 27 that the Supreme National Security Council (SCNC) had directed all Iranian military and civilian officials to designate several successors to ensure continuity of governance in the event of leadership disruption.[1] Pour Jamshidian added that the Interior Ministry adopted the same decision and designated several individuals, down to provincial governors, as successors within the Interior Ministry.[2] The SNSC rejected Pour Jamshidian’s statement on September 27 and denied holding any meeting on this issue.[3] The SNSC likely pursued succession planning as a part of the Iranian government's attempts to amend issues it faced during the 12-day war, including those posed by the Israeli decapitation campaign that targeted senior Iranian officials. Israeli strikes destroyed the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force command bunker on June 13 and killed senior IRGC commanders.[4] The death of these commanders disrupted Iran's command-and-control and made responding to Israeli attacks extremely difficult.[5] The SNSC’s succession planning also comes after Khamenei’s absence during the war, which prevented his principal subordinates from reaching him for rapid decisions.[6] Khamenei also reportedly named three senior clerics as potential successors during the war and directed the Iranian Assembly of Experts to choose from those clerics to ensure an orderly wartime transition.[7] The rare decision to take steps to ensure a smooth succession suggests that senior officials have already considered succession plans, even before the SNSC’s reported order.

Senior Iranian military commanders also continue to inspect military and air defense units across Iran. Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard inspected the Dezful Air Defense Group on September 29 and assessed its combat readiness.[8] Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi separately inspected Artesh and IRGC naval, commando, and aviation units in Hormozgan Province on September 30.[9] Mousavi assessed the capabilities of different units, met with commanders and personnel, and emphasized that both navies have achieved full readiness ”for a possible future conflict.”[10]

Iran's worsening water and energy crisis could gradually increase the Iranian public's frustrations with the regime and compound existing challenges to regime legitimacy. The Karaj Dam's water reserves decreased from 111 million cubic meters to 28 million cubic meters between September 2024 and September 2025, making the dam incapable of generating electricity for Tehran. The dam is currently only 15 percent full. The Karaj Dam is one of five dams that supply Tehran with drinking water. CTP assessed in August 2025 that the regime will likely not be able to meaningfully improve its water crisis if it does not address underlying issues, including mismanagement and unsustainable development.[11] The water and electricity shortages reflect the regime's inability to meet the basic needs of its citizens, which could generate potential internal instability.

The United Kingdom imposed sanctions on over 70 Iranian individuals and organizations linked to Iran's nuclear program on September 30 after the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) reimposed snapback sanctions on September 27.[13] The United Kingdom froze the assets of Iranian banks, such as Bank Sepah and Bank Melli, that have supported Iran's defense industry.[14] Iranian banks reportedly held at least 1.9 billion euros in assets in Europe, with a large part being in the UK, as of March 2024.[15] UK sanctions also targeted Iranian oil, nuclear engineering, and shipping companies that contribute to the funding of and projects for Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).[16] The United Kingdom imposed sanctions after the European Union imposed similar sanctions on September 29 that are designed to politically and economically isolate Iran due to its failure to fulfill its obligations under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).[17]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-30-2025/

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