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Iran Update, September 25, 2025

Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf emphasized on September 24 the strategic importance of maintaining an Iranian presence near Israel's borders to defend against Israel.[13] Ghalibaf claimed that Israel's recent campaign against Iran would “definitely not have occurred” and that Iran would have “confronted” Israel on its border with Syria if Iran still retained a presence in Syria.[14] Ghalibaf may have been arguing that Iran could have opened another front against Israel in Syria and thereby detracted Israel's attention and diverted its resources away from Iran during the Israel-Iran War if Iran maintained its foothold in Syria. Iranian-backed groups in southern Syria, including Lebanese Hezbollah and Palestinian militias, often launched munitions targeting Israel and the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights in the months following October 7, 2023. Iran's network in Syria remains extremely limited after the fall of Assad in December 2024, and Iranian-aligned militias in Syria did not participate in the Israel-Iran war.[15] Ghalibaf also claimed that Israel would advance to Iran's border if Iran does not “stand against [Israel] in the Golan [Heights].”[16] Ghalibaf’s comments reflect Iran's long-held objective to encircle Israel and to prevent conflicts with Israel from reaching Iran.

Ghalibaf also emphasized the need for Iran to strengthen its air power. Ghalibaf claimed that Iran's Bavar-373, Khordad, Sayyad, and Majid air defense systems operated effectively during the Israel-Iran War, but called on the regime to prioritize purchasing fighter jets.[17] Israel achieved air superiority in Iran within a few days of the start of the Israel-Iran War.[18] Ghalibaf’s statements come amid reports that Iran may have acquired Russian MiG-29 fighter jets from Russia.[19] Ghalibaf’s statements also come after Iranian armed forces-affiliated Defa Press expressed support for the purchase of Chinese fighter jets in June.[20]

The United States is continuing to pressure the Iraqi federal government to limit Iranian influence in the Iraqi federal government. Three unnamed Iraqi officials told UK-based, Qatari-owned media on September 24 that the United States asked the Iraqi federal government to reform the Iraqi judiciary and improve financial oversight as part of an effort to reduce Iranian influence over Iraqi state institutions.[21] Iranian-backed Iraqi actors have co-opted the Iraqi judicial system to issue rulings favorable to militia interests.[22] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have also exploited loopholes within the Iraqi financial system to commit fraud and obtain funds to support Iranian and militia operations, including attacks on US forces and allies.[23] The US demand for improved financial oversight comes after Iraq's Rafidain Bank signed a “professional partnership agreement” with a US-based financial consulting firm on August 15 to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.[24] The Iraqi government previously used Rafidain Bank to process and distribute salaries to members of the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces.[25]

Iran is preparing economic measures to try to withstand the likely reimposition of UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on September 27. UNSC Resolution 2231 endorsed the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and terminated six earlier UNSC resolutions.[26] The E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggered the 30-day JCPOA snapback process on August 28.[27] The UNSC will reimpose the six suspended resolutions, which include sanctions on Iranian military and nuclear entities, on September 27 unless Iran meets its obligations laid out under the JCPOA. Iranian Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad claimed on September 24 that the Iranian government has developed contingency plans to counter snapback sanctions and claimed that oil sales will continue at their current rate despite sanctions.[28] Paknejad added that snapback sanctions will not directly target Iranian oil sales but could affect trade, finance, and shipping.[29] Central Bank Governor Mohammad Reza Farzin similarly stated on September 24 that the bank will stabilize the Iranian currency if UNSC sanctions are reimposed.[30] Farzin also claimed that the Central Bank will sell more gold coins and bullion to keep the gold market stable and control inflation.[31] The Iranian rial reached 1,085,000 rials per one US dollar on September 25, reflecting Iranian anticipation about imminent snapback sanctions.[32]

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi stated on September 23 that Iran still retains the capacity to advance its nuclear program after US and Israeli strikes targeted Iranian nuclear facilities in June 2025.[33] Grossi stated that the strikes may not have damaged all Iranian centrifuges and that Iran retains facilities to manufacture centrifuge components.[34] Grossi also stated that it would take Iran only “weeks” to enrich its uranium stockpile to 90 percent.[35] Israel struck the Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (TESA) workshop in Karaj, west of Tehran, and the Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC) in Tehran Province during the Israel-Iran War.[36] Iran manufactured centrifuge components at TESA and manufactured and tested advanced centrifuge rotors at the TNRC.[37]

Iran showcased its nuclear technology at the 2025 Atom Expo in Moscow on September 25.[38] Atomic Energy Organization of Iran head Mohammad Eslami presented advancements in Iran's nuclear technology on September 25.[39] China, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan also participated in the exhibition.[40] Eslami met with Russian President Vladimir Putin and IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi on the sidelines of the event.[41] Eslami announced that Iran plans to develop large nuclear power plants and small modular reactors (SMRs) with the help of Russian state-owned atomic energy corporation Rosatom.[42] Eslami and the Rosatom director general signed a memorandum of understanding on September 24 for Russia to build eight SMRs in Iran, including four at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant.[43]

Indian officials recently discussed the possibility of purchasing oil from Iran and Venezuela in exchange for reducing Russian oil imports with the Trump administration.[44] An anonymous source with knowledge of the discussion told Bloomberg on September 25 that an Indian delegation visiting the United States emphasized to the Trump administration that India must receive oil from Iran and Venezuela in order to be able to suspend oil imports from Russia without causing a spike in global oil prices. India has not purchased oil from Iran since 2019.

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-25-2025/

Iran Update, September 26, 2025

The E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) will reimpose UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on Iran on September 27 despite a last-ditch Iranian effort to delay the snapback mechanism. A UK-based media outlet reported on September 26 that Iran offered to immediately grant International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors full access to the Natanz Nuclear Facility. Iran, in return, called for the UNSC to adopt a Russian-Chinese resolution to extend the snapback mechanism's deadline by six months.[1] The UNSC rejected the Russian-Chinese resolution in a vote on September 26, which means the UNSC sanctions will automatically be reimposed on September 27.[2] The E3 offered in July 2025 to extend the snapback mechanism's deadline if Iran fully cooperated with the IAEA, resumed nuclear talks with the United States, and accounted for its 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile.[3] Iran failed to meet the E3’s conditions.

Iran has continued to expand its nuclear infrastructure at the Mount Kolang Gaz La facility in Esfahan Province, which was not damaged or targeted during the Israel–Iran War in June 2025.[4] The Washington Post, citing satellite imagery, reported on September 26 that Iran has made key changes at the site since the war.[5]

Security perimeter: Iran completed construction on roughly 4,000 feet of wall on the western edge and graded a parallel road, which brings the enclosure close to completion.
Tunnel entrance: Iran reinforced one eastern entrance with dirt and rock to prevent damage or potential collapse in future airstrikes.
Excavation spoil: The pile of rock and soil outside the eastern tunnels has modestly increased, indicating continued tunneling inside the mountain.
Unspecified analysts told the Washington Post that the facility's underground halls may be 260 to 330 feet deep, which is deeper than the underground halls at Iran's Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant.[6] The depth of the facility's underground halls has fueled suspicions that the site could serve not only as a centrifuge assembly plant, as Iran announced in 2020, but also as a covert enrichment facility or secure storage for near-weapons-grade uranium.[7] The Institute for Science and International Security reported in April 2025 that Iran had already begun building a security wall with new roads and space for fences, lights, and cameras at the facility.[8] The institute's report noted that the facility could house an advanced centrifuge assembly plant or potentially a small undeclared enrichment plant.[9] The IAEA has never inspected the Mount Kolang Gaz La facility, which illustrates the limitations that the IAEA faces in obtaining a complete picture of Iran‘s nuclear program. Iran also barred IAEA inspectors from accessing the site's tunnels in April 2025 and told the agency that “it is none of [their] business.”[10]

Animated gif: https://x.com/TheStudyofWar/status/1971717640931398091

Iran is attempting to exploit anti-Israel sentiments in Saudi Arabia in order to protect Hezbollah from its looming disarmament. Iran's attempts to exploit anti-Israel sentiment in the Saudi government will most likely fail due to Iran's long history of attacking Saudi Arabia with proxies and partners trained by Hezbollah. Iranian officials appear to have grown increasingly concerned about Hezbollah's ability to retain its weapons amid the Lebanese state's current efforts to disarm the group following Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani’s trip to Riyadh on September 16.[11] Two unspecified Iranian sources told Reuters on September 26 that Hezbollah's disarmament was one of the “main topics” of Larijani’s visit and that Larijani attempted to convince Riyadh that Hezbollah's disarmament would benefit neither Lebanon nor the region.[12] Saudi Arabia has positioned itself in recent months as one of the principal regional powers supporting the Lebanese state's efforts to disarm Hezbollah.[13] Larijani urged Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem to reach out and show “goodwill” to Saudi Arabia after his trip, according to the two Iranian sources and an unspecified source with “knowledge of Hezbollah's thinking.“[14] Qassem—in acquiescence to Larijani’s request—called on Saudi Arabia to “open a new page” with Hezbollah during a speech on September 19.[15] Qassem argued that both parties have a common enemy in Israel.[16]

Qassem’s reasoning is consistent with Iranian diplomatic efforts and rhetoric that have attempted to exploit regional anti-Israel sentiments in the wake of Israel's strikes on Doha, Qatar, on September 9.[17] Iran has aimed these efforts at Gulf states, such as Saudi Arabia, and has called for Arab, Islamic, and international responses since Israel's strikes in Doha.[18] Iranian officials have framed Israel's strikes as an opportunity to unite regional powers—particularly the Gulf states—in an anti-Israel, anti-United States regional coalition.[19]

Such an Iranian effort to exploit anti-Israel sentiments in Saudi Arabia is highly unlikely to weaken Saudi support for Hezbollah's disarmament. Hezbollah has trained several Iranian proxy and partner groups—including Kataib Hezbollah in Iraq and other Iraqi militias and the Houthis—that have targeted Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia, in addition to other Gulf states, has promised significant economic aid to Lebanon that is contingent on Hezbollah's disarmament, likely as an economic incentive to pressure the Lebanese government to implement its disarmament plan.[20] Saudi Arabia is unlikely to ease pressure on the partner of its regional rival, Iran, based on shared anti-Israel sentiment alone.

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-26-2025/