Iran Update, October 13, 2025
Hamas and Israel have continued to implement the October 9 ceasefire agreement. Hamas and Israel agreed to a ceasefire and hostage-prisoner exchange on October 9, and the Israeli government approved the agreement on October 10.[1] The agreement called for Hamas to release all remaining hostages and Israel to release Palestinian prisoners held in Israel.[2] Hamas released all 20 living hostages and the bodies of four deceased hostages on October 13.[3] It is unclear when Hamas will release the remaining 24 deceased hostages.[4] Israel previously stated that an unspecified international organization would help locate the remaining deceased hostages if Hamas did not release them by October 13.[5] Israel released at least 1,700 Palestinian prisoners on October 13.[6] The ceasefire agreement also calls for humanitarian aid to be delivered to the Gaza Strip.[7] Egypt sent approximately 400 aid trucks to the Gaza Strip on October 12.[8] The aid will be distributed after Israel inspects the trucks.[9] Humanitarian organizations are expected to deliver approximately 600 trucks of aid per day to the Gaza Strip.[10]
US President Donald Trump traveled to Israel and Egypt to discuss the ceasefire with regional leaders. Trump addressed the Israeli Knesset on October 13 and told reporters that “the war is over.”[11] Trump departed Israel to attend a summit in Sharm al Sheikh, Egypt, on October 13 to discuss outstanding aspects of the US plan with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al Sisi and other Arab and regional leaders, including Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas.[12] Trump, Sisi, Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad al Thani, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan signed a ceasefire plan during the summit.[13] Trump said that the document, which the White House referred to as the “Gaza Peace Plan,” will “spell out rules and regulations” for the ceasefire.[14] The US plan calls for representatives from the United States, Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey to coordinate the implementation of the ceasefire between Israel and Hamas.[15] Two hundred US military personnel will deploy to Israel to assist with the implementation of the ceasefire alongside forces from Egypt, Qatar, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates.[16] The ceasefire agreement does not address key outstanding issues between Hamas and Israel, such as Hamas’ disarmament, a full Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, and future governance in the Gaza Strip.[17] Hamas and Israel concluded talks on Trump’s peace plan after both parties agreed to the first phase of the plan, and will not resume negotiations on outstanding issues until the first phase is implemented.[18]
Senior Iranian officials have continued to threaten to close the Strait of Hormuz, likely to try to deter the United States and its allies from enforcing UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1929 and sanctions on Iranian oil exports.[19] UNSC Resolution 1929 calls on UN member states to “inspect any [Iranian] vessel on their territory suspected of carrying prohibited cargo, including banned conventional arms or sensitive nuclear or missile items.”[20] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi warned on October 10 that Iran would respond “in a reciprocal and appropriate manner” if UN member states use UNSC Resolution 1929 to seize Iranian vessels.[21] Iranian Supreme Leader Adviser to the Defense Council Ali Shamkhani similarly warned Iranian adversaries on October 10 that Iran has not decided to close the Strait of Hormuz, but that Iran’s response to unspecified escalation in the strait would not be “limited.”[22] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Navy Commander Rear Admiral Ali Reza Tangsiri separately stated on October 11 that Iran’s decision to close the Strait of Hormuz would depend on “the pressure on Iranian exports,” most likely referring to Iranian oil exports.[23] The United States recently sanctioned over 90 individuals, entities, and vessels on October 9 for facilitating the illicit trade of Iranian oil and gas.[24] The sanctions are part of Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign, which seeks to drive Iranian oil exports to zero.[25] The United States previously seized Iranian oil tankers and weapons shipments between May 2018 and January 2021 as part of the first Trump administration’s maximum pressure campaign.[26] Iran responded to the maximum pressure campaign in 2019 by threatening international shipping, including by seizing a British oil tanker, harassing vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz, and conducting an attack targeting Saudi oil facilities.[27] Iranian officials’ concern about Iran’s ability to continue exporting Iranian oil comes after Reuters reported in March 2025 that the United States was considering a plan in which the United States and its allies would halt and inspect Iranian oil tankers at sea.[28] Oil exports are Iran’s economic lifeline and are critical to keeping the Iranian economy afloat, particularly amid increased Western economic pressure on Iran in recent weeks. Iranian military commanders have recently increased inspections of naval units in the Persian Gulf, including naval units stationed at Kharg Island, which is home to Iran’s main oil export terminal.[29]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-13-2025/
Iran Update, October 14, 2025
Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Commander Mazloum Abdi said on October 11 that he and the Syrian transitional government reached a “preliminary agreement” last week to integrate the SDF and Kurdish internal security forces into the state’s defense and interior ministries, respectively.[1] Abdi met with Syrian President Ahmed al Shara, Defense Minister Major General Marhaf Abu Qasra, and US officials in Damascus on October 7 to agree to a ceasefire following an outbreak of violence between government forces and the SDF in Aleppo City.[2] Abdi previously agreed to integrate all forces in northeastern Syria into state security forces in a framework agreement that he reached with Shara in March, but neither side has implemented most of the terms of the agreement.[3] Abdi referred to the new agreement as a “preliminary agreement” and “oral agreement,” which suggests that the new agreement may represent a renewed commitment by the SDF to integrate its forces into the state and will probably necessitate further negotiations on specific implementation mechanisms.[4] A prominent People’s Protection Units (YPG) commander led a delegation of SDF and Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) officials to discuss “joint military and security cooperation” with Abu Qasra and Syrian Interior Minister Anas Khattab in Damascus on October 13.[5] The Kurdish and Syrian government officials presumably discussed mechanisms to implement the new agreement.[6]
Shara and Abdi appear to have reached at least a partial agreement about certain elements of the SDF’s integration into the new Syrian army. Abdi told AFP that the SDF will be “restructured through its integration” into the Defense Ministry but did not provide further details.[7] Shara and Abdi have disagreed thus far over how the SDF would join the military. The SDF has consistently demanded that it integrate into the Syrian army as a “bloc” and retain its attributes, including its female units and commanders.[8] It is unclear if Shara and Abdi have fully addressed this issue. An unspecified “informed” source told Syria TV on October 13 that Shara and Abdi agreed to establish three divisions and several brigades “from the SDF” as army units in Hasakah, Raqqa, and Deir ez Zor provinces.[9] CTP-ISW cannot confirm this claim, but such an agreement would be consistent with the SDF’s demand to remain deployed in northeastern Syria.[10] Abdi may also have been referring to a recent US proposal to form a joint SDF-government force to fight the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS).[11] Abdi said that the SDF accepted this proposal.[12]
The Syrian transitional government and the SDF have not yet agreed on a model for decentralized governance in Syria, however. Such disagreements may continue to delay or prevent the SDF’s integration into the Syrian state. Abdi said that he and the Syrian government share an “understanding on the principle of decentralization” but that the SDF and government “have not agreed on it” and are “still discussing finding a common formula acceptable to all.”[13] The Syrian transitional government has consistently rejected decentralization and federalism and has accused the SDF of promoting “separatism.”[14] The two parties’ disagreement over decentralization has been one of the principal disagreements that has delayed the SDF’s integration into the Syrian state.
Senior Syrian officials likely discussed the status of talks with the SDF and Turkish support for the Syrian army with Turkish officials in Ankara on October 12.[15] Syrian Defense Minister Major General Marhaf Abu Qasra, intelligence head Hussein al Salama, and Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani discussed counterterrorism, border control, and joint training with their Turkish counterparts in Ankara.[16] The officials very likely discussed the progress of talks with the SDF, given Turkey’s role in pressuring the Syrian government to increase political and military pressure on the SDF to integrate into the Syrian state in recent months. Abdi told AFP on October 11 that successful negotiations with the Syrian government would depend on whether Turkey plays a “supportive and contributing role.”[17] Turkish Defense Minister Yaser Guler called on the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and “all affiliated groups…especially in Syria” to “surrender weapons immediately” in a statement on October 11 prior to the Syrian delegation’s visit.[18] Turkey often conflates the SDF with the PKK and uses “PKK” to refer to the entire SDF. Abu Qasra separately thanked Guler on October 12 for Turkey’s “concrete efforts” to build the Syrian army.[19] Turkey and Syria signed a defense agreement in August 2025 that commits Turkey to assisting Syria with military training and equipment procurement.[20]
Iran reportedly turned on the automatic identification systems (AIS) of most of its oil tankers on October 13, according to Tanker Trackers.[21] This incident marks the first time that Iranian tankers have turned on their AIS signals since 2018.[22] Iranian oil tankers keep their AIS signals turned off to obfuscate their identity and location while illicitly transporting Iranian oil. It is unclear why Iran would turn on its tankers’ AIS signals, but this report notably comes amid Iranian threats to close the Strait of Hormuz if the international community enforces UNSC and US sanctions against illicit Iranian exports.[23]
Unspecified gunmen attacked a vehicle carrying engineers and contractors who were working on the Chabahar–Mashhad water transfer project in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on October 12.[24] The Chabahar–Mashhad water transfer project aims to supply drinking and industrial water to Iran’s eastern provinces by transporting water from the Sea of Oman to eastern Iran.[25] No group has claimed responsibility for the attack at the time of this writing.
Former reformist President Hassan Rouhani proposed a series of diplomatic, military, and economic reforms to address challenges after the Israel-Iran War during a meeting with former provincial governors on October 12.[26] Rouhani urged the Iranian regime to strengthen its military and diplomatic capabilities to avoid further conflict. Rouhani advocated for negotiations but noted that negotiations under current circumstances would be “complex.”[27] Rouhani called on Iranian officials to stop inflation growth by implementing liquidity control measures and supporting investments. Rouhani additionally urged the regime to implement legal and institutional changes, including reforming the Iranian election law to reflect public preferences.
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-14-2025/