Iran Update, October 16, 2025
Iranian-backed Iraqi fighters likely assassinated Iraqi Sunni Sovereignty Alliance candidate and Baghdad Provincial Council member Safaa al Mashhadani on October 14 with an explosive device in al Dhubat neighborhood, Tarmiyah district, Iraq.[1] The perpetrators remotely detonated an explosive device on Mashhadani’s car, killing Mashhadani and injuring four others.[2] Both the Iraqi parliament speaker and the prime minister announced investigations into the assassination.[3] Iraqi Security Media Cell head Lieutenant General Saad Maan said on October 15 that unspecified actors had previously tried to assassinate Safaa al Mashhadani.[4] No group has claimed responsibility for either incident at the time of this writing, which suggests the involvement of Iranian-backed actors.
ranian-backed militias likely assassinated Safaa al Mashhadani. Iranian-backed Shia militias have long maintained a presence in Tarmiyah and other predominantly agricultural areas north of Baghdad, where they have murdered Sunni civilians and advocated sectarian cleansing of Sunni areas.[5] Both Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada and Kataib Hezbollah have explicitly and implicitly called for Sunnis in Tarmiyah to be displaced and presumably replaced with Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) facilities or other populations.[6] Iranian-backed militias previously cleansed Jurf al Sakhr, a formerly Sunni area south of Baghdad, and replaced the Sunni town there with a PMF base that is inaccessible to the Iraqi government.[7] These militias also recently denied the capable, apolitical, and US-trained Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS) access to Tarmiyah.[8] Mashhadani continuously advocated for the removal of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias from Tarmiyah, which these groups would have perceived as a threat to their dominance north of Baghdad.[9] Mashhadani’s assassination followed his October 14 announcement that the Baghdad Provincial Council voted to suspend the allocation of investment licenses for projects in the Baghdad Belts following reports of unspecified violations against local farmers and landowners.[10]
ISIS almost certainly did not conduct this attack. Several Iranian-backed Iraqi actors released statements on October 15 and 16 that deflected responsibility for the assassination and implied that ISIS was responsible.[11] ISIS conducted three attacks in all of September, none of which occurred in or around Baghdad or demonstrated any tactical sophistication.[12] ISIS’s lack of tactical ability in Iraq suggests that it would be incapable of conducting an assassination of this sort. This assassination required a pattern-of-life assessment and capable bomb-makers. ISIS in Iraq has resorted to small arms harassment and relatively simple IEDs, not well-orchestrated assassinations.[13] ISIS in Iraq has previously assassinated ISF and PMF leadership in Tarmiyah, but it has almost always claimed these attacks.[14] ISIS would almost certainly claim this attack, given its high-profile nature, if it conducted the attack to present itself as capable and relevant even as its attack rates have fallen.
The Houthis confirmed on October 16 that Israeli airstrikes killed Houthi Chief of General Staff Mohammad Abd al Karim al Ghamari.[15] Ghamari is the most senior Houthi official who has been killed since 2004, according to a Yemeni analyst.[16] Ghamari served as the Houthi military chief of staff since 2016.[17] Ghamari was responsible for overseeing Houthi military operations and directing the procurement of various weapons.[18] Ghamari reportedly had close ties to Hezbollah and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).[19] The United States designated Ghamari a Specially Designated National and Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) in May 2021.[20] The Houthis will almost certainly not immediately retaliate for Ghamari’s death. The Houthis did not specify when Ghamari was killed, but Israeli airstrikes in June and August 2025 reportedly targeted him.[21] The Houthis have likely announced his death now because they view the recent Hamas-Israel ceasefire agreement as an end to the October 7 War.[22] Other Axis of Resistance groups have similarly delayed confirming the death of leaders. Israel killed former Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip, Mohammad Sinwar, in May 2025, but Hamas only confirmed his death months later in August 2025.[23]
The Houthis appointed Major General Yousuf Hassan al Madani to replace Ghamari.[24] Madani previously commanded the Houthis’ Fifth Military Region, which is headquartered in Hudaydah City and oversees Hudaydah, Hajjah, Raymah, and Mahwit governorates.[25] The United States also designated Madani as an SDGT in May 2021.[26] Basha reported that Madani studied under Houthi cleric Majd al Din al Muayyad in Saada Governorate and joined the Houthis under Hussein al Houthi’s Believing Youth movement, the predecessor to the Houthi Movement.[27] Madani trained under the IRGC in 2002 and later returned to Yemen to train Houthi forces and send them to IRGC training camps in Iran and Syria, which suggests that Madani has well-established connections with other members of the Axis of Resistance.
Iranian Supreme Leader Adviser to the Defense Council Ali Shamkhani’s recent remarks on Iran’s missile doctrine and nuclear posture highlight an ongoing internal debate about the regime’s military strategies. This debate has focused on strategic missteps that led to the Israel–Iran War and the flaws in Iranian ideas about deterring Israel and the United States. Shamkhani gave an interview on October 12 to the Iranian podcast “Story of the War,” which features various senior Iranian officials’ perspectives on the Israel-Iran War.[28] Shamkhani expressed retrospective regret that he did not advocate more for the development of Iran’s nuclear capability as defense minister and said that he would advocate for building a nuclear capability if he could return to the 1990s again.[29] Shamkhani was Iran’s Minister of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics from 1997 to 2005.
Shamkhani also acknowledged shortcomings in Iran’s use of ballistic missiles, which contrasts sharply with the analysis of other Iranian leaders. Former IRGC Navy Commander Hossein Alaei claimed that Iran’s demonstration of missile capabilities caused the United States and Israel to call for a ceasefire in an interview on October 1.[30] Shamkhani acknowledged early operational errors during Iran’s missile strikes on Israel in April and October 2024 and stated that Iran’s shortcomings encouraged Israel to conclude that a large-scale attack on Iran ”with reasonable costs is possible.”[31] Shamkhani described Iran’s April and October 2024 strikes as part of a learning process that exposed gaps in Iran’s understanding of Israeli air defenses and improved its missile performance during the 12-day war.[32] Iran launched 500 to 550 ballistic missiles and over 1,000 drones during its Operation True Promise III in June 2025.[33] Israeli defenses intercepted 80 to 90 percent of Iran’s missiles and 99.99 percent of its drones, however.
The IRGC has reportedly appointed Seyed Jabar Hosseini as the new IRGC Quds Force Unit 190 commander, according to anti-regime hacktivist group Lab Dookhtegan.[34] Lab Dookhtegan has previously used language that suggests it sympathizes with Mojahedin-e-Khalq (MEK), an exiled Iranian opposition group based in Albania.[35] ISW-CTP cannot independently verify whether Hosseini is the new Unit 190 commander at this time. Israel killed the former Unit 190 commander, Behnam Shahriari, during the Israel-Iran War in June 2025.[36] Unit 190 is a specialized branch within the IRGC Quds Force that is involved in oil smuggling and money laundering.[37] The unit also oversees Iran’s covert arms transfers and smuggling to Hezbollah and other members of the Axis of Resistance.[38]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-16-2025/
Iran Update, October 17, 2025
The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) reported on October 16 that Iranian activity around Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC)’s underground facilities indicates that Iran is not attempting to retrieve centrifuges or uranium stocks. ISIS assessed that Iran may be trying to establish secure access to ENTC tunnels and reinforce tunnel entrances against future strikes.[1] ISIS reported that satellite imagery of the tunnel entrances to the ENTC’s underground facilities showed that Iran cleared out all debris in front of the northern tunnel entrance and most of the debris in front of the middle tunnel entrance in late July and late September, respectively.[2] ISIS reported that imagery from September 30 showed a backhoe piling rocks in front of the northern tunnel entrance, which ISIS said could be a sign that Iran is trying to reinforce the northern tunnel against possible future strikes.[3] The ISIS report added that Iran is likely prioritizing ”slow and safe access” to the ENTC underground facilities because it may be dangerous to enter after the strikes.[4] The United States struck the ENTC on June 22.[5] ISIS stated that the extent of damage to the three tunnels could not be assessed at this time.[6]
Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani met with Russian President Vladimir Putin on October 16, likely primarily to discuss sanctions evasion and mitigation efforts.[7] This is Larijani’s first visit to Russia since the UN Security Council reimposed snapback sanctions on Iran on September 27.[8] Iran relies heavily upon Russia as a key partner to mitigate the impact of international sanctions. The reimposition of UN sanctions restored an arms embargo and broad UN restrictions upon Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs.[9] Larijani likely discussed ways that Russia can assist Iran in evading and mitigating the impact of sanctions. Iran and Russia have historically collaborated through networks of foreign-based front companies and shadow fleets transporting sanctioned goods, such as energy exports and arms sales.[10] Russian Permanent Representative to the United Nations Vasily Nebenzya stated on October 1 that Russia does not recognize the “snapback as coming into force,” suggesting that Russia will continue to assist Iran evade sanctions as it did before the imposition of snapback sanctions.[11] Larijani and Putin also likely discussed Russian military assistance that Russia could provide to Iran. Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Sergei Lavrov separately stated on October 13 that Russia would “develop military-technical cooperation with Iran” with “no restrictions.”[12] Larijani could also have discussed military support for Iran from Russia in addition to sanctions evasion and mitigation. Iran seeks to buy Russian military equipment, though procuring it has been difficult given Russia’s prioritization of the war in Ukraine. Russian assets like the S-300 have also proven incapable of stopping Israeli or US air attack, and Russian aircraft like the MiG-29 and Su-35 are unlikely to seriously challenge the US-made F-35.
Iranian media also reported that Larijani conveyed an unspecified message from Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to Putin.[13] Kremlin newswire TASS previously reported on October 9 that Putin claimed that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told Russia that Israel is committed to a settlement and “is not interested in confrontation with Iran.”[14] Putin’s claim likely reflects Russia’s ongoing interest in serving as a political intermediary between Iran, the United States, and Israel. Russia has consistently attempted to position itself as a mediator between Iran and the United States during nuclear negotiations in early 2025.[15][16]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-17-2025/