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Iran Update, October 17, 2025

The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) reported on October 16 that Iranian activity around Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC)’s underground facilities indicates that Iran is not attempting to retrieve centrifuges or uranium stocks. ISIS assessed that Iran may be trying to establish secure access to ENTC tunnels and reinforce tunnel entrances against future strikes.[1] ISIS reported that satellite imagery of the tunnel entrances to the ENTC’s underground facilities showed that Iran cleared out all debris in front of the northern tunnel entrance and most of the debris in front of the middle tunnel entrance in late July and late September, respectively.[2] ISIS reported that imagery from September 30 showed a backhoe piling rocks in front of the northern tunnel entrance, which ISIS said could be a sign that Iran is trying to reinforce the northern tunnel against possible future strikes.[3] The ISIS report added that Iran is likely prioritizing ”slow and safe access” to the ENTC underground facilities because it may be dangerous to enter after the strikes.[4] The United States struck the ENTC on June 22.[5] ISIS stated that the extent of damage to the three tunnels could not be assessed at this time.[6]

Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani met with Russian President Vladimir Putin on October 16, likely primarily to discuss sanctions evasion and mitigation efforts.[7] This is Larijani’s first visit to Russia since the UN Security Council reimposed snapback sanctions on Iran on September 27.[8] Iran relies heavily upon Russia as a key partner to mitigate the impact of international sanctions. The reimposition of UN sanctions restored an arms embargo and broad UN restrictions upon Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs.[9] Larijani likely discussed ways that Russia can assist Iran in evading and mitigating the impact of sanctions. Iran and Russia have historically collaborated through networks of foreign-based front companies and shadow fleets transporting sanctioned goods, such as energy exports and arms sales.[10] Russian Permanent Representative to the United Nations Vasily Nebenzya stated on October 1 that Russia does not recognize the “snapback as coming into force,” suggesting that Russia will continue to assist Iran evade sanctions as it did before the imposition of snapback sanctions.[11] Larijani and Putin also likely discussed Russian military assistance that Russia could provide to Iran. Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Sergei Lavrov separately stated on October 13 that Russia would “develop military-technical cooperation with Iran” with “no restrictions.”[12] Larijani could also have discussed military support for Iran from Russia in addition to sanctions evasion and mitigation. Iran seeks to buy Russian military equipment, though procuring it has been difficult given Russia’s prioritization of the war in Ukraine. Russian assets like the S-300 have also proven incapable of stopping Israeli or US air attack, and Russian aircraft like the MiG-29 and Su-35 are unlikely to seriously challenge the US-made F-35.

Iranian media also reported that Larijani conveyed an unspecified message from Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to Putin.[13] Kremlin newswire TASS previously reported on October 9 that Putin claimed that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told Russia that Israel is committed to a settlement and “is not interested in confrontation with Iran.”[14] Putin’s claim likely reflects Russia’s ongoing interest in serving as a political intermediary between Iran, the United States, and Israel. Russia has consistently attempted to position itself as a mediator between Iran and the United States during nuclear negotiations in early 2025.[15][16]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-17-2025/

Iran Update, October 20, 2025

A senior Iranian official suggested in an interview with Nour News on October 13 that the Iranian regime is unable to develop a long-term strategy because it continues to suffer from shock and paralysis after the Israel-Iran War.[1] Nour News interviewed Iranian Deputy Vice President for Strategic Affairs Ali Abdullah Khani on October 13 as part of its “Pathway” series, which aims to present perspectives on how Iran can navigate post-war challenges. Nour News is affiliated with Ali Shamkhani, who is one of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s advisers to the Defense Council. Khani stated that the regime is in a “permanent state of crisis” in which Iranian officials are only focused on the possibility of renewed conflict with Israel and the United States. Khani argued that this mindset has paralyzed Iranian officials and made them unable to devise long-term defense, economic, and political strategies.[2] The Iranian regime has adopted stop-gap interim solutions, such as purchasing MiG-29s from Russia, which would be useless against F-35s, and conducting mass arrests of Iranians in the hope of solving Iran’s counter-intelligence failures.[3] Khani suggested that these reactive approaches do not solve more fundamental strategic issues that Iran faces in its competition with Israel and the United States.[4] Khani asserted that the regime’s reactive decision-making drains decisionmaker bandwidth and prevents senior leaders from confronting major post-war problems, including reconstruction, economic growth, and, presumably, the failure of Iran’s strategic theories of deterrence and defense.

Khani presented alternative policies that focus on societal resilience and deterrence at the strategic level.[5] Khani stated that Iran must accept that war is always a possibility but emphasized that the Iranian regime cannot allocate all of its resources and capabilities to preparing for war. Khani proposed that Iran should adopt a “more balanced and hybrid” and “people-based” security strategy, while still prioritizing its development of military capabilities. Khani also warned that Iran could fall behind in the international order if the Iranian regime does not fundamentally change its economic and defense strategy.

Khani also made a series of operational- and tactical-level proposals focused on command decentralization and technical improvements for certain weapon systems in light of the setbacks that Iran faced during the war.[6] Khani proposed expanding former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari‘s 2005 “mosaic doctrine,” which decentralized the IRGC by establishing 32 IRGC provincial units across Iran.[7] Khani argued that Iran should decentralize supply chains, defense systems, and command and control authority to lower levels to make wartime decision-making more efficient and effective.[8] Khani probably believes that decentralizing Iranian decision-making would help Iranian leaders overcome the command and control challenges they faced when Israel killed senior Iranian commanders during the war. Israeli strikes against senior IRGC commanders inhibited Iran’s ability to immediately retaliate against Israel.[9]

Khani also called on the regime to improve its missile guidance systems and implied that the regime should employ maneuverable reentry vehicles as part of an effort to advance its missile program.[10] Khani stated that Iran must improve its missiles’ circular error probable (CEP), which is “the radius of a circle, centered at the intended target, within which 50 percent of the missiles would be expected to impact.”[11] A maneuverable reentry vehicle can be used to evade anti-ballistic missile systems or improve the accuracy of ballistic missiles by altering their trajectory during the terminal stage of flight. These proposals demonstrate that some Iranian officials acknowledge the relatively low accuracy rate of Iranian missiles. The IRGC Aerospace Force announced on October 18 that it added an anti-electronic warfare system to the Ghadr ballistic missile and a precision-guided warhead to the Emad ballistic missile, which further highlights how the Iranian regime is trying to develop its ballistic missiles to perform more effectively in the event of a future conflict with Israel.[12] Iran used the Emad and Ghadr missiles in its April and October 2024 attacks on Israel, as well as during the Israel-Iran War.[13]

IRGC-affiliated outlet Tasnim News Agency separately called on the Iranian regime to develop long-term solutions to mitigate the impact of sanctions. This article illustrates that at least some Iranian regime elements are beginning to focus more on long-term solutions instead of short-term stop-gap measures.[14] Tasnim’s emphasis on long-term solutions is consistent with Khani’s call for a long-term strategic rethink. Tasnim stated that the Iranian economy cannot rely on “informal mechanisms” to mitigate the impact of international sanctions, which may be a reference to barter agreements and other mechanisms that Iran uses to evade sanctions.[15] Tasnim called for using regional and multilateral platforms to promote trade that does not rely on the Western financial system.[16] Iranian officials frequently emphasize the importance of cooperation with BRICS and Shanghai Cooperation Organization member states to “de-dollarize” trade.[17] Iranian media reported on October 19 that two Russian banks agreed to accept letters of credit issued by Iranian banks to facilitate Russian agricultural exports to Iran and allow Iran to circumvent the SWIFT international banking and finance system.[18] Tasnim also highlighted the importance of the private sector and called for reducing Iran’s reliance on oil exports.[19] Tasnim also called on the Iranian regime to downsize the government, eliminate monopolies in the economy, and promote private sector competition.[20]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-20-2025/