Iran Update, October 20, 2025
A senior Iranian official suggested in an interview with Nour News on October 13 that the Iranian regime is unable to develop a long-term strategy because it continues to suffer from shock and paralysis after the Israel-Iran War.[1] Nour News interviewed Iranian Deputy Vice President for Strategic Affairs Ali Abdullah Khani on October 13 as part of its “Pathway” series, which aims to present perspectives on how Iran can navigate post-war challenges. Nour News is affiliated with Ali Shamkhani, who is one of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s advisers to the Defense Council. Khani stated that the regime is in a “permanent state of crisis” in which Iranian officials are only focused on the possibility of renewed conflict with Israel and the United States. Khani argued that this mindset has paralyzed Iranian officials and made them unable to devise long-term defense, economic, and political strategies.[2] The Iranian regime has adopted stop-gap interim solutions, such as purchasing MiG-29s from Russia, which would be useless against F-35s, and conducting mass arrests of Iranians in the hope of solving Iran’s counter-intelligence failures.[3] Khani suggested that these reactive approaches do not solve more fundamental strategic issues that Iran faces in its competition with Israel and the United States.[4] Khani asserted that the regime’s reactive decision-making drains decisionmaker bandwidth and prevents senior leaders from confronting major post-war problems, including reconstruction, economic growth, and, presumably, the failure of Iran’s strategic theories of deterrence and defense.
Khani presented alternative policies that focus on societal resilience and deterrence at the strategic level.[5] Khani stated that Iran must accept that war is always a possibility but emphasized that the Iranian regime cannot allocate all of its resources and capabilities to preparing for war. Khani proposed that Iran should adopt a “more balanced and hybrid” and “people-based” security strategy, while still prioritizing its development of military capabilities. Khani also warned that Iran could fall behind in the international order if the Iranian regime does not fundamentally change its economic and defense strategy.
Khani also made a series of operational- and tactical-level proposals focused on command decentralization and technical improvements for certain weapon systems in light of the setbacks that Iran faced during the war.[6] Khani proposed expanding former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari‘s 2005 “mosaic doctrine,” which decentralized the IRGC by establishing 32 IRGC provincial units across Iran.[7] Khani argued that Iran should decentralize supply chains, defense systems, and command and control authority to lower levels to make wartime decision-making more efficient and effective.[8] Khani probably believes that decentralizing Iranian decision-making would help Iranian leaders overcome the command and control challenges they faced when Israel killed senior Iranian commanders during the war. Israeli strikes against senior IRGC commanders inhibited Iran’s ability to immediately retaliate against Israel.[9]
Khani also called on the regime to improve its missile guidance systems and implied that the regime should employ maneuverable reentry vehicles as part of an effort to advance its missile program.[10] Khani stated that Iran must improve its missiles’ circular error probable (CEP), which is “the radius of a circle, centered at the intended target, within which 50 percent of the missiles would be expected to impact.”[11] A maneuverable reentry vehicle can be used to evade anti-ballistic missile systems or improve the accuracy of ballistic missiles by altering their trajectory during the terminal stage of flight. These proposals demonstrate that some Iranian officials acknowledge the relatively low accuracy rate of Iranian missiles. The IRGC Aerospace Force announced on October 18 that it added an anti-electronic warfare system to the Ghadr ballistic missile and a precision-guided warhead to the Emad ballistic missile, which further highlights how the Iranian regime is trying to develop its ballistic missiles to perform more effectively in the event of a future conflict with Israel.[12] Iran used the Emad and Ghadr missiles in its April and October 2024 attacks on Israel, as well as during the Israel-Iran War.[13]
IRGC-affiliated outlet Tasnim News Agency separately called on the Iranian regime to develop long-term solutions to mitigate the impact of sanctions. This article illustrates that at least some Iranian regime elements are beginning to focus more on long-term solutions instead of short-term stop-gap measures.[14] Tasnim’s emphasis on long-term solutions is consistent with Khani’s call for a long-term strategic rethink. Tasnim stated that the Iranian economy cannot rely on “informal mechanisms” to mitigate the impact of international sanctions, which may be a reference to barter agreements and other mechanisms that Iran uses to evade sanctions.[15] Tasnim called for using regional and multilateral platforms to promote trade that does not rely on the Western financial system.[16] Iranian officials frequently emphasize the importance of cooperation with BRICS and Shanghai Cooperation Organization member states to “de-dollarize” trade.[17] Iranian media reported on October 19 that two Russian banks agreed to accept letters of credit issued by Iranian banks to facilitate Russian agricultural exports to Iran and allow Iran to circumvent the SWIFT international banking and finance system.[18] Tasnim also highlighted the importance of the private sector and called for reducing Iran’s reliance on oil exports.[19] Tasnim also called on the Iranian regime to downsize the government, eliminate monopolies in the economy, and promote private sector competition.[20]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-20-2025/
Iran Update, October 21, 2025
Different factions within the Iranian regime are fighting for influence in Iran to determine future Iranian policy after the Israel-Iran War and several scares over the health and availability of the supreme leader. This competition for influence comes after elements within the Iranian regime used Khamenei‘s absence during the Israel-Iran War to attempt to exert more influence over regime policy.[1] Khamenei gave a speech on October 20 after a month of absence, when he did not attend three events that he usually attends.[2] An unspecified senior regime diplomat said in September 2025 that some Iranian officials are concerned for his health after communication from his office slowed after the Israel-Iran War.[3] Khamenei, who is 86 years old, also had a major health scare in September 2022.[4] Regime insiders, who possibly aim to limit any effort by moderate and former President Hassan Rouhani to reclaim political relevance, have reacted negatively to Rouhani’s post-war public criticism of the regime. Rouhani has attempted to publicly reemerge as a prominent political actor since the start of the war in June 2025 and has positioned himself as a leading advocate for reform. Rouhani met with senior clerics in Qom during the war to urge them to persuade Khamenei to adjust the regime’s policy regarding the war.[5] Rouhani separately called on the regime to make concessions to the Iranian people, strengthen societal resilience, and reduce tensions with the West on August 13.[6] An Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) outlet accused Rouhani on October 20 of fueling division and serving as a cautionary example for political conduct amid Iran’s current conditions.[7]
The resurgence of long-standing tensions between Rouhani and Khamenei’s representative to the Defense Council Ali Shamkhani may also be a reaction to Rouhani’s post-war criticism of the regime and Rouhani’s attempts to reassert himself. Shamkhani stated on October 12 that Rouhani knew ”from the first day” that Iran’s air defense shot down Ukraine Airlines Flight PS752 in January 2020 despite Rouhani’s public denial.[8] The Iranian government initially denied any responsibility for the downing of the civilian plane. The comments on Flight PS752 coincided with public backlash regarding Shamkhani’s daughter’s wedding, which critics viewed as evidence of elite privilege amid economic hardship. Some Iranian social media users and outlets speculated that Rouhani’s faction initiated the leak of footage from Shamkhani’s daughter’s wedding in response to Shamkhani’s statements about Rouhani and Flight PS752.[9]
Long-standing tensions exist between Shamkhani and Rouhani. The Iranian Parliament passed the ”Strategic Action Law” in 2020 with Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) support when Shamkhani was SNSC Secretary.[10] The law mandated faster enrichment and reduced the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring, likely to influence the West regarding the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).[11] Shamkhani later accused Rouhani’s government of blocking the implementation of the law, which prompted Rouhani to say that he regretted appointing Shamkhani as the SNSC Secretary and that he blamed Shamkhani for obstructing the JCPOA’s revival.[12]
Some factions may seek to sideline Rouhani’s renewed activism to prevent him from shaping the succession narrative or rallying support among disaffected elites. These factions could see this effort as particularly important now due to the increasing concerns among senior Iranian officials about Khamenei’s health following reduced communication from his office since the beginning of the Israel-Iran War.[13] UK-based outlet “IranWire” previously reported on September 12 that an unspecified senior Iranian official stated that SNSC Secretary Ali Larijani and former First Vice President Mohammad Mokhber maintain the closest contact with Khamenei and are maneuvering to expand their influence ahead of a possible succession.[14]
The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) reported on October 20 that Iran is building unidentified structures at the former Taleghan 2 nuclear research site at Parchin Military Complex in southeastern Tehran Province.[15] ISIS assessed that Iran has ”bunkered [two of the structures] over with earth,” likely to “improve their survivability” in the event of future Israeli strikes.[16] Covering these structures with dirt is unlikely to stop a concerted effort to destroy the facility, depending on the munitions used. Israel struck Taleghan 2 in October 2024 and destroyed equipment needed to design and test nuclear devices.[17] Iran previously used the Taleghan 2 facility for this purpose prior to stopping its nuclear weapons program in 2003.[18] This is part of Iran’s effort to reconstitute its nuclear and missile programs in the wake of the Israel-Iran War.
IRGC Coordination Deputy Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Naghdi acknowledged that Iran failed to respond quickly during the Israel-Iran War.[23] Naghdi gave an interview on October 20 to the Iranian podcast “Story of the War,” which features various senior Iranian officials’ perspectives on the Israel-Iran War. Israel Defense Forces (IDF) launched a large-scale strike campaign on Iranian command and control centers, several senior IRGC commanders, and nuclear and military facilities in the early morning of June 13 in Iran.[24] Naghdi stated that IRGC units requested authorization to strike Israel early on June 13, but the supreme leader delayed the order until the regime could appoint new commanders to replace those who Israel had just killed.[25] Naghdi added that IRGC units remained ready to strike Israel but did not act until IRGC Ground Forces Commander Brigadier General Mohammad Pakpour became the IRGC Commander. Naghdi‘s comments confirm that Israel‘s targeting of senior commanders caused temporary disruptions in Iran’s chain of command that delayed its initial response and indicate that Iran faced coordination problems within its armed forces during wartime. Naghdi’s remarks echoed Iranian Deputy Vice President for Strategic Affairs Ali Abdullah Khani’s operational- and tactical-level proposals on October 13 to decentralize supply chains, defense systems, and command and control authority to lower levels to make wartime decision-making more efficient and effective in light of the setbacks that Iran faced during the Israel-Iran War.[26]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-21-2025/