Iranian Regime tv Channel One hacked while it was airing Khamenie speech

Iranian Regime national tv Channel One hacked about an hour ago. During a broadcast of Khamenie speech, a red crosshair appeared over his face and chanting of Women. Life. Freedom. There was writing to the side saying "Rise up. Join us". Also 4 photos at the bottom of the screen of young people killed and additional writing: "The blood of our youth is dropping from your paws".

Also, there was a huge banner in the middle of Tehran highway today that read: We are no longer afraid of you. We will fight.

Also, attempted attack on IRI ambassador in Denmark. Her bodyguard was stabbed. Diplomatic Security intervened before the attacker could stab the ambassador.

Iran Update, October 20, 2025

A senior Iranian official suggested in an interview with Nour News on October 13 that the Iranian regime is unable to develop a long-term strategy because it continues to suffer from shock and paralysis after the Israel-Iran War.[1] Nour News interviewed Iranian Deputy Vice President for Strategic Affairs Ali Abdullah Khani on October 13 as part of its “Pathway” series, which aims to present perspectives on how Iran can navigate post-war challenges. Nour News is affiliated with Ali Shamkhani, who is one of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s advisers to the Defense Council. Khani stated that the regime is in a “permanent state of crisis” in which Iranian officials are only focused on the possibility of renewed conflict with Israel and the United States. Khani argued that this mindset has paralyzed Iranian officials and made them unable to devise long-term defense, economic, and political strategies.[2] The Iranian regime has adopted stop-gap interim solutions, such as purchasing MiG-29s from Russia, which would be useless against F-35s, and conducting mass arrests of Iranians in the hope of solving Iran’s counter-intelligence failures.[3] Khani suggested that these reactive approaches do not solve more fundamental strategic issues that Iran faces in its competition with Israel and the United States.[4] Khani asserted that the regime’s reactive decision-making drains decisionmaker bandwidth and prevents senior leaders from confronting major post-war problems, including reconstruction, economic growth, and, presumably, the failure of Iran’s strategic theories of deterrence and defense.

Khani presented alternative policies that focus on societal resilience and deterrence at the strategic level.[5] Khani stated that Iran must accept that war is always a possibility but emphasized that the Iranian regime cannot allocate all of its resources and capabilities to preparing for war. Khani proposed that Iran should adopt a “more balanced and hybrid” and “people-based” security strategy, while still prioritizing its development of military capabilities. Khani also warned that Iran could fall behind in the international order if the Iranian regime does not fundamentally change its economic and defense strategy.

Khani also made a series of operational- and tactical-level proposals focused on command decentralization and technical improvements for certain weapon systems in light of the setbacks that Iran faced during the war.[6] Khani proposed expanding former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari‘s 2005 “mosaic doctrine,” which decentralized the IRGC by establishing 32 IRGC provincial units across Iran.[7] Khani argued that Iran should decentralize supply chains, defense systems, and command and control authority to lower levels to make wartime decision-making more efficient and effective.[8] Khani probably believes that decentralizing Iranian decision-making would help Iranian leaders overcome the command and control challenges they faced when Israel killed senior Iranian commanders during the war. Israeli strikes against senior IRGC commanders inhibited Iran’s ability to immediately retaliate against Israel.[9]

Khani also called on the regime to improve its missile guidance systems and implied that the regime should employ maneuverable reentry vehicles as part of an effort to advance its missile program.[10] Khani stated that Iran must improve its missiles’ circular error probable (CEP), which is “the radius of a circle, centered at the intended target, within which 50 percent of the missiles would be expected to impact.”[11] A maneuverable reentry vehicle can be used to evade anti-ballistic missile systems or improve the accuracy of ballistic missiles by altering their trajectory during the terminal stage of flight. These proposals demonstrate that some Iranian officials acknowledge the relatively low accuracy rate of Iranian missiles. The IRGC Aerospace Force announced on October 18 that it added an anti-electronic warfare system to the Ghadr ballistic missile and a precision-guided warhead to the Emad ballistic missile, which further highlights how the Iranian regime is trying to develop its ballistic missiles to perform more effectively in the event of a future conflict with Israel.[12] Iran used the Emad and Ghadr missiles in its April and October 2024 attacks on Israel, as well as during the Israel-Iran War.[13]

IRGC-affiliated outlet Tasnim News Agency separately called on the Iranian regime to develop long-term solutions to mitigate the impact of sanctions. This article illustrates that at least some Iranian regime elements are beginning to focus more on long-term solutions instead of short-term stop-gap measures.[14] Tasnim’s emphasis on long-term solutions is consistent with Khani’s call for a long-term strategic rethink. Tasnim stated that the Iranian economy cannot rely on “informal mechanisms” to mitigate the impact of international sanctions, which may be a reference to barter agreements and other mechanisms that Iran uses to evade sanctions.[15] Tasnim called for using regional and multilateral platforms to promote trade that does not rely on the Western financial system.[16] Iranian officials frequently emphasize the importance of cooperation with BRICS and Shanghai Cooperation Organization member states to “de-dollarize” trade.[17] Iranian media reported on October 19 that two Russian banks agreed to accept letters of credit issued by Iranian banks to facilitate Russian agricultural exports to Iran and allow Iran to circumvent the SWIFT international banking and finance system.[18] Tasnim also highlighted the importance of the private sector and called for reducing Iran’s reliance on oil exports.[19] Tasnim also called on the Iranian regime to downsize the government, eliminate monopolies in the economy, and promote private sector competition.[20]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-20-2025/

Iran Update, October 21, 2025

Different factions within the Iranian regime are fighting for influence in Iran to determine future Iranian policy after the Israel-Iran War and several scares over the health and availability of the supreme leader. This competition for influence comes after elements within the Iranian regime used Khamenei‘s absence during the Israel-Iran War to attempt to exert more influence over regime policy.[1] Khamenei gave a speech on October 20 after a month of absence, when he did not attend three events that he usually attends.[2] An unspecified senior regime diplomat said in September 2025 that some Iranian officials are concerned for his health after communication from his office slowed after the Israel-Iran War.[3] Khamenei, who is 86 years old, also had a major health scare in September 2022.[4] Regime insiders, who possibly aim to limit any effort by moderate and former President Hassan Rouhani to reclaim political relevance, have reacted negatively to Rouhani’s post-war public criticism of the regime. Rouhani has attempted to publicly reemerge as a prominent political actor since the start of the war in June 2025 and has positioned himself as a leading advocate for reform. Rouhani met with senior clerics in Qom during the war to urge them to persuade Khamenei to adjust the regime’s policy regarding the war.[5] Rouhani separately called on the regime to make concessions to the Iranian people, strengthen societal resilience, and reduce tensions with the West on August 13.[6] An Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) outlet accused Rouhani on October 20 of fueling division and serving as a cautionary example for political conduct amid Iran’s current conditions.[7]

The resurgence of long-standing tensions between Rouhani and Khamenei’s representative to the Defense Council Ali Shamkhani may also be a reaction to Rouhani’s post-war criticism of the regime and Rouhani’s attempts to reassert himself. Shamkhani stated on October 12 that Rouhani knew ”from the first day” that Iran’s air defense shot down Ukraine Airlines Flight PS752 in January 2020 despite Rouhani’s public denial.[8] The Iranian government initially denied any responsibility for the downing of the civilian plane. The comments on Flight PS752 coincided with public backlash regarding Shamkhani’s daughter’s wedding, which critics viewed as evidence of elite privilege amid economic hardship. Some Iranian social media users and outlets speculated that Rouhani’s faction initiated the leak of footage from Shamkhani’s daughter’s wedding in response to Shamkhani’s statements about Rouhani and Flight PS752.[9]

Long-standing tensions exist between Shamkhani and Rouhani. The Iranian Parliament passed the ”Strategic Action Law” in 2020 with Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) support when Shamkhani was SNSC Secretary.[10] The law mandated faster enrichment and reduced the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring, likely to influence the West regarding the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).[11] Shamkhani later accused Rouhani’s government of blocking the implementation of the law, which prompted Rouhani to say that he regretted appointing Shamkhani as the SNSC Secretary and that he blamed Shamkhani for obstructing the JCPOA’s revival.[12]

Some factions may seek to sideline Rouhani’s renewed activism to prevent him from shaping the succession narrative or rallying support among disaffected elites. These factions could see this effort as particularly important now due to the increasing concerns among senior Iranian officials about Khamenei’s health following reduced communication from his office since the beginning of the Israel-Iran War.[13] UK-based outlet “IranWire” previously reported on September 12 that an unspecified senior Iranian official stated that SNSC Secretary Ali Larijani and former First Vice President Mohammad Mokhber maintain the closest contact with Khamenei and are maneuvering to expand their influence ahead of a possible succession.[14]

The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) reported on October 20 that Iran is building unidentified structures at the former Taleghan 2 nuclear research site at Parchin Military Complex in southeastern Tehran Province.[15] ISIS assessed that Iran has ”bunkered [two of the structures] over with earth,” likely to “improve their survivability” in the event of future Israeli strikes.[16] Covering these structures with dirt is unlikely to stop a concerted effort to destroy the facility, depending on the munitions used. Israel struck Taleghan 2 in October 2024 and destroyed equipment needed to design and test nuclear devices.[17] Iran previously used the Taleghan 2 facility for this purpose prior to stopping its nuclear weapons program in 2003.[18] This is part of Iran’s effort to reconstitute its nuclear and missile programs in the wake of the Israel-Iran War.

IRGC Coordination Deputy Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Naghdi acknowledged that Iran failed to respond quickly during the Israel-Iran War.[23] Naghdi gave an interview on October 20 to the Iranian podcast “Story of the War,” which features various senior Iranian officials’ perspectives on the Israel-Iran War. Israel Defense Forces (IDF) launched a large-scale strike campaign on Iranian command and control centers, several senior IRGC commanders, and nuclear and military facilities in the early morning of June 13 in Iran.[24] Naghdi stated that IRGC units requested authorization to strike Israel early on June 13, but the supreme leader delayed the order until the regime could appoint new commanders to replace those who Israel had just killed.[25] Naghdi added that IRGC units remained ready to strike Israel but did not act until IRGC Ground Forces Commander Brigadier General Mohammad Pakpour became the IRGC Commander. Naghdi‘s comments confirm that Israel‘s targeting of senior commanders caused temporary disruptions in Iran’s chain of command that delayed its initial response and indicate that Iran faced coordination problems within its armed forces during wartime. Naghdi’s remarks echoed Iranian Deputy Vice President for Strategic Affairs Ali Abdullah Khani’s operational- and tactical-level proposals on October 13 to decentralize supply chains, defense systems, and command and control authority to lower levels to make wartime decision-making more efficient and effective in light of the setbacks that Iran faced during the Israel-Iran War.[26]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-21-2025/

Iran Update, October 22, 2025

The Iranian regime passed the Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) convention on October 22 as part of an effort to remove Iran from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) blacklist. The FATF is an international body that sets standards for combating money laundering and terrorist financing.[1] The FATF blacklisted Iran in 2007 and again in 2020 for failing to implement anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing policies.[2] An FATF blacklist designation requires all FATF members to sanction and restrict international financial exchanges with Iran.[3] The FATF outlined six conditions in 2020 for Iran to fulfill in order for the FATF to consider removing Iran from its blacklist. These conditions include implementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (Palermo Convention) and the CFT convention, criminalizing terrorist financing, and freezing terrorist assets, among others. The Iranian Expediency Discernment Council approved the Palermo Convention in May 2025.[4] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian signed Iran’s conditional accession to the CFT convention on October 22.[5] The CFT is a set of international policies and measures that prevent terrorist groups from accessing and using financial resources.[6] Pezeshkian approved the CFT convention under the condition that the Iranian constitution and domestic legislation will take precedence over the convention if the convention comes into conflict with Iranian law. An Iranian delegation separately participated in a plenary FATF meeting in Paris on October 21 for the first time in six years, which further highlights Iranian efforts to remove Iran from the FATF blacklist.[7]

Iran is very unlikely to meet the FATF requirements, given that it continues to provide financial and material support to members of the Axis of Resistance. The Axis of Resistance is a key component of Iran’s regional strategy because it enables Iran to project power and influence across the Middle East. Iran has provided financial and material support, as well as training, to members of the Axis over the past several decades. Senior Iranian officials have debated Iranian security strategy following the June 2025 Israel-Iran War, but have highlighted that the Axis of Resistance remains an important element of Iran’s security strategy.[8]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-22-2025/

Iran Update, October 23, 2025

Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf–a retired military officer but still currently a senior civilian–reportedly took the unprecedented step of assuming an unspecified but very senior military command during the Israel-Iran War in June 2025 after the deaths of many top commanders. Ghalibaf’s assumption of command as a civilian due to command losses demonstrates that Israel caused significant disruption to Iranian command and control. Iranian Tourism and Cultural Heritage Minister Reza Salehi Amiri stated on October 22 that Ghalibaf assumed command of the Iranian armed forces as an emergency response to the deaths of prominent Iranian commanders during the Israel-Iran War.[1] Ghalibaf was once IRGC Air Force commander—the predecessor to the IRGC Aerospace Force—but his assumption of command is nonetheless unprecedented because he currently holds a senior civilian political office.[2] Multiple IRGC Aerospace Force commanders were killed in the opening days of the conflict, and Ghalibaf could have stepped in on an interim basis to ensure continuity of command. An Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated outlet confirmed the veracity of Amiri’s statements, stating that his speech constituted an informational security breach and accusing him of spying for Israel.[3] The outlet added that Ghalibaf’s role during the war was kept secret from the public and that his revelation now makes Ghalibaf a prime target for an Israeli assassination.[4] Ghalibaf stated in an interview on September 24 that he was in ”daily contact” with IRGC Commander Major General Mohammad Pakpour over the course of the war.[5] IRGC Coordination Deputy Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Naghdi acknowledged on October 20 that Iran was unable to respond in a timely fashion during the Israel-Iran War due to disruptions in its chain of command after Israel killed several Iranian senior commanders.[6] Ghalibaf’s assumption of command demonstrates that Iran needed to opt for suboptimal interim measures to ensure continuity of command.

Ghalibaf may have assumed command of the Iranian military or elements of it during the Israel-Iran War without the approval of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Khamenei’s absence during the war suggests that Ghalibaf assumed command without Khamenei’s approval.[7] The New York Times reported on June 21 that Khamenei isolated himself in a bunker during the war to avoid being assassinated by Israel and that various factions were forming within the Iranian regime to vie for power in Khamenei’s absence.[8] Ghalibaf, who is a member of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), could have consulted the council. SNSC cannot make decisions without the supreme leader because he must approve all SNSC decisions, however.[9]

Ghalibaf’s reported role during and after the Israel-Iran War demonstrates his enormous influence in the Iranian regime. Ghalibaf has vast experience in several of Iran’s most important institutions that serve to achieve the regime’s strategic objectives. He previously served as the IRGC Air Force commander, as noted above, but also as the Iranian Police Force chief and the IRGC Khatam al Anbiya Construction Headquarters commander before transitioning to political leadership.[10] There is no public reporting that indicates other Iranian leaders opposed Ghalibaf‘s decision to assume command of the military or some elements of it during the Israel-Iran War, which indicates that he retains significant influence across the regime security establishment or that other regime officials recognized the dire situation during the war. These explanations are not mutually exclusive. Ghalibaf also played an important role in creating the post-war National Defense Council, which Iran designed to fix key vulnerabilities in its defense, cybersecurity, and intelligence systems that Israel exploited during the war.[11]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced on October 19 that Israeli forces began to conduct a five-day, division-level military exercise along the Israel-Lebanon border to prepare for “different scenarios.”[12] US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack previously warned the Lebanese government on October 20 that there may be a “major confrontation“ between Israel and Hezbollah if the government does not take steps to disarm Hezbollah.[13] An unspecified security source told Lebanese media on October 23 that Hezbollah decided that it would directly respond to any Israeli ground operations and is expecting an imminent Israeli escalation.[14] The source noted that Hezbollah has developed a new military plan incorporating lessons learned from the November 2024 Israel-Hezbollah conflict.[15]

Iran may be trying to secure weapons from Belarus to replace military systems destroyed during the Israel-Iran War. Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh, who is responsible for the Iranian military’s weapon acquisitions, discussed bilateral cooperation with Belarusian State Military-Industrial Committee Head Dmitry Pantus in Tehran on October 23.[25] Nasir Zadeh stated that Iran welcomes the expansion of defense and industrial cooperation with Belarus, while Pantus emphasized strengthening cooperation in research, defense production, and industrial exchange. The Belarusian State Military-Industrial Committee is responsible for the development and maintenance of armaments, military and special equipment, military-technical cooperation, and export control policy.[26] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko signed 12 memorandums of understanding intended to strengthen bilateral trade, military technical cooperation, and mutual investment in August 2025.[27] Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SZRU) warned on August 22 that Iran is seeking Belarusian help to restore Iranian air defense systems and electronic warfare (EW) equipment.[28]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-23-2025-2/

Iran Update, October 24, 2025

Some Iranian officials have emphasized the need to decentralize authority to provincial governors following the Israel-Iran War, likely, in part, to ensure continuity of governance during periods of crisis. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian announced in July that he had delegated “all of the president’s powers” to provincial governors, although it is unclear which specific powers Pezeshkian was referring to.[14] Pezeshkian stated that transferring authority to governors was necessary to ensure that local governments can continue to operate even if senior Iranian officials are killed.[15] Iranian media previously claimed that Israel targeted a Supreme National Security Council meeting in Tehran that Pezeshkian was attending during the Israel-Iran War.[16] Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf stated on October 24 that he supports the government’s efforts to delegate authority to provincial governors but emphasized that these efforts must comply with the Iranian Constitution.[17] The Iranian Constitution allows the president to appoint special representatives whose decisions hold the same authority as the president’s in “special circumstances.”[18] Ghalibaf’s remarks about decentralization come after other senior Iranian officials have similarly expressed support for decentralization in recent weeks. Deputy Vice President for Strategic Affairs Ali Abdullah Khani recently emphasized the need for Iran to decentralize its supply chains, defense systems, and command-and-control structures, for example.[19] These statements reflect a growing acknowledgement among Iranian officials that Israel exploited Iran’s centralized leadership structure during the Israel-Iran War.

Iran also appears to be empowering provinces to establish economic relations with other countries, likely as part of Iran’s effort to mitigate the impact of international sanctions. Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi stated during a “provincial diplomacy” conference in Khorasan Razavi Province on October 23 that Iran’s borders with neighboring countries have become “vital breathing channels” for Iran’s economy.[20] Araghchi described provincial diplomacy as a “paradigm shift” in how Iran conducts foreign relations.[21] Iran may calculate that it can ease the pressure of international sanctions by developing strong economic relationships between Iranian provinces and regional and extra-regional countries. The regime’s push for provincial diplomacy is one of numerous mechanisms that Iran has pursued to try to reduce the impact of sanctions.

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-24-2025/

Iran Update, October 27, 2025

Iranian officials are concerned that divisions among Iranian political factions around foreign policy will destabilize the Iranian regime and present opportunities for exploitation by Iran’s adversaries. Pragmatic hardliner and Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf called on all Iranian political factions to demonstrate national unity in a parliament session on October 26.[16] Ghalibaf simultaneously condemned former President Hassan Rouhani and his former Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, who are two reformist figureheads, for their comments criticizing Russia’s decision to follow United Nations sanctions on Iran prior to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreement.[17] Ghalibaf also referred to Zarif’s recent rebuttal of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s claim that Zarif created the JCPOA‘s snapback mechanism in 2015.[18] Rouhani and the Supreme Leader’s representative to the Defense Council, Ali Shamkhani, criticized each other‘s character and leadership recently, which reignited long-standing tensions between the two.[19] Iranian First Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref separately urged Iranian officials not to publicly discuss their ”differences” on October 26.[20] Former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Mohsen Rezaei also advised on October 27 that political factions should not return to disputes originating before the Israel-Iran War and instead capitalize on the post-war national unity, especially as Iran’s adversaries look to exploit Iran’s weaknesses.[21] Iranian media coverage reflects these factional disputes over Iranian foreign policy. Hardliner outlet Javan condemned Rouhani and Zarif’s comments about Russia on October 26, while reformist outlet Hammihan questioned the implicit inability of Iranians to criticize Russia on October 27.[22] Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani called on Iranian media executives to promote Iran’s social cohesion and defensive power on October 27, claiming that Israel and the United States can degrade the public’s trust in the Iranian regime.[23]

Iran’s recent efforts to remove itself from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) blacklist have failed. FATF announced on October 24 that Iran will remain on the FATF blacklist due to Iran’s failure to address its long-standing financial deficiencies and non-compliance with United Nations nuclear non-proliferation obligations.[24] The FATF is an international body that sets standards for combating money laundering and terrorist financing.[25] CTP-ISW assessed on October 22 that Iran was very unlikely to meet the FATF’s requirements to be removed from the blacklist because Iran continues to provide financial and material support to members of the Axis of Resistance.[26] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian signed Iran’s conditional accession to the Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) convention on October 22 as part of an effort to remove Iran from the FATF blacklist.[27] FAFT had required that Iran ratify and implement both the CFT convention and the Palermo convention in line with FATF standards.[28] The Iranian Expediency Discernment Council approved the Palermo Convention in May 2025.[29] The CFT is a set of international policies and measures that prevent terrorist groups from accessing and using financial resources.[30] Pezeshkian approved the CFT convention under seven conditions, stating that the Iranian constitution and domestic legislation take precedence over the convention if the convention comes into conflict with Iranian law.[31] Pezeshkian added that Iran reserves the right to define terrorism financing for itself in accordance with the Iranian constitution, which does not define Iran’s support for the Axis of Resistance as terrorism financing.

IRGC Commander Major General Mohammad Pakpour appointed Brigadier General Hojatollah Ghoreishi as the IRGC Deputy Coordinator on October 27.[32] Ghoreishi replaced Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Naghdi, whom Pakpour appointed as his unspecified “senior adviser.”[33] Ghoreishi served as the Deputy Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister in January 2024 and as the Deputy for Supply, Research, and Industry Affairs in the Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry before that.[34] The US Treasury Department sanctioned Ghoreishi in 2023 for negotiating an agreement to supply Iranian drones to Russia for use in Ukraine and for leading Iranian military research and development.[35] An Iranian outlet reported on October 26 that Ghoreishi has been functioning as the IRGC Deputy Coordinator for ”some time.”[36] CTP-ISW is unable to independently verify this claim. Coordination deputies in Iran serve in a similar capacity to a chief of staff in the US military.

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-27-2025/

Iran Update, October 28, 2025

Former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Mohammad Ali Jafari argued that Iran’s missile program is its main form of deterrence and that Iran deliberately prioritized developing its missile and drone capabilities over its air and ground forces to counter the superior capabilities of the United States and Israel.[1] Jafari gave an interview to the Iranian podcast “Story of the War” on October 25, which features various senior Iranian officials’ perspectives on the Israel–Iran War.[2] Jafari provided a long summary about the development of Iranian defense strategy. Jafari stated that after a strategic review directed by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei after the Iran-Iraq War, Iran concluded that future conflicts would differ from the war with Iraq and that Iran needed to prioritize other capabilities beyond its ground forces.[3] Jafari added that Khamenei made the Artesh — Iran’s conventional military — responsible for air defenses and conventional air force technologies like fighter aircraft, and made the IRGC responsible for missiles and drones.[4] Iran chose this approach to compensate for its limited conventional capabilities and to ensure that it could deter stronger adversaries through inexpensive weapons, such as missiles and drones. Jafari also stated that Iran anticipated future conflict with Israel and the United States after the Iran–Iraq War, which led it to adopt an approach focused on missiles and drones to offset the technological gap between Iranian and US airpower and information systems.[5]

Jafari also claimed that Iran has learned from its successful missile strikes to improve accuracy, starting with the 2017 strike on the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Syria, which was reportedly the first real battlefield test of Iranian missile precision.[6] Jafari also highlighted that Iran learned from its later strikes on anti-regime targets in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region in October 2022, which demonstrated further improvements to its missile precision.[7] Jafari’s remarks indicate how Iran has tried to develop its missile capabilities through real combat experience rather than military exercises. Some senior Iranian commanders have previously stated that Iran applied lessons learned from each round of Iran’s missile strikes on Israel, but acknowledged that the True Promise I and II operations in April and October 2024 were part of the learning process.[8] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran’s inability to accurately strike military or energy infrastructure in Israel highlights the limited accuracy of its ballistic missiles, which likely led Iran to adjust tactics and warhead types to compensate for these shortcomings.[9] Deputy Vice President for Strategic Affairs Ali Abdullah Khani urged on October 13 that Iran improve its missile guidance systems and adopt maneuverable reentry vehicles to enhance accuracy, which indicates that Iran has continued to emphasize the importance of missile accuracy after the war.[10] Khani added that Iran must reduce its missiles’ circular error probable (CEP), which is “the radius of a circle, centered at the intended target, within which 50 percent of the missiles would be expected to impact.”[11]

Senior Iranian officials continue to threaten the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, likely aiming to deter adversaries and raise the cost of further action. Jafari stated that Iran kept some options in reserve and did not need to use them during the Israel-Iran War in response to a question about why Iran did not employ naval forces in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz.[12] Jafari stated that Iran would likely close the Strait of Hormuz if Israel or the United States struck Iran’s infrastructure, like water, electricity, or gas, to pressure civilians.[13] Jafari added that Iran will also employ these capabilities if a future conflict proves harder.

Iran may be able to use ballistic or cruise missiles to strike moving ships in the Straits of Hormuz and Persian Gulf in future rounds of conflict. Jafari claimed that Iran has the capabilities to strike moving ships. The Houthis, who use Iranian technology and have received Iranian training, have managed to hit multiple moving ships. Iranian state media outlet Mehr News previously reported on October 7 that Iran has developed new anti-ship cruise missiles equipped with fully automated guidance systems.[14]

Iran sees the development of new economic corridors as a key element of regional economic competition. Supreme Leader Military Affairs Adviser Major General Seyed Yahya Safavi stated on October 27 that the world is engaged in a new era of competition called the “war of corridors,” determined by railway lines, sea routes, and transit roads.[15] He added that Iran is a key player because of its unique geographical location and due to Sistan and Baluchistan Province’s position at the center of the “war of corridors“ competition. Iran is a member of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), which it seeks to use to strengthen its economic relations with regional states. The INSTC is a trade route that connects India, Iran, Russia, and Central Asia via road, rail, and sea to reduce the transit time and costs between South Asia and Europe.[16] Iran has recently strengthened its economic ties with Pakistan, which borders Sistan and Baluchistan Province. Iran’s Roads and Urban Development Minister Farzaneh Sadegh met with Pakistani Federal Minister for Communications Abdul Aleem Khan, Federal Minister for Railways Hanif Abbasi, and Federal Minister for Commerce Jam Kamal Khan in recent weeks to discuss the establishment of a joint committee to resolve cross-border trade issues and the recent Pakistan-Iran railway agreement.[17] Abbasi proposed expediting the implementation of a Pakistan-Iran rail agreement that was signed in September and announced that the Islamabad-Tehran-Istanbul Train Project will be reviewed in December. Khan emphasized Pakistan’s desire to enhance the bilateral trade volume with Iran to $10 billion, while Sadegh expressed Iran’s interest in increasing maritime cooperation through Chabahar and Gwadar ports.

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-28-2025/

Iran Update, October 29, 2025

Iran is attempting to develop regional economic partnerships to counter increased economic pressure following the Israel-Iran War. Iran has faced mounting US, UN, and EU sanctions following the war, which has driven Iran to seek out alternative partners that can help it subvert these sanctions.[18] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian called for “resilient common frameworks” to build economic cooperation at the fourth Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) meeting in Tehran on October 28.[19] The ECO is a multilateral economic organization that includes Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.[20] Pezeshkian and Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani both called for increasing trade with Pakistan in separate meetings with Pakistani Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi on the sidelines of the ECO meeting.[21] Larijani called for Iran and Pakistan to develop a “sustainable strategic partnership” in his meeting with Naqvi.[22] Iranian and Pakistani officials recently met on October 26 to discuss joint trade routes and infrastructure, including the Islamabad-Tehran-Istanbul railway project and the Chabahar and Gwadar ports.[23] Supreme Leader Military Affairs Adviser Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi emphasized the importance of regional trade routes, including routes that pass through Pakistan, on October 27.[24] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi separately proposed that Iranian provinces engage in direct trade with neighboring states at a conference in North Khorasan Province on October 23.[25] Pezeshkian separately met with Tajikistan Interior Minister Ramadan Rahimzadeh on the sidelines of the ECO meeting and suggested that regional countries should use a “common currency.” This proposal is consistent with Iran’s efforts to reduce its dependence on the US dollar.[26]

Iran also continues to cooperate with regional states to address border security issues, which Iran perceives as a threat to its internal security and regime stability. Pezeshkian called on ECO members to establish a previously proposed regional police force called “ECOPOL” to address regional terrorism, human and drug trafficking, and illegal migration.[27] Pezeshkian also underlined the importance of regional anti-trafficking measures in his meeting with Rahimzadeh and Iran and Pakistan’s joint counterterrorism efforts in his meeting with Naqvi.[28] Iran remains concerned about Sunni militant group Jaish al Adl in Sistan and Baluchistan Province on Iran’s southeastern border with Pakistan. Iranian security forces recently arrested an unspecified number of Jaish al Adl fighters on October 26 for killing 10 local security forces in Gohar Kuh, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, in October 2024.[29]

Iran has begun to clear and repair some military and intelligence sites that Israel struck during the Israel-Iran War. Iran has begun addressing damage at the following sites:

Southwest Tabriz Missile Base, East Azerbaijan Province. This missile base houses several above-ground launch sites, two entrances to underground installations, and several underground launch facilities.[30] The site reportedly stored Shahab-variant missiles.[31] Israeli airstrikes during the war destroyed at least a missile launch control center, one storage tunnel, an air defense battery, and two stationary launchers at the site.[32] Satellite imagery from October 27 shows that Iran has partially rebuilt some of the infrastructure.

Northern Shiraz Missile Base, Fars Province. This missile base manufactured and stored ballistic missiles. Israeli airstrikes on June 15 damaged at least 12 facilities, including ballistic missile launch pads, command buildings, and tunnel entrances, at the site.[33] Satellite imagery from October 27 shows that Iran has cleared debris from several destroyed buildings and partially reconstructed other buildings.

Parchin Military Complex, Tehran Province. The Parchin Complex played a key role in Iran’s pre-2003 nuclear weapons program. Iran has used the site to develop and manufacture explosive materials and advanced munitions, including ballistic missiles.[34] Israel struck the Parchin Complex in October 2024 and during the 12-day war.[35] Satellite imagery from August 28 showed that Iran is rebuilding facilities at the site that housed solid fuel mixers, which are essential for producing solid fuel for ballistic missiles.[36] The Institute for Science and International Security reported on October 20 that Iran is also building unspecified structures at the former Taleghan 2 nuclear research site at Parchin that Israel struck in October 2024.[37] Satellite imagery from October 28 shows that Iran has partially repaired another unspecified building at Parchin that Israel struck and destroyed during the war.

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Ground Forces Seyyed ol Shohada Provincial Unit, Tehran Province. The IDF reported that the Seyyed ol Shohada Provincial Unit is responsible for defending Iranian territory and suppressing internal unrest in Tehran City.[38] Israeli airstrikes on June 23 targeted the unit’s headquarters.[39] Satellite imagery from October 3 shows that Iran has partially repaired one damaged building and demolished another at the site.

Law Enforcement Command (LEC) intelligence facility, Tehran Province. The IDF reported that the LEC intelligence facility is responsible for intelligence collection and surveillance of the Iranian public, especially regime opponents.[40] The LEC serves as Iran’s main internal security and law enforcement agency. Israeli airstrikes on June 23 targeted the LEC intelligence facility and destroyed at least two buildings and damaged another, according to satellite imagery from July 21.[41] Satellite imagery from October 28 shows that Iran has demolished the damaged building and cleared debris from the two destroyed buildings.

maps:
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-29-2025/

Iran Update, October 30, 2025

Iran has reportedly received increasingly large sodium perchlorate shipments from China amid Iranian efforts to rebuild its ballistic missile program in the wake of Israel-Iran War. European intelligence sources told CNN on October 29 that Iran received 2000 tons of sodium perchlorate in several shipments that arrived in Bandar Abbas, Iran, from China.[1] Sodium perchlorate is a chemical precursor for solid missile propellant. The Associated Press assessed on September 24 that Iran does not have the necessary planetary mixers to produce solid missile fuel due to Israeli strikes on Iranian military sites in October 2024 and June 2025, however.[2] Iran has reportedly received larger quantities of sodium perchlorate in recent shipments compared to the quantities of sodium perchlorate that Iran previously received from China in February and May 2025.[3] These shipments notably arrived in Iran on September 29, two days after the UN Security Council reimposed sanctions on Iran that included sanctions related to the Iranian missile program.[4] China has recently assisted Iran in developing its ballistic missile program through shipments of sodium perchlorate in addition to other dual-use technologies.[5] Iran reportedly received about 1000 tons of sodium perchlorate from China in February and May 2025.[6] The larger recent shipments to Iran come as Iran tries to rebuild its missile program following the Israel-Iran War in June 2025. Former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Mohammad Ali Jafari argued on October 25 that Iran's missile program is its main form of deterrence and that Iran deliberately prioritized developing its missile and drone capabilities over its air and ground forces to counter the superior capabilities of the United States and Israel.[7]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-30-2025/

Iran Update, October 31, 2025

An X account attributed to Mossad claimed on October 30 that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Political and Security Affairs, Ali Asghar Hejazi, and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Mohammad Pakpour have sidelined Khamenei and are “making decisions independently.”[1] CTP-ISW cannot verify this report. This claim follows reports that senior Iranian officials were unable to contact Khamenei during the Israel-Iran War.[2] Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf reportedly assumed at least partial command of the Iranian armed forces after Israeli airstrikes on June 12 killed several Iranian military leaders, possibly without Khamenei’s approval.[3] Both Hejazi and Pakpour hold senior positions in the regime. Hejazi is reportedly one of Khamenei’s closest advisers and is considered the “most powerful intelligence official” in Iran, according to five sources familiar with Khamenei’s decision-making process.[4] Pakpour previously served as the IRGC Ground Forces commander and Khamenei appointed Pakpour as IRGC commander after Israel killed former IRGC Commander Hossein Salami during the Israel-Iran War.[5] The X account attributed to Mossad previously accurately reported that Khamenei had appointed Ali Abdollahi Ali Abadi as the new Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters commander before the regime officially announced the appointment.[6] The account's claim that Pakpour and Hejazi have sidelined Khamenei, if true, would be extremely noteworthy as it would indicate that Khamenei is currently not the main decision-making authority in Iran.

Iranian media confirmed on October 30 that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi as the new Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) deputy chief.[25] Vahidi replaced Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Ashtiani, who had served in the position since August 2024.[26] Vahidi is a long-time member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and has previously held numerous senior military and political positions, including IRGC Quds Force commander, defense minister, and interior minister.[27] The United States and European Union sanctioned Vahidi in 2022 for his role in directing the Law Enforcement Command to suppress protests.[28] Vahidi’s appointment marks the first time in the Iranian regime's history that an IRGC officer is serving as the AFGS deputy chief under an Artesh officer, AFGS Chief Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi.[29] The Artesh is Iran's conventional army that defends the country from outside threats, while the IRGC is an ideological force created after the 1979 Revolution to protect the Iranian regime from internal and external threats.[30] Both the Artesh and the IRGC report to Khamenei through the AFGS.[31]

Iran is taking steps to strengthen the defense of its civilian infrastructure to address vulnerabilities that Israel exploited during the Israel-Iran War. Passive Defense Organization head Brigadier General Gholamreza Jalali stated on October 31 that Iran will soon hold three exercises designed to test Iran's banking, public warning, and national communications systems against enemy attacks.[32] Jalali stated that the Passive Defense Organization has identified a significant number of weaknesses and is engaging with agencies across the Iranian government to develop countermeasures to address them.[33] Anti-regime groups, including a pro-Israeli hacker group, conducted several cyberattacks targeting Iran's banking and communications infrastructure during the war.[34] These exercises reflect Iran's heightened paranoia about Israeli infiltration following the war.

Iran and Turkey signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on October 30 to strengthen border security cooperation, which likely reflects Iranian concerns about the presence of Kurdish militant groups along its northwestern border. Iranian Deputy Interior Minister Ali Akbar Pourjamshidian met with Turkish Deputy Interior Minister Munir Karaloglu at the seventh meeting of the Iran-Turkey Security Working Group.[35] Iran and Turkey both perceive Kurdish armed groups in the region as a threat to their security. The MoU comes after the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which is based in Kurdish-majority areas of Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran, announced in May 2025 that it would dissolve itself and “end its armed struggle.”[36] The Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK), which is the Iranian branch of the PKK, announced in May that it would not adhere to the PKK’s decision to dissolve.[37] PJAK seeks to establish an “autonomous Kurdish region within a federal political structure in Iran” and has previously targeted Iranian security forces.[38] Iran has previously accused Kurdish opposition groups of inciting protests in western Iran and cooperating with Israel to facilitate attacks in Iran.[39]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-31-2025/

Our agents on the scene report that Messrs Hijazi and Pakpour are not letting the person they call the “Leader” in on matters and are making decisions independently. They understand that talking to him is pointless and for that reason, they have formed a replacement board of directors.
They tell the “Leader” that everything is fine – air defence is in place, launchers are ready, and the country has full capabilities. This while Iran's skies are open and defenceless. For the information of the Honourable Mr Sleepyhead. @khamenei_ir

https://x.com/MossadSpokesman/status/1983934332625383501

https://x.com/MossadSpokesman

Iran Update, November 3, 2025

Venezuela recently requested military equipment, including drones, from Iran amid heightened tensions between Venezuela and the United States, according to internal US government documents obtained by The Washington Post.[1] It is unclear if Iran is willing and able to export drones and other military equipment to Venezuela after the Israel-Iran War, however. Venezuelan Transport Minister Ramon Celestino Velasquez reportedly “coordinated a shipment of military equipment and drones from Iran” and informed Iran that it requires “passive detection equipment,” GPS jamming devices, and drones with a range of 1,000 kilometers (approximately 600 miles).[2] The Washington Post stated that it is unclear how Iran responded to this request.[3] Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Esmail Baghaei stated on November 3 that Venezuela can defend itself, but that Iran will “certainly” continue to cooperate with Venezuela.[4] Velasquez previously visited Tehran in September 2024 and met with Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh.[5] Nasir Zadeh is responsible for Iranian military equipment sales and purchases. Nasir Zadeh and Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro also signed a memorandum of understanding to increase “trade and mobility” between Iran and Venezuela in Caracas, Venezuela, in November 2024.[6] Iran has outsourced some of its drone production to Venezuela over the past decade, including the production of Mohajer-6 drones, which have a range of 200 kilometers (approximately 124 miles).[7] It is unclear whether Iran would be willing to supply Venezuela with military equipment — despite Iran's historical military cooperation with Venezuela — given that Iran is trying to rebuild its weapons stockpiles following the Israel-Iran War. Iran launched at least 1,000 drones at Israel during the Israel-Iran War, and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) destroyed at least 950 Iranian drones during the war.[8]

Internal political tensions between senior Iranian officials appear to be growing as these officials seek to gain more influence in the regime. An outlet affiliated with Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani characterized Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf in an op-ed on November 1 as a political opportunist who regularly changes his positions on various issues, including engagement with the West, provincial authorities, and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to increase his decision-making power in the regime.[9] Ghalibaf has played a prominent role in Iranian decision-making both during and after the Israel-Iran War. Ghalibaf reportedly took the unprecedented step of assuming a senior military command position during the war.[10] Ghalibaf also played an important role in the establishment of the Defense Council after the war to address key vulnerabilities that Israel exploited during the war.[11] This op-ed comes amid a flurry of political infighting among various Iranian factions in recent weeks. Various Iranian officials, including Ghalibaf, have harshly criticized former Iranian moderate President Hassan Rouhani for allegedly criticizing the Iranian regime's close cooperation with Russia. The political infighting comes amid recent reports that senior Iranian officials have sidelined Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and could represent an effort by various Iranian actors to increase their influence in the regime in the face of Khamenei’s reported marginalization. An X account attributed to Mossad claimed on October 30 that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Political and Security Affairs, Ali Asghar Hejazi, and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Mohammad Pakpour have sidelined Khamenei and are “making decisions independently.”[12] CTP-ISW cannot independently verify this claim.

ranian military commanders have conducted a series of inspections of Artesh and IRGC units across Iran in recent days to assess and evaluate the combat capabilities and readiness of these units.

Armed Forces General Staff Deputy Chief Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi has inspected the following sites since October 31:

Artesh Air Force 6th Tactical Airbase: Vahidi inspected the Artesh Air Force 6th Tactical Airbase in Bushehr Province on October 31.[16] The IDF struck this airbase during the Israel–Iran War.[17] Israeli Army Radio reported that Iran was storing ballistic missiles at the airbase.
IRGC Navy 2nd Nouh-e Nabi Region: Vahidi inspected the IRGC Navy 2nd Nouh-e Nabi Region in Bushehr Province on November 1.[18]
IRGC Commander Major General Mohammad Pakpour has inspected the following sites since November 1:

IRGC Ground Forces Ashoura Operational Base: Pakpour inspected the IRGC Ground Forces Ashoura Operational Base in northwestern Iran on November 1. The Operational Base oversees IRGC Ground Forces units in Zanjan, Ardabil, and East Azerbaijan provinces.
IRGC Ground Forces Provincial Units: Pakpour met with Ashoura Provincial Unit personnel in East Azerbaijan Province on November 1. The Ashoura Unit is located near the Southwest Tabriz Missile Base.[19] Israeli airstrikes during the war destroyed a missile launch control center, one storage tunnel, an air defense battery, and two stationary launchers at the site.[20] Pakpour also visited the IRGC Ground Forces Karbala and Quds provincial units, which are based in Mazandaran Province and Gilan Province, respectively.[21]
Imam Zaman Mechanized Brigade: Pakpour inspected the IRGC Ground Forces Imam Zaman Mechanized Brigade in Shabestar, East Azerbaijan Province, on November 1.[22] The brigade operates along Iran's northwestern border and conducts armored and mechanized operations.[23] The brigade previously deployed fighters to Syria to defend the Assad regime.[24]
IRGC Ground Forces Sejjil Drone Units: Pakpour inspected the IRGC Ground Forces Sejjil Drone Units during a drone exercise in an unspecified location in northwestern Iran on November 2.[25]
IRGC Navy Commander Brigadier General Alireza Tangsiri inspected the following sites:

Abu Musa and Siri islands: Tangsiri inspected IRGC naval forces stationed on Abu Musa and Siri islands in the Persian Gulf on November 2.[26] Siri and Abu Musa are two of the four Nazeat Islands, along with Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb, which serve as key positions for controlling maritime access to the Persian Gulf.[27] Iranian military commanders have recently increased their inspections of naval units in the Persian Gulf since September 2025.[28]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-3-2025/

Iran Update, November 4, 2025

Iran is reportedly attempting to force its large proxy and partner militias in Iraq to move into politics, possibly to discourage US sanctions enforcement that would prevent Iran from using the Iraqi economy to evade sanctions.[1] UK-based Amwaj Media reported on November 3 that Iran has encouraged unspecified Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to shift their focus from armed resistance to political engagement, citing Iraqi political insiders.[2] A source in the Iraqi Prime Minister’s office told Amwaj that the Iraqi federal government has similarly encouraged Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to prioritize their political activities.[3] Iran reportedly wants “fresh [Iraqi] faces acceptable to the Iraqi public” to lead this political engagement.[4] An Iranian-backed Iraqi militia source added that Iran would consider funding and politically supporting smaller Iraqi militias that are not affiliated with the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), which would place these militias fully outside state structures and control.[5] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service primarily comprised of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, many of which report to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister.[6] The PMF militias linked or loyal to Iran have frequently targeted US forces and assets, including when a likely Kataib Hezbollah cell killed three US servicemembers in Jordan in a drone attack in January 2024.[7] The United States has sanctioned the Iraqi government and commercial entities and threatened to sanction unidentified PMF leaders.[8] The Iraqi economy is a crucial lifeline for Iran as it attempts to mitigate new US sanctions, and attacks by Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that are officially part of the Iraqi government could imperil that.

Iran may decide to build a loyal cadre of ideological militias, over which Iran has strong control, that will supplement pro-Iranian political parties in parliament while avoiding sanctions on Iraq. Iran has previously established splinter groups or front groups to ensure militia loyalty to Iran or to obfuscate the involvement of larger militias in military activity against the United States.[9] Front groups acted as fronts for larger militias, while splinters officially split from their previous organization. Iran helped split Kataib Hezbollah and Asaib Ahl al Haq from Moqtada al Sadr’s Jaysh al Mahdi (JaM) after 2006, as JaM became less responsive to Iranian control, for example.[10] Some legacy Iranian-backed groups in Iraq, like Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, have notably struggled to control some elements of their forces that have appeared to conduct unsanctioned attacks against US forces, Israel, and some Iraqi assets.[11] Overzealous and uncontrollable activity is negative for Iran because the risk for escalation that triggers sanctions or other negative effects on the Iraqi economy would badly weaken Iranian sanction evasion efforts. Prominent Iranian-backed Iraqi militias heavily relied on front groups to conduct attacks from 2020 to 2021, likely to avoid US strikes in retaliation for militia escalation against US forces after the US strike that killed Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force commander Major General Qassem Soleimani in 2020.[12] Iran and its partners in Iraq have not used front groups in a systematic way since 2021. Front groups could be much more controllable from Tehran than poorly disciplined forces like Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba and would allow powerful groups like the Badr Organization to support Iranian sanctions evasion efforts without drawing US attention.

Most militias will likely resist Iran’s proposals because their military wings are both their raison d’être and a tool to enforce their will on other Iraqis. The militia-affiliated Iraqi source told Amwaj that unspecified militias are not supportive of Iran’s suggestions, as further integration into the Iraqi state is viewed as a threat to the militias’ identities as resistance organizations.[13] Asaib Ahl al Haq attempted to assassinate then-Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al Kadhimi in Fall 2021 to force the formation of a government including Iranian-backed militias, for example, and Kataib Hezbollah assassinated Iraqi researcher Hashem al Hashimi in July 2020 for his investigations into Kataib Hezbollah’s structure and behavior.[14] These militias also see “resistance” against Israel and the United States as their raison d’être, and some have already been resistant to disarmament.[15]

A smaller group of militias—possibly including the Badr Organization—may acquiesce to Iranian demands and integrate their militias into the PMF while focusing on politics. This would not indicate that Badr has moderated, but instead that it seeks to position itself as a preeminent pro-Iranian political force in Iraq. This move would also be an expression of Badr’s deep commitment to the Iranian project in Iraq. Badr has already supported militia integration into the PMF and militia disarmament, probably because it controls most of the PMF’s support structures and a large number of its brigades.[16] This means that even if the PMF answered more reliably to the prime minister, Badr would still exercise extreme sway within the organization and could manipulate the PMF to accomplish Badr’s objectives in Iraq. Badr also controls and influences the Transport Ministry and many private and public enterprises in Iraq, which it could continue to use to help Iran exploit sanctions.[17] Iran could also feasibly use Badr’s influence in the PMF and other ministries to sideline and suppress militias that refused Iran’s proposals to integrate into politics.

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-4-2025/

Iran Update, November 5, 2025

Iran may seek to exchange technical information with Belarus related to air defense systems and electronic warfare (EW) equipment to enhance its ability to produce these systems. Iranian Artesh Air Force Commander Brigadier General Hamid Vahedi met with Belarusian Air Force and Air Defense Forces Commander Major General Andrei Lukyanovich during a four-day visit to Belarus between November 2 and 5.[16] The two commanders discussed bilateral relations and examined ways to expand air force and air defense cooperation. The Iranian delegation plans to visit the Belarusian Military Academy and Belarusian air force units and view the latest Belarusian electronic warfare equipment.[17] Iran has expressed interest in acquiring advanced air defense systems and aircraft, such as the S-400 air defense system and Su-35 fighter jet, from Russia. Belarus’ KB Radar Company manufactures niche radar systems for airspace control, air defense, and target tracking, and EW systems, which would be compatible with the systems that Iran seeks to acquire.[18] Belarus primarily produces these systems for Russia's operational needs in Ukraine, however, and it is unclear whether Russia or Belarus would be willing to spare any of these systems for Iran. ISW has long assessed that Russia has de facto annexed Belarus and has subsumed significant elements of the Belarusian economy and defense industrial base.[19] Belarus is unlikely to offer any low-density high-demand air defense or electronic warfare equipment to Iran without Russia's approval.

Iran may be trying to market its naval military hardware to international buyers at a maritime exhibition in Pakistan. An Iranian Defense Ministry delegation led by Captain Daryoush Eskandari participated in Pakistan's four-day International Maritime Exhibition and Conference (PIMEC) between November 3 and 6.[20] The Iranian delegation displayed mock models of anti-ship cruise missiles, mid-class submarines, hovercrafts, fast attack crafts, and other vessels.[21] The Iranian Defense Ministry is responsible for the Iranian defense industrial base and arms sales and purchases. Delegations from 44 countries, including China, participated in the exhibition.[22] Iran has previously sought to increase arms exports to generate revenue and mitigate the impacts of Western sanctions that have deteriorated Iran's economy.[23]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-5-2025/

Iran Update, November 6, 2025

Iran's annual oil revenues have significantly decreased, which will likely worsen Iran's ongoing economic issues amid international sanctions and provide the government with less revenue to carry out its initiatives. The Deputy Chairman of the Iranian Parliament's Budget and Planning Commission, Hadi Ghavami, stated on November 6 that Iran's oil revenue has dropped significantly, only meeting about 16 percent of the expected annual revenue in 2025.[12] Reuters reported last month that Iran is offering an eight-to-ten-dollar discount per barrel to incentivize Chinese buyers to buy its oil.[13] The discounts in oil revenue will cause profits to fall even if Iran increases its oil exports compared to before sanctions came into effect. Oil is the regime's largest source of revenue, and its failure to inject oil revenues into the economy could make it significantly difficult to mitigate the impact of international sanctions.

Lower oil revenues may cause Iran to reallocate its oil revenues to military expenditures to replace defense systems that Israel destroyed in June 2025, thus decreasing Iran's ability to invest in other domestic projects. Iranian officials continue to believe that renewed war with Israel is likely in the short term, which indicates that they will prioritize military expenditure over domestic projects at this time. Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Commission spokesperson Ebrahim Rezaei announced in September 2025 that the commission approved a bill that requires the Iranian Planning and Budget Organization and the Oil Ministry to meet 100 percent of the current year's budget to strengthen Iranian defense capabilities.[14] The bill also allows the Planning and Budget Organization and the Oil Ministry to transfer 1.5 billion dollars under the banner of “oil allocation” to the Armed Forces General Staff. The Iranian Planning and Budget Organization and the Oil Ministry may face challenges in allocating all of the funds outlined in the current budget due to the decrease in oil revenue, but any allocation to the military will decrease the revenue available for domestic projects. Iranian prioritization of military investment over domestic projects could change if the economy continues to weaken under sanctions and popular discontent increases.

Iran seeks to expand economic ties with its partners and regional countries, likely as part of an effort to mitigate the effects of international sanctions. Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf met with his Pakistani counterpart, Sardar Ayaz Sadegh and members of the Pakistani Chamber of Commerce in Islamabad on November 6 to discuss expanding bilateral trade, banking, and technological relations.[15] Ghalibaf argued for expanding the total trade volume between the two countries from $3 billion to $10 billion over an unspecified period of time.[16] Ghalibaf’s trip comes after Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi recently emphasized on October 23 that provinces will need to take a greater role in cross-border economic exchange with neighboring countries in the future.[17] Araghchi described these engagements as ”vital breathing channels” for the Iranian economy and ”a paradigm shift” in how Iran would conduct its foreign policy in the future.[18]

Iran also seeks to expand trade relations with Russia, which is a key Iranian partner. Iranian Port and Maritime Organization CEO Saeed Rasouli and Russian officials agreed on November 5 to form a port-sea consortium between the two countries to increase trade in the Caspian Sea.[19] The agreement comes after a member of the Iran-Russia Joint Chamber of Commerce‘s Board of Directors stated on October 20 that Iran must “make maximum use of the new regional space” and trade with countries bordering the Caspian Sea to counter the effects of international sanctions.[20]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-6-2025/

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