Iran Update, October 23, 2025
Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf–a retired military officer but still currently a senior civilian–reportedly took the unprecedented step of assuming an unspecified but very senior military command during the Israel-Iran War in June 2025 after the deaths of many top commanders. Ghalibaf’s assumption of command as a civilian due to command losses demonstrates that Israel caused significant disruption to Iranian command and control. Iranian Tourism and Cultural Heritage Minister Reza Salehi Amiri stated on October 22 that Ghalibaf assumed command of the Iranian armed forces as an emergency response to the deaths of prominent Iranian commanders during the Israel-Iran War.[1] Ghalibaf was once IRGC Air Force commander—the predecessor to the IRGC Aerospace Force—but his assumption of command is nonetheless unprecedented because he currently holds a senior civilian political office.[2] Multiple IRGC Aerospace Force commanders were killed in the opening days of the conflict, and Ghalibaf could have stepped in on an interim basis to ensure continuity of command. An Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated outlet confirmed the veracity of Amiri’s statements, stating that his speech constituted an informational security breach and accusing him of spying for Israel.[3] The outlet added that Ghalibaf’s role during the war was kept secret from the public and that his revelation now makes Ghalibaf a prime target for an Israeli assassination.[4] Ghalibaf stated in an interview on September 24 that he was in ”daily contact” with IRGC Commander Major General Mohammad Pakpour over the course of the war.[5] IRGC Coordination Deputy Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Naghdi acknowledged on October 20 that Iran was unable to respond in a timely fashion during the Israel-Iran War due to disruptions in its chain of command after Israel killed several Iranian senior commanders.[6] Ghalibaf’s assumption of command demonstrates that Iran needed to opt for suboptimal interim measures to ensure continuity of command.
Ghalibaf may have assumed command of the Iranian military or elements of it during the Israel-Iran War without the approval of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Khamenei’s absence during the war suggests that Ghalibaf assumed command without Khamenei’s approval.[7] The New York Times reported on June 21 that Khamenei isolated himself in a bunker during the war to avoid being assassinated by Israel and that various factions were forming within the Iranian regime to vie for power in Khamenei’s absence.[8] Ghalibaf, who is a member of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), could have consulted the council. SNSC cannot make decisions without the supreme leader because he must approve all SNSC decisions, however.[9]
Ghalibaf’s reported role during and after the Israel-Iran War demonstrates his enormous influence in the Iranian regime. Ghalibaf has vast experience in several of Iran’s most important institutions that serve to achieve the regime’s strategic objectives. He previously served as the IRGC Air Force commander, as noted above, but also as the Iranian Police Force chief and the IRGC Khatam al Anbiya Construction Headquarters commander before transitioning to political leadership.[10] There is no public reporting that indicates other Iranian leaders opposed Ghalibaf‘s decision to assume command of the military or some elements of it during the Israel-Iran War, which indicates that he retains significant influence across the regime security establishment or that other regime officials recognized the dire situation during the war. These explanations are not mutually exclusive. Ghalibaf also played an important role in creating the post-war National Defense Council, which Iran designed to fix key vulnerabilities in its defense, cybersecurity, and intelligence systems that Israel exploited during the war.[11]
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced on October 19 that Israeli forces began to conduct a five-day, division-level military exercise along the Israel-Lebanon border to prepare for “different scenarios.”[12] US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack previously warned the Lebanese government on October 20 that there may be a “major confrontation“ between Israel and Hezbollah if the government does not take steps to disarm Hezbollah.[13] An unspecified security source told Lebanese media on October 23 that Hezbollah decided that it would directly respond to any Israeli ground operations and is expecting an imminent Israeli escalation.[14] The source noted that Hezbollah has developed a new military plan incorporating lessons learned from the November 2024 Israel-Hezbollah conflict.[15]
Iran may be trying to secure weapons from Belarus to replace military systems destroyed during the Israel-Iran War. Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh, who is responsible for the Iranian military’s weapon acquisitions, discussed bilateral cooperation with Belarusian State Military-Industrial Committee Head Dmitry Pantus in Tehran on October 23.[25] Nasir Zadeh stated that Iran welcomes the expansion of defense and industrial cooperation with Belarus, while Pantus emphasized strengthening cooperation in research, defense production, and industrial exchange. The Belarusian State Military-Industrial Committee is responsible for the development and maintenance of armaments, military and special equipment, military-technical cooperation, and export control policy.[26] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko signed 12 memorandums of understanding intended to strengthen bilateral trade, military technical cooperation, and mutual investment in August 2025.[27] Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SZRU) warned on August 22 that Iran is seeking Belarusian help to restore Iranian air defense systems and electronic warfare (EW) equipment.[28]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-23-2025-2/
Iran Update, October 24, 2025
Some Iranian officials have emphasized the need to decentralize authority to provincial governors following the Israel-Iran War, likely, in part, to ensure continuity of governance during periods of crisis. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian announced in July that he had delegated “all of the president’s powers” to provincial governors, although it is unclear which specific powers Pezeshkian was referring to.[14] Pezeshkian stated that transferring authority to governors was necessary to ensure that local governments can continue to operate even if senior Iranian officials are killed.[15] Iranian media previously claimed that Israel targeted a Supreme National Security Council meeting in Tehran that Pezeshkian was attending during the Israel-Iran War.[16] Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf stated on October 24 that he supports the government’s efforts to delegate authority to provincial governors but emphasized that these efforts must comply with the Iranian Constitution.[17] The Iranian Constitution allows the president to appoint special representatives whose decisions hold the same authority as the president’s in “special circumstances.”[18] Ghalibaf’s remarks about decentralization come after other senior Iranian officials have similarly expressed support for decentralization in recent weeks. Deputy Vice President for Strategic Affairs Ali Abdullah Khani recently emphasized the need for Iran to decentralize its supply chains, defense systems, and command-and-control structures, for example.[19] These statements reflect a growing acknowledgement among Iranian officials that Israel exploited Iran’s centralized leadership structure during the Israel-Iran War.
Iran also appears to be empowering provinces to establish economic relations with other countries, likely as part of Iran’s effort to mitigate the impact of international sanctions. Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi stated during a “provincial diplomacy” conference in Khorasan Razavi Province on October 23 that Iran’s borders with neighboring countries have become “vital breathing channels” for Iran’s economy.[20] Araghchi described provincial diplomacy as a “paradigm shift” in how Iran conducts foreign relations.[21] Iran may calculate that it can ease the pressure of international sanctions by developing strong economic relationships between Iranian provinces and regional and extra-regional countries. The regime’s push for provincial diplomacy is one of numerous mechanisms that Iran has pursued to try to reduce the impact of sanctions.
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-24-2025/