Iran Update, October 24, 2025
Some Iranian officials have emphasized the need to decentralize authority to provincial governors following the Israel-Iran War, likely, in part, to ensure continuity of governance during periods of crisis. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian announced in July that he had delegated “all of the president’s powers” to provincial governors, although it is unclear which specific powers Pezeshkian was referring to.[14] Pezeshkian stated that transferring authority to governors was necessary to ensure that local governments can continue to operate even if senior Iranian officials are killed.[15] Iranian media previously claimed that Israel targeted a Supreme National Security Council meeting in Tehran that Pezeshkian was attending during the Israel-Iran War.[16] Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf stated on October 24 that he supports the government’s efforts to delegate authority to provincial governors but emphasized that these efforts must comply with the Iranian Constitution.[17] The Iranian Constitution allows the president to appoint special representatives whose decisions hold the same authority as the president’s in “special circumstances.”[18] Ghalibaf’s remarks about decentralization come after other senior Iranian officials have similarly expressed support for decentralization in recent weeks. Deputy Vice President for Strategic Affairs Ali Abdullah Khani recently emphasized the need for Iran to decentralize its supply chains, defense systems, and command-and-control structures, for example.[19] These statements reflect a growing acknowledgement among Iranian officials that Israel exploited Iran’s centralized leadership structure during the Israel-Iran War.
Iran also appears to be empowering provinces to establish economic relations with other countries, likely as part of Iran’s effort to mitigate the impact of international sanctions. Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi stated during a “provincial diplomacy” conference in Khorasan Razavi Province on October 23 that Iran’s borders with neighboring countries have become “vital breathing channels” for Iran’s economy.[20] Araghchi described provincial diplomacy as a “paradigm shift” in how Iran conducts foreign relations.[21] Iran may calculate that it can ease the pressure of international sanctions by developing strong economic relationships between Iranian provinces and regional and extra-regional countries. The regime’s push for provincial diplomacy is one of numerous mechanisms that Iran has pursued to try to reduce the impact of sanctions.
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-24-2025/
Iran Update, October 27, 2025
Iranian officials are concerned that divisions among Iranian political factions around foreign policy will destabilize the Iranian regime and present opportunities for exploitation by Iran’s adversaries. Pragmatic hardliner and Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf called on all Iranian political factions to demonstrate national unity in a parliament session on October 26.[16] Ghalibaf simultaneously condemned former President Hassan Rouhani and his former Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, who are two reformist figureheads, for their comments criticizing Russia’s decision to follow United Nations sanctions on Iran prior to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreement.[17] Ghalibaf also referred to Zarif’s recent rebuttal of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s claim that Zarif created the JCPOA‘s snapback mechanism in 2015.[18] Rouhani and the Supreme Leader’s representative to the Defense Council, Ali Shamkhani, criticized each other‘s character and leadership recently, which reignited long-standing tensions between the two.[19] Iranian First Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref separately urged Iranian officials not to publicly discuss their ”differences” on October 26.[20] Former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Mohsen Rezaei also advised on October 27 that political factions should not return to disputes originating before the Israel-Iran War and instead capitalize on the post-war national unity, especially as Iran’s adversaries look to exploit Iran’s weaknesses.[21] Iranian media coverage reflects these factional disputes over Iranian foreign policy. Hardliner outlet Javan condemned Rouhani and Zarif’s comments about Russia on October 26, while reformist outlet Hammihan questioned the implicit inability of Iranians to criticize Russia on October 27.[22] Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani called on Iranian media executives to promote Iran’s social cohesion and defensive power on October 27, claiming that Israel and the United States can degrade the public’s trust in the Iranian regime.[23]
Iran’s recent efforts to remove itself from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) blacklist have failed. FATF announced on October 24 that Iran will remain on the FATF blacklist due to Iran’s failure to address its long-standing financial deficiencies and non-compliance with United Nations nuclear non-proliferation obligations.[24] The FATF is an international body that sets standards for combating money laundering and terrorist financing.[25] CTP-ISW assessed on October 22 that Iran was very unlikely to meet the FATF’s requirements to be removed from the blacklist because Iran continues to provide financial and material support to members of the Axis of Resistance.[26] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian signed Iran’s conditional accession to the Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) convention on October 22 as part of an effort to remove Iran from the FATF blacklist.[27] FAFT had required that Iran ratify and implement both the CFT convention and the Palermo convention in line with FATF standards.[28] The Iranian Expediency Discernment Council approved the Palermo Convention in May 2025.[29] The CFT is a set of international policies and measures that prevent terrorist groups from accessing and using financial resources.[30] Pezeshkian approved the CFT convention under seven conditions, stating that the Iranian constitution and domestic legislation take precedence over the convention if the convention comes into conflict with Iranian law.[31] Pezeshkian added that Iran reserves the right to define terrorism financing for itself in accordance with the Iranian constitution, which does not define Iran’s support for the Axis of Resistance as terrorism financing.
IRGC Commander Major General Mohammad Pakpour appointed Brigadier General Hojatollah Ghoreishi as the IRGC Deputy Coordinator on October 27.[32] Ghoreishi replaced Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Naghdi, whom Pakpour appointed as his unspecified “senior adviser.”[33] Ghoreishi served as the Deputy Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister in January 2024 and as the Deputy for Supply, Research, and Industry Affairs in the Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry before that.[34] The US Treasury Department sanctioned Ghoreishi in 2023 for negotiating an agreement to supply Iranian drones to Russia for use in Ukraine and for leading Iranian military research and development.[35] An Iranian outlet reported on October 26 that Ghoreishi has been functioning as the IRGC Deputy Coordinator for ”some time.”[36] CTP-ISW is unable to independently verify this claim. Coordination deputies in Iran serve in a similar capacity to a chief of staff in the US military.
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-27-2025/