Iran Update, October 28, 2025
Former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Mohammad Ali Jafari argued that Iran’s missile program is its main form of deterrence and that Iran deliberately prioritized developing its missile and drone capabilities over its air and ground forces to counter the superior capabilities of the United States and Israel.[1] Jafari gave an interview to the Iranian podcast “Story of the War” on October 25, which features various senior Iranian officials’ perspectives on the Israel–Iran War.[2] Jafari provided a long summary about the development of Iranian defense strategy. Jafari stated that after a strategic review directed by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei after the Iran-Iraq War, Iran concluded that future conflicts would differ from the war with Iraq and that Iran needed to prioritize other capabilities beyond its ground forces.[3] Jafari added that Khamenei made the Artesh — Iran’s conventional military — responsible for air defenses and conventional air force technologies like fighter aircraft, and made the IRGC responsible for missiles and drones.[4] Iran chose this approach to compensate for its limited conventional capabilities and to ensure that it could deter stronger adversaries through inexpensive weapons, such as missiles and drones. Jafari also stated that Iran anticipated future conflict with Israel and the United States after the Iran–Iraq War, which led it to adopt an approach focused on missiles and drones to offset the technological gap between Iranian and US airpower and information systems.[5]
Jafari also claimed that Iran has learned from its successful missile strikes to improve accuracy, starting with the 2017 strike on the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Syria, which was reportedly the first real battlefield test of Iranian missile precision.[6] Jafari also highlighted that Iran learned from its later strikes on anti-regime targets in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region in October 2022, which demonstrated further improvements to its missile precision.[7] Jafari’s remarks indicate how Iran has tried to develop its missile capabilities through real combat experience rather than military exercises. Some senior Iranian commanders have previously stated that Iran applied lessons learned from each round of Iran’s missile strikes on Israel, but acknowledged that the True Promise I and II operations in April and October 2024 were part of the learning process.[8] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran’s inability to accurately strike military or energy infrastructure in Israel highlights the limited accuracy of its ballistic missiles, which likely led Iran to adjust tactics and warhead types to compensate for these shortcomings.[9] Deputy Vice President for Strategic Affairs Ali Abdullah Khani urged on October 13 that Iran improve its missile guidance systems and adopt maneuverable reentry vehicles to enhance accuracy, which indicates that Iran has continued to emphasize the importance of missile accuracy after the war.[10] Khani added that Iran must reduce its missiles’ circular error probable (CEP), which is “the radius of a circle, centered at the intended target, within which 50 percent of the missiles would be expected to impact.”[11]
Senior Iranian officials continue to threaten the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, likely aiming to deter adversaries and raise the cost of further action. Jafari stated that Iran kept some options in reserve and did not need to use them during the Israel-Iran War in response to a question about why Iran did not employ naval forces in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz.[12] Jafari stated that Iran would likely close the Strait of Hormuz if Israel or the United States struck Iran’s infrastructure, like water, electricity, or gas, to pressure civilians.[13] Jafari added that Iran will also employ these capabilities if a future conflict proves harder.
Iran may be able to use ballistic or cruise missiles to strike moving ships in the Straits of Hormuz and Persian Gulf in future rounds of conflict. Jafari claimed that Iran has the capabilities to strike moving ships. The Houthis, who use Iranian technology and have received Iranian training, have managed to hit multiple moving ships. Iranian state media outlet Mehr News previously reported on October 7 that Iran has developed new anti-ship cruise missiles equipped with fully automated guidance systems.[14]
Iran sees the development of new economic corridors as a key element of regional economic competition. Supreme Leader Military Affairs Adviser Major General Seyed Yahya Safavi stated on October 27 that the world is engaged in a new era of competition called the “war of corridors,” determined by railway lines, sea routes, and transit roads.[15] He added that Iran is a key player because of its unique geographical location and due to Sistan and Baluchistan Province’s position at the center of the “war of corridors“ competition. Iran is a member of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), which it seeks to use to strengthen its economic relations with regional states. The INSTC is a trade route that connects India, Iran, Russia, and Central Asia via road, rail, and sea to reduce the transit time and costs between South Asia and Europe.[16] Iran has recently strengthened its economic ties with Pakistan, which borders Sistan and Baluchistan Province. Iran’s Roads and Urban Development Minister Farzaneh Sadegh met with Pakistani Federal Minister for Communications Abdul Aleem Khan, Federal Minister for Railways Hanif Abbasi, and Federal Minister for Commerce Jam Kamal Khan in recent weeks to discuss the establishment of a joint committee to resolve cross-border trade issues and the recent Pakistan-Iran railway agreement.[17] Abbasi proposed expediting the implementation of a Pakistan-Iran rail agreement that was signed in September and announced that the Islamabad-Tehran-Istanbul Train Project will be reviewed in December. Khan emphasized Pakistan’s desire to enhance the bilateral trade volume with Iran to $10 billion, while Sadegh expressed Iran’s interest in increasing maritime cooperation through Chabahar and Gwadar ports.
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-28-2025/
Iran Update, October 29, 2025
Iran is attempting to develop regional economic partnerships to counter increased economic pressure following the Israel-Iran War. Iran has faced mounting US, UN, and EU sanctions following the war, which has driven Iran to seek out alternative partners that can help it subvert these sanctions.[18] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian called for “resilient common frameworks” to build economic cooperation at the fourth Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) meeting in Tehran on October 28.[19] The ECO is a multilateral economic organization that includes Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.[20] Pezeshkian and Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani both called for increasing trade with Pakistan in separate meetings with Pakistani Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi on the sidelines of the ECO meeting.[21] Larijani called for Iran and Pakistan to develop a “sustainable strategic partnership” in his meeting with Naqvi.[22] Iranian and Pakistani officials recently met on October 26 to discuss joint trade routes and infrastructure, including the Islamabad-Tehran-Istanbul railway project and the Chabahar and Gwadar ports.[23] Supreme Leader Military Affairs Adviser Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi emphasized the importance of regional trade routes, including routes that pass through Pakistan, on October 27.[24] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi separately proposed that Iranian provinces engage in direct trade with neighboring states at a conference in North Khorasan Province on October 23.[25] Pezeshkian separately met with Tajikistan Interior Minister Ramadan Rahimzadeh on the sidelines of the ECO meeting and suggested that regional countries should use a “common currency.” This proposal is consistent with Iran’s efforts to reduce its dependence on the US dollar.[26]
Iran also continues to cooperate with regional states to address border security issues, which Iran perceives as a threat to its internal security and regime stability. Pezeshkian called on ECO members to establish a previously proposed regional police force called “ECOPOL” to address regional terrorism, human and drug trafficking, and illegal migration.[27] Pezeshkian also underlined the importance of regional anti-trafficking measures in his meeting with Rahimzadeh and Iran and Pakistan’s joint counterterrorism efforts in his meeting with Naqvi.[28] Iran remains concerned about Sunni militant group Jaish al Adl in Sistan and Baluchistan Province on Iran’s southeastern border with Pakistan. Iranian security forces recently arrested an unspecified number of Jaish al Adl fighters on October 26 for killing 10 local security forces in Gohar Kuh, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, in October 2024.[29]
Iran has begun to clear and repair some military and intelligence sites that Israel struck during the Israel-Iran War. Iran has begun addressing damage at the following sites:
Southwest Tabriz Missile Base, East Azerbaijan Province. This missile base houses several above-ground launch sites, two entrances to underground installations, and several underground launch facilities.[30] The site reportedly stored Shahab-variant missiles.[31] Israeli airstrikes during the war destroyed at least a missile launch control center, one storage tunnel, an air defense battery, and two stationary launchers at the site.[32] Satellite imagery from October 27 shows that Iran has partially rebuilt some of the infrastructure.
Northern Shiraz Missile Base, Fars Province. This missile base manufactured and stored ballistic missiles. Israeli airstrikes on June 15 damaged at least 12 facilities, including ballistic missile launch pads, command buildings, and tunnel entrances, at the site.[33] Satellite imagery from October 27 shows that Iran has cleared debris from several destroyed buildings and partially reconstructed other buildings.
Parchin Military Complex, Tehran Province. The Parchin Complex played a key role in Iran’s pre-2003 nuclear weapons program. Iran has used the site to develop and manufacture explosive materials and advanced munitions, including ballistic missiles.[34] Israel struck the Parchin Complex in October 2024 and during the 12-day war.[35] Satellite imagery from August 28 showed that Iran is rebuilding facilities at the site that housed solid fuel mixers, which are essential for producing solid fuel for ballistic missiles.[36] The Institute for Science and International Security reported on October 20 that Iran is also building unspecified structures at the former Taleghan 2 nuclear research site at Parchin that Israel struck in October 2024.[37] Satellite imagery from October 28 shows that Iran has partially repaired another unspecified building at Parchin that Israel struck and destroyed during the war.
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Ground Forces Seyyed ol Shohada Provincial Unit, Tehran Province. The IDF reported that the Seyyed ol Shohada Provincial Unit is responsible for defending Iranian territory and suppressing internal unrest in Tehran City.[38] Israeli airstrikes on June 23 targeted the unit’s headquarters.[39] Satellite imagery from October 3 shows that Iran has partially repaired one damaged building and demolished another at the site.
Law Enforcement Command (LEC) intelligence facility, Tehran Province. The IDF reported that the LEC intelligence facility is responsible for intelligence collection and surveillance of the Iranian public, especially regime opponents.[40] The LEC serves as Iran’s main internal security and law enforcement agency. Israeli airstrikes on June 23 targeted the LEC intelligence facility and destroyed at least two buildings and damaged another, according to satellite imagery from July 21.[41] Satellite imagery from October 28 shows that Iran has demolished the damaged building and cleared debris from the two destroyed buildings.
maps:
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-29-2025/