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Iran Update, November 3, 2025

Venezuela recently requested military equipment, including drones, from Iran amid heightened tensions between Venezuela and the United States, according to internal US government documents obtained by The Washington Post.[1] It is unclear if Iran is willing and able to export drones and other military equipment to Venezuela after the Israel-Iran War, however. Venezuelan Transport Minister Ramon Celestino Velasquez reportedly “coordinated a shipment of military equipment and drones from Iran” and informed Iran that it requires “passive detection equipment,” GPS jamming devices, and drones with a range of 1,000 kilometers (approximately 600 miles).[2] The Washington Post stated that it is unclear how Iran responded to this request.[3] Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Esmail Baghaei stated on November 3 that Venezuela can defend itself, but that Iran will “certainly” continue to cooperate with Venezuela.[4] Velasquez previously visited Tehran in September 2024 and met with Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh.[5] Nasir Zadeh is responsible for Iranian military equipment sales and purchases. Nasir Zadeh and Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro also signed a memorandum of understanding to increase “trade and mobility” between Iran and Venezuela in Caracas, Venezuela, in November 2024.[6] Iran has outsourced some of its drone production to Venezuela over the past decade, including the production of Mohajer-6 drones, which have a range of 200 kilometers (approximately 124 miles).[7] It is unclear whether Iran would be willing to supply Venezuela with military equipment — despite Iran's historical military cooperation with Venezuela — given that Iran is trying to rebuild its weapons stockpiles following the Israel-Iran War. Iran launched at least 1,000 drones at Israel during the Israel-Iran War, and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) destroyed at least 950 Iranian drones during the war.[8]

Internal political tensions between senior Iranian officials appear to be growing as these officials seek to gain more influence in the regime. An outlet affiliated with Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani characterized Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf in an op-ed on November 1 as a political opportunist who regularly changes his positions on various issues, including engagement with the West, provincial authorities, and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to increase his decision-making power in the regime.[9] Ghalibaf has played a prominent role in Iranian decision-making both during and after the Israel-Iran War. Ghalibaf reportedly took the unprecedented step of assuming a senior military command position during the war.[10] Ghalibaf also played an important role in the establishment of the Defense Council after the war to address key vulnerabilities that Israel exploited during the war.[11] This op-ed comes amid a flurry of political infighting among various Iranian factions in recent weeks. Various Iranian officials, including Ghalibaf, have harshly criticized former Iranian moderate President Hassan Rouhani for allegedly criticizing the Iranian regime's close cooperation with Russia. The political infighting comes amid recent reports that senior Iranian officials have sidelined Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and could represent an effort by various Iranian actors to increase their influence in the regime in the face of Khamenei’s reported marginalization. An X account attributed to Mossad claimed on October 30 that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Political and Security Affairs, Ali Asghar Hejazi, and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Mohammad Pakpour have sidelined Khamenei and are “making decisions independently.”[12] CTP-ISW cannot independently verify this claim.

ranian military commanders have conducted a series of inspections of Artesh and IRGC units across Iran in recent days to assess and evaluate the combat capabilities and readiness of these units.

Armed Forces General Staff Deputy Chief Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi has inspected the following sites since October 31:

Artesh Air Force 6th Tactical Airbase: Vahidi inspected the Artesh Air Force 6th Tactical Airbase in Bushehr Province on October 31.[16] The IDF struck this airbase during the Israel–Iran War.[17] Israeli Army Radio reported that Iran was storing ballistic missiles at the airbase.
IRGC Navy 2nd Nouh-e Nabi Region: Vahidi inspected the IRGC Navy 2nd Nouh-e Nabi Region in Bushehr Province on November 1.[18]
IRGC Commander Major General Mohammad Pakpour has inspected the following sites since November 1:

IRGC Ground Forces Ashoura Operational Base: Pakpour inspected the IRGC Ground Forces Ashoura Operational Base in northwestern Iran on November 1. The Operational Base oversees IRGC Ground Forces units in Zanjan, Ardabil, and East Azerbaijan provinces.
IRGC Ground Forces Provincial Units: Pakpour met with Ashoura Provincial Unit personnel in East Azerbaijan Province on November 1. The Ashoura Unit is located near the Southwest Tabriz Missile Base.[19] Israeli airstrikes during the war destroyed a missile launch control center, one storage tunnel, an air defense battery, and two stationary launchers at the site.[20] Pakpour also visited the IRGC Ground Forces Karbala and Quds provincial units, which are based in Mazandaran Province and Gilan Province, respectively.[21]
Imam Zaman Mechanized Brigade: Pakpour inspected the IRGC Ground Forces Imam Zaman Mechanized Brigade in Shabestar, East Azerbaijan Province, on November 1.[22] The brigade operates along Iran's northwestern border and conducts armored and mechanized operations.[23] The brigade previously deployed fighters to Syria to defend the Assad regime.[24]
IRGC Ground Forces Sejjil Drone Units: Pakpour inspected the IRGC Ground Forces Sejjil Drone Units during a drone exercise in an unspecified location in northwestern Iran on November 2.[25]
IRGC Navy Commander Brigadier General Alireza Tangsiri inspected the following sites:

Abu Musa and Siri islands: Tangsiri inspected IRGC naval forces stationed on Abu Musa and Siri islands in the Persian Gulf on November 2.[26] Siri and Abu Musa are two of the four Nazeat Islands, along with Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb, which serve as key positions for controlling maritime access to the Persian Gulf.[27] Iranian military commanders have recently increased their inspections of naval units in the Persian Gulf since September 2025.[28]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-3-2025/

Iran Update, November 4, 2025

Iran is reportedly attempting to force its large proxy and partner militias in Iraq to move into politics, possibly to discourage US sanctions enforcement that would prevent Iran from using the Iraqi economy to evade sanctions.[1] UK-based Amwaj Media reported on November 3 that Iran has encouraged unspecified Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to shift their focus from armed resistance to political engagement, citing Iraqi political insiders.[2] A source in the Iraqi Prime Minister’s office told Amwaj that the Iraqi federal government has similarly encouraged Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to prioritize their political activities.[3] Iran reportedly wants “fresh [Iraqi] faces acceptable to the Iraqi public” to lead this political engagement.[4] An Iranian-backed Iraqi militia source added that Iran would consider funding and politically supporting smaller Iraqi militias that are not affiliated with the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), which would place these militias fully outside state structures and control.[5] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service primarily comprised of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, many of which report to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister.[6] The PMF militias linked or loyal to Iran have frequently targeted US forces and assets, including when a likely Kataib Hezbollah cell killed three US servicemembers in Jordan in a drone attack in January 2024.[7] The United States has sanctioned the Iraqi government and commercial entities and threatened to sanction unidentified PMF leaders.[8] The Iraqi economy is a crucial lifeline for Iran as it attempts to mitigate new US sanctions, and attacks by Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that are officially part of the Iraqi government could imperil that.

Iran may decide to build a loyal cadre of ideological militias, over which Iran has strong control, that will supplement pro-Iranian political parties in parliament while avoiding sanctions on Iraq. Iran has previously established splinter groups or front groups to ensure militia loyalty to Iran or to obfuscate the involvement of larger militias in military activity against the United States.[9] Front groups acted as fronts for larger militias, while splinters officially split from their previous organization. Iran helped split Kataib Hezbollah and Asaib Ahl al Haq from Moqtada al Sadr’s Jaysh al Mahdi (JaM) after 2006, as JaM became less responsive to Iranian control, for example.[10] Some legacy Iranian-backed groups in Iraq, like Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, have notably struggled to control some elements of their forces that have appeared to conduct unsanctioned attacks against US forces, Israel, and some Iraqi assets.[11] Overzealous and uncontrollable activity is negative for Iran because the risk for escalation that triggers sanctions or other negative effects on the Iraqi economy would badly weaken Iranian sanction evasion efforts. Prominent Iranian-backed Iraqi militias heavily relied on front groups to conduct attacks from 2020 to 2021, likely to avoid US strikes in retaliation for militia escalation against US forces after the US strike that killed Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force commander Major General Qassem Soleimani in 2020.[12] Iran and its partners in Iraq have not used front groups in a systematic way since 2021. Front groups could be much more controllable from Tehran than poorly disciplined forces like Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba and would allow powerful groups like the Badr Organization to support Iranian sanctions evasion efforts without drawing US attention.

Most militias will likely resist Iran’s proposals because their military wings are both their raison d’être and a tool to enforce their will on other Iraqis. The militia-affiliated Iraqi source told Amwaj that unspecified militias are not supportive of Iran’s suggestions, as further integration into the Iraqi state is viewed as a threat to the militias’ identities as resistance organizations.[13] Asaib Ahl al Haq attempted to assassinate then-Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al Kadhimi in Fall 2021 to force the formation of a government including Iranian-backed militias, for example, and Kataib Hezbollah assassinated Iraqi researcher Hashem al Hashimi in July 2020 for his investigations into Kataib Hezbollah’s structure and behavior.[14] These militias also see “resistance” against Israel and the United States as their raison d’être, and some have already been resistant to disarmament.[15]

A smaller group of militias—possibly including the Badr Organization—may acquiesce to Iranian demands and integrate their militias into the PMF while focusing on politics. This would not indicate that Badr has moderated, but instead that it seeks to position itself as a preeminent pro-Iranian political force in Iraq. This move would also be an expression of Badr’s deep commitment to the Iranian project in Iraq. Badr has already supported militia integration into the PMF and militia disarmament, probably because it controls most of the PMF’s support structures and a large number of its brigades.[16] This means that even if the PMF answered more reliably to the prime minister, Badr would still exercise extreme sway within the organization and could manipulate the PMF to accomplish Badr’s objectives in Iraq. Badr also controls and influences the Transport Ministry and many private and public enterprises in Iraq, which it could continue to use to help Iran exploit sanctions.[17] Iran could also feasibly use Badr’s influence in the PMF and other ministries to sideline and suppress militias that refused Iran’s proposals to integrate into politics.

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-4-2025/