Iran Update, October 8, 2025
Iranian officials have threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz, likely to try to discourage the United States from enforcing sanctions that target Iranian oil exports. An Iranian parliamentarian warned on October 4 that Iran would close the Strait of Hormuz if the United States or its allies prevent Iranian oil exports.[1] The head of the Iranian Armed Forces Judicial Organization similarly warned on October 5 that Iran would not allow a US presence in the Persian Gulf to threaten Iran’s economic or military security.[2] US President Donald Trump reinstated his maximum pressure campaign against Iran in February 2025 to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon and curb its influence abroad.[3] Trump’s maximum pressure campaign seeks to drive Iranian oil exports “to zero.”[4] The United States previously seized Iranian oil tankers and weapons shipments between May 2018 and January 2021 as part of the first Trump administration’s maximum pressure campaign.[5] Reuters reported in March 2025 that the United States was considering a plan for the United States and its allies to halt and inspect Iranian oil tankers at sea.[6] Iran previously attempted to close the strait in 2019 in response to the US maximum pressure campaign by sabotaging Emirati tankers, seizing British ships, and launching cruise missiles at Saudi oil facilities.[7] Iranian officials’ threats to close the Strait of Hormuz come as Iranian military commanders have recently increased inspections of naval units in the Persian Gulf, including naval units deployed at the Nazeat Islands.[8] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) deployed naval mines, ballistic and anti-ship cruise missiles, and fast attack craft to these islands in May 2025.[9] Iranian state-controlled outlet Mehr News detailed Iran’s anti-ship missile capabilities on October 7 and highlighted Iran’s development of new cruise missiles that reportedly have fully automated guidance systems.[10] These capabilities could support a potential Iranian effort to close the Strait of Hormuz.
The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) arrested several unidentified individuals in Anbar and Dhi Qar Provinces on October 2 and 8 for suspected Baath Party ties in what appear to be instances of sectarian targeting.[11] The PMF Intelligence and Information Department launched a campaign on October 2 to pursue Baath Party remnants.[12] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes several Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, some of which report to Iran instead of the Iraqi Prime Minister.[13] The 27th PMF Brigade, which the Iranian-backed Badr Organization controls, arrested a man in Karma District, Anbar Province, on October 2 for promoting Baath Party ideology.[14] PMF intelligence units separately arrested several alleged “senior” Baath Party members in Nasiriyah, Dhi Qar Province, on October 8.[15] Prominent Iraqi Shia politicians have commonly conflated Sunnism with membership in the Sunni-dominated Baathist government under Saddam Hussein and have abused de-Baathification measures to target Sunnis.[16]
It is unclear if these arrests are related to the upcoming November 2025 parliamentary elections, but the arrests come as multiple Iranian-backed Iraqi actors have sought to disqualify alleged Baath Party remnants ahead of the elections.[17] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iraqi Shia politicians are likely attempting to sideline Sunni political opposition ahead of the November 2025 elections by accusing their opponents of having Baathist ties.[18] Iraqi law prohibits Baath Party members from participating in political activities, including competing in elections.[19] Iraqi Shia political parties have weaponized this law and other de-Baathification mechanisms to target Sunnis, particularly Sunni political opposition.[20]
Iranian, Azerbaijani, Russian, and Kazakh naval commanders signed a strategic cooperation agreement in Russia on October 8 in response to concerns about external influence in the region.[21] The agreement stipulates that “no foreign country or extra-regional power” shall intervene in Caspian Sea affairs. Turkmenistan, which also borders the Caspian Sea, did not sign the document. Iranian leaders have raised concerns about extra-regional influence in the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea in response to discussions about the construction of the Zangezur Corridor.[22] The Zangezur Corridor is a Turkish and Azerbaijani-proposed transit route that would grant Turkey access to the Caspian Sea.[23]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-8-2025/
Iran Update, October 9, 2025
Hamas and Israel agreed on October 8 to the first phase of US President Donald Trump’s plan for peace in the Gaza Strip.[1] The first phase will not be implemented until the Israeli cabinet approves it.[2] The first phase stipulates that Israeli forces will immediately cease military operations in the Gaza Strip and withdraw to an agreed-upon line within 24 hours after the cabinet approves the plan.[3] Israeli forces will retain control of approximately 53 percent of the Gaza Strip during the first phase.[4] Hamas will release all 20 living hostages within 72 hours after Israel completes its withdrawal.[5] Hamas will also release all deceased hostages, and Israel will release 2,000 Palestinian prisoners within an unspecified timeframe. At least 400 truckloads of humanitarian aid will enter the Gaza Strip each day during the first phase.[6] Both Israel and Hamas have reportedly begun initial preparations to implement the ceasefire agreement. Israeli Army Radio reported that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has halted offensive operations in the Gaza Strip and begun preparing to withdraw its forces.[7] Hamas has reportedly started to transfer hostages to locations where medical care is available in preparation for their release.[8] The Israeli government has convened to vote on the agreement, but has not made an official decision at the time of this writing. Israeli media reported that the Israeli cabinet is expected to approve the deal.[9]
The Hamas-Israel ceasefire in the Gaza Strip is a framework ceasefire agreement and not a comprehensive agreement to end the war. Hamas and Israel ended negotiations on Trump’s plan after both parties agreed to the first phase, and will not resume negotiations on outstanding issues until the first phase is implemented.[10] Hamas and Israeli officials have not discussed key outstanding aspects of the US plan, including governance over the Gaza Strip and Hamas’ disarmament.[11] Western and Arab officials met in Paris on October 9 to discuss these issues.[12] Hamas and Israeli officials did not participate in the talks in Paris.
It remains unclear if the Hamas-Israel ceasefire will impact how Hamas’ partners in the Axis of Resistance engage with Israel. The Houthis have justified their missile and drone campaign against Israel and international shipping as a response to Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip.[13] Houthi Political Bureau member Mohammad al Bukhaiti stated on October 6 that international mediators should not focus on disarming Hamas “because our weapon is Hamas’ weapon, and our theater of operations is Hamas’ theater of operations,” which suggests that the Houthis will continue to support Hamas even if Hamas is disarmed.[14] The Houthis have continued to attack Israel since Hamas agreed to the ceasefire on October 3.[15] It is unclear if the Houthis would halt such attacks if the Hamas-Israel ceasefire holds. The Houthis would retain the ability to resume attacks against Israel or international shipping at any time and for any reason in the future, even if they suspended attacks due to a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.
Iranian news outlet Nour News highlighted the economic consequences of the Israel-Iran War in the second episode of its “Pathway” series, which aims to present perspectives on how Iran can navigate post-war challenges.[16] Nour News is affiliated with Ali Shamkhani, who is one of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s advisers to the Defense Council. Iranian economist Hamid Reza Fartouk Zadeh told Nour News on October 8 that sustained “external pressure” pushes Iranians to convert their savings into gold and foreign currency to preserve “purchasing power.”[17] Fartouk Zadeh added that this “outflow of capital” reduces demand for domestic goods, such as furniture, clothing, and leather, and weakens industries that produce these goods. Fartouk Zadeh argued that Iran must restructure small, labor-intensive industries and focus on non-oil exports to regional countries to counter these “destructive” trends.[18] Fartouk Zadeh’s remarks are consistent with the regime’s long-standing effort to diversify exports in response to international sanctions on oil sales.[19]
The United States sanctioned over 90 individuals, entities, and vessels on October 9 for facilitating the illicit trade of Iranian oil and gas. The sanctions are part of US President Donald Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign against Iranian energy exports.[20] The US Treasury Department designated three individuals, 28 entities, and 23 vessels, including a Chinese “teapot” oil refinery in Shandong Province, People’s Republic of China (PRC).[21] The US State Department concurrently sanctioned seven individuals, 10 vessels, and 21 entities, including a Chinese petrochemical terminal operator in Jiangyin, the PRC.[22] Approximately 90 percent of Iranian oil exports go to the PRC.[23]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-9-2025/