Iran Update, October 2, 2025
Former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy Commander Hossein Alaei emphasized the role that Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities and national unity played in its “success” during the Israel-Iran War in June 2025.[1] Alaei claimed that Iran demonstrated the strength of its ballistic missiles and national unity during the war in an interview with Nour News on October 1.[2] Alaei claimed that Iran‘s demonstration of these strengths caused the United States and Israel to call for a ceasefire.[3] Alaei also claimed that Iranian missiles became more precise throughout the war and that no segment of the Iranian population chose to side with Israel in support of internal division.[4] Alaei’s reflections almost certainly reflect only some segments of the regime’s national security community, and CTP-ISW cannot determine whether Alaei’s statements are reflective of a broader trend in Iranian strategic thought or if it is isolated to only a small number of thinkers.
Alaei’s statements regarding Iran‘s ballistic missiles and national unity suggest that some elements of the regime’s national security community believe that the regime has enough domestic support to engage in a prolonged conflict with Israel and could inflict more damage through continued missile strikes.[5] These reflections indicate that some Iranian officials believe that at least some elements of its previous efforts to deter and defend against Israeli strikes could be successful in the future, presumably with some modifications. Israel accomplished its campaign objectives—the degradation of Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs—in the Israel-Iran War, but it needed to end the war rapidly and at a moment of its own choosing.[6] Israel forced Iran to rapidly end the war by creating the perception of a credible existential threat to the Iranian regime.[7] Israel struck Iranian institutions and other assets used by the Iranian regime to ensure regime stability.[8] A series of strikes against these institutions and assets that the Israelis design to demonstrate a credible threat to the regime’s stability could be expanded or contracted depending on how the regime responds and Israel’s desire for a ceasefire. Israel calculated that the Iranian regime’s overwhelming interest in ensuring regime survival would compel it to agree to a ceasefire. Alaei appears to be implying that the war illustrated that, in the future, Iranian missiles could be more successful if Israeli interceptor stockpiles are depleted. Alaei also suggests that national unity would have sustained a longer war, but it is unclear if expanded Israeli strikes would change Iranian calculations about regime stability.
Alaei’s assumptions that the ballistic missile attack campaign and national unity were part of Iran’s “success” seem to disregard the reality that Israeli operations did not intend to collapse the regime or even seriously threaten it. Israel only aimed to demonstrate its military capability to destroy Iran’s ability to control its population. Israel retains that capability, and as noted above, could decide to expand or contract its military campaign against regime targets and threaten regime stability as it deems necessary to accomplish its objectives.
Alaei also emphasized that Iran can strike the United States and Israel due to its geographic position in the Persian Gulf.[9] Alaei described Iran’s location in the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman as the security and military “center of gravity of the region.” Alaei’s statement may be attempting to highlight the potential threat that Iran could pose to US forces and allied partners.[10] The IRGC Navy has historically harassed commercial and military vessels in the Persian Gulf to signal its ability to disrupt maritime traffic and pressure the United States and its partners.[11]
Notably, Nour News chose to interview Alaei as the first guest in its new “Pathway” series, given that Alaei has historically criticized the regime and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Nour News is affiliated with the Iranian Supreme Leader Adviser to the Defense Council, Ali Shamkhani. Alaei served as the first IRGC Navy Commander from 1985 to 1990 and later as IRGC chief of staff from 1997 to 1999.[12] Shamkhani similarly served as the IRGC Navy Commander from 1990 to 1997 and then as Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister from 1997 and 2005.[13] Shamkhani would have probably coordinated with Alaei in both roles. Alaei has repeatedly challenged the regime’s policies, including in his 2009 letter about the regime’s prison abuses, a 2011 editorial that indirectly criticized Khamenei, and his opposition to Iran’s support for former Syrian President Bashar al Assad.[14] Alaei also publicly sympathized with anti-regime protesters in 2020 and suggested abolishing Iran’s morality patrol.[15] Alaei’s criticism of the regime was underscored in his interview with Nour News. Alaei noted that both Iranian reformists and hardliners had managed the nuclear file but emphasized that all negotiations occurred under the Supreme Leader’s supervision, placing ultimate responsibility on Khamenei.[16] Alaei dismissed Iran’s foreign policy as no better than “acceptable” on the nuclear issue, which implicitly faulted Khamenei for the failure to achieve a resolution.[17]
Iran is attempting to improve and fix vulnerabilities in its air defense systems that Israel exploited during the Israel-Iran War. An Iranian Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS)-controlled outlet reported on October 1 that the Iranian army has replaced and strengthened its air defense systems and short-range air defenses to counter drones.[18] It is unclear what type of short-range systems the Iranians have strengthened or whether these systems include electronic warfare systems. The outlet also claimed that Iran is attempting to acquire HQ-9 long-range surface-to-air missile (SAMs) batteries to counter Israeli F-35 fighter jets. Iranian Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Commission head Abolfazl Zohrevand previously claimed in September 2025 that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) would supply Iran with HQ-9 SAMs.[19] CTP-ISW has observed no evidence that the PRC delivered these systems. It is unlikely that an HQ-9 SAM could shoot down an F-35 fighter jet, however.[20] Israel destroyed the target engagement radars of four Russian S-300s, which bear technical similarities to Chinese HQ-9 SAMs, in Iran in April and October 2024.[21] The IRGC Ground Forces also conducted an air defense drill in its eastern air defense zone south of Mashhad, Khorasan Razavi Province, on October 2 to bolster its air defenses.[22] Iran conducted a similar exercise in northwestern Iran on September 24.[23]
Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh met with Turkish Defense Minister General Yasar Guler in Ankara on October 1.[34] Nasir Zadeh and Guler discussed bilateral cooperation and unspecified regional security issues. Guler emphasized Turkey’s readiness to work with Iran to enhance regional stability and border security. Nasir Zadeh invited Guler to Tehran to follow up on the agreements that they reached. Nasir Zadeh noted that developing and strengthening defense relations with neighboring countries is one of Iran’s priorities.
Turkey sanctioned and froze the assets of 18 Iranian entities and 20 Iranian individuals on October 1 for supporting Iran’s nuclear program.[35] The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Bank Sepah, and Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center are among the sanctioned entities.[36] The sanctions come after the United Nations Security Council reimposed snapback sanctions on Iran on September 27.[37]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-2-2025/
Iran Update, October 3, 2025
A Syrian militia sympathetic to the Iranian-led Axis of Resistance claimed an attack on a US base in northeastern Syria on October 2.[1] This attack marks the first time that the militia has claimed to attack US forces. The Syrian Popular Resistance announced that it and “allied forces” targeted US forces with unspecified weapons south of Hasakah City.[2] Syrian social media accounts posted videos purporting to show US air defense systems activating over al Shaddadi Base, Hasakah Province, on October 2.[3] The United States has not confirmed the attack at the time of this writing, and CTP-ISW is unable to independently verify the group’s claim.
The Syrian Popular Resistance previously limited its attacks to entities associated with the Syrian transitional government and had not targeted US forces, despite its opposition to the US force presence in Syria.[4] Unspecified US officials told US-based al Monitor on October 2 that the United States has paused its planned reduction of forces in Syria due to concerns about the Syrian transitional government’s stability.[5] The Syrian Popular Resistance warned in August 2025 that it would expand its target bank and operational reach because of its opposition to the United States, Israel, and the Syrian transitional government.[6] The Syrian Popular Resistance formed immediately after the fall of Assad in December 2024 to oppose the Syrian transitional government.[7] The group’s last claimed attack was in March 2025, when it claimed to poison the meals and water of Syrian government soldiers using a “biological weapon.”[8] The Syrian Popular Resistance has venerated former Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah and former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani on its channel in addition to its regular pro-Assad content, suggesting that the group is ideologically aligned with the Axis of Resistance.[9] The Syrian Popular Resistance celebrated Iran’s attack on US forces in Qatar during the Israel-Iran War in June 2025, further underscoring the group’s ideological alignment with Iran.[10]
Iranian Artesh Navy Commander Rear Admiral Shahram Irani inspected the combat and operational readiness of units deployed on Kharg Island in the Persian Gulf on October 2.[11] Irani emphasized the critical position of Kharg Island in Iran’s maritime domain and added that the Artesh Navy plays an important role in ensuring the security of the Persian Gulf and open waters. Iran exports around 90 percent of its crude oil from Kharg Island.[12]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-3-2025/