Iran Update, October 6, 2025
Hamas agreed to a ceasefire with Israel on October 3 but called for negotiating other aspects of US President Donald Trump’s plan for peace in the Gaza Strip. Trump proposed a 20-point plan to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on September 29 that laid out a broad vision for the end of the Israel-Hamas War and the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip.[1] Trump warned that Hamas would face “all hell” if it did not agree to his peace plan by October 5.[2] Hamas leaders agreed on October 3 to release all living and deceased Israeli hostages as part of the ceasefire and expressed openness to engaging in negotiations on other elements of Trump’s plan.[3] Hamas endorsed one point of Trump’s plan that calls for a Palestinian body of independent technocrats to govern the Gaza Strip, but did not explicitly agree that an international transitional body chaired by Trump should have oversight and supervision over the Palestinian technocratic body.[4] Hamas’ statement also did not acknowledge that Trump’s plan requires Hamas and other Palestinian factions to disarm.[5] US, Israeli, and Hamas negotiators held indirect negotiations on the ceasefire plan in Egypt on October 6.[6] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has continued offensive operations and airstrikes in the Gaza Strip, but halted its major offensive into Gaza City due to the ceasefire agreement.[7] Hamas and other Palestinian factions have continued to target Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip since Hamas agreed to the proposal on October 3.[8]
Elements of Trump’s plan require Hamas to concede on many of its long-held ceasefire demands, which raises questions about the viability of a long-term ceasefire agreement. Hamas and Israel last observed a ceasefire between January and March 2025. The ceasefire ended after Israel accused Hamas of delaying the release of hostages and failing to negotiate on next steps to end the war.[9] Hamas has consistently demanded a full Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and a “permanent ceasefire,” but Trump’s plan only requires the IDF to fully withdraw after a set of undefined ”standards, milestones, and timeframes linked to demilitarization” are met in the opinion of the IDF, the United States, and additional guarantors.[10] Hamas previously demanded a “permanent” ceasefire in exchange for releasing Israeli hostages due to skepticism that the IDF would resume hostilities once Israel received the hostages.[11] Hamas has seemingly conceded on this demand by agreeing to release all living and deceased Israeli hostages before receiving a guarantee of a full IDF withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. Hamas has also not yet addressed US and Israeli demands that it disarm and disband under Trump’s plan. Netanyahu remains adamant that Hamas will be disarmed either through diplomatic means with Trump’s plan or through IDF military action if the plan fails.[12] Hamas would receive some elements of its long-held demands, namely aid, reconstruction, and the release of prisoners held in Israel, under the proposal.[13]
It is unclear if an end to the war in the Gaza Strip would impact how Hamas’ partners in the Axis of Resistance engage with Israel. Both Iran and Hezbollah supported Hamas’ agreement to the ceasefire and implicit rejection of the full US plan.[14] Iran and Hezbollah’s endorsement of Hamas’ objection to the later stages of Trump’s plan surrounding the political administration of the Gaza Strip suggests that both support Hamas continuing the war. The Houthis have justified their missile and drone campaign against Israel and international shipping as a response to Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip.[15] It is unclear if the Houthis would halt these campaigns in response to a lasting Israel-Hamas ceasefire. The Houthis have continued to attack Israel since Hamas agreed to the ceasefire with Israel on October 3.[16] Houthi Political Bureau member Mohammad al Bukhaiti said on October 6 that international mediators should not focus on disarming Hamas “because our weapon is Hamas’ weapon, and our theater of operations is Hamas’ theater of operations,” suggesting that the Houthis will continue to support Hamas even if the group is disarmed.[17]
Iran and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have used barter systems that avoid monetary transactions on the international market to circumvent US sanctions on Iran since at least 2018, according to two US media reports published on October 5.[42] PRC companies began exporting motor vehicles to Iran in exchange for Iranian metals, including copper and zinc, around 2018 after US President Donald Trump launched his “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran, according to individuals with knowledge of the trade speaking to Bloomberg.[43] Hong Kong-registered PRC front companies have also recently paid PRC contractors to build infrastructure in Iran in exchange for Iranian crude oil exports to the PRC, according to current and former Western officials speaking to the Wall Street Journal.[44] Some of the officials stated that the PRC transmitted $8.4 billion in oil payments via this barter arrangement to finance PRC contracted infrastructure projects in Iran in 2024.[45] Iran and the PRC previously conducted negotiations in 2023 over a similar barter agreement in which Iran would provide the PRC with crude oil in exchange for the PRC’s assistance in constructing the Tehran-North freeway, which connects Tehran to the Caspian Sea.[46] It is unclear whether Iran and the PRC signed the agreement in 2023. These transactions do not require Chinese or Iranian companies to trade on the international market using the US dollar and are not subject to US sanctions, according to the Wall Street Journal and Bloomberg reports.[47] The PRC does not acknowledge the United States’ unilateral sanctions and subsequent secondary sanctions on Iran, claiming that PRC-Iran trade complies with international law.[48]
Iran appears to be prioritizing strengthening its air power by purchasing foreign fighter jets to address weaknesses that Israel exploited during the Israel-Iran War. Iran allegedly agreed to buy 48 Su-35 fighter jets from Russia with electronic warfare components and avionic enhancements, according to documents from Russian military conglomerate Rostec that were leaked by the Ukrainian hacker group “Black Mirror.”[49] CTP-ISW cannot independently verify the authenticity of the leaked documents. Iran would allegedly receive the first shipment of Su-35s as early as 2026, although Iran has previously experienced difficulties acquiring Russian military systems given Russia’s constraints and preoccupation with its war in Ukraine.[50] Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf advocated on September 24 for Iran to enhance its air power through the purchase of fighter jets.[51] The supposed Iran-Russia deal also comes amid reports that Iran may have acquired MiG-29 fighter jets from Russia.[52] Iranian Armed Forces General Staff-controlled Defa Press previously expressed support for the purchase of Chinese J-10 fighter jets in June 2025.[53] Iran has sought advanced fighter jets from its partners because Israel achieved air superiority in Iran within the first few days of the Israel-Iran War, which helped Israel to achieve its objectives of degrading the Iranian nuclear and ballistic missile programs.[54]
Iranian military commanders have recently increased inspections of naval units in the Persian Gulf. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Mohammad Pak Pour inspected the combat and operational readiness of Iranian naval units deployed on the Nazeat Islands in the Persian Gulf on October 5.[63] The Nazeat Islands, which include the Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, Abu Musa, and Siri islands, are key positions for Iran’s ability to control maritime access to the Persian Gulf.[64] Pak Pour’s visit comes after other Iranian military commanders, including Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi and Artesh Navy Commander Rear Admiral Shahram Irani, conducted inspections of southern Iranian naval units in recent weeks.[65] Former IRGC Navy Commander Hossein Alaei separately stated on October 1 that Iran has the ability to strike the United States and Israel due to its geographic position near the Persian Gulf.[66] Alaei described Iran’s location near the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman as the security and military “center of gravity of the region.”[67]
Iranian Artesh Navy Commander Rear Admiral Shahram Irani visited Russia on October 6 to attend a meeting for Caspian littoral state navy commanders.[68] Irani met with Iranian Ambassador to Russia Kazem Jalali and Russian Navy Deputy Commander Vladimir Zemtsov in Saint Petersburg. Irani emphasized that Iran’s cooperation with Caspian littoral states aims not only to safeguard security but also to bolster economic growth and address shared environmental concerns.[69] Irani is expected to meet with the Azerbaijani and Kazakh navy commanders during his visit to Russia.[70]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-6-2025/
Iran Update, October 7, 2025
Iran is pursuing alternative mechanisms, which may include barter systems, to mitigate the impact of snapback sanctions. Iranian Government Spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani stated on October 7 that the Iranian government aims to counter snapback sanctions by deepening ties with neighboring countries and international blocs such as the Eurasian Economic Union, BRICS, and Shanghai Cooperation Organization.[1] Mohajerani added that the Iranian government will also use barter mechanisms to sustain trade.[2] An Iranian trade official similarly stated on October 7 that the Iranian government is preparing alternative ”mechanisms“ to reduce the impact of snapback sanctions on Iran’s trade agreements.[3] The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) reimposed snapback sanctions on Iran on September 27, and the European Union (EU) reimposed sanctions on Iran on September 29.[4]
These alternative mechanisms may include barter systems that bypass sanctions. US media previously reported on October 5 that Iran and China have used barter systems that bypass dollar transactions to evade US sanctions since at least 2018, including via the exchange of Iranian oil and metals for Chinese goods and infrastructure projects.[5] Unspecified officials told the Wall Street Journal on October 5 that China funded infrastructure projects in Iran in 2024 in exchange for 8.4 billion US dollars of Iranian oil.[6]
Iran’s moves to mitigate sanctions are probably driven by concerns that sanctions on the Iranian economy will trigger an economic downturn. The World Bank forecasted in its October report that Iran will face an economic downturn over the next two years.[7] The World Bank stated that the Iranian economy will shrink by 1.7 percent in 2025 and 2.8 percent in 2026, which is a change from the World Bank’s April 2025 forecast of 0.7 percent growth in 2026.[8] The World Bank attributed this decline to reduced oil exports and non-oil economic activity due to the reimposition of UNSC sanctions and economic disruptions that followed the Israel-Iran War. The World Bank’s assessment comes amid the reimposition of sanctions on Iran and after several countries, including Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and Turkey, stated that they would abide by UNSC measures.[9]
The Hamas-Israel ceasefire in the Gaza Strip is a framework ceasefire agreement and not a comprehensive agreement to end the war. Hamas and Israel continued to hold indirect negotiations on US President Donald Trump’s ceasefire plan in Egypt on October 7, which demonstrates that both sides view the plan as a starting point or framework for further negotiations rather than a comprehensive agreement to end the war.[10] Hamas leaders agreed on October 3 to release all living and deceased Israeli hostages during the ceasefire and expressed openness to negotiate on other elements of the US plan.[11] Hamas and Israeli officials first held talks on October 6 to discuss the roadmap for future negotiations and ceasefire mechanisms.[12] The officials discussed an Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and a timetable for a hostage exchange during talks on October 7.[13] Hamas and Israeli officials have not discussed other key aspects of the US plan for peace in the Gaza Strip, such as governance over the Gaza Strip and Hamas’ disarmament.[14] Israeli and Hamas officials are expected to continue negotiations for several days, with US officials joining the talks on October 8.[15]
Anti-regime fighters killed two Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) security personnel and wounded three others in an attack on an IRGC operational base near Iraqi Kurdistan on October 6.[45] Kurdish anti-regime armed groups may be responsible for the attack due to the location and demographics of the area. Iranian and Iraqi officials agreed in March 2023 that Iraqi authorities would disarm and relocate members of Kurdish opposition groups away from the Iran-Iraq border to address Iranian concerns about the groups’ activities.[46] The Iranian regime has historically accused Israel of using Iraqi Kurdistan and Kurdish opposition groups to conduct operations against Iran.[47]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-7-2025/