Iranian Regime tv Channel One hacked while it was airing Khamenie speech

Iranian Regime national tv Channel One hacked about an hour ago. During a broadcast of Khamenie speech, a red crosshair appeared over his face and chanting of Women. Life. Freedom. There was writing to the side saying "Rise up. Join us". Also 4 photos at the bottom of the screen of young people killed and additional writing: "The blood of our youth is dropping from your paws".

Also, there was a huge banner in the middle of Tehran highway today that read: We are no longer afraid of you. We will fight.

Also, attempted attack on IRI ambassador in Denmark. Her bodyguard was stabbed. Diplomatic Security intervened before the attacker could stab the ambassador.

Iran Update, May 2, 2025

Persistent energy shortages have fueled public frustration and strained the Iranian economy, which may pose a growing threat to regime stability. Power outages have increased in Iran in recent days due to the energy crisis in Iran. Traders at the Tehran Province iron market went on strike on May 5, alongside other small protests across Iran in recent days over the repeated power outages.[19] The Iranian Interior Ministry ordered all provincial governors on May 7 to open all government offices, banks, and municipal offices nationwide from 6 am to 1 pm starting May 10 to reduce electricity consumption.[20] The ministry also announced that Thursdays will be an official holiday across all provinces until September 22 to further ease strain on the energy grid. The Iranian Management of Electric Power Generation and Transmission Organization (Tavanir) cut electricity to approximately 700 banks in Tehran Province for exceeding consumption limits and warned that high-usage customers who ignore warning messages will face additional power cuts.[21] It remains unclear how the regime will address the worsening shortages and the mounting economic losses caused by outages and the subsequent business closures. Iranian officials stated that electricity shortages have caused around 20 billion US dollars in losses to Iranian industries nationwide.[22] New blackouts also could trigger protests. Natural gas cuts in January 2023 sparked demonstrations in northeastern Iran, and nationwide blackouts during the June 2021 heatwave fueled widespread public unrest.[23] Small protests and strikes over the energy crisis in Iran could escalate into anti-regime protests, similar to how demonstrations against increasing gas prices morphed into anti-regime protests in 2017 and 2018.[24]

The Iranian rial depreciated from 825,500 rials to one US dollar on May 6 to 828,500 rials to one US dollar on May 7.[25]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-7-2025

Iran Update, May 8, 2025

Senior Iranian military officials inspected a military facility in southern Iran, likely as part of preparations for a potential US or Israeli strike on Iran. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Hossein Salami and IRGC Navy Commander Rear Admiral Ali Reza Tangsiri inspected an underground drone hangar in Hormozgan Province on May 8.[45] Salami threatened to attack any country that supports an attack on Iran. Footage of the base during the visit showed Iranian Mohajer-6 and Ababil-5 drones. Mohajer-6 and Ababil-5 drones have a range of 200 and 480 km, respectively.[46] The precise location of the facility is unclear, but the inspection of a base hosting drones that has the range to target most of the Persian Gulf from the southern Iranian coast suggests that Iranian officers were inspecting units and reviewing plans for post-strike responses in the Persian Gulf region. Hormozgan Province lies along Iran‘s southern coast. The visit follows a series of similar inspections at Iranian military and defense sites in Hormozgan and the surrounding provinces.[47] Senior military officers often visit units and facilities under their command as part of their preparations for major defensive and offensive operations to ensure that their commands are well-prepared. IRGC-affiliated media also published old footage on May 8 that showed an Iranian Mohajer-6 drone surveilling the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower aircraft carrier.[48] Artesh Air Force Commander Brigadier General Hamid Vahedi separately claimed on May 8 that Iran equipped all of its fighter jets with long-range munitions and updated navigation systems.[49] Most Iranian fighter jets are Cold War third- and fourth-generation aircraft like the F4 Phantom and F14 Tomcat. These threats follow new US threats to attack Iran. US President Donald Trump stated on May 7 that he wants to “blow up” Iran’s nuclear centrifuges either “nicely” through an agreement with Iran or “viciously.”[50]

An attempted Iranian attack on the Israeli embassy in London highlights the unconventional ways through which Iran has and will likely continue to attempt to impose costs on Israel. UK authorities arrested eight Iranian nationals on May 4 after foiling a suspected Iranian-directed terror plot to target the Israeli Embassy in London.[51] The Guardian reported on May 8 that the UK police conducted its largest raid across the country due to threats of a suspected terror plot.[52] UK MI5 assessed that the plot had reached an “advanced but not imminent” stage and detained the suspects. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi denied Iranian involvement in the terror plot and called for diplomacy.[53] It is possible that the Iranian IRGC did not notify Araghchi about this plot. The IRGC has previously failed to notify other government bodies about its operations.[54] Iran has historically relied on unconventional methods to impose costs on Israel, including conducting terror attacks on Israeli diplomatic and civilian targets abroad. This recent Iranian plot in the UK does not represent an inflection in Iranian activity but is part of a decades-long strategy that includes assassination and bombing plots against Israeli interests in Argentina, Cyprus, Turkey, Georgia, Greece, and Azerbaijan.[55] Iranian officials and Iranian media have previously suggested that Iran may attack Israeli diplomatic facilities in response to the Israeli airstrike near the Iranian embassy in Damascus in April 2024.[56] Iranian officials have also repeatedly warned that Iran will conduct a third missile attack on Israel.[57] Israeli strikes on Iran in October 2024 damaged Iranian long-range missile production, which suggests that Iran‘s ability to respond militarily using its missile stockpile may be somewhat constrained. Iran can still impose costs on Israel by attacking Israeli diplomatic targets in the region and beyond, however.[58]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi met with Indian officials in New Delhi, India, on May 8 to discuss India-Pakistan tensions and bilateral economic cooperation.[60] Araghchi met with Indian President Droupadi Murmu and Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar.[61] Araghchi and Jaishankar discussed the implementation of the May 2024 ten-year Chabahar cooperation agreement.[62] The agreement outlines the development of Iran’s southeastern Chabahar port to facilitate trade between Iran, Afghanistan, and Central Asian countries, which effectively bypasses Pakistani ports.[63] India was the second largest importer of Iranian oil before the US maximum pressure campaign in 2018.[64] Araghchi also met with Pakistani officials in Pakistan on May 5.[65] This series of meetings comes amid military escalation between India and Pakistan.[66]

Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian stated that direct negotiations under “threat or coercion” are irrational and dishonorable but that negotiations in “equal, pressure-free conditions” are “rational and honorable.”[67] Ahmadian’s remarks may lay the ground for justifying direct negotiations with the United States. Ahmadian’s remarks follow an Israeli report on May 7 that Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi approached US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff to request direct US-Iran negotiations, reportedly due to Iran’s frustration with the slow progress of Omani-mediated talks.[68] The fourth round of US-Iran talks, initially scheduled for May 3, was postponed due to “logistical reasons.”[69]

The Iranian rial depreciated from 828,500 rials to one US dollar on May 7 to 831,000 rials to one US dollar on May 8.[59]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-8-2025

Iran Update, May 8, 2025

Details about the activities of senior Hezbollah commanders in northern Yemen in the early 2010s demonstrate how Iran and its allies likely share lessons, techniques, and capabilities over time.[16] Yemeni sources posted new photos and information showing Hezbollah advisers in Yemen on May 8. [17] The IDF killed both Hezbollah advisers in Fall 2024 during the campaign against Hezbollah in Lebanon.[18] One Hezbollah commander, Ali Adel Ashmar, played a major role in the capture of Amran and Sanaa cities, which happened in July and September 2014, respectively.[19] This suggests that Hezbollah played a major role in advising the 2014 Houthi campaign. Hezbollah also sent Mohammad Hussein Srour, who at the time of his death was Hezbollah’s Aerial Command commander, to Yemen to support the development of Houthi missile capabilities and drone manufacturing.[20] Key Houthi commanders have now assumed an advising role with Iraqi militias that is similar to Hezbollah’s advising role in Yemen. A US airstrike killed a top Houthi drone expert outside Baghdad in July 2024, for example.[21] This demonstrates how Iran and its key proxies and partners share lessons learned, techniques, and capabilities over time and across the region. The Houthi commanders in Iraq today surely share lessons learned from their Hezbollah advisers in the 2010s, as well as the lessons the Houthis have learned over two decades of war against several different regional and international powers.

Unspecified Iranian diplomatic sources told anti-regime media on May 8 that the US-Iran nuclear talks are “faltering” over Iranian uranium enrichment restrictions and “fluctuating US demands.”[22] Iranian sources added that shifting US demands on Iran’s missile program and support for the Axis of Resistance are complicating progress in the negotiations. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi previously stated on April 16 that “contradictory” US positions do not help the negotiations and emphasized that “Iran must hear Washington’s real stance” to assess whether a framework agreement is possible.[23] An Iranian expert close to the regime separately stated on May 1 that the fourth round of talks originally scheduled for May 3 was postponed due to “contradictory US positions.”[24] US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff initially said Iran could enrich uranium to 3.67 percent, but later demanded all enrichment be stopped and eliminated.[25] Witkoff then said in a Breitbart interview on May 9 that he hoped that Iran would “voluntarily“ stop enrichment before adding that the US “red line“ is that “an enrichment program can never exist in Iran again.“[26] Araghchi confirmed on May 9 that the fourth round of talks will take place in Muscat, Oman, on May 12.[27] An Iranian Parliamentarian claimed on May 6 that the talks were postponed partly due to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi’s reported desire to join the nuclear talks as a European representative.[28] The Parliamentarian also claimed that Grossi provided reports to the United States suggesting that Iran is “very close” to a nuclear bomb.[29] Araghchi held a phone call with Grossi on May 9 to discuss cooperation between Iran and the agency and the current status of the US-Iran nuclear talks.[30] CTP-ISW previously assessed that it is unlikely that Iran will accept zero uranium enrichment and full dismantlement of its nuclear program, as Iran views uranium enrichment as its “undeniable right” and sees giving up as a core national red line. CTP-ISW also continues to assess that Iran is unlikely to concede on its missile program, as the missile program is essential to its defense strategy, especially given the weakness of Iran’s conventional armed forces.[31]

Iran faces growing disruption to its key oil exports as US sanctions on Chinese refineries threaten its main revenue stream. Reuters reported on May 8 that US sanctions imposed in March and April 2025 on two small Chinese independent refineries—Shandong Shouguang Luqing Petrochemical and Shandong Shengxing Chemical—have begun to disrupt Chinese handling of Iranian crude oil.[49] The sanctioned refineries now face a loss of port access, financing restrictions from major Chinese banks, and the loss of domestic crude oil supply from state firms like China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC).[50] The sanctioned Chinese refineries are also using third-party entities to sell their products and bypass formal restrictions. The US State Department separately sanctioned China-based Hebei Xinhai Chemical Group and three oil terminal operators, along with numerous firms, vessels, and captains, for facilitating hundreds of millions of dollars in Iranian oil sales on May 8.[51] These sanctions follow an increase in US sanctions targeting China-based entities involved in the illicit Iranian oil trade as part of US President Donald Trump’s renewed “maximum pressure” campaign.[52] China remains the largest importer of Iranian oil, purchasing approximately 90 percent of Iran’s total oil exports, according to Reuters.[53]

The Iranian rial depreciated from 831,000 rials to one US dollar on May 8 to 840,000 rials to one US dollar on May 9.[48]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-9-2025

Iran Update, May 12, 2025

Iran's refusal to accept US demands for zero uranium enrichment and the complete dismantlement of its nuclear program could stall US-Iran nuclear negotiations. The United States and Iran held their fourth round of nuclear talks in Oman on May 11.[1] US Special Envoy to the Middle East and lead US negotiator Steve Witkoff stated prior to the talks that Iran can ”never” have an enrichment program.[2] Witkoff stated that Iran must dismantle its three enrichment facilities at Natanz, Fordow, and Esfahan and can no longer have centrifuges. Witkoff added that a new nuclear agreement would not include sunset provisions, which are provisions that expire after a certain period of time. The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) included a sunset provision that restricted Iranian uranium enrichment for 15 years. Iranian officials, including Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi and President Masoud Pezeshkian, rejected Witkoff’s statements and emphasized that Iran will not accept zero enrichment. Araghchi stated, for example, that Iran is willing to accept limits on its uranium enrichment but “the principle of enrichment itself is simply non-negotiable.”[3] Iranian officials have recently stated that Iran would agree to reduce its uranium enrichment to 2015 JCPOA levels.[4] Anti-Iranian regime media previously reported on May 8 that the US-Iran nuclear talks were “faltering” over Iranian uranium enrichment restrictions and “fluctuating US demands prior to the fourth round of talks.”[5]

Iran is also very unlikely to curtail its support for the Axis of Resistance. Witkoff stated on May 8 that the United States remains committed to ending Iranian support for its regional proxies but will address this issue in “later phases” of the negotiations.[6] Iranian officials have repeatedly rejected this demand. Iranian Parliamentarian Ebrahim Rezaei stated on May 12 that Iran's “regional power” is non-negotiable, almost certainly referring to Iran's support for the Axis of Resistance.[7] Iran has continued to support its regional proxies, including by sending missiles to Iraqi militias and supporting the financial reconstitution of Hezbollah, for example. [8]

Senior Iranian commanders appear to be preparing for potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran amid new implicit US threats. Iranian Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri visited Artesh and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) naval sites in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, on May 12 to inspect their operational readiness.[9] Other senior Iranian commanders, including IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami and Artesh Commander Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi, accompanied Bagheri.[10] Bagheri stated that the AFGS reviewed all operational plans in southern Iran and claimed that the plans showed “full readiness to confront any potential threat.”[11] Artesh Air Force Commander Brigadier General Hamid Vahedi separately visited the Fifth Tactical Air Base in Khuzestan Province on May 11 to assess combat readiness and inspect facilities, including barracks and a weapons depot.[12] Senior Iranian commanders have conducted inspections of air defense sites and military bases across Iran in recent weeks, likely to ensure that units remain prepared for a potential strike.[13] The recent inspections come amid new implicit threats from US officials about potential military action against Iran if the current US-Iran nuclear negotiations do not result in an agreement. US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff warned on May 9 that it would be ”very unwise” for Iran to reject US demands.[14] Witkoff stated that if the May 11 talks with Iran were ”not productive,” then the United States would ”take a different route.”[15] Unspecified sources close to Witkoff similarly told Israel media on May 10 that if the May 11 talks with Iran did not yield ”significant progress,” then the United States would consider putting the “military option back on the table.[16] US President Donald Trump stated on May 12 that Iran is acting “intelligently and reasonably” in ongoing negotiations over the country's nuclear program.[17]

Iran and the Axis of Resistance are likely conducting a coordinated disinformation campaign against the Syrian transitional government. A BBC investigation published on May 11 found that approximately 50,000 accounts on X appear to have coordinated the spread of sectarian rhetoric, hate speech, and disinformation since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024.[40] Many of the accounts have usernames with randomly generated characters, which indicates that the accounts are bots.[41] BBC reported that approximately 60 percent of the posts originated from outside Syria and were concentrated in Iran and Axis of Resistance strongholds, including Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon.[42] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran is attempting to inflame sectarian tensions in Syria, likely to destabilize the Syrian transitional government and thereby re-establish itself in Syria.[43]

This disinformation campaign is likely intended to generate sectarian tensions and discontent with the transitional government within the Syrian population, which could enable Iran to re-entrench itself in Syria. BBC reported that the bot accounts flooded the information space with posts that contained sectarian language.[44] The accounts also posted old footage and imagery of sectarian violence and falsely portrayed the violence as recent sectarian events in Syria.[45] Iranian media has circulated reports of sectarian violence in Syria and has highlighted the transitional government's alleged failure to address security concerns since the fall of the Assad regime.[46] Reports of sectarian violence in the information space, regardless of whether they are real or false, risk generating feelings of insecurity within the Syrian population and discouraging cooperation between the Syrian population and government. A fractured Syrian state could enable Iran and Iranian-backed actors to exploit security gaps to reestablish their influence in Syrian and rebuild ground lines of communication through Syria to members of the Axis of Resistance.

The disinformation campaign could drive Syrian communities to seek out alternative sources of security to the transitional government. The disinformation campaign supports pro-Alawite insurgent efforts to undermine confidence in the transitional government. Insurgents seek to exploit fear and grievances within a population to establish themselves as the primary security guarantor. The bot accounts, which intentionally spread reports of violence, generate an outsized perception of threats against a community and undermine confidence in the transitional government's ability to provide basic protection. CTP-ISW has observed a relative decline in insurgent activity since March 2025, but insurgent groups have not abandoned their objectives to eject government forces from Alawite areas and undermine the new Syrian government. There is no evidence that Iran is cooperating with the pro-Alawite insurgency at this time.

Iranian Law Enforcement Commander Brigadier General Ahmad Reza Radan visited Niger on May 8 to deepen security cooperation.[70] Radan met with senior Nigerien officials, including Prime Minister Ali Lamine Zeine, Foreign Affairs Minister Bakary Yaou Sangare, and Police Chief Brigadier General Omar Tchiani. Iran and Niger signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) focused on counterterrorism, organized crime, and intelligence sharing. Radan stated that Iran is ready to transfer ”policing experience“ to Niger.[71] Radan recently visited Ethiopia and Burkina Faso on May 6 to sign security cooperation agreements focused on counterterrorism, human trafficking, and law enforcement training.[72] Iran could seek to export policing tools, including surveillance and protest suppression capabilities, to these countries while simultaneously building strategic partnerships that can help Iran evade sanctions and access critical resources.[73]

The United States sanctioned several Iranian individuals and entities involved in Iranian nuclear-related research on May 12.[77] The United States sanctioned three Iranian individuals and one Iran-based entity for their role in supporting Iranian nuclear research in association with the Iranian Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND).[78] The SPND played a leading role in the Iranian nuclear weapons research program before 2003.[79] The sanctioned individuals and entity include:

Sayyed Mohammad Reza Seddighi Saber: Saber is the head of SPND’s Shahid Karimi Group, which is involved in explosives research.
Ahmad Haghighat Talab: Haghighat Talab is a senior SPND official and former Amad Project nuclear scientist. The Amad Project refers to Iran's nuclear weapons program prior to 2003. Haghighat Talab has conducted nuclear research that has potential military applications.
Mohammed Reza Mehdipur: Mehdipur is the head of SPND’s Shahid Chamran Group, which conducts explosion and shock research.
Fuya Pars Prospective Technologists (Ideal Vacuum): Fuya Pars Prospective Technologists is an SPND-affiliated company that has attempted to procure or produce equipment that Iran could use in nuclear weapons research and development.
The US Department of the Treasury stated that all of the sanctioned individuals and entities face secondary sanctions. These sanctions come amid a broader increase in US sanctions against Iran as part of US President Donald Trump's “maximum pressure” campaign.

The Iranian rial appreciated from 840,000 rials to one US dollar on May 9 to 837,000 rials to one US dollar on May 12.[80]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-12-2025

Iran Update, May 13, 2025

Iran is preparing for a potential escalation with the United States by positioning military assets on key islands in the Persian Gulf and signaling its intent to target US bases, commercial shipping, and regional allies. Iranian Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri inspected military positions in southern Iran on May 12 to prepare for a possible escalation against the United States and approved deployments of military assets to the Nazeat islands around the Strait of Hormuz.[1] Bagheri ordered the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy, in coordination with local and tactical commanders, to implement a new operational plan around the Nazeat Islands to enhance missile and drone strike capabilities, fortify air defenses, and integrate advanced command and control infrastructure.[2] Bagheri explicitly stated that Iran would retaliate against US military bases, disrupt international commercial shipping, and attack regional states hosting US forces “if the US military makes a mistake.”[3] The Nazeat islands—including Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, Abu Musa, and Siri Island—are key positions for controlling maritime access to the Persian Gulf.[4] The IRGC has recently deployed naval mines, ballistic and anti-ship cruise missiles, and fast attack craft to these islands, though it is unclear if Bagheri ordered these specific deployments.[5] AFGS-affiliated media published an article on May 13 showcasing IRGC Navy surveillance footage of the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower from a Mohajer-6 drone and highlighted a new underground drone hangar in Hormozgan Province, likely to signal Iranian capability to surveil and strike US naval assets.[6] Iran previously responded to the US “maximum pressure” campaign in 2019 by attacking oil tankers near the Strait of Hormuz, seizing a foreign vessel, and harassing US and British naval ships.[7] The deployments to Nazeat could enable similar activities again. These activities follow new implicit US threats, including a statement by US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff on May 9 that raised the possibility of renewed military action against Iran if ongoing US-Iran talks fail.[8]

Iranian officials continued to categorically reject US demands for zero uranium enrichment, which may stall US-Iran nuclear negotiations. Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi told the Parliament’s National Security Commission on May 13 that uranium enrichment is Iran’s “red line” and emphasized that Iran will not negotiate on missile or regional defense issues.[9] Gharibabadi warned that Iran will ”see no need to continue the negotiations” if the United States continues to demand zero uranium enrichment. Gharibabadi and Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Political Affairs Majid Takht Ravanchi—who led the most recent round of technical talks in Oman on April 26—will likely lead Iran’s technical team in future technical negotiations that will almost certainly focus on Iranian uranium enrichment levels and Iran’s centrifuge stockpile.[10] Parliamentarian Ebrahim Rezaei separately stated on May 13 that several parliamentarians called for suspending nuclear negotiations until the United States publicly recognizes Iran’s right to uranium enrichment.[11] Iranian officials, including Foreign Affairs Minister and lead Iranian negotiator Abbas Araghchi and President Masoud Pezeshkian, have said that Iran will not negotiate ”on the principle of enrichment itself.”[12]

Iran reportedly proposed forming a regional nuclear consortium with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to enrich uranium at Iranian facilities, according to Western and Iranian media.[13] The consortium would return enrichment levels to 2015 JCPOA levels at 3.67 percent.[14] It would also give Saudi Arabia and the UAE access to Iranian nuclear technology. Iran previously proposed a similar consortium between Iran and the Persian Gulf states in 2007.[15] This new proposal is likely part of Iran’s efforts to maintain some level of uranium enrichment.[16]

Houthi air defenses appear to have prevented US forces from establishing air supremacy over Yemen, though the Houthis did not create sufficient disruption to prevent US operations.[17] Control of the airspace is a continuum that stretches from air parity, which is when no force controls the air, to air supremacy, which is when the opposing force—in this case, the Houthis—is incapable of any effective interference with friendly air operations.[18] Air superiority, which falls between air parity and air supremacy, means a friendly force can operate without “prohibitive” interference from the opposing force.[19] The Houthis shot down seven MQ-9 Reaper drones and reportedly nearly struck an F-35 and an F-16 during the US air campaign between March 15 and May 5.[20] The Houthis probably possess the ability to shoot down F-16s. The Houthis use an Iranian-made version of the SA-6 Gainful, which other US adversaries have used to shoot down F-16s.[21] US Central Command (CENTCOM) was able to continue air operations despite this surface-to-air missile fire, and it is unclear to what degree Houthi air defenses impeded CENTCOM air operations, if at all.

A well-designed air campaign can only achieve temporary effects that must be sustained through other means. A relatively brief air campaign is unlikely to achieve long-term strategic effects like the destruction of an enemy’s missile program, because the adversary can usually rebuild the assets that are destroyed in the air campaign. The Houthis can replenish their losses from the air campaign through a combination of shipments from Iran and domestic production using goods purchased on the international market, thus demonstrating the air campaign’s limitations.[22]

Iran is continuing to try to circumvent US sanctions targeting Iranian oil exports. The United States sanctioned several front companies on May 13 that were created by the Armed Forces General Staff-affiliated Sepehr Energy to facilitate sanctioned oil trade.[44] The front companies include several People’s Republic of China-based companies, which illustrates the cooperation between US adversaries to undermine the US maximum pressure campaign.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-13-2025

Iran Update, May 13, 2025

Iran is reportedly trying to get Arab countries, including Iraq, to encourage the United States to lift sanctions on Iran and conclude a nuclear deal. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani met with Iraqi National Security Adviser Qassem al Araji in Baghdad on May 14 to encourage the Iraqi federal government to raise “Iranian desires” at the Arab Summit in Baghdad on May 17, according to an unspecified source speaking to Iraqi media.[38] Araji is a member of the Iranian-backed Badr Organization. Ghaani will reportedly meet with other Iranian-backed Iraqi politicians during his visit to Baghdad. The unspecified source stated that Iran “seeks Arab support” to remove international sanctions on Iran and “move toward a nuclear agreement more quickly.” Senior Iranian officials have repeatedly rejected US demands during the ongoing US-Iran nuclear negotiations for zero uranium enrichment and criticized the US maximum pressure campaign targeting Iranian oil exports.

Iran reportedly recently proposed forming a regional nuclear consortium with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to enrich uranium at Iranian facilities, likely to try to maintain some level of uranium enrichment. Emirati Foreign Affairs Minister Khalifa Shaheen al Marar and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman al Saud will attend the Arab Summit. It is possible that this proposal will be discussed at the summit.

Iran and the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) will meet in Istanbul, Turkey, on May 16 to discuss the US-Iran nuclear negotiations.[39] The Iranian delegation will likely try to persuade the E3 not to impose snapback sanctions on Iran. Unspecified diplomats told Reuters on May 13 that the E3 may trigger snapback sanctions on Iran by August if Iran and the United States do not reach a “substantial deal” by then.[40] The E3 previously stated that Iran needed to conclude a new nuclear deal by June 2025.[41] The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.”[42] The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) previously passed a censure resolution proposed by the E3 in November 2024 that requires the IAEA to produce a “comprehensive report” on Iranian nuclear activities by spring 2025.[43] The IAEA has not released the report at the time of this writing. CTP-ISW previously assessed that the report will almost certainly confirm Iranian noncompliance with the JCPOA and lay the foundation for the E3 to impose snapback sanctions.[44] The snapback mechanism expires in October 2025.

Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Political Affairs Majid Takht Ravanchi and Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi may lead the Iranian delegation. Ravanchi and Gharibabadi previously led the US-Iran technical talks in Oman on April 26.[45] Ravanchi was part of the Iranian nuclear negotiating team that helped conclude the 2015 nuclear deal and has recently met with senior Russian officials to discuss the Iranian nuclear program and US-Iran nuclear talks.[46] Gharibabadi has also recently coordinated with China and Russia on Iran's nuclear program.[47] The Iran-E3 talks were originally scheduled for May 2 but were postponed after the fourth round of US-Iran nuclear talks was delayed.[48]

A group of Iranian parliamentarians echoed a senior Iranian military commander's recent threat to close the Strait of Hormuz if Israel or the United States strikes Iranian energy infrastructure.[49] Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri threatened on May 13 to disrupt international commercial shipping if the United States “makes a mistake.”[50] Bagheri recently inspected military positions in southern Iran and approved the deployment of military assets to the Nazeat Islands in the Persian Gulf.[51] Bagheri also ordered the IRGC to implement a new operational plan around these islands to enhance missile and drone strike capabilities.[52]

more info:
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-14-2025

Iran Update, May 15, 2025

An Iranian vessel may have harassed a commercial vessel in the Persian Gulf on May 10. The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported that a small craft collided with a merchant vessel and attempted to collide with other vessels about 80 nautical miles northwest of Jebel Ali, the United Arab Emirates (UAE).[1] It is unclear if the collision was intentional or an accident. UKMTO reported that the merchant vessel later received Very High Frequency (VHF) messages from unidentified individuals claiming to be “local authorities.“[2] The unidentified individuals instructed the vessel to stop and allow authorities to board it. The incident occurred west of Siri Island, which Iran controls. This incident occurred shortly before Iranian Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri ordered the deployment of missile-capable fast attack craft (FAC) to Iranian islands in the Persian Gulf on May 12.[3] Bagheri stated on May 12 that Iran would retaliate against US military bases, disrupt international commercial shipping, and attack regional states hosting US forces “if the US military makes a mistake.” Iranian Artesh Navy Commander Rear Admiral Shahram Irani separately claimed on May 15 that Iran recently “neutralized” US naval activity in the Persian Gulf using “light naval units.”[4] Iran previously responded to the US “maximum pressure” campaign in 2019 by attacking oil tankers near the Strait of Hormuz, seizing a foreign vessel, and harassing US and British naval ships.[5]

Iran and the United States continue to disagree on the US demand for zero uranium enrichment, which may stall the US-Iran nuclear negotiations and delay a nuclear deal. US President Donald Trump stated on May 15 that the United States and Iran are “very close” to reaching a nuclear deal and that Iran has “sort of” agreed to US demands.[6] An unspecified Iranian source familiar with the negotiations told Reuters on May 15 that Iran and the United States continue to disagree on the issue of Iranian uranium enrichment.[7] Senior US officials, including lead US negotiator Steve Witkoff, have previously stated that Iran can “never” have an enrichment program.[8] Senior Iranian officials have repeatedly rejected this US demand.[9] Iranian Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Shamkhani told NBC News on May 14 that Iran is ready to sign a deal with the United States and willing to limit enrichment to “civilian levels.”[10] “Civilian levels” likely refers to the 3.67 percent enriched uranium limit set by the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Reuters reported that the United States and Iran also disagree on where and how Iran would transfer its highly enriched uranium stockpile to another location, citing unspecified Iranian sources.[11] Iran’s rejection of the US demands for zero uranium enrichment may jeopardize the talks or force negotiations toward a less expansive agreement than what the United States reportedly desires.

The Houthis are unlikely to seriously engage in the Saudi-led peace roadmap because doing so would undermine their objectives to control all of Yemen. UK-based outlet Amwaj Media reported on May 13 that the United States asked the Houthis to return to the peace process, which Saudi Arabia initiated in 2022, as part of the US-Houthi ceasefire.[12] US President Donald Trump stated during a press conference in Doha on May 15 that “we want [the Houthis] to get along with Saudi Arabia.”[13] CTP-ISW assessed on May 9 that the Houthis have little incentive to participate meaningfully in peace negotiations given that the Houthis have not suffered any military defeats that would compel them to re-engage in peace talks.[14] The Saudi-led and UN-facilitated roadmap envisioned a political settlement among Yemen’s factions, including the Houthis, and would presumably work toward some kind of power-sharing agreement between the Houthis and the Yemeni government.[15] The Houthis consider themselves to be Yemen’s legitimate government and will likely oppose any negotiations that could reduce their authority in northern Yemen or undermine their objective to control the entire country.

The United States sanctioned six individuals and 12 entities on May 14 for helping Iran procure materials needed for the production of ballistic missiles.[25] The sanctioned entities and individuals are based in Iran and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The United States sanctioned an Iran-based company that has supplied carbon fiber to the IRGC Aerospace Force Research and Self Sufficiency Jihad Organization and the IRGC Research and Self Sufficiency Jihad Organization. Carbon fiber is used to produce ballistic missiles.[26] The United States sanctioned these two IRGC organizations in 2017 for involvement in Iranian ballistic missile research, development, and flight test launches.[27] The United States also sanctioned one PRC-based company and three of its employees for sending carbon fiber to Iranian companies.[28]

Iran approved the opening of the first branch of a Russian bank in Iran on May 15.[29] Iran and Russia launched a new interbank network to circumvent the US dollar-based SWIFT system in November 2024 that allows Iranians to use Iranian bank cards to withdraw money in Russia.[30] The opening of a Russian bank branch is part of a broader Iranian effort to mitigate sanctions and bolster the Iranian economy.

The Iranian rial appreciated from 836,000 rials to one US dollar on May 14 to 830,000 rials to one US dollar on May 15.[31]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-15-2025

Iran Update, May 16, 2025

The IRGC Quds Force commander probably traveled to Iraq to ensure alignment among Iranian-backed Iraqi parties ahead of the Arab summit, particularly over engagement with Syria and the invitation to Shara. A State of Law parliamentarian criticized unspecified Iraqi political parties for portraying Iraq as weak in order to attack the Iraqi federal government in an interview on May 14.[43] The parliamentarian added that IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani traveled to Baghdad on May 14 to “secure the Arab Summit,” implying that Ghaani sought to create unity among the Iranian-backed parties. Ghaani arrived one day after Sudani met with Khazali and Ameri, and would presumably need to forge unity after the political sparring over the invite to Shara. Many Iranian-backed factions, including Khazali’s Asaib Ahl al Haq, threatened the summit if Shara attended, while Ameri defended Shara’s invite. Iran is especially concerned about tensions between the Shia Coordination Framework ahead of the upcoming parliamentary elections.[44] Iranian-backed Iraqi parties lost a significant number of seats in the 2021 elections due to inter-party competition that advantaged a more unified opposition.[45]

Iranian efforts to secure Syrian debt reimbursement through Iraqi mediation probably do not represent a change in Iranian hostility towards Damascus, though it does illustrate Iran’s economic fragility and need for funds. An informed source told Iraqi media on May 15 that Ghaani emphasized to several Shia Coordination Framework leaders, including Maliki and Ameri, that the Iraqi federal government should help recover Syrian debt to Iran.[46] Iranian parliamentarians and former diplomats calculate that Iran spent about 30 billion US dollars to bolster the Assad regime. CTP-ISW cannot verify this number.[47] Ghaani’s effort to secure Syrian debt to Iran follows US President Donald Trump’s announcement on May 13 that he intends to lift “all” sanctions on Syria, despite several legal obstacles to doing so.[48] Ghaani may have discussed this with Iranian-backed Iraqi politicians due to Shaibani’s planned attendance at the Arab Summit in Baghdad, where Iraqi leaders could engage Shaibani.[49] Ghaani reportedly discussed other Iranian “desires” regarding sanctions relief and the US-Iran nuclear negotiations for the Iraqi federal government to raise at the summit with Iraqi National Security Advisor Qasim al Araji on May 14.[50] It is not clear what Iraq could offer Syria to entice the new Syrian government to repay Assad’s debts to Iran. The money and other support that Tehran gave Assad would have been used to attack the Syrians who currently control Syria.

Iran and the Iranian-backed Iraqi actors that Ghaani approached to mediate Syria’s debt repayment continue to oppose Iraq-Syria normalization. Unidentified political sources told Iraqi media in late February 2025 that Iraq has not normalized relations with the Syrian government due to Iranian opposition, demonstrating the reality that Iran is still hostile towards Syria.[51] Iran also views Turkey’s influence in Syria as a threat to its long-standing strategic objectives. Iranian officials have also expressed concern that the fall of Assad created a vacuum for ISIS to exploit and spread instability to Iran.[52] Maliki and Ameri, like some Iranian officials, view Hayat Tahrir al Sham and Shara as “terrorists.”[53] It is unlikely that Iranian-backed Iraqi politicians would be able to compel the Syrian government to repay its debt to Iran. The Syrian government would also almost certainly prioritize reconstructing Syria over repaying Iran because Iranian money made serious contributions to Syria’s destruction.

Iran and Iranian-backed Iraqi actors will likely begin the first phase of a pressure campaign to compel Turkey to withdraw from northern Iraq. Ghaani reportedly discussed applying political and diplomatic pressure on Turkey to withdraw from Iraq during meetings with Shia Coordination Framework leaders on May 15.[54] Turkey maintains at least 136 permanent military bases across northern Iraq and has built 121 of these bases since 2018 to combat the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), according to BBC analysis.[55] The PKK announced on May 9 that it would dissolve itself and “end its armed struggle” after forty years of militant activity.[56]

Iran and Iranian-backed Iraqi leaders may use force to compel Turkey to withdraw from northern Iraq if the diplomatic and political efforts fail. Iran and Iranian-backed Iraqi figures appear to believe that political and diplomatic pressure will be sufficient to ensure a Turkish withdrawal upon PKK disarmament, but Turkey has not expressed willingness to withdraw at this time. Turkey exerts major influence within the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and has previously worked with Iraqi Sunni parties to increase its influence in Iraq, often at Iran’s expense.[57] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have previously struck a Turkish base in Ninewa Province and other Turkish positions in northern Iraq to impose a cost on Turkey for its regional activities.[58]

Iran and the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) met in Istanbul, Turkey, on May 16 to discuss the US-Iran nuclear negotiations and snapback sanctions.[59] This marks the first Iran-E3 meeting since the start of US-Iran nuclear talks on April 12. Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Political Affairs Majid Takht Ravanchi and Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi led the Iranian delegation.[60] UK Foreign Office Political Director Christian Turner stated that Iran and the E3 “shared [a] commitment to dialogue” and “agreed to meet again,” citing the “urgency” of the moment. This urgency likely refers to US President Donald Trump’s 60-day nuclear deal deadline, which ends in June 2025.[61] The meeting also comes after E3 diplomats recently threatened to trigger snapback sanctions on Iran by August if no substantial deal is reached.[62]

Iran continues to deepen its economic ties with the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) to mitigate the impact of Western sanctions. The Iran-EEU free trade agreement, signed in December 2023, entered into force on May 15.[66] The EEU is comprised of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia. The deal aims to facilitate trade between the parties in various sectors, including agriculture, textiles, and industrial goods.[67] The deal reportedly cuts Iranian tariffs on Russian imports from 16.6 percent to 5.2 percent.[68] Iranian media reported that the deal could raise Iran-EEU trade to 12 billion dollars.[69] Iran and Russia have continued to expand ties since they signed the January 2025 Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty.[70] Iran recently approved the opening of the first Russian bank branch in Iran, likely to bypass the US dollar-based SWIFT system and bolster Iran’s economy.[71] The deal is part of a broader Iranian effort to reduce dependence on Western markets and mitigate the effect of sanctions on Iran’s deteriorating economy.

The Iranian rial appreciated from 830,000 rials to one US dollar on May 15 to 829,000 rials to one US dollar on May 16.[77]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-16-2025

One of Hamas’s motivations for launching its Oct. 7, 2023 invasion of Israel was to frustrate U.S.‑brokered talks to normalize relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia, according to documents published Sunday by The Wall Street Journal.

According to the minutes of a meeting recovered by Israeli troops from a hidden Hamas command tunnel in Gaza, terrorist leader Yahya Sinwar had told senior commanders on Oct. 2 that only an “extraordinary act” could wreck the fast‑advancing deal. If Riyadh signed, he warned, “most Arab and Muslim governments would line up behind it,” sidelining Hamas. The minutes say the assault, in which about 6,000 Hamas-led Gazan terrorists stormed the Israeli border, murdered some 1,200 people and abducted another 251, had been under preparation for two years as part of a broader campaign to “shift the strategic balance” and pull other members of the so‑called Axis of Resistance into the fight.

A companion memo—also found in the tunnel—advised accelerating attacks in Judea, Samaria and Jerusalem for the same purpose and dismissed any Saudi pledge to defend Palestinian interests as a bluff. Hamas even circulated a “help wanted” notice for a university‑educated operative to coordinate anti‑normalization work, the cache revealed.

The prospect of Saudi‑Israeli talks had advanced further in 2023 than in any previous effort: draft U.S. security guarantees for the kingdom, U.S. approval of civil nuclear technology and a roadmap for Palestinian self‑governance were all on the table, according to the Journal. Hamas saw the moment as existential. An August 2022 internal briefing cited in the files states it was the movement's “duty” to derail the “wave of normalization sweeping the Arab world,” which already included the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan—the cosignatories of the 2020 Abrahams Accords led by U.S. President Donald Trump during his first term in office.

The Oct. 7 attacks triggered a war in Gaza and throughout the region, leaving much of the Strip in ruins. It also froze the Saudi peace track: Riyadh has said it would not revisit the deal until fighting stops and a credible path to Palestinian statehood emerges. Israeli troops killed Sinwar in Gaza on Oct. 16, 2024.

https://www.jns.org/hamas-docs-oct-7-aimed-to-block-israel-saudi-peace/

Iran Update, May 19, 2025

Iran may have jammed vessel navigation systems in the Strait of Hormuz in order to set conditions to seize vessels that inadvertently enter Iranian territorial waters as a result of navigation issues.[1] The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported that several vessels experienced Global Positioning System (GPS) interference in the Strait of Hormuz for several hours on May 18.[2] GPS interference disrupts ships’ ability to navigate, and they may veer off course as a result. GPS interference around the Strait of Hormuz can cause vessels to inadvertently enter Iranian territorial waters, which Iran can then use to justify seizing vessels .[3] Iran previously conducted GPS jamming in 2019 to try to lure vessels into Iranian waters.[4] The GPS jamming in 2019 was part of a broader Iranian response to the US “maximum pressure” campaign that also included seizing and attacking vessels. The recent GPS interference incidents come after Iranian Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri threatened on May 12 that Iran would retaliate by disrupting international commercial shipping, among other things, “if the US military makes a mistake.”[5] Bagheri was likely referring to a potential US strike on Iranian nuclear or energy facilities. Iran also deployed missile-capable fast attack craft (FAC) as well as geospatial intelligence and surveillance technology to Iranian islands in the Persian Gulf on May 12.[6] Iran can use FAC to attack and harass ships.[7]

A possible Iranian vessel recently harassed a commercial vessel in the Persian Gulf on May 10. The UKMTO reported on May 10 that a small craft collided with a merchant vessel and attempted to collide with other vessels about 80 nautical miles northwest of Jebel Ali, the United Arab Emirates (UAE).[8] The UKMTO reported that the merchant vessel later received Very High Frequency (VHF) messages from unidentified individuals claiming to be “local authorities.”[9] Iran’s partner, the Houthis, have similarly used GPS jamming and small boats to harass international shipping and have seized vessels in the Red Sea, specifically the Bab el Mandeb Strait, another important maritime trade chokepoint.[10]

This recent series of events suggests that Iran may be in the very early stages of an escalation campaign against international shipping around the Strait of Hormuz. Iran previously threatened international shipping through this important waterway in 2019 in response to US President Donald Trump’s “maximum pressure” strategy.[11] Iran’s preparations for its campaign in 2019 mirror actions that Iran is taking today.[12] Iranian officials inspected Iranian military sites near the Persian Gulf in 2019 before Iran conducted attacks on vessels.[13] Senior Iranian military commanders, including Bagheri and Artesh Navy Commander Rear Admiral Shahram Irani, have recently visited Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and Artesh Navy sites along the Persian Gulf coast.[14] Iran later used drones to harass vessels passing through the Strait of Hormuz and used GPS jamming to coax vessels into Iranian territorial waters.[15] IRGC-affiliated media recently published videos of Iranian drones following US naval vessels in the Persian Gulf. [16]It is unclear whether Iran is preparing for a campaign targeting international shipping in the Strait of Hormuz or trying to signal to the United States that it can threaten freedom of navigation through the Persian Gulf to try to deter a potential US strike on Iran.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-19-2025

Iran Update, May 20, 2025

Iran is deepening high-level defense cooperation with Armenia, likely as part of a broader strategy to counter Israeli, Turkish, and Western influence in the South Caucasus. Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh met with Armenian Defense Minister Suren Papikyan in Yerevan, Armenia, on May 20.[30] The Iranian Defense Ministry is responsible for foreign arms sales and defense agreements. Nasir Zadeh expressed support for peace talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan, stating that Iran is ready to help accelerate the peace process between the two countries. Nasir Zadeh and Papikyan signed a Memorandum of Cooperation (MoC) between their respective defense ministries. Nasir Zadeh’s visit likely reflects advanced defense talks rather than initial Iranian outreach to Armenia, given Nasir Zadeh’s seniority in the Iranian regime.[31] Iran has historically maintained close ties to Armenia and has reportedly provided security assistance to Armenia in recent years. Israeli media claimed in July 2023, for example, that Armenia had used Iranian Shahed drones in its conflict with Azerbaijan.[32] Iran and Armenia recently conducted their first-ever joint military exercise in northwestern Iran on April 9 and 10 to bolster border security and counter-terrorism coordination.[33] Iran may seek to increase military and defense cooperation with Armenia in the coming months, particularly as Iran appears to be growing increasingly concerned about Israeli, Turkish, and Western influence in the South Caucasus.

Iran is simultaneously maintaining military, political, and economic ties with Azerbaijan to counter external influences in the South Caucasus. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces Mirza Kuchak Khan Special Forces Brigade and Azerbaijani Special Forces began joint exercises along the Iran-Azerbaijan border on May 17. The exercises will continue until May 21.[34] The exercises included coordinated tactical drills and simulated counter-terrorism operations. Armed Forces General Staff-affiliated media framed the exercises as a strategic show of force aimed at enhancing combat readiness, expanding bilateral defense cooperation, countering Israeli “military movements,” and reinforcing Iran’s role in shaping regional security and stability in the South Caucasus.[35] This exercise follows a series of high-level Israeli-Azerbaijani engagements in recent weeks. Israeli government officials have recently called for including Azerbaijan in the Abraham Accords and increasing “trilateral cooperation” between Azerbaijan, Israel, and the United States.[36] US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff visited Baku on March 14 to discuss US-Israel-Azerbaijan trilateral coordination and strengthen ties between the three countries under the Abraham Accords framework.[37] Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz separately met with his Azerbaijani counterpart in Israel on May 19 to discuss bolstering defense cooperation.[38] The Iranian regime has historically accused Baku of allowing Israel to use Azerbaijani territory to launch operations against Iran.[39] IRGC-affiliated media in February 2025 called the Israeli-Azerbaijani alliance a direct threat to Iranian national security and warned that Israel uses Azerbaijani territory for intelligence operations and exploiting ethnic tensions inside Iran.[40]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-20-2025

Iran Update, May 20, 2025

An unsanctioned oil tanker that is operated by a US-sanctioned entity and has probably illicitly transported oil to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) from Iran issued a false distress call in the Strait of Hormuz on May 20.[1] The Panamanian-flagged oil tanker the Themir likely issued a distress call that claimed it had been hijacked.[2] A British maritime security firm said that the distress call occurred 51 nautical miles northwest of Bandar-e Jask, which is consistent with the Themir’s position. The firm confirmed on May 21 that the hijacking call was a false alarm.[3] It remains unclear at the time of writing why the Themir issued the false distress call, but the vessel is linked to Iranian efforts to illicitly transfer oil.[4] The United States sanctioned the Themir’s Malaysia-based owner, IMS Ltd, on February 24 for aiding the Iranian oil export network, as part of US President Donald Trump’s ”maximum pressure” policy.[5]

The Themir’s pattern of behavior suggests it may have conducted a ship-to-ship transfer at some time while off the coast of Iran.[6] Iran and the PRC use ship-to-ship transfers to obfuscate the transportation of PRC purchases of Iranian oil, and ships travel in circular holding patterns when conducting ship-to-ship transfers.[7] The Themir was in a circular holding pattern 51 nautical miles northwest of Bandar-e Jask Port on the southern coast of Iran at the time of the distress call, according to maritime data.[8] The ship and its two sister ships—the Peterpaul and the Chamtang—have regularly sailed between the Gulf of Oman and the PRC.[9] Both the Peterpaul and the Chamtang are sanctioned for illicit transfers of Iranian oil to the PRC.[10] The ships usually enter circular holding patterns in the Gulf of Oman before sailing eastwards to PRC ports. Circular holding patterns can indicate that the ships are executing ship-to-ship transfers.[11] The Themir also previously travelled from the Gulf of Oman to the PRC’s biggest oil offloading port, Shandong Port, in September 2024.[12] The US Treasury Department recently sanctioned refineries in Shandong for importing billions of dollars in Iranian oil.[13] The Themir has also travelled along similar routes as its two sanctioned sister ships from near Bandar-e-Jask Port to eastern PRC through the Gulf of Oman and Malacca Strait five times since January 2024, suggesting that the Themir has previously illicitly transported Iranian oil to the PRC.[14]

Iranian Artesh Commander Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi met with Belarusian Deputy Chief of the General Staff Major General Vladimir Kupriyanyuk on May 21 to discuss defense cooperation.[41] Both sides emphasized the importance of strengthening ties in key areas, including military training, experience-sharing, and broader defense coordination. Iran and Belarus previously signed two memoranda of understanding on defense and trade cooperation in March and April 2024, respectively. Iran has begun work on establishing a military drone factory in Belarus since May 2023 to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[42] Cooperation between Iran and Belarus, a key Russian ally, comes amid increased engagement and defense coordination between Iranian and Russian defense officials since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.[43]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-21-2025

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