Iran's refusal to accept US demands for zero uranium enrichment and the complete dismantlement of its nuclear program could stall US-Iran nuclear negotiations. The United States and Iran held their fourth round of nuclear talks in Oman on May 11.[1] US Special Envoy to the Middle East and lead US negotiator Steve Witkoff stated prior to the talks that Iran can ”never” have an enrichment program.[2] Witkoff stated that Iran must dismantle its three enrichment facilities at Natanz, Fordow, and Esfahan and can no longer have centrifuges. Witkoff added that a new nuclear agreement would not include sunset provisions, which are provisions that expire after a certain period of time. The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) included a sunset provision that restricted Iranian uranium enrichment for 15 years. Iranian officials, including Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi and President Masoud Pezeshkian, rejected Witkoff’s statements and emphasized that Iran will not accept zero enrichment. Araghchi stated, for example, that Iran is willing to accept limits on its uranium enrichment but “the principle of enrichment itself is simply non-negotiable.”[3] Iranian officials have recently stated that Iran would agree to reduce its uranium enrichment to 2015 JCPOA levels.[4] Anti-Iranian regime media previously reported on May 8 that the US-Iran nuclear talks were “faltering” over Iranian uranium enrichment restrictions and “fluctuating US demands prior to the fourth round of talks.”[5]
Iran is also very unlikely to curtail its support for the Axis of Resistance. Witkoff stated on May 8 that the United States remains committed to ending Iranian support for its regional proxies but will address this issue in “later phases” of the negotiations.[6] Iranian officials have repeatedly rejected this demand. Iranian Parliamentarian Ebrahim Rezaei stated on May 12 that Iran's “regional power” is non-negotiable, almost certainly referring to Iran's support for the Axis of Resistance.[7] Iran has continued to support its regional proxies, including by sending missiles to Iraqi militias and supporting the financial reconstitution of Hezbollah, for example. [8]
Senior Iranian commanders appear to be preparing for potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran amid new implicit US threats. Iranian Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri visited Artesh and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) naval sites in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, on May 12 to inspect their operational readiness.[9] Other senior Iranian commanders, including IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami and Artesh Commander Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi, accompanied Bagheri.[10] Bagheri stated that the AFGS reviewed all operational plans in southern Iran and claimed that the plans showed “full readiness to confront any potential threat.”[11] Artesh Air Force Commander Brigadier General Hamid Vahedi separately visited the Fifth Tactical Air Base in Khuzestan Province on May 11 to assess combat readiness and inspect facilities, including barracks and a weapons depot.[12] Senior Iranian commanders have conducted inspections of air defense sites and military bases across Iran in recent weeks, likely to ensure that units remain prepared for a potential strike.[13] The recent inspections come amid new implicit threats from US officials about potential military action against Iran if the current US-Iran nuclear negotiations do not result in an agreement. US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff warned on May 9 that it would be ”very unwise” for Iran to reject US demands.[14] Witkoff stated that if the May 11 talks with Iran were ”not productive,” then the United States would ”take a different route.”[15] Unspecified sources close to Witkoff similarly told Israel media on May 10 that if the May 11 talks with Iran did not yield ”significant progress,” then the United States would consider putting the “military option back on the table.[16] US President Donald Trump stated on May 12 that Iran is acting “intelligently and reasonably” in ongoing negotiations over the country's nuclear program.[17]
Iran and the Axis of Resistance are likely conducting a coordinated disinformation campaign against the Syrian transitional government. A BBC investigation published on May 11 found that approximately 50,000 accounts on X appear to have coordinated the spread of sectarian rhetoric, hate speech, and disinformation since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024.[40] Many of the accounts have usernames with randomly generated characters, which indicates that the accounts are bots.[41] BBC reported that approximately 60 percent of the posts originated from outside Syria and were concentrated in Iran and Axis of Resistance strongholds, including Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon.[42] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran is attempting to inflame sectarian tensions in Syria, likely to destabilize the Syrian transitional government and thereby re-establish itself in Syria.[43]
This disinformation campaign is likely intended to generate sectarian tensions and discontent with the transitional government within the Syrian population, which could enable Iran to re-entrench itself in Syria. BBC reported that the bot accounts flooded the information space with posts that contained sectarian language.[44] The accounts also posted old footage and imagery of sectarian violence and falsely portrayed the violence as recent sectarian events in Syria.[45] Iranian media has circulated reports of sectarian violence in Syria and has highlighted the transitional government's alleged failure to address security concerns since the fall of the Assad regime.[46] Reports of sectarian violence in the information space, regardless of whether they are real or false, risk generating feelings of insecurity within the Syrian population and discouraging cooperation between the Syrian population and government. A fractured Syrian state could enable Iran and Iranian-backed actors to exploit security gaps to reestablish their influence in Syrian and rebuild ground lines of communication through Syria to members of the Axis of Resistance.
The disinformation campaign could drive Syrian communities to seek out alternative sources of security to the transitional government. The disinformation campaign supports pro-Alawite insurgent efforts to undermine confidence in the transitional government. Insurgents seek to exploit fear and grievances within a population to establish themselves as the primary security guarantor. The bot accounts, which intentionally spread reports of violence, generate an outsized perception of threats against a community and undermine confidence in the transitional government's ability to provide basic protection. CTP-ISW has observed a relative decline in insurgent activity since March 2025, but insurgent groups have not abandoned their objectives to eject government forces from Alawite areas and undermine the new Syrian government. There is no evidence that Iran is cooperating with the pro-Alawite insurgency at this time.
Iranian Law Enforcement Commander Brigadier General Ahmad Reza Radan visited Niger on May 8 to deepen security cooperation.[70] Radan met with senior Nigerien officials, including Prime Minister Ali Lamine Zeine, Foreign Affairs Minister Bakary Yaou Sangare, and Police Chief Brigadier General Omar Tchiani. Iran and Niger signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) focused on counterterrorism, organized crime, and intelligence sharing. Radan stated that Iran is ready to transfer ”policing experience“ to Niger.[71] Radan recently visited Ethiopia and Burkina Faso on May 6 to sign security cooperation agreements focused on counterterrorism, human trafficking, and law enforcement training.[72] Iran could seek to export policing tools, including surveillance and protest suppression capabilities, to these countries while simultaneously building strategic partnerships that can help Iran evade sanctions and access critical resources.[73]
The United States sanctioned several Iranian individuals and entities involved in Iranian nuclear-related research on May 12.[77] The United States sanctioned three Iranian individuals and one Iran-based entity for their role in supporting Iranian nuclear research in association with the Iranian Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND).[78] The SPND played a leading role in the Iranian nuclear weapons research program before 2003.[79] The sanctioned individuals and entity include:
Sayyed Mohammad Reza Seddighi Saber: Saber is the head of SPND’s Shahid Karimi Group, which is involved in explosives research.
Ahmad Haghighat Talab: Haghighat Talab is a senior SPND official and former Amad Project nuclear scientist. The Amad Project refers to Iran's nuclear weapons program prior to 2003. Haghighat Talab has conducted nuclear research that has potential military applications.
Mohammed Reza Mehdipur: Mehdipur is the head of SPND’s Shahid Chamran Group, which conducts explosion and shock research.
Fuya Pars Prospective Technologists (Ideal Vacuum): Fuya Pars Prospective Technologists is an SPND-affiliated company that has attempted to procure or produce equipment that Iran could use in nuclear weapons research and development.
The US Department of the Treasury stated that all of the sanctioned individuals and entities face secondary sanctions. These sanctions come amid a broader increase in US sanctions against Iran as part of US President Donald Trump's “maximum pressure” campaign.
The Iranian rial appreciated from 840,000 rials to one US dollar on May 9 to 837,000 rials to one US dollar on May 12.[80]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-12-2025
Iran Update, May 13, 2025
Iran is preparing for a potential escalation with the United States by positioning military assets on key islands in the Persian Gulf and signaling its intent to target US bases, commercial shipping, and regional allies. Iranian Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri inspected military positions in southern Iran on May 12 to prepare for a possible escalation against the United States and approved deployments of military assets to the Nazeat islands around the Strait of Hormuz.[1] Bagheri ordered the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy, in coordination with local and tactical commanders, to implement a new operational plan around the Nazeat Islands to enhance missile and drone strike capabilities, fortify air defenses, and integrate advanced command and control infrastructure.[2] Bagheri explicitly stated that Iran would retaliate against US military bases, disrupt international commercial shipping, and attack regional states hosting US forces “if the US military makes a mistake.”[3] The Nazeat islands—including Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, Abu Musa, and Siri Island—are key positions for controlling maritime access to the Persian Gulf.[4] The IRGC has recently deployed naval mines, ballistic and anti-ship cruise missiles, and fast attack craft to these islands, though it is unclear if Bagheri ordered these specific deployments.[5] AFGS-affiliated media published an article on May 13 showcasing IRGC Navy surveillance footage of the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower from a Mohajer-6 drone and highlighted a new underground drone hangar in Hormozgan Province, likely to signal Iranian capability to surveil and strike US naval assets.[6] Iran previously responded to the US “maximum pressure” campaign in 2019 by attacking oil tankers near the Strait of Hormuz, seizing a foreign vessel, and harassing US and British naval ships.[7] The deployments to Nazeat could enable similar activities again. These activities follow new implicit US threats, including a statement by US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff on May 9 that raised the possibility of renewed military action against Iran if ongoing US-Iran talks fail.[8]
Iranian officials continued to categorically reject US demands for zero uranium enrichment, which may stall US-Iran nuclear negotiations. Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi told the Parliament’s National Security Commission on May 13 that uranium enrichment is Iran’s “red line” and emphasized that Iran will not negotiate on missile or regional defense issues.[9] Gharibabadi warned that Iran will ”see no need to continue the negotiations” if the United States continues to demand zero uranium enrichment. Gharibabadi and Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Political Affairs Majid Takht Ravanchi—who led the most recent round of technical talks in Oman on April 26—will likely lead Iran’s technical team in future technical negotiations that will almost certainly focus on Iranian uranium enrichment levels and Iran’s centrifuge stockpile.[10] Parliamentarian Ebrahim Rezaei separately stated on May 13 that several parliamentarians called for suspending nuclear negotiations until the United States publicly recognizes Iran’s right to uranium enrichment.[11] Iranian officials, including Foreign Affairs Minister and lead Iranian negotiator Abbas Araghchi and President Masoud Pezeshkian, have said that Iran will not negotiate ”on the principle of enrichment itself.”[12]
Iran reportedly proposed forming a regional nuclear consortium with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to enrich uranium at Iranian facilities, according to Western and Iranian media.[13] The consortium would return enrichment levels to 2015 JCPOA levels at 3.67 percent.[14] It would also give Saudi Arabia and the UAE access to Iranian nuclear technology. Iran previously proposed a similar consortium between Iran and the Persian Gulf states in 2007.[15] This new proposal is likely part of Iran’s efforts to maintain some level of uranium enrichment.[16]
Houthi air defenses appear to have prevented US forces from establishing air supremacy over Yemen, though the Houthis did not create sufficient disruption to prevent US operations.[17] Control of the airspace is a continuum that stretches from air parity, which is when no force controls the air, to air supremacy, which is when the opposing force—in this case, the Houthis—is incapable of any effective interference with friendly air operations.[18] Air superiority, which falls between air parity and air supremacy, means a friendly force can operate without “prohibitive” interference from the opposing force.[19] The Houthis shot down seven MQ-9 Reaper drones and reportedly nearly struck an F-35 and an F-16 during the US air campaign between March 15 and May 5.[20] The Houthis probably possess the ability to shoot down F-16s. The Houthis use an Iranian-made version of the SA-6 Gainful, which other US adversaries have used to shoot down F-16s.[21] US Central Command (CENTCOM) was able to continue air operations despite this surface-to-air missile fire, and it is unclear to what degree Houthi air defenses impeded CENTCOM air operations, if at all.
A well-designed air campaign can only achieve temporary effects that must be sustained through other means. A relatively brief air campaign is unlikely to achieve long-term strategic effects like the destruction of an enemy’s missile program, because the adversary can usually rebuild the assets that are destroyed in the air campaign. The Houthis can replenish their losses from the air campaign through a combination of shipments from Iran and domestic production using goods purchased on the international market, thus demonstrating the air campaign’s limitations.[22]
Iran is continuing to try to circumvent US sanctions targeting Iranian oil exports. The United States sanctioned several front companies on May 13 that were created by the Armed Forces General Staff-affiliated Sepehr Energy to facilitate sanctioned oil trade.[44] The front companies include several People’s Republic of China-based companies, which illustrates the cooperation between US adversaries to undermine the US maximum pressure campaign.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-13-2025