Iran Update, May 13, 2025
Iran is preparing for a potential escalation with the United States by positioning military assets on key islands in the Persian Gulf and signaling its intent to target US bases, commercial shipping, and regional allies. Iranian Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri inspected military positions in southern Iran on May 12 to prepare for a possible escalation against the United States and approved deployments of military assets to the Nazeat islands around the Strait of Hormuz.[1] Bagheri ordered the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy, in coordination with local and tactical commanders, to implement a new operational plan around the Nazeat Islands to enhance missile and drone strike capabilities, fortify air defenses, and integrate advanced command and control infrastructure.[2] Bagheri explicitly stated that Iran would retaliate against US military bases, disrupt international commercial shipping, and attack regional states hosting US forces “if the US military makes a mistake.”[3] The Nazeat islands—including Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, Abu Musa, and Siri Island—are key positions for controlling maritime access to the Persian Gulf.[4] The IRGC has recently deployed naval mines, ballistic and anti-ship cruise missiles, and fast attack craft to these islands, though it is unclear if Bagheri ordered these specific deployments.[5] AFGS-affiliated media published an article on May 13 showcasing IRGC Navy surveillance footage of the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower from a Mohajer-6 drone and highlighted a new underground drone hangar in Hormozgan Province, likely to signal Iranian capability to surveil and strike US naval assets.[6] Iran previously responded to the US “maximum pressure” campaign in 2019 by attacking oil tankers near the Strait of Hormuz, seizing a foreign vessel, and harassing US and British naval ships.[7] The deployments to Nazeat could enable similar activities again. These activities follow new implicit US threats, including a statement by US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff on May 9 that raised the possibility of renewed military action against Iran if ongoing US-Iran talks fail.[8]
Iranian officials continued to categorically reject US demands for zero uranium enrichment, which may stall US-Iran nuclear negotiations. Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi told the Parliament’s National Security Commission on May 13 that uranium enrichment is Iran’s “red line” and emphasized that Iran will not negotiate on missile or regional defense issues.[9] Gharibabadi warned that Iran will ”see no need to continue the negotiations” if the United States continues to demand zero uranium enrichment. Gharibabadi and Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Political Affairs Majid Takht Ravanchi—who led the most recent round of technical talks in Oman on April 26—will likely lead Iran’s technical team in future technical negotiations that will almost certainly focus on Iranian uranium enrichment levels and Iran’s centrifuge stockpile.[10] Parliamentarian Ebrahim Rezaei separately stated on May 13 that several parliamentarians called for suspending nuclear negotiations until the United States publicly recognizes Iran’s right to uranium enrichment.[11] Iranian officials, including Foreign Affairs Minister and lead Iranian negotiator Abbas Araghchi and President Masoud Pezeshkian, have said that Iran will not negotiate ”on the principle of enrichment itself.”[12]
Iran reportedly proposed forming a regional nuclear consortium with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to enrich uranium at Iranian facilities, according to Western and Iranian media.[13] The consortium would return enrichment levels to 2015 JCPOA levels at 3.67 percent.[14] It would also give Saudi Arabia and the UAE access to Iranian nuclear technology. Iran previously proposed a similar consortium between Iran and the Persian Gulf states in 2007.[15] This new proposal is likely part of Iran’s efforts to maintain some level of uranium enrichment.[16]
Houthi air defenses appear to have prevented US forces from establishing air supremacy over Yemen, though the Houthis did not create sufficient disruption to prevent US operations.[17] Control of the airspace is a continuum that stretches from air parity, which is when no force controls the air, to air supremacy, which is when the opposing force—in this case, the Houthis—is incapable of any effective interference with friendly air operations.[18] Air superiority, which falls between air parity and air supremacy, means a friendly force can operate without “prohibitive” interference from the opposing force.[19] The Houthis shot down seven MQ-9 Reaper drones and reportedly nearly struck an F-35 and an F-16 during the US air campaign between March 15 and May 5.[20] The Houthis probably possess the ability to shoot down F-16s. The Houthis use an Iranian-made version of the SA-6 Gainful, which other US adversaries have used to shoot down F-16s.[21] US Central Command (CENTCOM) was able to continue air operations despite this surface-to-air missile fire, and it is unclear to what degree Houthi air defenses impeded CENTCOM air operations, if at all.
A well-designed air campaign can only achieve temporary effects that must be sustained through other means. A relatively brief air campaign is unlikely to achieve long-term strategic effects like the destruction of an enemy’s missile program, because the adversary can usually rebuild the assets that are destroyed in the air campaign. The Houthis can replenish their losses from the air campaign through a combination of shipments from Iran and domestic production using goods purchased on the international market, thus demonstrating the air campaign’s limitations.[22]
Iran is continuing to try to circumvent US sanctions targeting Iranian oil exports. The United States sanctioned several front companies on May 13 that were created by the Armed Forces General Staff-affiliated Sepehr Energy to facilitate sanctioned oil trade.[44] The front companies include several People’s Republic of China-based companies, which illustrates the cooperation between US adversaries to undermine the US maximum pressure campaign.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-13-2025
Iran is reportedly trying to get Arab countries, including Iraq, to encourage the United States to lift sanctions on Iran and conclude a nuclear deal. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani met with Iraqi National Security Adviser Qassem al Araji in Baghdad on May 14 to encourage the Iraqi federal government to raise “Iranian desires” at the Arab Summit in Baghdad on May 17, according to an unspecified source speaking to Iraqi media.[38] Araji is a member of the Iranian-backed Badr Organization. Ghaani will reportedly meet with other Iranian-backed Iraqi politicians during his visit to Baghdad. The unspecified source stated that Iran “seeks Arab support” to remove international sanctions on Iran and “move toward a nuclear agreement more quickly.” Senior Iranian officials have repeatedly rejected US demands during the ongoing US-Iran nuclear negotiations for zero uranium enrichment and criticized the US maximum pressure campaign targeting Iranian oil exports.
Iran reportedly recently proposed forming a regional nuclear consortium with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to enrich uranium at Iranian facilities, likely to try to maintain some level of uranium enrichment. Emirati Foreign Affairs Minister Khalifa Shaheen al Marar and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman al Saud will attend the Arab Summit. It is possible that this proposal will be discussed at the summit.
Iran and the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) will meet in Istanbul, Turkey, on May 16 to discuss the US-Iran nuclear negotiations.[39] The Iranian delegation will likely try to persuade the E3 not to impose snapback sanctions on Iran. Unspecified diplomats told Reuters on May 13 that the E3 may trigger snapback sanctions on Iran by August if Iran and the United States do not reach a “substantial deal” by then.[40] The E3 previously stated that Iran needed to conclude a new nuclear deal by June 2025.[41] The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.”[42] The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) previously passed a censure resolution proposed by the E3 in November 2024 that requires the IAEA to produce a “comprehensive report” on Iranian nuclear activities by spring 2025.[43] The IAEA has not released the report at the time of this writing. CTP-ISW previously assessed that the report will almost certainly confirm Iranian noncompliance with the JCPOA and lay the foundation for the E3 to impose snapback sanctions.[44] The snapback mechanism expires in October 2025.
Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Political Affairs Majid Takht Ravanchi and Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi may lead the Iranian delegation. Ravanchi and Gharibabadi previously led the US-Iran technical talks in Oman on April 26.[45] Ravanchi was part of the Iranian nuclear negotiating team that helped conclude the 2015 nuclear deal and has recently met with senior Russian officials to discuss the Iranian nuclear program and US-Iran nuclear talks.[46] Gharibabadi has also recently coordinated with China and Russia on Iran's nuclear program.[47] The Iran-E3 talks were originally scheduled for May 2 but were postponed after the fourth round of US-Iran nuclear talks was delayed.[48]
A group of Iranian parliamentarians echoed a senior Iranian military commander's recent threat to close the Strait of Hormuz if Israel or the United States strikes Iranian energy infrastructure.[49] Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri threatened on May 13 to disrupt international commercial shipping if the United States “makes a mistake.”[50] Bagheri recently inspected military positions in southern Iran and approved the deployment of military assets to the Nazeat Islands in the Persian Gulf.[51] Bagheri also ordered the IRGC to implement a new operational plan around these islands to enhance missile and drone strike capabilities.[52]
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https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-14-2025