Iran Update, May 13, 2025
Iran is reportedly trying to get Arab countries, including Iraq, to encourage the United States to lift sanctions on Iran and conclude a nuclear deal. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani met with Iraqi National Security Adviser Qassem al Araji in Baghdad on May 14 to encourage the Iraqi federal government to raise “Iranian desires” at the Arab Summit in Baghdad on May 17, according to an unspecified source speaking to Iraqi media.[38] Araji is a member of the Iranian-backed Badr Organization. Ghaani will reportedly meet with other Iranian-backed Iraqi politicians during his visit to Baghdad. The unspecified source stated that Iran “seeks Arab support” to remove international sanctions on Iran and “move toward a nuclear agreement more quickly.” Senior Iranian officials have repeatedly rejected US demands during the ongoing US-Iran nuclear negotiations for zero uranium enrichment and criticized the US maximum pressure campaign targeting Iranian oil exports.
Iran reportedly recently proposed forming a regional nuclear consortium with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to enrich uranium at Iranian facilities, likely to try to maintain some level of uranium enrichment. Emirati Foreign Affairs Minister Khalifa Shaheen al Marar and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman al Saud will attend the Arab Summit. It is possible that this proposal will be discussed at the summit.
Iran and the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) will meet in Istanbul, Turkey, on May 16 to discuss the US-Iran nuclear negotiations.[39] The Iranian delegation will likely try to persuade the E3 not to impose snapback sanctions on Iran. Unspecified diplomats told Reuters on May 13 that the E3 may trigger snapback sanctions on Iran by August if Iran and the United States do not reach a “substantial deal” by then.[40] The E3 previously stated that Iran needed to conclude a new nuclear deal by June 2025.[41] The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.”[42] The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) previously passed a censure resolution proposed by the E3 in November 2024 that requires the IAEA to produce a “comprehensive report” on Iranian nuclear activities by spring 2025.[43] The IAEA has not released the report at the time of this writing. CTP-ISW previously assessed that the report will almost certainly confirm Iranian noncompliance with the JCPOA and lay the foundation for the E3 to impose snapback sanctions.[44] The snapback mechanism expires in October 2025.
Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Political Affairs Majid Takht Ravanchi and Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi may lead the Iranian delegation. Ravanchi and Gharibabadi previously led the US-Iran technical talks in Oman on April 26.[45] Ravanchi was part of the Iranian nuclear negotiating team that helped conclude the 2015 nuclear deal and has recently met with senior Russian officials to discuss the Iranian nuclear program and US-Iran nuclear talks.[46] Gharibabadi has also recently coordinated with China and Russia on Iran's nuclear program.[47] The Iran-E3 talks were originally scheduled for May 2 but were postponed after the fourth round of US-Iran nuclear talks was delayed.[48]
A group of Iranian parliamentarians echoed a senior Iranian military commander's recent threat to close the Strait of Hormuz if Israel or the United States strikes Iranian energy infrastructure.[49] Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri threatened on May 13 to disrupt international commercial shipping if the United States “makes a mistake.”[50] Bagheri recently inspected military positions in southern Iran and approved the deployment of military assets to the Nazeat Islands in the Persian Gulf.[51] Bagheri also ordered the IRGC to implement a new operational plan around these islands to enhance missile and drone strike capabilities.[52]
more info:
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-14-2025
Iran Update, May 15, 2025
An Iranian vessel may have harassed a commercial vessel in the Persian Gulf on May 10. The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported that a small craft collided with a merchant vessel and attempted to collide with other vessels about 80 nautical miles northwest of Jebel Ali, the United Arab Emirates (UAE).[1] It is unclear if the collision was intentional or an accident. UKMTO reported that the merchant vessel later received Very High Frequency (VHF) messages from unidentified individuals claiming to be “local authorities.“[2] The unidentified individuals instructed the vessel to stop and allow authorities to board it. The incident occurred west of Siri Island, which Iran controls. This incident occurred shortly before Iranian Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri ordered the deployment of missile-capable fast attack craft (FAC) to Iranian islands in the Persian Gulf on May 12.[3] Bagheri stated on May 12 that Iran would retaliate against US military bases, disrupt international commercial shipping, and attack regional states hosting US forces “if the US military makes a mistake.” Iranian Artesh Navy Commander Rear Admiral Shahram Irani separately claimed on May 15 that Iran recently “neutralized” US naval activity in the Persian Gulf using “light naval units.”[4] Iran previously responded to the US “maximum pressure” campaign in 2019 by attacking oil tankers near the Strait of Hormuz, seizing a foreign vessel, and harassing US and British naval ships.[5]
Iran and the United States continue to disagree on the US demand for zero uranium enrichment, which may stall the US-Iran nuclear negotiations and delay a nuclear deal. US President Donald Trump stated on May 15 that the United States and Iran are “very close” to reaching a nuclear deal and that Iran has “sort of” agreed to US demands.[6] An unspecified Iranian source familiar with the negotiations told Reuters on May 15 that Iran and the United States continue to disagree on the issue of Iranian uranium enrichment.[7] Senior US officials, including lead US negotiator Steve Witkoff, have previously stated that Iran can “never” have an enrichment program.[8] Senior Iranian officials have repeatedly rejected this US demand.[9] Iranian Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Shamkhani told NBC News on May 14 that Iran is ready to sign a deal with the United States and willing to limit enrichment to “civilian levels.”[10] “Civilian levels” likely refers to the 3.67 percent enriched uranium limit set by the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Reuters reported that the United States and Iran also disagree on where and how Iran would transfer its highly enriched uranium stockpile to another location, citing unspecified Iranian sources.[11] Iran’s rejection of the US demands for zero uranium enrichment may jeopardize the talks or force negotiations toward a less expansive agreement than what the United States reportedly desires.
The Houthis are unlikely to seriously engage in the Saudi-led peace roadmap because doing so would undermine their objectives to control all of Yemen. UK-based outlet Amwaj Media reported on May 13 that the United States asked the Houthis to return to the peace process, which Saudi Arabia initiated in 2022, as part of the US-Houthi ceasefire.[12] US President Donald Trump stated during a press conference in Doha on May 15 that “we want [the Houthis] to get along with Saudi Arabia.”[13] CTP-ISW assessed on May 9 that the Houthis have little incentive to participate meaningfully in peace negotiations given that the Houthis have not suffered any military defeats that would compel them to re-engage in peace talks.[14] The Saudi-led and UN-facilitated roadmap envisioned a political settlement among Yemen’s factions, including the Houthis, and would presumably work toward some kind of power-sharing agreement between the Houthis and the Yemeni government.[15] The Houthis consider themselves to be Yemen’s legitimate government and will likely oppose any negotiations that could reduce their authority in northern Yemen or undermine their objective to control the entire country.
The United States sanctioned six individuals and 12 entities on May 14 for helping Iran procure materials needed for the production of ballistic missiles.[25] The sanctioned entities and individuals are based in Iran and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The United States sanctioned an Iran-based company that has supplied carbon fiber to the IRGC Aerospace Force Research and Self Sufficiency Jihad Organization and the IRGC Research and Self Sufficiency Jihad Organization. Carbon fiber is used to produce ballistic missiles.[26] The United States sanctioned these two IRGC organizations in 2017 for involvement in Iranian ballistic missile research, development, and flight test launches.[27] The United States also sanctioned one PRC-based company and three of its employees for sending carbon fiber to Iranian companies.[28]
Iran approved the opening of the first branch of a Russian bank in Iran on May 15.[29] Iran and Russia launched a new interbank network to circumvent the US dollar-based SWIFT system in November 2024 that allows Iranians to use Iranian bank cards to withdraw money in Russia.[30] The opening of a Russian bank branch is part of a broader Iranian effort to mitigate sanctions and bolster the Iranian economy.
The Iranian rial appreciated from 836,000 rials to one US dollar on May 14 to 830,000 rials to one US dollar on May 15.[31]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-15-2025