Iran Update, May 16, 2025
The IRGC Quds Force commander probably traveled to Iraq to ensure alignment among Iranian-backed Iraqi parties ahead of the Arab summit, particularly over engagement with Syria and the invitation to Shara. A State of Law parliamentarian criticized unspecified Iraqi political parties for portraying Iraq as weak in order to attack the Iraqi federal government in an interview on May 14.[43] The parliamentarian added that IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani traveled to Baghdad on May 14 to “secure the Arab Summit,” implying that Ghaani sought to create unity among the Iranian-backed parties. Ghaani arrived one day after Sudani met with Khazali and Ameri, and would presumably need to forge unity after the political sparring over the invite to Shara. Many Iranian-backed factions, including Khazali’s Asaib Ahl al Haq, threatened the summit if Shara attended, while Ameri defended Shara’s invite. Iran is especially concerned about tensions between the Shia Coordination Framework ahead of the upcoming parliamentary elections.[44] Iranian-backed Iraqi parties lost a significant number of seats in the 2021 elections due to inter-party competition that advantaged a more unified opposition.[45]
Iranian efforts to secure Syrian debt reimbursement through Iraqi mediation probably do not represent a change in Iranian hostility towards Damascus, though it does illustrate Iran’s economic fragility and need for funds. An informed source told Iraqi media on May 15 that Ghaani emphasized to several Shia Coordination Framework leaders, including Maliki and Ameri, that the Iraqi federal government should help recover Syrian debt to Iran.[46] Iranian parliamentarians and former diplomats calculate that Iran spent about 30 billion US dollars to bolster the Assad regime. CTP-ISW cannot verify this number.[47] Ghaani’s effort to secure Syrian debt to Iran follows US President Donald Trump’s announcement on May 13 that he intends to lift “all” sanctions on Syria, despite several legal obstacles to doing so.[48] Ghaani may have discussed this with Iranian-backed Iraqi politicians due to Shaibani’s planned attendance at the Arab Summit in Baghdad, where Iraqi leaders could engage Shaibani.[49] Ghaani reportedly discussed other Iranian “desires” regarding sanctions relief and the US-Iran nuclear negotiations for the Iraqi federal government to raise at the summit with Iraqi National Security Advisor Qasim al Araji on May 14.[50] It is not clear what Iraq could offer Syria to entice the new Syrian government to repay Assad’s debts to Iran. The money and other support that Tehran gave Assad would have been used to attack the Syrians who currently control Syria.
Iran and the Iranian-backed Iraqi actors that Ghaani approached to mediate Syria’s debt repayment continue to oppose Iraq-Syria normalization. Unidentified political sources told Iraqi media in late February 2025 that Iraq has not normalized relations with the Syrian government due to Iranian opposition, demonstrating the reality that Iran is still hostile towards Syria.[51] Iran also views Turkey’s influence in Syria as a threat to its long-standing strategic objectives. Iranian officials have also expressed concern that the fall of Assad created a vacuum for ISIS to exploit and spread instability to Iran.[52] Maliki and Ameri, like some Iranian officials, view Hayat Tahrir al Sham and Shara as “terrorists.”[53] It is unlikely that Iranian-backed Iraqi politicians would be able to compel the Syrian government to repay its debt to Iran. The Syrian government would also almost certainly prioritize reconstructing Syria over repaying Iran because Iranian money made serious contributions to Syria’s destruction.
Iran and Iranian-backed Iraqi actors will likely begin the first phase of a pressure campaign to compel Turkey to withdraw from northern Iraq. Ghaani reportedly discussed applying political and diplomatic pressure on Turkey to withdraw from Iraq during meetings with Shia Coordination Framework leaders on May 15.[54] Turkey maintains at least 136 permanent military bases across northern Iraq and has built 121 of these bases since 2018 to combat the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), according to BBC analysis.[55] The PKK announced on May 9 that it would dissolve itself and “end its armed struggle” after forty years of militant activity.[56]
Iran and Iranian-backed Iraqi leaders may use force to compel Turkey to withdraw from northern Iraq if the diplomatic and political efforts fail. Iran and Iranian-backed Iraqi figures appear to believe that political and diplomatic pressure will be sufficient to ensure a Turkish withdrawal upon PKK disarmament, but Turkey has not expressed willingness to withdraw at this time. Turkey exerts major influence within the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and has previously worked with Iraqi Sunni parties to increase its influence in Iraq, often at Iran’s expense.[57] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have previously struck a Turkish base in Ninewa Province and other Turkish positions in northern Iraq to impose a cost on Turkey for its regional activities.[58]
Iran and the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) met in Istanbul, Turkey, on May 16 to discuss the US-Iran nuclear negotiations and snapback sanctions.[59] This marks the first Iran-E3 meeting since the start of US-Iran nuclear talks on April 12. Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Political Affairs Majid Takht Ravanchi and Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi led the Iranian delegation.[60] UK Foreign Office Political Director Christian Turner stated that Iran and the E3 “shared [a] commitment to dialogue” and “agreed to meet again,” citing the “urgency” of the moment. This urgency likely refers to US President Donald Trump’s 60-day nuclear deal deadline, which ends in June 2025.[61] The meeting also comes after E3 diplomats recently threatened to trigger snapback sanctions on Iran by August if no substantial deal is reached.[62]
Iran continues to deepen its economic ties with the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) to mitigate the impact of Western sanctions. The Iran-EEU free trade agreement, signed in December 2023, entered into force on May 15.[66] The EEU is comprised of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia. The deal aims to facilitate trade between the parties in various sectors, including agriculture, textiles, and industrial goods.[67] The deal reportedly cuts Iranian tariffs on Russian imports from 16.6 percent to 5.2 percent.[68] Iranian media reported that the deal could raise Iran-EEU trade to 12 billion dollars.[69] Iran and Russia have continued to expand ties since they signed the January 2025 Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty.[70] Iran recently approved the opening of the first Russian bank branch in Iran, likely to bypass the US dollar-based SWIFT system and bolster Iran’s economy.[71] The deal is part of a broader Iranian effort to reduce dependence on Western markets and mitigate the effect of sanctions on Iran’s deteriorating economy.
The Iranian rial appreciated from 830,000 rials to one US dollar on May 15 to 829,000 rials to one US dollar on May 16.[77]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-16-2025
According to the minutes of a meeting recovered by Israeli troops from a hidden Hamas command tunnel in Gaza, terrorist leader Yahya Sinwar had told senior commanders on Oct. 2 that only an “extraordinary act” could wreck the fast‑advancing deal. If Riyadh signed, he warned, “most Arab and Muslim governments would line up behind it,” sidelining Hamas. The minutes say the assault, in which about 6,000 Hamas-led Gazan terrorists stormed the Israeli border, murdered some 1,200 people and abducted another 251, had been under preparation for two years as part of a broader campaign to “shift the strategic balance” and pull other members of the so‑called Axis of Resistance into the fight.
A companion memo—also found in the tunnel—advised accelerating attacks in Judea, Samaria and Jerusalem for the same purpose and dismissed any Saudi pledge to defend Palestinian interests as a bluff. Hamas even circulated a “help wanted” notice for a university‑educated operative to coordinate anti‑normalization work, the cache revealed.
The prospect of Saudi‑Israeli talks had advanced further in 2023 than in any previous effort: draft U.S. security guarantees for the kingdom, U.S. approval of civil nuclear technology and a roadmap for Palestinian self‑governance were all on the table, according to the Journal. Hamas saw the moment as existential. An August 2022 internal briefing cited in the files states it was the movement's “duty” to derail the “wave of normalization sweeping the Arab world,” which already included the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan—the cosignatories of the 2020 Abrahams Accords led by U.S. President Donald Trump during his first term in office.
The Oct. 7 attacks triggered a war in Gaza and throughout the region, leaving much of the Strip in ruins. It also froze the Saudi peace track: Riyadh has said it would not revisit the deal until fighting stops and a credible path to Palestinian statehood emerges. Israeli troops killed Sinwar in Gaza on Oct. 16, 2024.
https://www.jns.org/hamas-docs-oct-7-aimed-to-block-israel-saudi-peace/
Iran Update, May 19, 2025
Iran may have jammed vessel navigation systems in the Strait of Hormuz in order to set conditions to seize vessels that inadvertently enter Iranian territorial waters as a result of navigation issues.[1] The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported that several vessels experienced Global Positioning System (GPS) interference in the Strait of Hormuz for several hours on May 18.[2] GPS interference disrupts ships’ ability to navigate, and they may veer off course as a result. GPS interference around the Strait of Hormuz can cause vessels to inadvertently enter Iranian territorial waters, which Iran can then use to justify seizing vessels .[3] Iran previously conducted GPS jamming in 2019 to try to lure vessels into Iranian waters.[4] The GPS jamming in 2019 was part of a broader Iranian response to the US “maximum pressure” campaign that also included seizing and attacking vessels. The recent GPS interference incidents come after Iranian Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri threatened on May 12 that Iran would retaliate by disrupting international commercial shipping, among other things, “if the US military makes a mistake.”[5] Bagheri was likely referring to a potential US strike on Iranian nuclear or energy facilities. Iran also deployed missile-capable fast attack craft (FAC) as well as geospatial intelligence and surveillance technology to Iranian islands in the Persian Gulf on May 12.[6] Iran can use FAC to attack and harass ships.[7]
A possible Iranian vessel recently harassed a commercial vessel in the Persian Gulf on May 10. The UKMTO reported on May 10 that a small craft collided with a merchant vessel and attempted to collide with other vessels about 80 nautical miles northwest of Jebel Ali, the United Arab Emirates (UAE).[8] The UKMTO reported that the merchant vessel later received Very High Frequency (VHF) messages from unidentified individuals claiming to be “local authorities.”[9] Iran’s partner, the Houthis, have similarly used GPS jamming and small boats to harass international shipping and have seized vessels in the Red Sea, specifically the Bab el Mandeb Strait, another important maritime trade chokepoint.[10]
This recent series of events suggests that Iran may be in the very early stages of an escalation campaign against international shipping around the Strait of Hormuz. Iran previously threatened international shipping through this important waterway in 2019 in response to US President Donald Trump’s “maximum pressure” strategy.[11] Iran’s preparations for its campaign in 2019 mirror actions that Iran is taking today.[12] Iranian officials inspected Iranian military sites near the Persian Gulf in 2019 before Iran conducted attacks on vessels.[13] Senior Iranian military commanders, including Bagheri and Artesh Navy Commander Rear Admiral Shahram Irani, have recently visited Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and Artesh Navy sites along the Persian Gulf coast.[14] Iran later used drones to harass vessels passing through the Strait of Hormuz and used GPS jamming to coax vessels into Iranian territorial waters.[15] IRGC-affiliated media recently published videos of Iranian drones following US naval vessels in the Persian Gulf. [16]It is unclear whether Iran is preparing for a campaign targeting international shipping in the Strait of Hormuz or trying to signal to the United States that it can threaten freedom of navigation through the Persian Gulf to try to deter a potential US strike on Iran.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-19-2025