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The National Transportation Safety Board on Thursday issued four safety recommendations in its final report on the agency’s investigation of the fatal June 17, 2017 collision between the destroyer USS Fitzgerald and the containership ACX Crystal.

The US Navy is to replace touchscreen controls on destroyers with physical systems in 2020 after a report into the fatal 2017 USS John S McCain collision branded the controls ‘unnecessarily complex’. The investigation into the accident that resulted in the deaths of 10 sailors said that the complexity of the control system and a lack of training led to the collision. Bridge design on US naval vessels is largely uncontrolled by the military, with a lack of specific requirements leaving design decisions to shipbuilders. The step-back in technology will give sailors more tactile feedback and remove the ambiguity and...

Former USS Fitzgerald CO Outlines Defense in Rebuttal to SECNAV By: Sam LaGrone Cmdr. Bryce Benson, then-executive officer, assists in bringing down the battle ensign aboard USS Fitzgerald (DDG-62) in 2016. US Navy Photo The former commander of USS Fitzgerald (DDG-62) is pushing back against a rebuke from the Secretary of the Navy, disputing major facts in the service’s argument he was criminally negligent leading up a June 17, 2017, fatal collision, according to a copy of the April 26 rebuttal obtained by USNI News. Earlier this month, Richard V. Spencer wrote that former Fitzgerald commander Cmdr. Bryce Benson failure...

Board Finds ‘No Basis’ to Remove Officer Involved in USS Fitzgerald Collision from Navy A board of inquiry moved not to separate from service a sailor who the Navy had previously charged with negligent homicide for his role in the 2017 fatal collision of USS Fitzgerald (DDG-62), USNI News has learned. On Friday, a board found “no basis” to separate Lt. Irian Woodley from the Navy for cause, Woodley’s lawyer, Lt. Cmdr. Justin McEwen, confirmed to USNI News when contacted on Friday. The board was made up of three surface warfare officers and was based in Japan. “The findings were...

A little after 1:30 a.m. on June 17, 2017, Alexander Vaughan tumbled from his bunk onto the floor of his sleeping quarters on board the Navy destroyer USS Fitzgerald. The shock of cold, salty water snapped him awake. He struggled to his feet and felt a torrent rushing past his thighs. Around him, sailors were screaming. “Water on deck. Water on deck!” Vaughan fumbled for his black plastic glasses and strained to see through the darkness of the windowless compartment.

When Vice Adm. Joseph Aucoin was elevated to lead the vaunted 7th Fleet in 2015, he expected it to be the pinnacle of his nearly four-decade Navy career. But what he found with the 7th Fleet alarmed and angered him. The fleet was short of sailors, and those it had were often poorly trained and worked to exhaustion. Its warships were falling apart, and a bruising, ceaseless pace of operations meant there was little chance to get necessary repairs done. The very top of the Navy was consumed with buying new, more sophisticated ships, even as its sailors struggled to...

An anonymous email came in over the transom this morning: Hi, Stacy. During the early weeks after the USS Fitzgerald was speared by a lumbering Philippine container ship, it was noteworthy that the captain and a couple of admirals were publically named, but not the actual officer in charge, the officer of the deck. (OOD) The other person who should have kept the Fitz out of trouble is the person in charge of the combat information center, the Tactical Action Officer. That individual is supposed to be monitoring the combat radar, which can detect a swimmer at a distance of...

The collisions were avoidable between USS FITZGERALD (DDG 62) and Motor Vessel ACX CRYSTAL, and between USS JOHN S MCCAIN (DDG 56) and Motor Vessel ALNIC MC. Three U.S. Navy investigations concerning each of these incidents are complete. Command and Admiralty investigations in each case retain legal privilege to protect the interests of the United States Government in future litigation. As Chief of Naval Operations, I have determined to retain the legal privilege that exists with the command Admiralty investigations in order to protect the legal interests of the United States Government and the families of those Sailors who perished....

This post has been updated to correct the name of the former commander of USS John S. McCain (DDG-56). The correct name is Cmdr. Alfredo J. Sanchez. This post has also been updated with a statement from the service. The commanders of the two guided-missile destroyers that were involved in fatal collisions with merchant ships in 2017 will face military criminal charges that include charges of dereliction of duty, hazarding a vessel and negligent homicide, after the two incidents that resulted in the death of 17 sailors total, USNI News has learned. Cmdr. Bryce Benson, former commander of USS Fitzgerald...

Two Navy commanders will face negligent homicide charges related to the deadly crashes of two ships off Asia last year, the Navy announced Tuesday. The decision to file charges against service members of the USS Fitzgerald and the USS John S. McCain were decided by Adm. Frank Caldwell, who was given the authority and examined the evidence of what caused the collisions, according to Navy spokesman Capt. Greg Hicks. Former Cmdr. Bryce Benson of the USS Fitzgerald and former Cmdr. Alfredo J. Sanchez of the USS John S. McCain are among those charged...

The Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyer USS Fitzgerald (DDG 62) has been loaded aboard the heavy lift transport vessel Transshelf and begin her journey to Pascagoula, Mississippi for further repairs. Fitzgerald departed Fleet Activities (FLEACT) Yokosuka under tow on November 24 begin the heavy lift process in deep water.

The following is the U.S. Fleet Forces led, Comprehensive Review of Recent Surface Force Incidents. The report was released by the Navy on Nov. 2, 2017.

The fatal collisions of the two guided-missile destroyers USS John S. McCain and USS Fitzgerald between merchant ships that killed 17 sailors were rooted in fundamental failures in the crew’s ability to operate their ships effectively, according to a summary of two investigations the Navy released to the public on Wednesday. “Both of these accidents were preventable and the respective investigations found multiple failures by watchstanders that contributed to the incidents, said Chief of Naval Operations Adm. John Richardson in a statement. “We must do better.”

Two of the world’s most sophisticated warships collided with merchant ships this year in preventable incidents that killed 17 American sailors. While those inside and out of the Navy are demanding answers to what caused the failures, the root causes are many and the fixes are far from easy. On June 17, USS Fitzgerald (DDG-62) collided with a merchant ship 50 miles off the coast of Japan, ripping the destroyer’s welded steel hull open under the waterline and crushing the superstructure of the warship. Seven sailors drowned in the space where they slept, unable to escape after water began pouring...

The admiral in charge of the Navy’s nuclear reactors program will oversee any additional punishments related to the fatal collisions of guided-missile destroyers USS Fitzgerald (DDG-62) and USS John S. McCain (DDG-56), USNI News has learned. Adm. James Caldwell was appointed by Vice Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Bill Moran on Monday as the “Consolidated Disposition Authority (CDA) for administrative and disciplinary actions related to the Fitzgerald and McCain collisions,” Navy spokesman Cmdr. Bill Speaks told USNI News. “As CDA, Adm. Caldwell will review the evidence regarding causes of these collisions, and he will make a determination regarding what administrative...

USS Fitzgerald The collision between Fitzgerald and Crystal was avoidable and resulted from an accumulation of smaller errors over time, ultimately resulting in a lack of adherence to sound navigational practices. Specifically, Fitzgerald’s watch teams disregarded established norms of basic contact management and, more importantly, leadership failed to adhere to well-established protocols put in place to prevent collisions. In addition, the ship’s triad was absent during an evolution where their experience, guidance and example would have greatly benefited the ship. USS JOHN S. MCCAIN The collision between John S. McCain and Alnic MC was also avoidable and resulted primarily from...

Poor decisions and lax standards made by the crews of the USS Fitzgerald and the USS John S. McCain contributed to the deadly collisions last summer that killed 17 sailors, according to a new Navy investigation. "The collisions were avoidable," said Adm. John Richardson, the chief of naval operations, in the executive summary to the report. "Both of these accidents were preventable and the respective investigations found multiple failures by watchstanders that contributed to the incidents," he added in a statement accompanying the report's release. "We must do better." On June 17, the guided-missile destroyer USS Fitzgerald collided with a...

Interesting theory

Full title: "US Navy Loss Of The USS Guardian, 2 Patrol Boats, USS Fitzgerald and USS McCain. Why Does The List Keeps Going?" Four ships in four years – not to mention USS Antietam grounding and the USS Fitzgerald collision – apparently due to breakdowns in seamanship, something is wrong. Having served for a combined 36 years in the Navy and the civilian Military Sealift Command, I have had the opportunity to compare both systems of grooming deck watch standers. In my opinion the surface Navy expects too much too soon from its surface junior officers. Initial sea tours on...

On the bridge of the Fitz, the OOD was in charge. OODs on duty receive exact, timely, information from the ship’s sensors, including Combat Information Center (CIC) about the location, course, speed, and trajectory of all objects on, above, or below the surface. the Fitz’s OOD had precise warning, perhaps 45 minutes before the collision happened, that he was on a collision course. The OOD either removes the problem by changing course by one or two degrees on his own authority, or, notifies the captain who then makes the course adjustment. Surely, this OOD did none of the above. we...