Posted on 06/04/2024 2:51:19 AM PDT by Jacquerie
Battle of Midway, (June 3–6, 1942), World War II naval battle, fought almost entirely with aircraft.
The Midway Islands were claimed for the United States on July 5, 1859, by Capt. N.C. Brooks. The coral atoll—consisting of Eastern Island and the larger Sand Island to the west—has a total land area of just 2.4 square miles (6.2 square km). Midway was formally annexed by the U.S. in 1867. A coal depot was established for transpacific steamers, but it was never used.
It was World War II which conclusively demonstrated the strategic importance of Midway. In 1940 the U.S. Navy began work on a major air and submarine base there. By the following year Eastern Island would boast three runways, while on Sand Island a seaplane hangar was built for a squadron of PBY Catalina flying boats.
So prominent was Midway in Japanese war planning that it was included in the opening offensive of the Pacific War on December 7–8, 1941. Roughly 12 hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese destroyers Sazanami and Ushio bombarded the power plant and seaplane hangar on Sand Island.
Despite a strategic setback at the Battle of the Coral Sea (May 4–8, 1942), the Japanese had continued with plans to seize the Midway Islands and bases in the Aleutians. Seeking a naval showdown with the numerically inferior U.S. Pacific Fleet, Adm. Yamamoto Isoroku sent out the bulk of the Kidō Butai (“Mobile Force”), a massive carrier battle group under the command of Vice Adm. Nagumo Chuichi.
The 4 heavy aircraft carriers Akagi, Hiryu, Kaga, and Soryu were supplemented by 2 light aircraft carriers, 2 seaplane carriers, 7 battleships, 15 cruisers, 42 destroyers, 10 submarines, and various support and escort vessels.
Their orders were to destroy the American fleet and invade Midway.
(Excerpt) Read more at britannica.com ...
Thank you for posting. I’ve seen both movies, so I could visualize the descriptions.
Bkmk
Good reminder.
We were very lucky.
I’m not one who thinks breaking the code made victory automatic. We knew their general direction and their target. That meant they were in an area of a gazillion square miles.
We got some really good breaks like radio failures on their float planes, timing of our uncoordinated torpedo attacks that pulled their CAP to the surface, Nagumo becoming flustered and ordering rearming when he could have hit us with HE ordinance (our carriers had wooden decks).
I’ve read the naval academy uses the most sophisticated technology and fights the battle over as a war game every year. That we have never pulled such a one sided victory in any scenario since WW2.
Commanded Task Force 16, centered on USS Enterprise and USS Hornet. He was a destroyer man, commander of the escort force but elevated to overall command by circumstance (ADM Halsey had shingles). Some FReepers may have served aboard one of his namesake SPRUANCE-class destroyers.
Commander of Task Force 17, centered on USS Yorktown. Yorktown was badly damaged at the Coral Sea ... yard men at Pearl Harbor fixed her up in record time to fight at Midway. The japs (thought they) sank her four times:
1) By aerial bombardment at Coral Sea.
2) By aerial bombardment at Midway. The crew got her back in the fight.
3) By aerial bombardment at Midway (again). The crew kept her from sinking; she was taken under tow by USS Hammond back to Pearl.
4) By submarine torpedo. The japs got both Yorktown and Hammond.
Looks like she just recovered one of her aircraft.
Unlike the Jap carriers that became horrid infernos, Yorktown fared much better due in large part to:
1. Better USN damage control.
2. A fuels division petty officer aboard Yorktown floated the idea of, before battle, replacing the aviation fuel from all lines with inert CO2.
It is why the non-burning Yorktown was attacked a second time.
The matter is discussed at some length in “Shattered Sword”. “Better USN damage control” doesn’t quite cover it. In IJN doctrine, damage control was a specialty only. The damage control guys got good training, but there were relatively few of them. The rest of the sailors got nothing. In USN doctrine, there were damage control specialists, but damage control was considered EVERYBODY’S business, and everybody got trained.
That’s not to discount the value of purging the fuel lines.
At Midway, we were lucky with bombs.
Torpedos are the real ship sinkers.
The Yorktown was heavily damaged by aerial torpedos, and sunk by sub launched torpedos.
For the IJN torpedo bombers to hit a moving ship with bombs would much more difficult and dangerous than a torpedo attack. Plus, the bombs they loaded with were fused for surface bursts, damaging for ships, but not ship sinkers. A greater question is his course change to the NorthEast, and not West.
On Youtube, Montemayor has some excellent presentations on Midway, and some other actions.
Students, or others who have refought the battle are hampered, knowing too much or not enough, and will almost never get the same results.
Nagumo rearmed at about 715 ish A.M., switched his planes from HE to torpedos and penetrating bombs. In their hurry they stacked the ordinance around the decks and hangers like firewood some sources say. Which made the US strikes 10x more damaging.
Hard to say how many of our carriers he would have caught, maybe 2 of the 3? If he would have just launched the strikes.
Speculation.
So say neither sank (how likely?) but both had shattered decks, massive fires. You would be talking of huge losses in trained personnel, US aircraft on return would find no decks to land on save one or midway which had chaos and cratered runways. So how many planes would have been lost, to ditching or wrecks, how many more pilots? Both those carriers would have been out for a long time for repairs.
Plus Hiryu likely would have survived the battle untouched (she wasn’t killed until that evening) and with aircraft from the other 3 carriers (we assume would still have been sunk—not a guarantee with ordinance being stored properly) been bursting at the seams with planes.
It’s obvious Nagumo made a massive mistake in not using HE to strike when he could. This of course is with the clarity of hindsight.
It would not be war changing but certainly affected the course of events to our detriment. Imagine the touch and go fighting we had at Guadalcanal a few months later (our most lopsided loss of the war besides midway was Savo Island) and now throw in a fully loaded and veteran crewed Hiryu lurking around “iron bottom sound”.
Things might have went much harder on us.
It’s interesting to look at the alternative paths history might have taken.
As opposed to June 1944, the allies were back on their heels in Spring 1942.
1941 USN bloodied at Pearl Harbor. Wake and Guam fall.
1942. U-boats still threaten to starve the UK.
Rommel trouncing around North Africa.
Russia is near collapse.
IJN victorious across the Pacific as it runs the Royal Navy out of the Indian Ocean, and the Dutch Navy, Australian Navy and USN from the Java Sea.
Philippines fall.
Japs attack Darwin.
With the Lexington sunk and Yorktown damaged, the Battle of the Coral Sea is a strategic success and tactical defeat for the USN.
Edit
“ our most lopsided loss of the war besides midway…”
Oops meant Pearl Harbor.
Heroic aviators and a huge helping of luck.
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.
