Grading Midway's Commanders

Which side received higher leadership marks on its Battle of Midway report card is no surprise, but the illuminating ‘why’ behind the grades reflects crucial differences between the U.S. Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy.

Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, Commander-in-Chief of Japan’s Combined Fleet, was the architect of Midway and arguably the chief author of its failure.

An inveterate gambler, accomplished bureaucratic infighter, and air-power advocate, he was also an outspoken opponent of the Axis alliance with which Japan had entered the war. Yet the outbreak of the conflict he feared had been coincident with his most spectacular achievement: the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Now, just a few months later, Yamamoto was trying to end the war he had begun. Midway was intended to be the decisive battle that would destroy the U.S. Pacific Fleet’s remaining aircraft carriers, break the United States’ morale, and bring the enemy to the bargaining table. American historians have noted the hubris of Yamamoto’s aims at Midway. But we often forget he was driven by fear. Having lived and traveled extensively in the United States, Yamamoto was intimately familiar with the country’s industrial might and the ingenuity and drive of its citizens.

In retrospect, the notion of U.S. forces needing to be lured into battle seems ludicrous. In fact, Yamamoto’s opposite number, Admiral Chester Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, was itching for a fight.

Nimitz’s plan made the most of what he had. Crucially, too, Nimitz gave his subordinates crystal clear orders on how they were to fight.

Contrast with Robert E. Lee at Gettysburg or the Charge of the Light Brigade at Balaclava. If orders are not clear, things will go not go well.

It is equally clear that Nagumo and Yamaguchi’s outlooks were becoming mono-dimensional and limited to a sphere of combat that was primarily tactical, personal, and visual. Neither man was capable of placing his tactical decisions within the larger context of the nation’s war-waging.

I think that the current US military would likely be in this sort of situation. The primary goal for many in the US is to make sure you can't be held accountable. Focus on yourself. Stay out of trouble. There is no big picture. Overall strategy is not your concern, just make sure you won't be blamed when things go wrong. And, to that end, if you have to give orders, try to make them vague and confusing. That way, when a subordinate does A and screws things up, you can say, "I Meant you should have done B. It's not my fault you didn't understand."

I don't think the current US culture is capable of fighting a serious war. We are not the nation we were in the 1940s.

goal for many in the US is to make sure you can’t be held accountable.
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While we are on the subject of WWII Pacific, contrast this:

“Commander Ernest E. Evans, a Native American naval officer, famously declared at the commissioning of the USS Johnston (DD-557) on October 27, 1943: “This is going to be a fighting ship. I intend to go in harm’s way, and anyone who doesn’t want to go along had better get off right now.”

Evans lived up to those words during the Battle off Samar on October 25, 1944, when the outnumbered and outgunned Johnston charged into the vastly superior Japanese fleet to protect the American escort carriers. Despite being heavily damaged, Evans refused to retreat and continued engaging the enemy ships until Johnston was sunk.

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