Ignoring the Lessons of Defeat (Midway)

Naval History Magazine ^ | June 2007 | Jonathan Parshall

[Jacquerie]

It would stand to reason that a battle as momentous as Midway—and a defeat as calamitous as the one the Japanese suffered—would have led to a major re-evaluation of their naval practices and, most likely, to lessons learned that would have improved Japanese performance in future battles. Learning can take place on a number of levels, and the effects of Midway were felt across the board, from the halls of power down to the level of the navy’s operational personnel.

Third Fleet’s doctrine emerged in late July 1942. It contained a number of important recognitions and tactical innovations.2 Most important, for the first time, the navy explicitly recognized the primacy of the aircraft carrier, noting that it was “the center, the main objective, of the Decisive Air Battle” and that “[all other] surface forces will cooperate with them.” The battleship was thus finally and formally removed from the apex of Japanese naval thinking.

The first major change proposed was to the fleet’s formation. Carrier divisions, which formerly had been composed of two carriers, were now to contain three flight decks—two fleet carriers and a light fleet carrier, the smallest ship charged with carrying combat air patrol fighters.

[Jacquerie]

Parshall’s article is well worth your time.

[sauropod]

bkmk

[NFHale]

Thank you

[Captain Walker]

This is an informative article, but Parshall's comment about it being the beginning of a Japanese campaign to hide or disguise bad news is a bit ironic.

For three months after the battle, the US's official description of the damage incurred to Yorktown was simply that the ship had suffered "heavy damage".

It was not until September 1942 that she was reported sunk in the battle.

[Jacquerie]

Not ironic at all.

Read Shattered Sword.

[Phlyer]

. . . the US's official description of the damage . . .

That was the official *public* description. The US Navy didn't lie to itself, as the Japanese Navy did. The Japanese government also lied to the Japanese people and claimed that Midway as a victory, etc.

In the absence of hard, verifiable data, the US Navy had a lot of wishful thinking about things like our torpedoes, which were a lot worse than we 'thought', and about Japanese torpedoes, which were a lot better than we thought. But we learned from the battles and got better, while the Japanese kept trying to recreate the Battle of Tsushima and refused to believe any changes in doctrine or tactics were required.

[Captain Walker]

The Japanese government also lied to the Japanese people and claimed that Midway as a victory, etc.

But how much of this is unusual for any country to do in wartime?

(How was our bombing campaign over Germany being described stateside, or our losses in the Hurtgen Forest?)

[SunkenCiv]

• The Battle of Midway -- Myths, Legends and Greatness (with John Parshall) [06/04/2024]
• Battle of Midway [06/04/2024]
• Grading Midway's Commanders [06/04/2024]