Iranian Regime tv Channel One hacked while it was airing Khamenie speech

various | 10-8-22

[nuconvert]

Iranian Regime national tv Channel One hacked about an hour ago. During a broadcast of Khamenie speech, a red crosshair appeared over his face and chanting of Women. Life. Freedom. There was writing to the side saying "Rise up. Join us". Also 4 photos at the bottom of the screen of young people killed and additional writing: "The blood of our youth is dropping from your paws".

Also, there was a huge banner in the middle of Tehran highway today that read: We are no longer afraid of you. We will fight.

Also, attempted attack on IRI ambassador in Denmark. Her bodyguard was stabbed. Diplomatic Security intervened before the attacker could stab the ambassador.

[AdmSmith]

Iran Update, July 17, 2025

A US media outlet reported on July 17 that US strikes in Iran on June 21 caused significant damage to only one of the three Iranian nuclear facilities that the United States struck.[1] CTP-ISW has previously assessed that the strikes caused significant damage to all three facilities and will likely set back Iran’s nuclear program.[2] US airstrikes targeted the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant, Natanz Enrichment Complex, and Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC).[3] NBC News reported on July 17 that the US strikes set back uranium enrichment at Fordow by up to two years but stated that “nuclear enrichment [at Natanz and the ENTC] could resume in the next several months,” citing former and current US officials familiar with a recent US damage assessment.[4] A US weapons expert stated on July 17 that Iran does not conduct uranium enrichment at the ENTC.[5]

The strikes destroyed key infrastructure at all three facilities. US strikes destroyed the Uranium Metal Conversion Plant at the ENTC, which Iran could have used to transform uranium gas into dense metal in a process called metallization.[6] This process is one of the last steps required to form the explosive core of an atomic bomb. CIA Director John Ratcliffe reportedly said in a closed-door briefing that it would take “years to rebuild” this facility, according to a US official authorized to discuss the briefing.[7] The strikes also struck and sealed tunnel entrances to an underground complex at the ENTC that stores part of Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile.[8] Ratcliffe said that the strikes buried the “vast majority” of enriched uranium at the ENTC and Fordow and that it would be “extremely difficult” for Iran to extract the material.[9] CTP-ISW previously reported that Iranian personnel have not made any visible attempts to access the ENTC or Natanz.[10] Senior Israeli officials have repeatedly warned that Israel would “almost certainly” detect any Iranian attempts to recover the material and conduct renewed strikes to prevent Iran from accessing the material.[11] The IAEA previously reported that US and Israeli strikes also rendered most, if not all, of the centrifuges at Natanz and Fordow inoperable.[12] Three sources told NBC News that US officials knew that some facilities at Natanz were “beyond the reach” of GBU-57 bunker buster bombs.[13] The destruction of centrifuges and facilities does not necessarily require bombs to “reach” all infrastructure, however. Grossi previously stated that centrifuges are “delicate” and that even small vibrations can destroy them.[14] The United States used two massive ordnance penetrator (MOP) bunker-buster bombs on Natanz, which would have generated a blast wave far more significant than small vibrations.[15]

Iran is increasing securitization measures in response to concerns about infiltration. Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei called on July 17 for accelerating the resolution of cases against individuals accused of having ties to Israel, calling any delays “unacceptable.”[50] Ejei’s directive follows Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s July 16 call for the judiciary to pursue “recent crimes” with precision and vigilance.[51] Intelligence Minister Esmail Khatib separately stated on July 16 that the judiciary is processing espionage cases and that “some [accused individuals] have already been executed, and the rest will also receive their punishment.”[52] Khatib briefed Iranian lawmakers on counterintelligence operations against “spies” and anti-regime groups both during and before the recent war during a closed parliament session on July 15.[53] The Judiciary spokesperson separately stated on July 12 that the judiciary has filed 50 cases in Tehran Province against individuals accused of collaborating with Israel.[54] Parliament previously introduced a nine-article law on June 29 that labels any intelligence, espionage, or cooperation with Israel, the United States, or other “hostile” actors as “corruption on earth,” which is a crime punishable by death.[55]

Senior Iranian commanders are likely establishing relationships across military branches following the introduction of a new generation of military leadership during the Israel-Iran War. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Mohammad Pak Pour met with Artesh Commander Major General Amir Hatami on July 17, marking the first public meeting between Iran’s new IRGC and Artesh commanders since the war.[56] Pak Pour praised the IRGC’s “high morale” and Iran’s unity during the war.[57] Pak Pour replaced Major General Hossein Salami, while Hatami replaced Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi.[58] Pak Pour and Hatami’s meeting followed a July 14 meeting between Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi and IRGC Aerospace Force Commander Brigadier General Hossein Mousavi.[59] Abdol Rahim Mousavi replaced Major General Mohammad Bagheri, and Hossein Mousavi replaced Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajji Zadeh.[60] These engagements likely reflect efforts to build relationships between top Iranian military commanders after Israeli strikes eliminated key Iranian military leaders.[61]

Assembly of Experts member Mohsen Araki warned on July 17 that any attack on Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei would trigger a full-scale war.[62] Araki declared that the United States and its allies, including the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, would face attacks on their “military bases, economic assets, political forces, and affiliated companies.”[63] Senior Iranian clerics issued a fatwa on June 30 that described US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as “mohareb” (enemies of God) and called for their assassination.[64] Araki was among 400 Qom clerics who signed a statement on July 13 in support of the fatwa.[65]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-17-2025

[AdmSmith]

Iran Update, July 18, 2025

The E3 (the United Kingdom, Germany, and France) urged Iran to deliver “concrete results” or the E3 would trigger the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism, but more time is unlikely to result in changes to Iranian policy.[12] The E3 foreign ministers held a teleconference with Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi on July 17 to urge Iran to resume nuclear negotiations and cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to avoid snapback sanctions.[13] An unspecified French diplomatic source stated the E3 seeks a “verifiable and lasting” deal and reiterated their readiness to reimpose UN sanctions if Iran fails to produce results by the end of August.[14] The E3 would have to initiate the process to impose snapback sanctions by September 3 to complete the 45–65-day process before the measure expires in October 2025.[15] A Wall Street Journal reporter noted that the E3 foreign ministers and European Union Foreign Policy Chief Kaja Kallas also suggested extending the snapback deadline during the call.[16] He added that such an extension would reportedly require agreement from Iran and its UN Security Council allies, Russia and China, to amend the timeline.[17] There is no provision in the JCPOA to extend the snapback clause, however.[18] It is unclear how the UN Security Council could amend the snapback timeline, given that the JCPOA is a political agreement among its participants and not a legally binding UN treaty.[19]

Iran has set a de facto precondition to negotiations that would require the United States to guarantee Iran’s right to enrich before the resumption of any negotiations. Iran has repeatedly reiterated its unwillingness to concede on its right to enrich, though there is an ongoing debate in Iran over resuming negotiations, and this policy could change. Iranian officials have maintained their position on retaining uranium enrichment capabilities despite pressure from the United States and European countries. The delay of snapback sanctions is unlikely to change Iran’s position on nuclear enrichment because a delay does not incentivize Iran to change its position. The Iranian Supreme Leader’s International Affairs Adviser, Ali Akbar Velayati, stated on July 14 that Iran would not oppose negotiations without “preconditions” if the United States guarantees Iran’s right to enrichment.[20] The recognition of this right is itself a precondition, however. US officials repeatedly rejected the demand and insisted on “zero enrichment.”[21] Senior Supreme Leader adviser Ali Larijani separately stated on July 17 that “no talks are underway” and argued that Iran should not rush into negotiations, leaving it to Khamenei to decide when to proceed.[22]

Senior Iranian commanders are discussing air defense modernization as they assess force readiness after the Israel-Iran War. Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi inspected Iran’s air defense headquarters on July 18 to assess postwar readiness.[23] Mousavi highlighted the need for updated air defense systems, creative tactics, and operational agility to counter “future threats.”[24] Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard also presented a report during Mousavi’s visit on recent efforts to strengthen Iran’s air defense capabilities.[25] The emphasis on modernization follows Iran’s ineffective defense against Israeli strikes between June 12 and June 24, using domestically produced systems.[26] Iranian officials may seek to acquire advanced systems from partners like China after domestically produced systems failed.[27]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-18-2025

[AdmSmith]

Iran Update, July 19, 2025

Axios reported on July 19 that senior E3 (the United Kingdom, Germany, and France) and Iranian diplomats are expected to meet in Europe next week to discuss a possible nuclear deal, citing unspecified sources.[22] Iran has not softened its position on its right to enrich uranium on Iranian soil, which makes it unlikely that Iran will accept a nuclear deal that includes a zero uranium enrichment demand. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi told Chinese media on July 19 that Iran is “not convinced yet” to resume nuclear negotiations.[23] Araghchi added that the United States must show a “real intention” to achieve a “win-win solution.”[24] Iranian officials, including a senior adviser to the Supreme Leader, have similarly signaled caution about talks and reiterated that Iran will not accept a zero uranium enrichment demand.[25] The E3 has warned that it may trigger the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran if Iran does not deliver unspecified “concrete results” by the end of August.[26] The E3 would have to initiate the process to impose snapback sanctions by September 3 to complete the process before the mechanism expires in October 2025.[27]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-19-2025

[AdmSmith]

Iran Update, July 20, 2025

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-affiliated Tasnim News Agency confirmed that senior E3 (the United Kingdom, Germany, and France) and Iranian diplomats agreed to discuss Iran’s nuclear program “next week.”[1] Tasnim reported that the parties have agreed on the “principle of talks” but that the timing and location of the talks are not finalized.[2] A German diplomatic source confirmed to Agence France-Presse that the E3 are in contact with Iran to schedule talks for the coming week.[3] Tasnim reported that the talks will take place at the deputy foreign minister level.[4] The E3 has warned that it may trigger the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran if Iran does not deliver unspecified “concrete results” by the end of August.[5] An Iranian Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Committee member said on July 20 that parliament would respond with “severe countermeasures” if the E3 triggers the snapback mechanism.[6] The E3 would have to initiate the process to impose snapback sanctions by September 3 to complete the process before the mechanism expires in October 2025.[7]

A senior Iranian military commander claimed on July 20 that Iran has replaced air defense systems that Israel destroyed during the Israel-Iran War. Iranian Artesh Operations Deputy Rear Admiral Mahmoud Mousavi told Iranian Armed Forces General Staff-affiliated media on July 20 that Israel damaged “some” Iranian air defense systems during the war.[8] Israel destroyed Iranian air defense systems and radars throughout the war to establish air superiority over Iran. Previous Israeli airstrikes on Iran in April and October 2024 rendered Iran’s four Russian-made S-300 air defense systems inoperable.[9] Mousavi claimed that the Iranian armed forces replaced the destroyed systems with existing and new systems.[10] CTP-ISW previously assessed that it is very unlikely that Russia has supplied Iran with new S-300 systems, so Iran has likely replaced damaged air defense systems with domestically produced systems.[11] Iran tested its domestically produced Bavar-373 air defense system in March 2025.[12] Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Ali Reza Sabahi Fard announced in March that Iran would soon unveil a new version of the Bavar-373.[13] Iran has yet to publicly unveil the new version, however. CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran may prioritize developing indigenous air defense systems given that Russia is unlikely to supply Iran with S-300s in the near future.[14] Iran’s domestically produced air defense systems failed to prevent Israel from achieving air superiority during the Israel-Iran War and it is therefore unlikely that the same systems would effectively defend Iran against another conventional conflict with Israel or the United States.

Iranian Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Larijani discussed the Iranian nuclear program with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on July 20.[15] Iranian media did not provide details about the meeting, but the Kremlin stated that Larijani presented Iran’s views on the “current escalation” in the Middle East and the Iranian nuclear program. Larijani’s visit to Russia is notable given reports in January 2025 that Larijani had made frequent visits to Moscow to seek Russian assistance with the Iranian nuclear program and air defense capabilities.[16] The visit is also notable given Iran’s reported dissatisfaction with Russian support for Iran during the Israel-Iran War. Iranian media reported on July 15 that Iran will likely maintain ties with Russia but must “rethink parts of the relationship and expand cooperation with other partners,” especially in “sensitive military and strategic areas.”[17] Moscow has offered to mediate between Iran and the United States and has reportedly encouraged Iran to accept a nuclear deal with the United States in which Iran would halt domestic uranium enrichment.[18] Russia reportedly offered to provide Iran with 3.67 enriched uranium to support a civil nuclear program, presumably in return for Iran agreeing to stop domestic uranium enrichment.[19] Russia previously accepted 11,000 kilograms of enriched uranium from Iran in exchange for natural uranium in December 2015 as part of the JCPOA.[20] Neither the United States nor Iran has accepted Russia’s offers regarding

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-20-2025

[AdmSmith]

Iran Update, July 21, 2025

The Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry announced on July 21 that senior Iranian officials will meet with E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) officials in Istanbul, Turkey, on July 25 to discuss the Iranian nuclear issue.[1] Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Political Affairs Majid Takht Ravanchi and Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi will attend the talks. The talks come as the E3 has threatened to trigger the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism to reimpose UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on Iran. The E3 has warned that it may trigger the snapback mechanism if Iran does not resume nuclear negotiations with the United States and make “concrete results” in the negotiations by the end of August.[2] The E3 would have to initiate the snapback mechanism by September 3 to complete the snapback process before the mechanism expires in October 2025.[3] Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Esmail Baghaei emphasized on July 21 that the Iran-E3 talks are separate from nuclear negotiations with the United States and stated that Iran has “no plans” to negotiate with the United States.[4]

Baghaei also announced that Iranian officials will meet with Chinese and Russian officials on July 22 to discuss the possibility of the E3 triggering the JCPOA snapback mechanism.[5] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Russia and China would likely not be able to prevent the reimposition of UNSC sanctions on Iran if the E3 triggers the snapback mechanism.[6] Any JCPOA signatory can initiate the snapback process by referring Iran's non-compliance to the UNSC. The JCPOA gives the UNSC 30 days to pass a resolution to extend sanctions relief for Iran, but UNSC permanent members (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, and Russia) can veto such a resolution.[7] China and Russia could therefore try to prevent the reimposition of UNSC sanctions on Iran by proposing a resolution to extend sanctions relief for Iran, but the United States, the United Kingdom, or France could veto such a resolution.

Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh met with Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov in Moscow on July 21, possibly to try to secure Russian military assistance following the Israel-Iran War. Iranian media reported that Nasir Zadeh and Belousov discussed “expanding military cooperation.”[8] Iranian media also reported that Nasir Zadeh attended Iranian Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Larijani’s meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin on July 20.[9] Nasir Zadeh heads the Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry, which oversees the Iranian defense-industrial complex and manages Iranian arms sales and purchases.[10] Iran has long sought to acquire Russian Su-35 fighter jets and has pressured Russia to provide it with S-400 air defense systems after Israeli airstrikes in April and October 2024 rendered Iran's four S-300 air defense systems inoperable.[11] Russia has not provided Iran with this equipment and is unlikely to do so in the near future, which underscores the limits of the Russo-Iranian strategic relationship.[12] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran may expand strategic relations with other partners, such as China, due to Russia's limited support for Iran during and after the war.[13]

Senior Iranian officials reiterated their opposition to the planned Zangezor Corridor to senior Armenian officials on July 19. The Zangezor Corridor is a Turkish-Azerbaijani proposed transit route that would connect Azerbaijan proper to the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. Iran opposes the proposed Zangezor Corridor because the route would cut off Iranian land access to Russia and Europe via Armenia. Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian emphasized that Iran opposes any “change in the region's geopolitics” in a phone call with Armenian Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan.[28] Grigoryan assured Ahmadian that Armenia has not changed its position “regarding regional transit routes.” Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian separately emphasized Iran's support for “preserving the territorial integrity of all countries” in a phone call with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan.[29] The July 19 phone calls come after the United States offered on July 11 to manage the Zangezor Corridor.[30] Iranian media described the Zangezor Corridor on July 16 as a Turkish attempt to extend Turkish influence into Eurasia.[31] Iranian media also argued that the Zangezor Corridor would prevent Iran from being able to militarily support Armenia against Azerbaijan. Iran has become increasingly concerned about the growth of Turkish influence in the South Caucasus in recent years, particularly since the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Iranian officials have expressed concern that Russia's focus on the war in Ukraine has left a power vacuum in the South Caucasus for other regional actors, such as Turkey and Israel, to exploit.[32]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-21-2025

https://www.forbes.com/sites/guneyyildiz/2025/07/18/americas-high-stakes-bet-on-zangezur-how-a-us-led-corridor-could-slash-europes-energy-costs-and-counter-russia/

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zangezur_corridor

[AdmSmith]

Iran Update, July 22, 2025

There continues to be internal disagreements within Iran over how to engage with the West. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-affiliated (IRGC) media published an article on July 22, accusing Araghchi of making “two strategic errors” in his Fox News interview. [18] The article criticized Araghchi for acknowledging damage to Iranian nuclear facilities and stating that enrichment in Iran has stopped. The article said such statements can be ”interpreted as a sign of flexibility” and encourage further Western pressure.[19] The article also criticized Araghchi for attributing threats to assassinate Trump to “radical groups” and stated that this portrayal undermined national unity.[20] Several Iranian parliamentarians, including ultraconservative members, similarly criticized Pezeshkian for failing to endorse recent clerical fatwas against Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and undermining national unity during his interview with Western media in early July 2025.[21] Khamenei stated on July 16 that individuals who oppose Iranian officials on “diplomatic or military issues” must express their opposition in line with regime policy.[22] Khamenei may have been referring to efforts by the anti-negotiation camp in the regime to block efforts to resume nuclear talks with the United States. The backlash to Araghchi’s interview highlights ongoing disagreements between Iranian reformists and hardliners over nuclear negotiations and US-Iran relations following the 12-day Israel-Iran war.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-22-2025

[AdmSmith]

Iran Update, July 23, 2025

The Israel-Iran War has exacerbated longstanding divides within the Iranian regime as “pragmatic conservatives” seek to reassert influence over foreign policy and counterbalance hardliners’ opposition to diplomacy with the West. Reformist newspaper Ham Mihan published an article on July 23 in which it argued that the recent activities of two senior advisers to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, Ali Larijani and Ali Akbar Velayati, signal a renewed effort by “pragmatic conservatives” to reassert influence over Iran’s domestic and foreign policy after the 12-Day Israel-Iran War.[22] The outlet highlighted Larijani’s unannounced trip to Russia on July 20 to discuss the Iranian nuclear program with Russian President Vladimir Putin. It also argued that Velayati’s public calls for a “new approach” on July 21 to preserve national unity reflect Velayati’s efforts to counterbalance entrenched hardliners. which likely includes the ultraconservative Stability (Paydari) Front faction.[23] Velayati stated on X on July 21 that preserving “national cohesion” may require the government to change certain social policies and prioritize “public satisfaction in a tangible way.”[24] Velayati added that “outdated methods” will no longer meet the needs of Iranian society after the war.[25] Velayati made other more pragmatic statements prior to July 20 and 21, such as on July 14, when he said that Iran is open to negotiations without “preconditions.” This July 14 statement is in direct opposition to the hardliners’ established position that the United States must classify Israel as the aggressor during the Iran-Israel War, that unspecified actors must investigate US involvement, and Iran must secure war reparations and security guarantees to prevent future attacks.[26] Ham Mihan highlighted that Larijani and Velayati have historically aligned with “moderate conservatives” within Iran‘s traditional right wing and often supported ”cautious reforms” and engagement with the West.[27] Paydari leader Saeed Jalili and other hardline officials have openly challenged this pragmatic faction and opposed the ceasefire with Israel.[28] Jalili also criticized Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi for agreeing to the ceasefire with Israel and signaling their openness to renewed nuclear negotiations with the United States.[29]

This internal divide between hardliners and pragmatic conservatives is not a new phenomenon within Iranian politics, however. Parliament Speaker Mohamad Bagher Ghalibaf, long seen as a hardliner, moved closer to pragmatic conservatives such as Pezeshkian during the 2024 presidential election.[30] Ghalibaf’s split from figures like Jalili highlighted the regime’s ongoing internal rifts over domestic and foreign policy and fissures between hardliners and pragmatic conservatives.[31]

Iran held trilateral talks with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia in Tehran on June 22 ahead of expected United States-Iran nuclear talks, likely to rally diplomatic support for Iran in the event that the E3 triggers the JCPOA snapback mechanism. NOTE: A version of this text also appears in CTP-ISW’s July 23 Adversary Entente Task Force Update. Iranian media reported on June 22 that representatives of Iran, the PRC, and Russia discussed the nuclear negotiations and sanctions against Iran and agreed to continue “close consultations” in coming weeks.[51] Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Esmail Baghaei said that Iran has “aligned positions” with the PRC and Russia and noted that Iran is in “continuous” consultations with both countries to prevent the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) from reinstating snapback sanctions or to mitigate the potential consequences of reinstated sanctions.[52] The E3 threatened on July 17 to trigger the JCPOA snapback mechanism if Iran fails to achieve progress on a nuclear deal by August 2025.[53] Iran has previously engaged with the PRC and Russia over the possibility that the E3 triggers the snapback mechanism.[54] It is unlikely, however, that the PRC and Russia could prevent the reimposition of UN Security Council sanctions if the E3 triggers the snapback mechanism, so Iran is likely trying to get the PRC and Russia to prevent the E3 from activating the snapback mechanism in the first place.[55]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-23-2025

[AdmSmith]

Iran Update, July 24, 2025

Some Iranian officials continued to signal openness to resuming nuclear talks with the United States, but Iranian officials have not altered their previous set of conditions.[1] Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi stated on July 24 that Iran is ready to resume talks with the United States and added, “The sooner, the better.”[2] Gharibabadi said that Iran will open talks only if the United States comes to the table with “sincerity” for a “win-win solution,” and not use the talks as a “cover for another military attack.”[3] Gharibabadi is the Iranian chief nuclear negotiator and has coordinated high-level engagement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) envoys.[4] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi previously stated on July 1 that Iran will not resume nuclear talks unless it first receives assurance that the United States will not launch military attacks during negotiations.[5] Gharibabadi also described the E3-imposed end-of-August deadline for reaching an agreement as “flexible.”[6] A Wall Street Journal reporter previously noted that the E3 proposed extending the snapback deadline during a July 17 call with Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi.[7]

A delay in the snapback deadline is unlikely to shift Iran's position on domestic uranium enrichment, though additional leverage applied after a delay could cause Iran to shift its position.[8] Iran and the E3 will meet on July 25 in Istanbul to discuss Iran's nuclear program and snapback-related sanctions.[9] Iran may calculate that reaching a deal with the E3 and the United States would delay or prevent snapback sanctions by demonstrating Iran's willingness to resolve the nuclear issue. The E3 reportedly aims to engage Iran and secure verifiable steps—such as restoring Iranian cooperation with the IAEA and the removal of Iran‘s 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile—before the snapback deadline takes effect.[10]

Araghchi emphasized Iran's commitment to domestic uranium enrichment ahead of the upcoming July 25 E3 meeting.[11] Araghchi added that the upcoming Iran and E3 meeting is important for European officials to understand that Iran's position remains “unchanged,” and that enrichment will continue as a “non-negotiable right.[12] Gharibabadi warned on July 23 that continued E3 pressure to reimpose snapback sanctions could push Iran to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).[13] Iranian officials repeatedly threatened to withdraw from the NPT if the E3 triggers the snapback sanction mechanism.[14]

Gharibabadi announced on July 23 that an IAEA technical team will visit Iran in the coming weeks to discuss a “future engagement framework.”[15] Gharibabadi stated that the technical team will not be allowed access to damaged nuclear sites.[16] Iranian personnel have been unable to access the nuclear sites due to damage caused by the strikes, which makes the question of a technical visit to the sites mostly irrelevant at this time because the IAEA cannot access centrifuge halls or other enrichment facilities that are underground.[17] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian claimed during his interview with Tucker Carlson on July 7 that the US strikes on Iran's nuclear facilities destroyed much of the equipment and infrastructure, and Iranian personnel cannot easily access the sites.[18] Pezeshkian added that Iran must wait to determine whether it can regain access.[19] IAEA announced on July 4 that it withdrew all inspectors from Iran.[20] Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Esmail Baghaei previously stated on June 30 that Iran would allow inspectors to remain in the country, but could not guarantee their safety following recent strikes on nuclear infrastructure.[21] The Iranian Parliament passed a bill on June 25 to suspend all cooperation with the IAEA, mandating the suspension of inspections until the IAEA recognizes Iran's right to enrich uranium.[22]

Iran is facing a severe water shortage crisis, which may stoke further anti-regime sentiment and internal unrest if sustained over time. IRGC-affiliated media reported on July 23 that half of the Iranian urban population is facing water shortages.[49] Rainfall levels across the country have reportedly decreased by 40 percent in 2025.[50] The East Azerbaijan Regional Water Company CEO warned on July 23 that the most populated city in northwestern Iran, Tabriz, has less than 3 months’ worth of drinking water reserves.[51] Tehran Provincial Water Company reported that the reservoirs used to supply water to Tehran Province are at their lowest levels in a century.[52] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian acknowledged that his government needs to take urgent action to remedy the water crisis during a cabinet meeting on July 19.[53] Iranian Energy Minister Abbas Aliabadi announced on July 15 that Iran is looking to import water from neighboring countries and that negotiations have already taken place with Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.[54] Iran closed government offices in at least 14 provinces on July 23 in an effort to relieve some stress on water and energy infrastructure.[55] Local authorities in some regions have even cut water supplies to consumers for hours at a time amid a severe heatwave.[56]

The water crisis may stoke internal unrest. Anti-regime media posted footage of a protest outside of the governor's office in Sabzevar, Razavi Khorasan Province, which featured chants such as “Water, power, life: our absolute rights.”[57] Severe water shortages in Khuzestan Province in 2021 sparked protests that spread across Iran.[58] Iranian security forces suppressed these protests using live ammunition, and dozens were killed.[59]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-24-2025

[AdmSmith]

Iran Update, July 25, 2025

Iran and the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) reportedly discussed extending the snapback mechanism deadline during a meeting on July 25.[15] CTP-ISW previously assessed that postponing the snapback deadline would very likely not change Iran’s position on the key issue of domestic uranium enrichment.[16] Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Political Affairs Majid Takht Ravanchi and Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi met with E3 officials in Istanbul on July 25 to discuss the Iranian nuclear program and potential snapback sanctions.[17] Ravanchi and Gharibabadi previously led Iran’s technical team in the US-Iran nuclear negotiations in April and May 2025.[18] A Wall Street Journal correspondent reported on July 25 that Iran and the E3 discussed extending the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism to reimpose UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on Iran.[19] The mechanism expires in October 2025. An extension would require a new UNSC resolution with at least nine votes in favor of the resolution and no vetoes from permanent UNSC members. Iran reportedly did not explicitly reject the idea of extending the deadline.[20] The Financial Times reported on July 24 that the E3 is prepared to extend the snapback deadline if Iran agrees to resume talks with the United States and cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).[21] Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Esmail Baghaei dismissed recent reports that the E3 may seek to extend the snapback deadline as “baseless and meaningless.”[22] Iran is very unlikely to accept any deal that requires zero uranium enrichment, even if the E3 extends the snapback deadline to provide Iran more time to reach a deal with the United States. Senior Iranian officials, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, have repeatedly stated that domestic enrichment is non-negotiable.[23] Gharibabadi stated that Iran and the E3 agreed to continue talks.[24]

Moderate and pragmatic elements of the Iranian regime appear to be trying to reshape Iran’s domestic and foreign policy in the post-war period. These elements have increasingly sought to influence Iranian decision-making since the start of the Israel-Iran War. Reformist outlet Ensaf News claimed on July 25 that ultraconservatives have become marginalized and sidelined by all three branches of government as moderates and pragmatic conservatives seek to exert more political influence in the regime.[25] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian stated on July 22 that the Iranian government is willing to engage in dialogue with the “opposition” and emphasized that solving problems requires dialogue, “not confrontation.”[26] Pezeshkian may have been referring to domestic opposition figures, including former Iranian Prime Minister and key 2009 Green Movement leader Mir Hossein Mousavi.[27] Mousavi called on July 11 for a referendum to establish a constitutional assembly as a “means to reclaim national sovereignty,” framing the current Iranian governance system as unrepresentative of the Iranian people.[28] Some traditional conservatives, including senior advisers to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei such as Ali Shamkhani and Ali Akbar Velayati, have publicly called on the regime to prioritize reconciliation in its domestic policy.[29] Shamkhani called on regime officials on June 28 to resolve “disputes” with the Iranian population through “mutual understanding.”[30] Velayati stated on July 21 that preserving national cohesion may require “revising social policies” and prioritizing public satisfaction.[31] He also warned that “outdated methods” no longer suit Iranian society.[32]

Iranian officials, including Pezeshkian and Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi, have attempted in recent weeks to reframe the regime’s image in Western media by downplaying the regime’s hardline policies and ideology. Pezeshkian falsely presented Iran as a peaceful force in the Middle East in an interview with Tucker Carlson on July 7.[33] Araghchi separately claimed in a July 22 interview with US media that Iran has never sought to destroy Israel.[34] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Pezeshkian and Araghchi leveraged these interviews with US media to misrepresent Iran’s policy toward the West to a Western audience.[35] This misrepresentation may also seek to distance the regime from rhetoric and confrontational policies pushed by ultraconservatives.[36] Ultraconservatives, including the Stability (Paydari) Front and some members of the Assembly of Experts, have supported hardline positions in recent weeks, including a senior cleric’s call for the killing of US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.[37]

Russia is continuing to support the development of the Iranian space program. Russia launched the Iranian Nahid-2 communications satellite into orbit on July 25 using the Russian Soyuz space launch vehicle (SLV).[38] The Iranian Space Research Center and Iranian Space Agency designed and developed the Nahid-2.[39] Russia has launched four Iranian-made satellites into orbit since 2022, including the Khayyam satellite in August 2022, the Pars-1 satellite in February 2024, and the Kowsar and Hodhod satellites in November 2024.[40] Russia’s launch of the Nahid-2 comes after Iran conducted a suborbital test of its Qased SLV on July 21.[41] Russia reportedly provides Iran with technical assistance for its SLV and missile programs.[42] Russian assistance with the SLV program is particularly significant given that this program could support the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM).[43]

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei reiterated his call for national unity in a statement on July 25 commemorating the deaths of senior Iranian military commanders and nuclear scientists during the Israel-Iran War.[44] Khamenei acknowledged that the deaths of military commanders and nuclear scientists were a “heavy” loss for the regime but praised the “perseverance and stability” of regime institutions. Khamenei also praised the Iranian people’s “firm determination to stand united” during the war. Khamenei previously called for national unity in a speech on July 16.[45] Khamenei’s calls for unity come amid fissures between hardliners and pragmatic elements of the regime over the regime’s domestic and foreign policies.[46] Khamenei outlined seven recommendations for different parts of Iranian society and the regime in the post-war period. These recommendations include:

All elements of Iranian society should maintain national unity.
The “scientific elite” should accelerate scientific and technological advancements.
Iranian media and intellectuals should maintain Iran’s “honor and reputation.”
Military commanders should improve Iran’s ability to preserve national security and independence.
Government officials should pursue national goals with “seriousness.”
The clerical establishment should provide spiritual guidance and help Iranians remain “patient, calm, and steadfast.”
Iranian youth should maintain a revolutionary spirit.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-25-2025

[AdmSmith]

Trump Halted Israeli Strikes Aimed at Toppling Iranian Regime
An Israeli source also told The Washington Post that the Israeli offensive delayed Iran’s nuclear program by one to two years, adding, ‘Iran is no longer a threshold nuclear state’

Israel planned to target regime targets to topple the Islamic Republic of Iran, but U.S. President Donald Trump halted the strikes by announcing a cease-fire, The Washington Post reported on Saturday, citing American and Israeli officials.

The officials told the Post’s senior military analyst, David Ignatius, that Trump approved the launch of Israel’s mid-June offensive on Iran, but made clear that he would only continue U.S. support if Israel’s progress met expectations. By the time Trump announced the cease-fire, Israeli forces were reportedly poised to hit senior regime targets.

Israeli officials told Ignatius that they believe that Iran was developing an electromagnetic pulse, or EMP, weapon designed to cripple Israel’s power and communications networks. These officials said that Iran was also researching the development of more complex nuclear bombs.

https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2025-07-26/ty-article/report-trump-halted-israeli-strikes-aimed-at-toppling-iranian-regime/00000198-45e9-d675-a79a-67efca290000

[nuconvert]

Was there anything we didn’t already know in that article?

[AdmSmith]

Perhaps the EMP part. Earlier it was speculations:

ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE (EMP): THREAT TO CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
113th Congress (2013-2014)

Currently the nations of Russia and China have the technology to launch an EMP attack, and we have speculated that Iran and North Korea may be developing EMP weapon technology. This is why we must remain vigilant in our efforts to mitigate the effects of an EMP attack.

Iran—the world's leading sponsor of international terrorism—in military writings openly describes EMP as a terrorist weapon, and as the ultimate weapon for prevailing over the West: ``If the world's ´ industrial countries fail to devise effective ways to defend themselves against dangerous electronic assaults, then they will disintegrate ´within a few years . . . American soldiers would not be able to find ´food to eat nor would they be able to fire a single shot.’’

The threats are not merely words. The EMP Commission assesses that Russia has, as it openly declares in military writings, probably developed what Russia describes as a ``Super-EMP’’ nuclear weapon— specifically designed to generate extraordinarily high EMP fields in order to paralyze even the best protected U.S. strategic and military forces. China probably also has Super-EMP weapons. North Korea too may possess or be developing a Super-EMP nuclear weapon, as alleged by credible Russian sources to the EMP Commission, and by open-source reporting from South Korean military intelligence. But any nuclear weapon, even a low-yield first generation device, could suffice to make a catastrophic EMP attack on the United States. Iran, although it is assessed as not yet having the bomb, is actively testing missile delivery systems and has practiced launches of its best missile, the Shahab-III, fuzing for high-altitude detonations, in exercises that look suspiciously like training for making EMP attacks. As noted earlier, Iran has also practiced launching from a ship a Scud, the world's most common missile—possessed by over 60 nations, terrorist groups, and private collectors. A Scud might be the ideal choice for a ship-launched EMP attack against the United States intended to be executed anonymously, to escape any last-gasp U.S. retaliation. Unlike a nuclear weapon detonated in a city, a high-altitude EMP attack leaves no bomb debris for forensic analysis, no perpetrator ``fingerprints.’’

https://www.congress.gov/event/113th-congress/house-event/LC25001/text

[AdmSmith]

Iran Update, July 28, 2025

The E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) reiterated that it will trigger the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism to reinstate UN Security Council sanctions on Iran if Iran fails to make progress towards a nuclear deal by the end of August 2025.[1] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran is unlikely to make concessions on key issues such as domestic uranium enrichment and limits to its ballistic missile program by the August deadline.[2] French Foreign Affairs Minister Jean-Noel Barrot told Western media on July 26 that the E3 will trigger the JCPOA snapback mechanism if Iran does not reach an agreement by the end of summer.[3] He stated that the E3 wants a “more comprehensive agreement” that includes limits to Iran's ballistic missile program and activities that destabilize the region, which refers to Iran's leading role in the Axis of Resistance. Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Esmail Baghaei stated on July 28 that Iran will not negotiate over its defense capabilities.[4] Iran sees its missile program and its proxies and partners as integral parts of its deterrence and therefore its defense. Senior Iranian officials repeatedly rejected demands during the US-Iran nuclear negotiations in April and May 2025 to limit Iran's missile program and support for the Axis of Resistance because the missile program is Iran's ”most reliable means of defense.”[5]

The Washington Post quoted an Israeli source on July 25 who reported Iran is “no longer a threshold nuclear state” following US and Israeli strikes.[6] The source stated that Iran will need at least one to two years to build a deliverable nuclear weapon, assuming it can do so undetected.[7] The source stated that Israel would very likely detect any Iranian efforts to test a nuclear weapon and launch an attack. Senior Israeli officials have repeatedly warned since the strikes that Israel would “almost certainly” detect any Iranian attempts to recover nuclear material and conduct renewed strikes to prevent Iran from accessing the material.[8] The source said that US and Israeli strikes destroyed the “logistical foundations” of Iran's nuclear program, which will hinder Iran's ability to weaponize.[9] The strikes destroyed the Uranium Metal Conversion Plant at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center, which Iran could have used to transform uranium gas into dense metal in a process called metallization.[10] This process is one of the last steps required to form the explosive core of an atomic bomb. The source also stated that the loss of nuclear scientists will significantly hinder Iran's ability to conduct ongoing nuclear weapons research, including research Iran was reportedly conducting on electromagnetic pulse weapons that target electronics in a target area.[11] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the destruction of Iran's metallization process and the loss of several Iranian nuclear scientists would hinder Iran's ability to transform weapons-grade uranium, or 90 percent enriched uranium, into a usable nuclear weapon.[12]

Israeli strikes also reportedly buried a site where Iran stored 400 kilograms of highly-enriched uranium (HEU), or uranium enriched up to at least 20 percent.[13] Western media previously reported that Israeli strikes blocked tunnel entrances to an underground complex at the ENTC that stores part of Iran's enriched uranium stockpile.[14] The International Atomic Energy Agency reported in May 2025 that Iran had 683.1 kilograms of HEU as of mid-May 2025.[15] The Institute for Science and International Security previously assessed that the Israeli campaign also rendered most, if not all, of Iran's operational centrifuges inoperable and “effectively destroyed” Iran's enrichment capacity.[16]

The Iranian regime is facing a broad set of internal security challenges, including insurgency and anti-regime activities, which could constrain its ability to rebuild military capabilities following the Israel–Iran war. The Iranian Ministry of Intelligence released a comprehensive report on July 28 detailing its efforts during and after the 12-Day Israel-Iran War to secure Iran. The report emphasized the scale and complexity of the threats Iran faced.[17] The ministry described the war as a coordinated campaign by the “American-Zionist front” involving military strikes, sabotage, “cognitive warfare,” and efforts to trigger internal unrest through armed groups, separatists, and political dissidents.[18] Iranian officials use the term “cognitive warfare” to characterize what they claim are enemy-led psychological operations aimed at spreading distrust and hopelessness among the Iranian public to weaken the regime.[19] The ministry claimed that it arrested three Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) commanders and 50 ”takfiri” fighters inside Iran as part of its counterintelligence efforts, seized suicide vests and advanced weapons, and disrupted the infiltration of 300 foreign fighters allegedly ”mobilized by Israel” under an entity called the “United Baluchistan Front.”[20] The statement is likely referring to Jaish al Adl, a Baloch, Salafi-jihadi militant group that frequently attacks Iranian security forces in southeastern Iran. The Iranian regime has previously accused Israel of supporting Jaish al Adl.[21] The report also cited operations in Sistan and Baluchistan and Kerman provinces that led to the seizure of rocket-propelled grenades, grenades, and light arms intended for use in terror attacks.[22] These claims underscore the regime's growing concern that internal threats are increasing at a time when it cannot address them all simultaneously.

These internal security challenges will naturally limit Iran's ability to reinvest in its external security. Iran will very likely prioritize its internal security challenges over rebuilding the Axis of Resistance or its external capabilities beyond the level necessary to deter attacks. Iranian officials would prioritize these internal security challenges because they remain concerned about regime stability over the long term.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Brigadier General Majid Ibn al Reza as deputy defense and armed logistics minister on July 26.[44] Defense and Armed Logistics Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh proposed that Reza replace former deputy Defense and Armed Logistics Minister Hojatollah Ghoreishi, who was appointed in January 2024 under former Defense and Armed Logistics Minister Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Ashtiani.[45] It is unclear what position Ghoreishi will hold, if any. Reza had served as the chief executive officer of the Armed Forces Social Security Organization (SATA) since 2022.[46] The Defense and Armed Logistics Ministry established SATA in 2009 to provide social security for veterans.[47]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-28-2025