The Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry announced on July 21 that senior Iranian officials will meet with E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) officials in Istanbul, Turkey, on July 25 to discuss the Iranian nuclear issue.[1] Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Political Affairs Majid Takht Ravanchi and Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi will attend the talks. The talks come as the E3 has threatened to trigger the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism to reimpose UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on Iran. The E3 has warned that it may trigger the snapback mechanism if Iran does not resume nuclear negotiations with the United States and make “concrete results” in the negotiations by the end of August.[2] The E3 would have to initiate the snapback mechanism by September 3 to complete the snapback process before the mechanism expires in October 2025.[3] Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Esmail Baghaei emphasized on July 21 that the Iran-E3 talks are separate from nuclear negotiations with the United States and stated that Iran has “no plans” to negotiate with the United States.[4]
Baghaei also announced that Iranian officials will meet with Chinese and Russian officials on July 22 to discuss the possibility of the E3 triggering the JCPOA snapback mechanism.[5] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Russia and China would likely not be able to prevent the reimposition of UNSC sanctions on Iran if the E3 triggers the snapback mechanism.[6] Any JCPOA signatory can initiate the snapback process by referring Iran's non-compliance to the UNSC. The JCPOA gives the UNSC 30 days to pass a resolution to extend sanctions relief for Iran, but UNSC permanent members (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, and Russia) can veto such a resolution.[7] China and Russia could therefore try to prevent the reimposition of UNSC sanctions on Iran by proposing a resolution to extend sanctions relief for Iran, but the United States, the United Kingdom, or France could veto such a resolution.
Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh met with Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov in Moscow on July 21, possibly to try to secure Russian military assistance following the Israel-Iran War. Iranian media reported that Nasir Zadeh and Belousov discussed “expanding military cooperation.”[8] Iranian media also reported that Nasir Zadeh attended Iranian Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Larijani’s meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin on July 20.[9] Nasir Zadeh heads the Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry, which oversees the Iranian defense-industrial complex and manages Iranian arms sales and purchases.[10] Iran has long sought to acquire Russian Su-35 fighter jets and has pressured Russia to provide it with S-400 air defense systems after Israeli airstrikes in April and October 2024 rendered Iran's four S-300 air defense systems inoperable.[11] Russia has not provided Iran with this equipment and is unlikely to do so in the near future, which underscores the limits of the Russo-Iranian strategic relationship.[12] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran may expand strategic relations with other partners, such as China, due to Russia's limited support for Iran during and after the war.[13]
Senior Iranian officials reiterated their opposition to the planned Zangezor Corridor to senior Armenian officials on July 19. The Zangezor Corridor is a Turkish-Azerbaijani proposed transit route that would connect Azerbaijan proper to the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. Iran opposes the proposed Zangezor Corridor because the route would cut off Iranian land access to Russia and Europe via Armenia. Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian emphasized that Iran opposes any “change in the region's geopolitics” in a phone call with Armenian Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan.[28] Grigoryan assured Ahmadian that Armenia has not changed its position “regarding regional transit routes.” Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian separately emphasized Iran's support for “preserving the territorial integrity of all countries” in a phone call with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan.[29] The July 19 phone calls come after the United States offered on July 11 to manage the Zangezor Corridor.[30] Iranian media described the Zangezor Corridor on July 16 as a Turkish attempt to extend Turkish influence into Eurasia.[31] Iranian media also argued that the Zangezor Corridor would prevent Iran from being able to militarily support Armenia against Azerbaijan. Iran has become increasingly concerned about the growth of Turkish influence in the South Caucasus in recent years, particularly since the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Iranian officials have expressed concern that Russia's focus on the war in Ukraine has left a power vacuum in the South Caucasus for other regional actors, such as Turkey and Israel, to exploit.[32]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-21-2025
