Iran Update, July 23, 2025
The Israel-Iran War has exacerbated longstanding divides within the Iranian regime as “pragmatic conservatives” seek to reassert influence over foreign policy and counterbalance hardliners’ opposition to diplomacy with the West. Reformist newspaper Ham Mihan published an article on July 23 in which it argued that the recent activities of two senior advisers to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, Ali Larijani and Ali Akbar Velayati, signal a renewed effort by “pragmatic conservatives” to reassert influence over Iran’s domestic and foreign policy after the 12-Day Israel-Iran War.[22] The outlet highlighted Larijani’s unannounced trip to Russia on July 20 to discuss the Iranian nuclear program with Russian President Vladimir Putin. It also argued that Velayati’s public calls for a “new approach” on July 21 to preserve national unity reflect Velayati’s efforts to counterbalance entrenched hardliners. which likely includes the ultraconservative Stability (Paydari) Front faction.[23] Velayati stated on X on July 21 that preserving “national cohesion” may require the government to change certain social policies and prioritize “public satisfaction in a tangible way.”[24] Velayati added that “outdated methods” will no longer meet the needs of Iranian society after the war.[25] Velayati made other more pragmatic statements prior to July 20 and 21, such as on July 14, when he said that Iran is open to negotiations without “preconditions.” This July 14 statement is in direct opposition to the hardliners’ established position that the United States must classify Israel as the aggressor during the Iran-Israel War, that unspecified actors must investigate US involvement, and Iran must secure war reparations and security guarantees to prevent future attacks.[26] Ham Mihan highlighted that Larijani and Velayati have historically aligned with “moderate conservatives” within Iran‘s traditional right wing and often supported ”cautious reforms” and engagement with the West.[27] Paydari leader Saeed Jalili and other hardline officials have openly challenged this pragmatic faction and opposed the ceasefire with Israel.[28] Jalili also criticized Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi for agreeing to the ceasefire with Israel and signaling their openness to renewed nuclear negotiations with the United States.[29]
This internal divide between hardliners and pragmatic conservatives is not a new phenomenon within Iranian politics, however. Parliament Speaker Mohamad Bagher Ghalibaf, long seen as a hardliner, moved closer to pragmatic conservatives such as Pezeshkian during the 2024 presidential election.[30] Ghalibaf’s split from figures like Jalili highlighted the regime’s ongoing internal rifts over domestic and foreign policy and fissures between hardliners and pragmatic conservatives.[31]
Iran held trilateral talks with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia in Tehran on June 22 ahead of expected United States-Iran nuclear talks, likely to rally diplomatic support for Iran in the event that the E3 triggers the JCPOA snapback mechanism. NOTE: A version of this text also appears in CTP-ISW’s July 23 Adversary Entente Task Force Update. Iranian media reported on June 22 that representatives of Iran, the PRC, and Russia discussed the nuclear negotiations and sanctions against Iran and agreed to continue “close consultations” in coming weeks.[51] Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Esmail Baghaei said that Iran has “aligned positions” with the PRC and Russia and noted that Iran is in “continuous” consultations with both countries to prevent the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) from reinstating snapback sanctions or to mitigate the potential consequences of reinstated sanctions.[52] The E3 threatened on July 17 to trigger the JCPOA snapback mechanism if Iran fails to achieve progress on a nuclear deal by August 2025.[53] Iran has previously engaged with the PRC and Russia over the possibility that the E3 triggers the snapback mechanism.[54] It is unlikely, however, that the PRC and Russia could prevent the reimposition of UN Security Council sanctions if the E3 triggers the snapback mechanism, so Iran is likely trying to get the PRC and Russia to prevent the E3 from activating the snapback mechanism in the first place.[55]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-23-2025
Some Iranian officials continued to signal openness to resuming nuclear talks with the United States, but Iranian officials have not altered their previous set of conditions.[1] Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi stated on July 24 that Iran is ready to resume talks with the United States and added, “The sooner, the better.”[2] Gharibabadi said that Iran will open talks only if the United States comes to the table with “sincerity” for a “win-win solution,” and not use the talks as a “cover for another military attack.”[3] Gharibabadi is the Iranian chief nuclear negotiator and has coordinated high-level engagement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) envoys.[4] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi previously stated on July 1 that Iran will not resume nuclear talks unless it first receives assurance that the United States will not launch military attacks during negotiations.[5] Gharibabadi also described the E3-imposed end-of-August deadline for reaching an agreement as “flexible.”[6] A Wall Street Journal reporter previously noted that the E3 proposed extending the snapback deadline during a July 17 call with Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi.[7]
A delay in the snapback deadline is unlikely to shift Iran's position on domestic uranium enrichment, though additional leverage applied after a delay could cause Iran to shift its position.[8] Iran and the E3 will meet on July 25 in Istanbul to discuss Iran's nuclear program and snapback-related sanctions.[9] Iran may calculate that reaching a deal with the E3 and the United States would delay or prevent snapback sanctions by demonstrating Iran's willingness to resolve the nuclear issue. The E3 reportedly aims to engage Iran and secure verifiable steps—such as restoring Iranian cooperation with the IAEA and the removal of Iran‘s 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile—before the snapback deadline takes effect.[10]
Araghchi emphasized Iran's commitment to domestic uranium enrichment ahead of the upcoming July 25 E3 meeting.[11] Araghchi added that the upcoming Iran and E3 meeting is important for European officials to understand that Iran's position remains “unchanged,” and that enrichment will continue as a “non-negotiable right.[12] Gharibabadi warned on July 23 that continued E3 pressure to reimpose snapback sanctions could push Iran to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).[13] Iranian officials repeatedly threatened to withdraw from the NPT if the E3 triggers the snapback sanction mechanism.[14]
Gharibabadi announced on July 23 that an IAEA technical team will visit Iran in the coming weeks to discuss a “future engagement framework.”[15] Gharibabadi stated that the technical team will not be allowed access to damaged nuclear sites.[16] Iranian personnel have been unable to access the nuclear sites due to damage caused by the strikes, which makes the question of a technical visit to the sites mostly irrelevant at this time because the IAEA cannot access centrifuge halls or other enrichment facilities that are underground.[17] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian claimed during his interview with Tucker Carlson on July 7 that the US strikes on Iran's nuclear facilities destroyed much of the equipment and infrastructure, and Iranian personnel cannot easily access the sites.[18] Pezeshkian added that Iran must wait to determine whether it can regain access.[19] IAEA announced on July 4 that it withdrew all inspectors from Iran.[20] Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Esmail Baghaei previously stated on June 30 that Iran would allow inspectors to remain in the country, but could not guarantee their safety following recent strikes on nuclear infrastructure.[21] The Iranian Parliament passed a bill on June 25 to suspend all cooperation with the IAEA, mandating the suspension of inspections until the IAEA recognizes Iran's right to enrich uranium.[22]
Iran is facing a severe water shortage crisis, which may stoke further anti-regime sentiment and internal unrest if sustained over time. IRGC-affiliated media reported on July 23 that half of the Iranian urban population is facing water shortages.[49] Rainfall levels across the country have reportedly decreased by 40 percent in 2025.[50] The East Azerbaijan Regional Water Company CEO warned on July 23 that the most populated city in northwestern Iran, Tabriz, has less than 3 months’ worth of drinking water reserves.[51] Tehran Provincial Water Company reported that the reservoirs used to supply water to Tehran Province are at their lowest levels in a century.[52] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian acknowledged that his government needs to take urgent action to remedy the water crisis during a cabinet meeting on July 19.[53] Iranian Energy Minister Abbas Aliabadi announced on July 15 that Iran is looking to import water from neighboring countries and that negotiations have already taken place with Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.[54] Iran closed government offices in at least 14 provinces on July 23 in an effort to relieve some stress on water and energy infrastructure.[55] Local authorities in some regions have even cut water supplies to consumers for hours at a time amid a severe heatwave.[56]
The water crisis may stoke internal unrest. Anti-regime media posted footage of a protest outside of the governor's office in Sabzevar, Razavi Khorasan Province, which featured chants such as “Water, power, life: our absolute rights.”[57] Severe water shortages in Khuzestan Province in 2021 sparked protests that spread across Iran.[58] Iranian security forces suppressed these protests using live ammunition, and dozens were killed.[59]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-24-2025