The E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) reiterated that it will trigger the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism to reinstate UN Security Council sanctions on Iran if Iran fails to make progress towards a nuclear deal by the end of August 2025.[1] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran is unlikely to make concessions on key issues such as domestic uranium enrichment and limits to its ballistic missile program by the August deadline.[2] French Foreign Affairs Minister Jean-Noel Barrot told Western media on July 26 that the E3 will trigger the JCPOA snapback mechanism if Iran does not reach an agreement by the end of summer.[3] He stated that the E3 wants a “more comprehensive agreement” that includes limits to Iran's ballistic missile program and activities that destabilize the region, which refers to Iran's leading role in the Axis of Resistance. Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Esmail Baghaei stated on July 28 that Iran will not negotiate over its defense capabilities.[4] Iran sees its missile program and its proxies and partners as integral parts of its deterrence and therefore its defense. Senior Iranian officials repeatedly rejected demands during the US-Iran nuclear negotiations in April and May 2025 to limit Iran's missile program and support for the Axis of Resistance because the missile program is Iran's ”most reliable means of defense.”[5]
The Washington Post quoted an Israeli source on July 25 who reported Iran is “no longer a threshold nuclear state” following US and Israeli strikes.[6] The source stated that Iran will need at least one to two years to build a deliverable nuclear weapon, assuming it can do so undetected.[7] The source stated that Israel would very likely detect any Iranian efforts to test a nuclear weapon and launch an attack. Senior Israeli officials have repeatedly warned since the strikes that Israel would “almost certainly” detect any Iranian attempts to recover nuclear material and conduct renewed strikes to prevent Iran from accessing the material.[8] The source said that US and Israeli strikes destroyed the “logistical foundations” of Iran's nuclear program, which will hinder Iran's ability to weaponize.[9] The strikes destroyed the Uranium Metal Conversion Plant at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center, which Iran could have used to transform uranium gas into dense metal in a process called metallization.[10] This process is one of the last steps required to form the explosive core of an atomic bomb. The source also stated that the loss of nuclear scientists will significantly hinder Iran's ability to conduct ongoing nuclear weapons research, including research Iran was reportedly conducting on electromagnetic pulse weapons that target electronics in a target area.[11] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the destruction of Iran's metallization process and the loss of several Iranian nuclear scientists would hinder Iran's ability to transform weapons-grade uranium, or 90 percent enriched uranium, into a usable nuclear weapon.[12]
Israeli strikes also reportedly buried a site where Iran stored 400 kilograms of highly-enriched uranium (HEU), or uranium enriched up to at least 20 percent.[13] Western media previously reported that Israeli strikes blocked tunnel entrances to an underground complex at the ENTC that stores part of Iran's enriched uranium stockpile.[14] The International Atomic Energy Agency reported in May 2025 that Iran had 683.1 kilograms of HEU as of mid-May 2025.[15] The Institute for Science and International Security previously assessed that the Israeli campaign also rendered most, if not all, of Iran's operational centrifuges inoperable and “effectively destroyed” Iran's enrichment capacity.[16]
The Iranian regime is facing a broad set of internal security challenges, including insurgency and anti-regime activities, which could constrain its ability to rebuild military capabilities following the Israel–Iran war. The Iranian Ministry of Intelligence released a comprehensive report on July 28 detailing its efforts during and after the 12-Day Israel-Iran War to secure Iran. The report emphasized the scale and complexity of the threats Iran faced.[17] The ministry described the war as a coordinated campaign by the “American-Zionist front” involving military strikes, sabotage, “cognitive warfare,” and efforts to trigger internal unrest through armed groups, separatists, and political dissidents.[18] Iranian officials use the term “cognitive warfare” to characterize what they claim are enemy-led psychological operations aimed at spreading distrust and hopelessness among the Iranian public to weaken the regime.[19] The ministry claimed that it arrested three Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) commanders and 50 ”takfiri” fighters inside Iran as part of its counterintelligence efforts, seized suicide vests and advanced weapons, and disrupted the infiltration of 300 foreign fighters allegedly ”mobilized by Israel” under an entity called the “United Baluchistan Front.”[20] The statement is likely referring to Jaish al Adl, a Baloch, Salafi-jihadi militant group that frequently attacks Iranian security forces in southeastern Iran. The Iranian regime has previously accused Israel of supporting Jaish al Adl.[21] The report also cited operations in Sistan and Baluchistan and Kerman provinces that led to the seizure of rocket-propelled grenades, grenades, and light arms intended for use in terror attacks.[22] These claims underscore the regime's growing concern that internal threats are increasing at a time when it cannot address them all simultaneously.
These internal security challenges will naturally limit Iran's ability to reinvest in its external security. Iran will very likely prioritize its internal security challenges over rebuilding the Axis of Resistance or its external capabilities beyond the level necessary to deter attacks. Iranian officials would prioritize these internal security challenges because they remain concerned about regime stability over the long term.
Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Brigadier General Majid Ibn al Reza as deputy defense and armed logistics minister on July 26.[44] Defense and Armed Logistics Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh proposed that Reza replace former deputy Defense and Armed Logistics Minister Hojatollah Ghoreishi, who was appointed in January 2024 under former Defense and Armed Logistics Minister Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Ashtiani.[45] It is unclear what position Ghoreishi will hold, if any. Reza had served as the chief executive officer of the Armed Forces Social Security Organization (SATA) since 2022.[46] The Defense and Armed Logistics Ministry established SATA in 2009 to provide social security for veterans.[47]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-28-2025
Iran Update, July 29, 2025
Media affiliated with Iranian Supreme Leader International Affairs Adviser Ali Akbar Velayati published an op-ed on July 29, framing moderates and pragmatic hardliners in Iran as necessary for national unity following the 12-day Israel-Iran War.[1] The article emphasized the importance of national unity and stated that a “reformist, moderate or transformational force must be strengthened” to establish and maintain such unity.[2] The article stated that this “force“ does not seek to overthrow the existing system but is focused on gradual changes to improve societal conditions.[3] This statement is consistent with CTP-ISW’s assessment that ascendant moderates and pragmatic hardliners in the Iranian regime appear to be trying to reshape Iran’s domestic and foreign policy in the post-war period.[4] The article stated that this approach has the “closest and most positive connection“ with national solidarity.”[5] The article stated that the moderates and pragmatic hardliners, which include moderate Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, pragmatic hardliner Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, and Velayati, were the most successful at bolstering national unity during the war.[6] The article criticized other “political forces,” including reformists and ultra-hardliners.[7] Reformist outlet Ensaf News claimed on July 25 that ultra-hardliners have become marginalized and sidelined by all three branches of government as moderates and pragmatic hardliners seek to exert more political influence in the regime.[8]
The article emphasized the importance of “achieving social satisfaction.”[9] This statement aligns with the views of moderates and pragmatic hardliners, who emphasize social reform. Velayati stated on July 21 that preserving national cohesion may require “revising social policies” and prioritizing public satisfaction.[10] He also warned that “outdated methods” no longer suit Iranian society.[11] Pezeshkian similarly stated on July 22 that solving problems requires dialogue, “not confrontation.”[12]
Iranian Parliament National Security and Foreign Policy Commission members urged President Masoud Pezeshkian’s administration on July 28 to prioritize national defense, strengthen internal security, and realign foreign policy.[27] Parliamentarians called for allocating more budget to defensive capabilities in the next Persian calendar year (March 2025 to March 2026) and reinforcing border security in the northeast and southeast.[28] The emphasis on southeastern border security follows an uptick in anti-regime attacks in the region since December 2023, mainly by Jaish al Adl—a Baloch Salafi-jihadi group that frequently attacks Iranian security forces in southeastern Iran.[29] The committee members also demanded upgrades to the military communications infrastructure.[30] Parliamentarians also urged stronger ties with China.[31] This is consistent with CTP-ISW’s assessment that Iran is trying to strengthen military and defense cooperation with China following the Israel-Iran War.[32] The committee members also called for a reassessment of relations with certain countries, especially Azerbaijan.[33] Iranian officials and media have repeatedly accused Azerbaijan of cooperating with Israel, particularly during the 12-day war.[34] These demands come as Parliament has taken a more active role in recent weeks and is now pushing the Pezeshkian administration for a more assertive security and foreign policy agenda.
Iran’s inflation rate rose to its highest level in two years, according to an Iranian government-run statistics center report published on July 29.[54] The report assessed that the price of bread and cereals increased by 16.6 percent, cooking oil increased by 7.3 percent, and meat increased by 5.9 percent in July. This comes amid drinking water and electricity shortages in Iran.[55] The Iranian regime is particularly concerned about stabilizing the price of basic goods, as increased prices demonstrate the regime’s inability to effectively provide for the Iranian people. The cost of basic goods has been a frequent flashpoint that has led to protests against the regime in the past.[56] Economic-related protests have the potential to escalate into anti-regime protests, as demonstrations against increasing gas prices morphed into anti-regime protests in 2019.[57]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-29-2025