[AdmSmith]

Iran Update, August 1, 2025

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated Fars News announced on August 1 the formation of a new “Defense Council” in Iran. The new council will reportedly assume strategic responsibilities for Iran's national defense policy, and the regime will soon finalize its structure.[13] Fars News stated that the Defense Council will be part of Iran's “new” defense and security structure.[14] Fars News also announced that the regime will likely appoint Ali Larijani as the new Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) secretary in the coming days.[15] Some Iranian media outlets and social media users have speculated in recent weeks that Larijani may soon be appointed as SNSC secretary.[16] Fars News reported that current SNSC Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian would take responsibility for “several special and strategic files.”

This announcement follows a Nour News report from July 30 that there will likely be “imminent changes” in high-ranking Iranian security institutions after “necessary...structural reforms have been implemented.”[17] Nour News has historically been affiliated with the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) broadly, but has recently increasingly aligned itself with former SNSC Secretary Ali Shamkhani. Iran previously established the “Supreme Defense Council” following the 1979 Islamic Revolution to oversee the Iranian armed forces and manage defense-related matters, including coordinating the armed forces and overseeing national security during the Iran-Iraq War.[18] This announcement also follows a July 29 Nour News op-ed that called on the regime to restructure its decision-making system and establish a “Strategic Command Center” with “cross-sectoral authority” to coordinate security, economic, and diplomatic responses to threats.[19]

A CBS News investigation published on July 31 found that 12 ship-to-ship oil transfers took place in the Riau Archipelago off the coast of Malaysia in a single day as part of Iran's illicit oil trade with the People's Republic of China (PRC).[20] Iran and the PRC use ship-to-ship transfers to obfuscate the origin of Iranian oil. The investigation found that the vessels involved in ship-to-ship transfers used tarps and nets to cover their names and identification numbers. All the vessels also turned off their transponders. The publication of this investigation comes after the United States sanctioned dozens of vessels on July 30 for facilitating Iranian and Russian oil trade.[21] Over 92 percent of Iranian crude oil exports in June 2025 went to China.[22]

The United States sanctioned five entities and one individual based in Iran, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and China on July 31 for procuring technology for the Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company (HESA).[23] HESA is a subsidiary of the Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry and manufactures Ababil and Shahed-series drones.[24] Several of the sanctioned entities procured computer numerical control (CNC) machines for HESA. This equipment is used “to create precise and durable components for commercial and military aircraft,” according to the US Treasury Department.[25]

Iran is continuing to face severe water shortages. Director of the United Nations University Institute for Water, Environment, and Health Kaveh Madani told CNN on July 31 that Tehran Province could run out of water within weeks.[30] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian warned on July 31 that dams in Tehran will become empty by September or October if Iranians do not reduce water consumption.[31] The CEO of the Tehran Provincial Water and Wastewater Company said on July 17 that citizens in Tehran must reduce water consumption by 20 percent to “overcome” the water crisis, and that there was a seven percent decrease in consumption so far.[32]

The Iranian regime will likely not be able to meaningfully improve this water crisis if it does not address underlying issues, such as mismanagement and unsustainable development. President Pezeshkian met with regime officials, including Energy Minister Abbas Aliabadi and Interior Minister Eskandar Momeni, on July 31 to discuss potential solutions for the water shortages.[33] The Iranian government shut down municipal offices in Tehran on July 23 and is considering further shutdowns to conserve water resources.[34] Pezeshkian stated on July 30 that closures are not enough to solve Iran's water crisis and emphasized the importance of implementing sustainable development practices.[35] The head of the Iranian Environmental Protection Organization told state media on July 31 that the lack of sustainable water management practices caused the water crisis.”[36]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-1-2025

[AdmSmith]

Iran Update, August 4, 2025

Unprecedented and growing discontent among Hezbollah’s Shia support base could weaken Hezbollah’s political leverage to resist disarmament. Much of the Lebanese Shia community has fervently backed Hezbollah since the 1980s.[15] The New York Times reported on August 4 that the Lebanese Shia community is in “shock, despair,” and angry with Hezbollah, however.[16] An anonymous Hezbollah supporter told the New York Times that Hezbollah “promised us a victory but instead destroyed our villages, destroyed our homes.”[17] Hezbollah, which quickly rebuilt Lebanon and provided a social safety net for Lebanese civilians after the 2006 war, is struggling to reconstruct damaged infrastructure and reconstitute its forces following the Israel-Hezbollah conflict in late 2024.[18] Hezbollah has struggled to maintain its financial commitments to fighters following the conflict in late 2024, which has contributed to the Shia community’s growing frustration.[19] Frustrated Hezbollah supporters have demanded answers from Hezbollah about when they will receive reconstruction funds to rebuild businesses and homes destroyed in the war.[20] Hezbollah has historically used financial benefits, including pensions for the families of deceased fighters and compensation to those who lost their homes or property, to retain its support base among Lebanese Shia.[21]

The Lebanese government reportedly hopes that frustration among southern residents toward Hezbollah will pressure Hezbollah to disarm.[22] Frustration among Hezbollah’s Lebanese Shia support base comes amid six weeks of negotiations between the United States and Lebanon about disarming Hezbollah.[23] Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem has persistently rejected calls to disarm, while some Hezbollah allies have recently shifted their positions and expressed support for the state’s monopoly on arms.[24] Lebanese media reported on July 28 that Lebanese Parliament Speaker and Hezbollah ally Nabih Berri is “in agreement” with Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam “on the approach toward the weapons file.”[25] Both Aoun and Salam have publicly called on Hezbollah to disarm.[26] Lebanese media reported that Hezbollah “is in a state of shock over its allies’ public calls for the monopolization of weapons” by the state.[27] Lebanese media also stated that Aoun’s speech on July 31, in which he called on Hezbollah to disarm, has “created a popular and political momentum supportive of the state.”[28] Continued frustration among Hezbollah’s Shia support base and growing momentum for the Lebanese government’s position could weaken Hezbollah’s political leverage and ability to maintain support for its retention of weapons.

A brief breakdown in the ceasefire in Suwayda Province, Syria, on August 3 underscores the lack of trust between the Syrian transitional government and the Druze community. This distrust extends to other Syrian minority groups as well. Druze militias launched a preplanned attack on August 3 to capture the strategically important Tell Hadid hill from the Syrian General Security Service (GSS).[29] Tell Hadid overlooks Suwayda City and serves as a government-controlled buffer between Druze militias and Sunni Bedouin fighters who are in the process of implementing a three-phase ceasefire agreement after intercommunal violence swept the province in mid-July.[30] The Israeli Air Force fired flares over neighboring Daraa Province as Druze militias captured the hill.[31] The Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Sunni Bedouin fighters recaptured Tell Hadid on August 3 after engaging with Druze militias.[32] The GSS also recaptured the villages of Walgha and Rimat Hazm on August 3 after Druze militias advanced toward the villages.[33] All parties agreed to a ceasefire, and Druze fighters returned to their original positions on August 3.[34] Syrian sources claimed that the new ceasefire calls for the withdrawal of all Syrian government and affiliated forces from Suwayda Province.[35] CTP-ISW cannot independently verify this claim. The Syrian Ministry of Interior (MoI) reopened a key humanitarian corridor into Suwayda Province on August 4 after closing it due to the fighting.[36] Parties were in the process of implementing the second phase of the previous July 18 ceasefire agreement, which includes the delivery of aid, provision of services, and repair of infrastructure, when fighting broke out on August 3.[37] It remains unclear how or if the July 18 ceasefire will progress to its third phase, which calls for activating state-run institutions, gradually deploying government forces to Suwayda Province, and integrating Suwaydawi institutions into the Syrian state, after the recent ceasefire violation and new ceasefire agreement.[38]

A Sheikh al Karama Druze militia member outlined the Druze community’s irreconcilable grievances toward the Syrian transitional government a day before Druze militias attacked Tell Hadid.[39] Sheikh al Karama previously negotiated with the Syrian transitional government about security issues and integration before the outbreak of intercommunal violence in Suwayda in mid-July.[40] The militia member stated on August 2 that “after the grievous violations committed against the minorities [in Suwayda Province]...it has become impossible to remain under a centralized state that prevents the minorities from participating in it.” The militia member added that an “autonomous administration or separation is the sole solution.”[41] This sentiment is not unique to the Druze. Kurdish and Alawite communities have repeatedly called for autonomy and voiced their opposition to centralized rule because they view the transitional government as exclusionary and are skeptical of the government’s ability and willingness to protect their communities.[42] The Syrian transitional government’s repeated failure to protect minority communities has reinforced the perception among minority communities that integration under the current government framework is unviable.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-4-2025