The Iranian Parliament appears to be trying to play an influential role in shaping Iranian security policy following the Israel-Iran War by supporting and approving security-related legislation at an anomalously high rate. Parliament recently approved a bill on July 27 that would further expand the regime's ability to suppress public dissent.[1] The bill targets unspecified “fake news” on social media and only applies to social media accounts with over 90,000 followers.[2] The regime could define anti-regime statements or unapproved narratives as “fake news” to suppress regime dissidents. The “fake news“ bill is the latest of several security-related pieces of legislation that Parliament has approved since the conclusion of the war, which is consistent with the regime's efforts to securitize Iranian society following the war.[3] Parliament approved an espionage bill on June 29 that targets suspected spies or individuals aiding hostile states.[4] The regime could use the espionage bill to target any Iranian who opposes the regime, similar to the “fake news” bill. The Guardian Council still needs to approve the espionage bill in order for it to become law. Parliament separately passed a bill on July 2 to suspend Iranian cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which could undermine moderate pro-negotiations officials’ ability to comply with foreign demands for Iran to cooperate with the IAEA.[5] The Iranian Parliament regularly passes legislation, including legislation related to security, but the rate at which it has done so following the war is anomalous and may reflect Parliament's efforts to play a more significant role in shaping Iranian security policy.
Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian’s cabinet withdrew the “fake news” bill from Parliament on July 30, which highlights the fissures between moderate and hardliner elements in the Iranian political sphere.[6] The decision to withdraw the bill may also reflect government concerns that the legislation could trigger popular unrest. Pezeskhian’s cabinet withdrew the bill to maintain “national unity,” according to the Iranian government spokesperson.[7] The Government Information Council head separately stated that Pezeshkian’s cabinet withdrew the bill in order to avoid causing “concern and discomfort” to the Iranian people.[8] The decision comes after the justice minister, legal experts, and civil society members reviewed the bill on July 30 upon Pezeshkian’s request and amid criticism from reformist and moderate factions that the bill would further erode trust between the regime and the Iranian people.[9] Iranian hardliners, who comprise the majority of Parliament, will likely oppose Pezeshkian’s decision to withdraw the bill.
The United States is reportedly pressuring the Lebanese Council of Ministers to vote on a resolution to disarm Hezbollah. The United States and Lebanon have exchanged multiple proposals to disarm Hezbollah during ongoing negotiations over the past six weeks but have unable not been able to reach an agreement.[10] The Lebanese government gave US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack an updated proposal during his visit to Beirut in early July, which Israel rejected.[11] Five unspecified sources told Reuters on July 29 that the United States will no longer engage in direct negotiations or “pressure Israel” to stop operations in Lebanon until the Lebanese Council of Ministers votes on a resolution that commits the Lebanese government to disarming Hezbollah.[12] The 24-member Council of Ministers is Lebanon's executive body that sets and implements the Lebanese government's policies.[13] A council decision would make Hezbollah's disarmament Lebanese state policy and publicly affirm the government's commitment to do so. Unspecified political sources told Lebanese media that French President Emmanuel Macron advised Salam to hold a council session to pass a resolution to monopolize the state's arms during their July 24 meeting.[14]
Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam is attempting to obtain support for a disarmament resolution from Hezbollah and the Amal Movement before convening the council for a vote, which will likely further stall US-Lebanon negotiations given that Hezbollah continues to refuse to disarm. Unspecified sources told Lebanese media that Salam is avoiding convening the council before obtaining an internal disarmament agreement with Hezbollah and the Amal Movement, which is a close ally of Hezbollah.[15] Salam agreed to hold a council session on August 5 to discuss Hezbollah disarmament, but Lebanese sources have indicated that no decision will be made at the session.[16] It is unlikely that Hezbollah would support a resolution that calls for its disarmament given its persistent rejection of calls to disarm. Hezbollah has long used ongoing Israeli operations in Lebanon and the 1989 Taif Agreement to justify its retention of weapons.[17] The Taif Agreement calls for the disarmament of all Lebanese militias except Hezbollah and states that Lebanon would take all necessary steps “to liberate all Lebanese territories from [Israel].”[18] Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem has persistently rejected calls for the group to disarm and said on July 30 that supporters of disarmament “serve the Israeli project.”[19] Lebanese Parliament Speaker and Hezbollah ally Nabih Berri suggested on July 25 that recent Israeli operations in Lebanon and southern Syria have reinforced Hezbollah's fears that Israel will remain in Lebanon and continue to pose a challenge to Hezbollah.[20]
Iran may be trying to replace its US-owned Global Positioning System (GPS) with the People's Republic of China's (PRC) BeiDou satellite navigation system.[21] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media reported on July 30 that repeated GPS disruptions during the recent Israel-Iran War, especially in the Persian Gulf, have led Iran to seek China's BeiDou navigation system.[22] The Iranian Information and Communications Technology Ministry confirmed on July 14 that the Iranian government deliberately jammed GPS signals inside Iran.[23] IRGC-affiliated media added on July 30 that Iran's acquisition of BeiDou would represent a step toward strategic and “technological independence.”[24] The report claimed that US-Israeli strikes exposed Iran's GPS as a vulnerability and framed Iran's interest in BeiDou as part of a broader effort to challenge “Western digital hegemony.”[25]
Iran's interest in BeiDou is part of a broader increase in Iranian military and defense cooperation with the PRC following the war.[26] Iranian Deputy Information and Communications Technology Minister Ehsan Chitsaz stated on July 14 that Iran is pursuing cooperation with the PRC within the framework of the 25-year Iran-PRC strategic agreement and noted that BeiDou was one of the main issues that Iranian and Chinese officials discussed during negotiations to reach that agreement.[27] Iran has also reportedly sought to acquire PRC military assets, including J-10 fighter jets and advanced AWACS systems.[28] CTP-ISW cannot verify these reports. The BeiDou system provides navigation to aircraft, submarines, and missiles.[29] A US-based think tank previously reported that the PRC uses BeiDou-aided guidance for short-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and long-range guided rockets.[30] Iran may seek to use the BeiDou system in similar Iranian weapons systems, particularly to improve the accuracy of short-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones. PRC media previously reported that the BeiDou satellite navigation system is most effective with missiles with ranges under 500 kilometers.[31]
Iran's worsening water crisis has reportedly triggered protests in at least two cities across Iran since July 22. Anti-regime media published footage on July 29 of a large protest in Khomam, Gilan Province, that featured chants such as “water and electricity are cut off, this happens every day” and “we don't want incompetent officials.”[48] Security forces reportedly violently suppressed the protest.[49] A similar protest against water shortages reportedly took place in Sabzevar, Khorasan Razavi Province, on July 22.[50]
Iran's water crisis has continued to worsen and may lead to further protests. Iranian Energy Minister Abbas Aliabadi stated on July 26 that 30 out of Iran's 31 provinces are facing “water stress.”[51] Tehran Province Governor Mohammad Sadegh Motamedi said on July 25 that four of the dams that supply the province with water are 13 percent full. Certain areas of Tehran are reportedly experiencing water outages for up to 12 hours a day.[52] A resident of Bushehr in southwestern Iran told Western media that Bushehr residents only have access to running water for a few hours per day.[53] Water shortages have become increasingly common in Iran in recent years due to industrial expansion, climate change, and sanctions.[54] Tehran Province has entered its fifth straight year of drought, according to Iranian state media.[55] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian warned in a cabinet meeting on July 19 that the water crisis requires “urgent action.”[56] The Iranian regime is likely concerned that water shortages could cause further internal unrest. Water shortages in Khuzestan and Esfahan provinces in 2021 and Sistan and Baluchistan Province in 2023 previously triggered protests.[57]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-30-2025
Iran Update, July 31, 2025
The United States sanctioned Senior Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Shamkhani’s son, Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani, and his multinational shipping network on July 30 for generating tens of billions of dollars in revenue for the Shamkhani family and the Iranian regime.[1] The US Treasury Department sanctioned 12 individuals, 52 vessels, and 53 entities, including 15 shipping firms, tied to Hossein Shamkhani’s network to disrupt Iranian and Russian exports of petroleum products and other goods.[2] Hossein Shamkhani manages a fleet of oil tankers and containerships through several UAE-based companies.[3] One of the companies is involved in shipping missiles, drone components, and dual-use goods from Iran to Russia to support Russia’s war in Ukraine in exchange for Russian oil.[4] The European Union recently sanctioned Hossein Shamkhani on July 21 for facilitating Russian oil trade.[5] Hossein Shamkhani’s network has employed sophisticated tactics to evade previous international sanctions on his network.[6] These tactics include frequently changing vessel operators and managers to obscure ownership, falsifying cargo information, creating subsidiary companies in offshore jurisdictions, and turning off automatic identification systems (AIS) during loading. Iran’s ghost fleet vessels frequently turn off their AIS and use falsified documents to transfer Iranian oil.[7] Hossein Shamkhani and his sanctioned associates also use aliases and international passports to bypass financial restrictions in the international banking system.[8] The network has laundered oil revenues through Emirati companies.[9] US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent noted that these sanctions are the largest action that the US Treasury Department has taken against Iran since US President Donald Trump reinstated his “maximum pressure” campaign on Iran in February 2025.[10]
The United States sanctioned the Zhoushan Jinrun Petroleum Transfer Company, which is located at Zhoushan Port, Zhejiang Province, China, on July 30 for receiving at least six Iranian crude oil shipments.[11] At least three oil tankers and 18 cargo ships that the United States sanctioned on July 30 have visited Zhoushan Port since January 2024, according to commercially available maritime data. Zhoushan Port is one of several ports that Foundation for Defense of Democracies Financial Economics Adviser Saeed Ghasseminejad and Senior Fellow Behnam Ben Taleblu identified on July 30 as being involved in Iran’s illicit oil trade.[12]
Iran increased crude oil exports from 1.7 million barrels per day (bpd) in June 2025 to 1.8 million bpd in the first half of July 2025, according to data reviewed by Ghasseminejad and Taleblu on July 30.[13] Ninety-two percent of Iranian crude oil exports in June went to China, including to Zhoushan and Qingdao ports, while 6 percent of Iranian crude oil exports in June went to the United Arab Emirates (UAE), including to Fujairah and Jebel Ali ports, according to the data. China imported more than 1.8 million bpd between June 1 and 10, according to Vortexa.[14] Another firm that tracks Iranian oil tankers reported that Iranian oil exports to China, including petroleum products and condensates, reached 1.46 million bpd on June 27.[15] Iranian oil exports to China likely decreased in the second half of June due to the 12-day Israel-Iran War. Iranian oil exports still increased in June from around 1 million bpd in May, however.[16]
Iran continues to maintain maximalist demands, including its right to domestic uranium enrichment, which makes it very unlikely that Iran will accept a nuclear deal with the United States that includes a zero-uranium enrichment demand. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi stated in an interview with the Financial Times on July 31 that the United States “must agree to compensate” Iran for damages it incurred during the Israel-Iran War.[34] Araghchi further demanded that the United States explain why it struck Iran during nuclear negotiations and assure Iran that it will not attack Iran again.[35] Araghchi exchanged messages with US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff during and after the war and has reportedly told Witkoff that the path to negotiations is possible but remains “narrow.”[36] Unspecified Western diplomats told Israeli media on July 30 that the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) officials left the July 25 Iran-E3 meeting frustrated and stated that “there is little room for progress” if Iran maintains its right to domestic uranium enrichment.[37] The E3 has repeatedly warned that it may trigger the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism if Iran does not resume nuclear negotiations with the United States and produce “concrete results” in the negotiations by the end of August.[38]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-31-2025