I believe the Court will rule that the President exceeded his authority using the IEEPA in this manner.
I believe that is what should happen based on the the law; however Scotus sometimes gets creative. I'm thinking of Obamacare where a penalty under the Commerce Clause was found unconstitutional; but an alternate reading resulted in a tax under the Taxing power, and that was constitutional. I thought they would just rule it unconstitutional, in blatant violation of the Commerce Clause.
I listened to the oral arguments today and Gorsuch-Sauer was interesting on constitutional issues. Generally, the justices seemed skeptical of the government argument.
Audio of the complete oral argument [2 hr 39 min] is available here:
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2025/24-1287
Transcript ewxcerpt of Gorsuch-Sauer is below: https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-1287_097c.pdf
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Pages: 1 through 189
Place: Washington, D.C.
Date: November 5, 2025
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CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice Gorsuch?
JUSTICE GORSUCH: General, just a few questions following up on the major questions discussions you've had.
You say that we shouldn't be so concerned in the area of foreign affairs because of the President's inherent powers. That's the gist of it, as I understand it, why we should disregard both major questions and nondelegation.
So could Congress delegate to the President the power to regulate commerce with
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foreign nations as he sees fit -
GENERAL SAUER: We don't -
JUSTICE GORSUCH: --to lay and collect duties as he sees fit?
GENERAL SAUER: We --we don't --we don't assert that here. That would be a much harder case. Now, in 1790 -
JUSTICE GORSUCH: Isn't that the logic of your --of your view, though?
GENERAL SAUER: I don't think so, because we're dealing with a statute that was a carefully crafted compromise. It does have all the limitations that I just talked about.
JUSTICE GORSUCH: But you're saying we shouldn't look -
GENERAL SAUER: He has broad powers in this very narrow assignment.
JUSTICE GORSUCH: --we shouldn't be concerned with --I want you to explain to me how you draw the line, because you say we shouldn't be concerned because this is foreign affairs, the President has inherent authority, and so delegation off the books more or less.
GENERAL SAUER: Or at least -
JUSTICE GORSUCH: And if that's true,
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what would --what would prohibit Congress from just abdicating all responsibility to regulate foreign commerce, for that matter, declare war to the President?
GENERAL SAUER: We don't contend that he could do that. If it did -
JUSTICE GORSUCH: Why not?
GENERAL SAUER: Well, because we're dealing with a statute, again, that has a whole list of limitations.
JUSTICE GORSUCH: I'm not asking about the statute. General, I'm not asking about the statute. I'm asking for your theory of the Constitution and why the major questions and nondelegation, what bite it would have in that case.
GENERAL SAUER: Yes. I would say by then you would move from the area where there's enormous deference to the President in actually both the political branches, where, here, there's inherent authority, and pile on top of that there's a broad delegation of the duty and -
JUSTICE GORSUCH: You're saying there's inherent authority in foreign affairs,
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all foreign affairs, so regulate commerce, duties and --and --and --and tariffs and war. It's inherent authority all the way down, you say. Fine. Congress decides tomorrow, well, we're tired of this legislating business. We're just going to hand it all off to the President.
What would stop Congress from doing that?
GENERAL SAUER: That would be different than a situation where there are metes and bounds, so to speak. It would be a wholesale abdication.
JUSTICE GORSUCH: You say we --we -we are not here to judge metes and bounds when the foreign affairs. That's what I'm struggling with. You'd have to have some test. And if it isn't the intelligible principle test or something more --with more bite than that, you're saying it's something less. Well, what is that less?
GENERAL SAUER: I think what the Court has said in its opinions is just that it applies with much less force, more limited application in this context.
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So perhaps the right way to approach it is a very, very deferential application of the intelligible --intelligible principle test, that --that sort of wholesale abdication of -
JUSTICE GORSUCH: All right. So now you're admitting that there is some nondelegation principle at play here and, therefore, major questions as well, is that right?
GENERAL SAUER: If so, very limited, you know, very, very deferential -
JUSTICE GORSUCH: Okay.
GENERAL SAUER: --and limited is what --and, again, the phrase that Justice Jackson used is it just does not apply, at least -
JUSTICE GORSUCH: I know, but that's where you started off, and now you've retreated from that as I understand it.
GENERAL SAUER: Well, I think we would as our frontline position assert a stronger position, but if the Court doesn't accept it, then, if there is a highly deferential version -
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JUSTICE GORSUCH: Can you give me a reason to accept it, though? That's what I'm struggling and waiting for. What's the reason to accept the notion that Congress can hand off the power to declare war to the President?
GENERAL SAUER: Well, we don't contend that. Again, that would be -
JUSTICE GORSUCH: Well, you do. You say it's unreviewable, that there's no manageable standard, nothing to be done. And now you're --I think you --tell me if I'm wrong. You've backed off that position.
GENERAL SAUER: Maybe that's fair to say.
JUSTICE GORSUCH: Okay. All right. Thank you.
(Laughter.)
GENERAL SAUER: Because that would be, I think, an abdication. That would really be an abdication, not a delegation.
JUSTICE GORSUCH: I'm delighted to hear that, you know. Okay. All right.