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"The Order at docket 119 is not an injunction but an order of remedy for violation of an injunction."

Yes, and that's why the USSC ruled against it. It was an unConstitutional breach of powers.

The issue of the remedial orders at Docket 119 was not appealed, nor was a stay sought, and such was never placed before the court which, therefore, had no jurisdiction to rule upon it, and the Court did not rule upon it. The Opinion of the Court did not even mention it. You cite a USSC ruling which is a figment of your imagination.

It was raised in the dissent of Justice Sotomayor. The Wise Latina hung it out there like a flashing neon sign telling Judge Murphy precisely what the government had failed to do. Judge Murphy acted immediately upon the government failure pointed out by Justice Sotomayor.

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/24a1153_l5gm.pdf

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 24A1153

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, ET AL. v. D.V.D., ET AL.

ON APPLICATION FOR STAY

[June 23, 2025]

The application for stay presented to JUSTICE JACKSON and by her referred to the Court is granted. The April 18, 2025, preliminary injunction of the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, case No. 25–cv–10676, is stayed pending the disposition of the appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit and disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari, if such writ is timely sought. Should certiorari be denied, this stay shall terminate automatically. In the event certiorari is granted, the stay shall terminate upon the sending down of the judgment of the Court.

Cited Sotomayor dissent at 11-12:

Besides the facially absurd contention that the Executive is “irreparabl[y]” harmed any time a court orders it tempo­rarily to refrain from doing something it would like to do, see Application for Stay of Injunction 37, the Government has identified no irreparable harm from the challenged preliminary injunction. Instead, the Government locates the source of its injury in the District Court’s efforts to provide relief to the class members in South Sudan. Id., at 37–39. That argument is misguided. First, the District Court’s re­medial orders are not properly before this Court because the Government has not appealed them, nor sought a stay pending a forthcoming appeal.

In the absence of any appeal or request for stay of the remedial orders, said orders could not be ruled upon by the Court. Judge Murphy's ORDER followed the observation provided by the Wise Latina.

ORDER of Judge Murphy:

176

Jun 23, 2025

Judge Brian E. Murphy: ELECTRONIC ORDER ENTERED. Plaintiffs' Emergency Motion, Dkt. 174, is DENIED as unnecessary, subject to the below. The Court's May 21, 2025 Order on Remedy, Dkt. 119, remains in full force and effect, notwithstanding today's stay of the Preliminary Injunction. DHS v. D.V.D., No. 24A1153, slip op. at 12 (S. Ct. Jun. 23, 2025) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) ("[T]he District Court's remedial orders [were] not properly before [the Supreme] Court because the Government has not appealed them, nor sought a stay pending a forthcoming appeal."). For the avoidance of doubt, and to the extent Plaintiffs N.M. and D.D. are indeed subject to third-country removal, see Dkt. 175 at 5-7, N.M. and D.D. are included among the individuals referenced in the May 21, 2025 Order. (BAH) Modified on 6/23/2025 (PK). (Entered: 06/23/2025)

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/24a884_8n59.pdf

Court at 26:

The Government’s applications to partially stay the pre­liminary injunctions are granted, but only to the extent that the injunctions are broader than necessary to provide com­plete relief to each plaintiff with standing to sue.

Sotomayor dissent at 44 tells the affected class of people how to proceed:

[excerpt]

Nevertheless, the parents of children covered by the Cit­izenship Order would be well advised to file promptly class-action suits and to request temporary injunctive relief for the putative class pending class certification. See A.A.R.P., 605 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 7); Califano, 442 U.S., at 701–703; see also ante, at 1–2 (opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.) (recognizing that lower courts, in some cir­cumstances, can “award preliminary classwide relief that may . . . be statewide, regionwide, or even nationwide”). For suits challenging policies as blatantly unlawful and harmful as the Citizenship Order, moreover, lower courts would be wise to act swiftly on such requests for relief and to adjudicate the cases as quickly as they can so as to enable this Court’s prompt review.

https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.mdd.574698/gov.uscourts.mdd.574698.98.0.pdf

PLAINTIFFS’ EMERGENCY MOTION FOR A CLASS-WIDE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, WITH MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs request that this Court immediately enter an injunction that prohibits Defendants from implementing or enforcing Executive Order 14,160 against anyone who is part of the following putative class: “All children who have been born or will be born in the United States on or after February 19, 2025, who are designated by Executive Order 14,160 to be ineligible for birthright citizenship, and their parents.” Am. Compl. ¶ 104. As the Court has already determined, “plaintiffs easily have met the standard for a preliminary injunction,” PI Opinion at 2, ECF No. 65, and broad injunctive relief is “appropriate and necessary” to protect everyone subject to a facially unconstitutional and unlawful Executive Order. Id. at 32.

The Supreme Court’s recent stay opinion acknowledges that courts may award injunctive relief beyond the named parties when the case is brought as a class action. Trump v. CASA, slip op. 13-14 (June 27, 2025). Justice Kavanaugh’s concurring opinion confirms that district courts may “grant or deny the functional equivalent of a universal injunction—for example, by granting or denying a preliminary injunction to a putative nationwide class under Rule 23(b)(2).” Id., slip op. at 6 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). And Justice Sotomayor’s dissenting opinion notes that “the majority leaves untouched one important tool to provide broad relief to individuals subject to lawless Government conduct: Rule 23(b)(2) class actions for injunctive relief.” Id., slip op. at 43 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Thus, “the parents of children covered by the Citizenship Order would be well advised to file promptly class-action suits and to request temporary injunctive relief for the putative class pending class certification.” Id. at 44.

Consistent with the Supreme Court’s instructions, Plaintiffs have now filed an amended complaint that expressly seeks relief on behalf of a putative class of those U.S.-born babies wrongfully deemed by the Executive Order to be ineligible for U.S. citizenship, along with their parents. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 103-112, ECF No. 96.

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/29/2025-02007/protecting-the-meaning-and-value-of-american-citizenship

EXECUTIVE ORDER 14160 of january 20, 2025

Protecting the Meaning and Value of American Citizenship

For the document setting forth the authority to use the autopen to approve a bill, there is the 30-page Memorandum Opinion for the Counsel to the President of July 7, 2005.

https://www.justice.gov/file/494411/dl?inline

Whether the President May Sign a Bill by Directing That His Signature Be Affixed to It

The President need not personally perform the physical act of affixing his signature to a bill he approves and decides to sign in order for the bill to become law. Rather, the President may sign a bill within the meaning of Article I, Section 7 by directing a subordinate to affix the President’s signature to such a bill, for example by autopen.

MEMORANDUM OPINION FOR THE COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT

You have asked whether, having decided to approve a bill, the President may sign it, within the meaning of Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution, by directing a subordinate to affix the President’s signature to it, for example by autopen. This memorandum confirms and elaborates upon our earlier advice that the President may sign a bill in this manner. See Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, from M. Edward Whelan III, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Signing of H.J. Res. 124 (Nov. 22, 2002) (“Whelan Memorandum”). We emphasize that we are not suggesting that the President may delegate the decision to approve and sign a bill, only that, having made this decision, he may direct a subordinate to affix the President’s signature to the bill.¹

¹ Practical reasons why the President might wish to proceed in this manner are apparent. For example, the President may be away from Washington, D.C., when Congress presents an enrolled bill to the White House, and he may wish it to take effect immediately (for example to prevent a government shutdown, to avoid lapses in authority, or to approve new authorities without delay).

[...]

Our understanding of the common law meaning of “sign” at the time the Constitution was drafted and ratified and during the early years of the Republic, as well as the opinions of Attorneys General and the Department of Justice applying the principle of signatures, lead us to conclude that the President may sign a bill within the meaning of Article I, Section 7 without personally affixing his signature to it with his own hand. Rather, consistent with the principle of signatures, the President may sign by directing a subordinate to affix the President’s signature to a bill that the President has approved and decided to sign.

We do not suggest that the President may delegate the decision whether to “approve[]” and “sign” a bill. U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. It has long been the view of the Executive Branch that the President may not delegate this decision. As Attorney General Cushing explained 150 years ago, “[The President] approves or disapproves of bills which have passed both Houses of Congress: that is a personal act of the President, like the vote of a Senator or Representative in Congress, not capable of performance by a Head of Department or any other person.” Relation of the President to the Executive Departments, 7 Op. Att’y Gen. 453, 465 (1855); see also Presidential Succession and Delegation in Case of Disability, 5 Op. O.L.C. 91, 94 (1981) (listing “[t]he power to approve or return legislation” among the “nondelegable functions of the President”); Memorandum for the Attorney General, from Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Delegation of Presidential Powers to the Vice President at 2 (June 22, 1961) (same); cf. Eber Bros. Wine & Liquor Corp. v. United States, 337 F.2d 624, 628 (Ct. Cl.) (“[The President] alone can approve or veto legislation; that authority cannot be delegated. Whatever the help a President may have, the ultimate decision must be his.”), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 950 (1964). And with respect to signing bills, this Office has likewise stated that “[t]here is no doubt that the responsibility is meant to be that of the President alone. He alone for the executive branch participates in the legislative process.” Wilkey Memorandum at 2. Thus, although the President generally has considerable discretion to delegate power conferred on him by the Constitution, see Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 117 (1926), or statute, see 3 U.S.C. §§ 301–303 (2000), we do not question the substantial authority supporting the view that the President must personally decide whether to approve and sign bills.

[...]

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the President need not personally perform the physical act of affixing his signature to a bill he approves and decides to sign in order for the bill to become law. Rather, the President may sign a bill within the meaning of Article I, Section 7 by directing a subordinate to affix the President’s signature to such a bill, for example by autopen.*

HOWARD C. NIELSON, JR.
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Office of Legal Counsel

* Editor’s Note: A footnote providing advice concerning implementation of the authority discussed in this opinion has been redacted.

Trump never declared war.

No nation has officially declared an international war since WW2. I believe the last occurrance was the USSR against Japan, August 8, 1945.

That is why the Laws of War are archaic, replaced by the Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC). Instead of wars we have conflicts which do not qualify as wars — international conflict, non-international conflict, and trans-national conflict.

The authority of the President to enter troops into war or conflict is limited by the Constitution and federal law.

As the War Powers Act of 1973 states,

(c) The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.

The stated restriction is upon introduction of troops into hostilities, not wars.

Required is (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.

For the document setting forth the authority to use the autopen to approve a bill, there is the 30-page Memorandum Opinion for the Counsel to the President of July 7, 2005.

https://www.justice.gov/file/494411/dl?inline

Whether the President May Sign a Bill by Directing That His Signature Be Affixed to It

The President need not personally perform the physical act of affixing his signature to a bill he approves and decides to sign in order for the bill to become law. Rather, the President may sign a bill within the meaning of Article I, Section 7 by directing a subordinate to affix the President’s signature to such a bill, for example by autopen.

MEMORANDUM OPINION FOR THE COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT

You have asked whether, having decided to approve a bill, the President may sign it, within the meaning of Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution, by directing a subordinate to affix the President’s signature to it, for example by autopen. This memorandum confirms and elaborates upon our earlier advice that the President may sign a bill in this manner. See Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, from M. Edward Whelan III, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Signing of H.J. Res. 124 (Nov. 22, 2002) (“Whelan Memorandum”). We emphasize that we are not suggesting that the President may delegate the decision to approve and sign a bill, only that, having made this decision, he may direct a subordinate to affix the President’s signature to the bill.¹

¹ Practical reasons why the President might wish to proceed in this manner are apparent. For example, the President may be away from Washington, D.C., when Congress presents an enrolled bill to the White House, and he may wish it to take effect immediately (for example to prevent a government shutdown, to avoid lapses in authority, or to approve new authorities without delay).

[...]

Our understanding of the common law meaning of “sign” at the time the Constitution was drafted and ratified and during the early years of the Republic, as well as the opinions of Attorneys General and the Department of Justice applying the principle of signatures, lead us to conclude that the President may sign a bill within the meaning of Article I, Section 7 without personally affixing his signature to it with his own hand. Rather, consistent with the principle of signatures, the President may sign by directing a subordinate to affix the President’s signature to a bill that the President has approved and decided to sign.

We do not suggest that the President may delegate the decision whether to “approve[]” and “sign” a bill. U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. It has long been the view of the Executive Branch that the President may not delegate this decision. As Attorney General Cushing explained 150 years ago, “[The President] approves or disapproves of bills which have passed both Houses of Congress: that is a personal act of the President, like the vote of a Senator or Representative in Congress, not capable of performance by a Head of Department or any other person.” Relation of the President to the Executive Departments, 7 Op. Att’y Gen. 453, 465 (1855); see also Presidential Succession and Delegation in Case of Disability, 5 Op. O.L.C. 91, 94 (1981) (listing “[t]he power to approve or return legislation” among the “nondelegable functions of the President”); Memorandum for the Attorney General, from Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Delegation of Presidential Powers to the Vice President at 2 (June 22, 1961) (same); cf. Eber Bros. Wine & Liquor Corp. v. United States, 337 F.2d 624, 628 (Ct. Cl.) (“[The President] alone can approve or veto legislation; that authority cannot be delegated. Whatever the help a President may have, the ultimate decision must be his.”), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 950 (1964). And with respect to signing bills, this Office has likewise stated that “[t]here is no doubt that the responsibility is meant to be that of the President alone. He alone for the executive branch participates in the legislative process.” Wilkey Memorandum at 2. Thus, although the President generally has considerable discretion to delegate power conferred on him by the Constitution, see Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 117 (1926), or statute, see 3 U.S.C. §§ 301–303 (2000), we do not question the substantial authority supporting the view that the President must personally decide whether to approve and sign bills.

[...]

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the President need not personally perform the physical act of affixing his signature to a bill he approves and decides to sign in order for the bill to become law. Rather, the President may sign a bill within the meaning of Article I, Section 7 by directing a subordinate to affix the President’s signature to such a bill, for example by autopen.*

HOWARD C. NIELSON, JR.
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Office of Legal Counsel

* Editor’s Note: A footnote providing advice concerning implementation of the authority discussed in this opinion has been redacted.

Did you see Judge Murphy's response to the Supreme Court's order to stay his earlier ruling?

Here is a transcript from a screen image (bolding mine):

It is not an earlier ruling. It is the same Order that I quoted from the Docket Report.

What do you make of this? It looks like Murphy cited Justice Sotomayor's dissent as his justification, despite the assertion that the Supreme Court intended to stay both rulings even though they only mentioned the April ruling, since both rulings were essentially the same thing.

Scotus explicitly stayed a Preliminary Injunction. "The April 18, 2025, preliminary injunction of the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, case No. 25–cv–10676, is stayed...."

Judge Murphy quoted Sotomayor who stated, "the District Court’s remedial orders are not properly before this Court because the Government has not appealed them, nor sought a stay pending a forthcoming appeal."

It appears that Sotomayor and, by extension, Judge Murphy made a technically correct point. The Order at docket 119 is not an injunction but an order of remedy for violation of an injunction.

The point may not prevail but it is not defiance of the Supreme Court. It points out what may be an oversight. Sotomayor's dissent was joined by Kagan and Jackson, so it was not frivolous.

The entirety of what the Supreme Court said was in one paragraph. Possibly the Supreme Court may have failed to do all they intended to do. The lack of cleanup, despite the comment in dissent, may indicate that the government made an oversight in failing to appeal or seek a stay of the remedial orders. They may have to file another piece of paper.

The Constitution Didn’t Change — Just Who’s Quoting It. Article I, Section 8 gives Congress the power to declare war. But for more than 80 years, that power has gone unused.

You are right. The Constitution has not changed. It still says, "The Congress shall have power... To declare war."

Also, "The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces." That is not me, it is Federal law.

As for not declaring war, nations that the Laws of War only apply to declared international war. So they stopped declaring war. As a result, the very term Laws of War has been rendered archaic and it has been replaced by the Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC).

The AUMFs authorized the use of armed force without reference to any war.

Presidents today rely on two aging AUMFs:

2001 AUMF — passed to target those responsible for 9/11

2002 AUMF — originally intended to authorize war in Iraq

Presidents today cannot rely on those inapplicable AUMFs. The rely on the failure of the Legislature to do its job. Each AUMF states that, "Nothing in this joint resolution supersedes any requirement of the War Powers Resolution."

When citing legislative acts, it would serve you well to read them.

https://www.congress.gov/107/plaws/publ40/PLAW-107publ40.pdf

AUMF, 18 Sep 2001

(c) WAR POWERS RESOLUTION REQUIREMENTS.—

(1) SPECIFIC STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION.—Consistent with section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, the Congress declares that this section is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution.

(2) APPLICABILITY OF OTHER REQUIREMENTS.—Nothing in this joint resolution supersedes any requirement of the War Powers Resolution.

https://www.congress.gov/bill/107th-congress/house-joint-resolution/114/text

AUMF, 16 Oct 2002, HJ Res 114, PL 107-323, 116 Stat 1498

Joint Resolution

To authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against Iraq.

[...]

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This joint resolution may be cited as the ‘‘Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002’’.

[...] (c) WAR POWERS RESOLUTION REQUIREMENTS.—

(1) SPECIFIC STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION.—Consistent with section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, the Congress declares that this section is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution.

(2) APPLICABILITY OF OTHER REQUIREMENTS.—Nothing in this joint resolution supersedes any requirement of the War Powers Resolution.

War Powers Act of 1973 PL 93-148

https://www.congress.gov/93/statute/STATUTE-87/STATUTE-87-Pg555.pdf

Public Law 93-148

JOINT RESOLUTION

November 7, 1973
[H. J. Res. 542]

Concerning the war powers of Congress and the President,

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SHORT TITLE

SECTION 1. This joint resolution may be cited as the "War Powers Resolution".

PURPOSE AND POLICY

SEC. 2. (a) It is the purpose of this joint resolution to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States and insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations.

(b) Under article I, section 8, of the Constitution, it is specifically provided that the Congress shall have the power to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution, not only its own powers but also all other powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.

(c) The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.

CONSULTATION

Sec. 3. The President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and after every such introduction shall consult regularly with the Congress until United States Armed Forces are no longer engaged in hostilities or have been removed from such situations.

REPORTING

Sec. 4. (a) In the absence of a declaration of war, in any case in which United States Armed Forces are introduced—

(1) into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances;

(2) into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation, while equipped for combat, except for deployments which relate solely to supply, replacement, repair, or training of such forces; or

(3) in numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed Forces equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation;

the President shall submit within 48 hours to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President pro tempore of the Senate a report, in writing, setting forth—

(A) the circumstances necessitating the introduction of United States Armed Forces;

(B) the constitutional and legislative authority under which such introduction took place; and

(C) the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or involvement.

(b) The President shall provide such other information as the Congress may request in the fulfillment of its constitutional responsibilities with respect to committing the Nation to war and to the use of United States Armed Forces abroad.

(c) Whenever United States Armed Forces are introduced into hostilities or into any situation described in subsection (a) of this section, the President shall, so long as such armed forces continue to be engaged in such hostilities or situation, report to the Congress periodically on the status of such hostilities or situation as well as on the scope and duration of such hostilities or situation, but in no event shall he report to the Congress less often than once every six months.

CONGRESSIONAL ACTION

Sec. 5. (a) Each report submitted pursuant to section 4(a) (1) shall be transmitted to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President pro tempore of the Senate on the same calendar day. Each report so transmitted shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate for appropriate action. If, when the report is transmitted, the Congress has adjourned sine die or has adjourned for any period in excess of three calendar days, the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate, if they deem it advisable (or if petitioned by at least 30 percent of the membership of their respective Houses) shall jointly request the President to convene Congress in order that it may consider the report and take appropriate action pursuant to this section.

(b) Within sixty calendar days after a report is submitted or is required to be submitted pursuant to section 4(a)(1), whichever is earlier, the President shall terminate any use of United States Armed Forces with respect to which such report was submitted (or required to be submitted), unless the Congress (1) has declared war or has enacted a specific authorization for such use of United States Armed Forces, (2) has extended by law such sixty-day period, or (3) is physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack upon the United States. Such sixty-day period shall be extended for not more than an additional thirty days if the President determines and certifies to the Congress in writing that unavoidable military necessity respecting the safety of United States Armed Forces requires the continued use of such armed forces in the course of bringing about a prompt removal of such forces.

(c) Notwithstanding subsection (b), at any time that United States Armed Forces are engaged in hostilities outside the territory of the United States, its possessions and territories without a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization, such forces shall be removed by the President if the Congress so directs by concurrent resolution.

CONGRESSIONAL PRIORITY PROCEDURES FOR JOINT RESOLUTION OR BILL

SEC. 6. (a) Any joint resolution or bill introduced pursuant to section 5(b) at least thirty calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in such section shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives or the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, as the case may be, and such committee shall report one such joint resolution or bill, together with its recommendations, not later than tAventy-four calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in such section, unless such House shall otherwise determine by the yeas and nays.

(b) Any joint resolution or bill so reported shall become the pending business of the House in question (in the case of the Senate the time for debate shall be equally divided between the proponents and the opponents), and shall be voted on within three calendar days thereafter, unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.

(c) Such a joint resolution or bill passed by one House shall be referred to the committee of the other House named in subsection (a) and shall be reported out not later than fourteen calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in section 5(b). The joint resolution or bill so reported shall become the pending business of the House in question and shall be voted on within three calendar days after it has been reported, unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.

(d) In the case of any disagreement between the two Houses of Congress with respect to a joint resolution or bill passed by both Houses, conferees shall be promptly appointed and the committee of conference shall make and file a report with respect to such resolution or bill not later than four calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in section 5(b). In the event the conferees are unable to agree within 48 hours, they shall report back to their respective Houses in disagreement. Notwithstanding any rule in either House concerning the printing of conference reports in the Record or concerning any delay in the consideration of such reports, such report shall be acted on by both Houses not later than the expiration of such sixty-day period.

CONGRESSIONAL PRIORITY PROCEDURES FOR CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

SEC. 7. (a) Any concurrent resolution introduced pursuant to section 5(c) shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives or the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, as the case may be, and one such concurrent resolution shall be reported out by such committee together with its recommendations within fifteen calendar days, unless such House shall otherwise determine by the yeas and nays.

(b) Any concurrent resolution so reported shall become the pending business of the House in question (in the case of the Senate the time for debate shall be equally divided between the proponents and the opponents) and| shall be voted on within three calendar days thereafter, unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.

(c) Such a concurrent resolution passed by one House shall be referred to the committee of the other House named in subsection (a) and shall be reported out by such committee together with its recommendations within fifteen calendar days and shall thereupon become the pending business of such House and shall be voted upon within three calendar days, unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.

(d) In the case of any disagreement between the two Houses of Congress with respect to a concurrent resolution passed by both Houses, conferees shall be promptly appointed and the committee of conference shall make and file a report with respect to such concurrent resolution within six calendar days after the legislation is referred to the committee of conference. Notwithstanding any rule in either House concerning the printing of conference reports in the Record or concerning any delay in the consideration of such reports, such report shall be acted on by both Houses not later than six calendar days after the conference report is filed. In the event the conferees are unable to agree within 48 hours, they shall report back to their respective Houses in disagreement.

INTERPRETATION OF JOINT RESOLUTION

Sec. 8. (a) Authority to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations wherein involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances shall not be inferred—

(1) from any provision of law (whether or not in effect before the date of the enactment of this joint resolution), including any provision contained in any appropriation Act, unless such provision specifically authorizes the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into such situations and states that it is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of this joint resolution; or

(2) from any treaty heretofore or hereafter ratified unless such treaty is implemented by legislation specifically authorizing the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into such situations and stating that it is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of this joint resolution.

(b) Nothing in this joint resolution shall be construed to require any further specific statutory authorization to permit members of United States Armed Forces to participate jointly with members of the armed forces of one or more foreign countries m the headquarters operations of high-level military commands which were established prior to the date of enactment of this joint resolution and pursuant to the United Nations Charter or any treaty ratified by the United States prior to such date.

(c) For purposcs of this joint resolution, the term "introduction of United States Armed Forces" includes the assignment of members of such armed forces to command, coordinate, participate in the movement of, or accompany the regular or irregular military forces of any foreign country or government when such military forces are engaged, or there exists an imminent threat that such forces will become engaged, in hostilities.

(d) Nothing in this joint resolution—

(1) is intended to alter the constitutional authority of the Congress or of the President, or the provisions of existing treaties; or

(2) shall be construed as granting any authority to the President with respect to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations wherein involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances which authority he would not have had in the absence of this joint resolution.

SEPARABILITY CLAUSE

SEC. 9. If any provision of this joint resolution or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the joint resolution and the application of such provision to any other person or circumstance shall not be affected thereby.

EFFECTIVE DATE

SEC. 10. This joint resolution shall take effect on the date of its enactment.

CARL ALBERT
Speaker of the House of Representatives.

JAMES O. EASTLAND
President of the Senate pro tempore.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, U.S.,
November 7, 1973.

The House of Representatives having proceeded to reconsider the resolution (H. J. Res. 542) entitled "Joint resolution concerning the war powers of Congress and the President", returned by the President of the United States with his objections, to the House of Representatives, in which it originated, it was

Resolved, That the said resolution pass, two-thirds of the House of Representatives agreeing to pass the same.

Attest:
W. PAT JENNINGS Clerk.

I certify that this Joint Resolution originated in the House of Representatives.

W. PAT JENNINGS
Clerk.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
November 7, 1973.

The Senate having proceeded to reconsider the joint resolution (H. J. Res. 542) entitled "Joint resolution concerning the war powers of Congress and the President", returned by the President of the United States with his objections to the House of Representatives, in which it originated, it was

Resolved, That the said joint resolution pass, two-thirds of the Senators present having voted in the affirmative.

Attest:
FRANCIS R. VALEO Secretary.

The Constitution names the president as Commander in Chief under Article II. That role gives the president lawful authority to respond to imminent threats with military force, even without a formal declaration of war.

A formal declaration of war is not required for a state of war to exist.

Pursuant to Article I, Section 8, to Congress is given the power to declare war. The Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces is not given that power. It is the role of the President as the Chief Executive which gives him lawful authority to use the military forces. The entire executive authority of the government is placed in one person—the President. His designation as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces subjects the armed forces to ultimate civilian authority.

While the President may respond to imminent threats, no imminent threat to the United States was or has been identified.

The Supreme Court reaffirmed this authority in The Prize Cases (1863) when it ruled that Abraham Lincoln could lawfully impose a blockade during the Civil War without a declaration of war.

Could you please identify the precise content to which you refer?

The Prize Cases opinion may be found at https://www.loc.gov/item/usrep067635/

https://www.loc.gov/item/usrep079700/

The precise dates, and the precise events, of the start and end of the civil war was addressed by the United States Supreme Court in the case of The Protector, 79 U.S. 700 (1870).

The question, in the present case is, when did the rebellion begin and end? In other words, what space of time must be considered as excepted from the operation of the statute of limitations by the war of the rebellion?

[...]

It is necessary, therefore, to refer to some public act of the political departments of the government to fix the dates, and, for obvious reasons, those of the executive department which may be and in fact was, at the commencement of hostilities, obliged to act during the recess of Congress, must be taken.

The proclamation of intended blockade by the President may therefore be assumed as marking the first of these dates, and the proclamation that the war had closed as marking the second.

As you may see, the U.S. Supreme Court found Lincoln's proclamation of a blockade to denote the start of the war of the rebellion. Precise dates were needed for legal purposes after the war. A state of war is not imposed by the action of a foreign nation, but rather by some overt act of this nation.

A blockade is an international act. The domestic equivalent is a closing of the ports. The proclamation of a blockade had the effect of reecognizing the Confederacy as a lawful belligerent power whose troops, upon capture, were considered prisoners of war and not common criminals.

The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635, 664-65 (1862)

That the rebellion had come to a state requiring the exercise by us of the war powers of blockade and capture, has been passed upon by the political department of the Government,—by both the Executive and Legislative branches. That is conclusive on the Courts. President's proclamations of April 15, April 19, 1861, and April 27, May 3, 1861; Acts of Congress Aug. 6, 1861, ch. 63, see. 3; March 25, 1862, ch. 50; and July 17, 1862, ch. 234, sec. 12.

Whether a particular place, which the owner of the vessel inhabits, is enemy's territory, is for the Court to decide. The Gerasimo, (11 Moore, Pr. C., 101).

If the political department of the Government has decided that question, that is, of course, conclusive on the Courts. If it has not been passed upon by the political department, the Court must decide it as a question of fact.

In this case, the political department decided that Richmond was in enemy territory, on the 10th of July, 1861. Proclamation of April 27, 1861, and Aug. 16, 1861; Act of Congress of Aug. 6, 1861, ch. 63, see. 3.

What actually happened.

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/24a1153_l5gm.pdf

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 24A1153

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, ET AL. v. D.V.D., ET AL.

ON APPLICATION FOR STAY

[June 23, 2025]

The application for stay presented to JUSTICE JACKSON and by her referred to the Court is granted. The April 18, 2025, preliminary injunction of the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, case No. 25–cv–10676, is stayed pending the disposition of the appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit and dis position of a petition for a writ of certiorari, if such writ is timely sought. Should certiorari be denied, this stay shall terminate automatically. In the event certiorari is granted, the stay shall terminate upon the sending down of the judgment of the Court.

Cited Sotomayor dissent at 11-12:

Besides the facially absurd contention that the Executive is “irreparabl[y]” harmed any time a court orders it tempo­rarily to refrain from doing something it would like to do, see Application for Stay of Injunction 37, the Government has identified no irreparable harm from the challenged preliminary injunction. Instead, the Government locates the source of its injury in the District Court’s efforts to provide relief to the class members in South Sudan. Id., at 37–39. That argument is misguided. First, the District Court’s re­medial orders are not properly before this Court because the Government has not appealed them, nor sought a stay pending a forthcoming appeal.

ORDER of Judge Murphy:

176

Jun 23, 2025

Judge Brian E. Murphy: ELECTRONIC ORDER ENTERED. Plaintiffs' Emergency Motion, Dkt. 174, is DENIED as unnecessary, subject to the below. The Court's May 21, 2025 Order on Remedy, Dkt. 119, remains in full force and effect, notwithstanding today's stay of the Preliminary Injunction. DHS v. D.V.D., No. 24A1153, slip op. at 12 (S. Ct. Jun. 23, 2025) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) ("[T]he District Court's remedial orders [were] not properly before [the Supreme] Court because the Government has not appealed them, nor sought a stay pending a forthcoming appeal."). For the avoidance of doubt, and to the extent Plaintiffs N.M. and D.D. are indeed subject to third-country removal, see Dkt. 175 at 5-7, N.M. and D.D. are included among the individuals referenced in the May 21, 2025 Order. (BAH) Modified on 6/23/2025 (PK). (Entered: 06/23/2025)

https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.mad.282404/gov.uscourts.mad.282404.119.0_1.pdf

Cited Order on Remedy, Dkt 119 (heading omitted):

ORDER ON REMEDY FOR VIOLATION OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

MURPHY, J.

As set forth in today’s hearing and at Dkt. 118, the Court found that Defendants violated the Court’s Preliminary Injunction. Having considered the arguments of counsel, the Court ORDERS the following remedy for Defendants’ violations of the Preliminary Injunction: Each of the six individuals must be given a reasonable fear interview in private, with the opportunity for the individual to have counsel of their choosing present during the interview, either in-person or remotely, at the individual’s choosing. Each individual must be afforded access to counsel that is commensurate with the access that they would have received had these procedures occurred within the United States prior to their deportation, including remote access where in-person access would otherwise be available. Each individual must also be afforded the name and telephone number of class counsel, as well as access to a phone, interpreter, and technology for the confidential transfer of documents that is commensurate with the access they would receive were they in DHS custody within United States borders.

Each individual, along with class counsel, must be given no fewer than 72-hours’ notice of the scheduled time for each reasonable fear interview. Should any individual raise a fear with respect to deportation to the third country that DHS determines falls short of “reasonable fear,” the individual must be provided meaningful opportunity, and a minimum of 15 days, to seek to move to reopen immigration proceedings to challenge the potential third-country removal. During that 15-day period, the individual must remain within the custody or control of DHS, and must be afforded access to counsel that is commensurate with the access they would be afforded if they were seeking to move to reopen from within the United States’ borders. Defendants must provide status reports every seven days as to all six individuals. Should any individual move to reopen, the parties must also immediately provide a status report, and continue providing status reports every seven days thereafter, on the status of the motion to reopen.

DHS, in its discretion, may elect to provide this process to the six individuals either within the United States—should it choose to return them to the United States—or abroad, if at all relevant times DHS retains custody and control over the individuals in conditions commensurate to those the individuals would be housed in were they still in DHS’s custody within the United States.

This Order reflects a remedy, in light of the Court’s finding of a violation of its Preliminary Injunction, that has been narrowly tailored in accordance with principles of equity. The Court cautions Defendants that this remedy should not be construed as setting forth a course of conduct that would constitute compliance with the Preliminary Injunction, and the Court is not—in ordering this remedy—making any findings or conclusions that compliance with these processes before deportation would have satisfied the requirements of its Preliminary Injunction in the first instance.

So Ordered.

/s/ Brian E. Murphy
Brian E. Murphy
Judge, United States District Court

Dated: May 21, 2025

Turley disagrees with you

From your linked article by, Turley: "Presidents have long maintained their right to deploy military assets unilaterally without congressional approval to address imminent threats. President Thomas Jefferson did so when he went to war with the Barbary Pirates at the start of the Nineteenth Century."

In the instant case, here was no imminent threat to the United States.

Redacted portion added back in blue font.

Here:

Try this....

The War Powers Act, [(also known as the War Powers Resolution of 1973 or the War Powers Act) (50 U.S.C. ch. 33)] officially known as the War Powers Resolution of 1973, is a federal law that limits the U.S. president’s ability to engage in military actions without congressional approval. It requires the president to notify Congress within 48 hours of committing armed forces and restricts military engagement to 60 days without a declaration of war or congressional authorization.

Let's NOT try a partial redacted quote from some anonymous twit writing in Wikipedia.

At my #70, I quoted; from 50 U.S.C. ch 33, the federal statute law at 50 U.S.C. 1541. Chapter 33 includes 50 U.S.C. 1540 thru 1550, and is the codified version of the War Powers Resolution.

In stating what a law says, I prefer the actual words of the law and do not prefer anybody's stylized description in preference thereto. Below is the full text of the War Powers Act, so nobody has to rely on a partial unattributed anonymous quote from Wikipedia.

https://www.congress.gov/93/statute/STATUTE-87/STATUTE-87-Pg555.pdf

Public Law 93-148

JOINT RESOLUTION

November 7, 1973
[H. J. Res. 542]

Concerning the war powers of Congress and the President,

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SHORT TITLE

SECTION 1. This joint resolution may be cited as the "War Powers Resolution".

PURPOSE AND POLICY

SEC. 2. (a) It is the purpose of this joint resolution to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States and insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations.

(b) Under article I, section 8, of the Constitution, it is specifically provided that the Congress shall have the power to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution, not only its own powers but also all other powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.

(c) The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in- Chief to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.

CONSULTATION

Sec. 3. The President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and after every such introduction shall consult regularly with the Congress until United States Armed Forces are no longer engaged in hostilities or have been removed from such situations.

REPORTING

Sec. 4. (a) In the absence of a declaration of war, in any case in which United States Armed Forces are introduced—

(1) into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances;

(2) into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation, while equipped for combat, except for deployments which relate solely to supply, replacement, repair, or training of such forces; or

(3) in numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed Forces equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation;

the President shall submit within 48 hours to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President pro tempore of the Senate a report, in writing, setting forth—

(A) the circumstances necessitating the introduction of United States Armed Forces;

(B) the constitutional and legislative authority under which such introduction took place; and

(C) the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or involvement.

(b) The President shall provide such other information as the Congress may request in the fulfillment of its constitutional responsibilities with respect to committing the Nation to war and to the use of United States Armed Forces abroad.

(c) Whenever United States Armed Forces are introduced into hostilities or into any situation described in subsection (a) of this section, the President shall, so long as such armed forces continue to be engaged in such hostilities or situation, report to the Congress periodically on the status of such hostilities or situation as well as on the scope and duration of such hostilities or situation, but in no event shall he report to the Congress less often than once every six months.

CONGRESSIONAL ACTION

Sec. 5. (a) Each report submitted pursuant to section 4(a) (1) shall be transmitted to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President pro tempore of the Senate on the same calendar day. Each report so transmitted shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate for appropriate action. If, when the report is transmitted, the Congress has adjourned sine die or has adjourned for any period in excess of three calendar days, the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate, if they deem it advisable (or if petitioned by at least 30 percent of the membership of their respective Houses) shall jointly request the President to convene Congress in order that it may consider the report and take appropriate action pursuant to this section.

(b) Within sixty calendar days after a report is submitted or is required to be submitted pursuant to section 4(a)(1), whichever is earlier, the President shall terminate any use of United States Armed Forces with respect to which such report was submitted (or required to be submitted), unless the Congress (1) has declared war or has enacted a specific authorization for such use of United States Armed Forces, (2) has extended by law such sixty-day period, or (3) is physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack upon the United States. Such sixty-day period shall be extended for not more than an additional thirty days if the President determines and certifies to the Congress in writing that unavoidable military necessity respecting the safety of United States Armed Forces requires the continued use of such armed forces in the course of bringing about a prompt removal of such forces.

(c) Notwithstanding subsection (b), at any time that United States Armed Forces are engaged in hostilities outside the territory of the United States, its possessions and territories without a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization, such forces shall be removed by the President if the Congress so directs by concurrent resolution.

CONGRESSIONAL PRIORITY PROCEDURES FOR JOINT RESOLUTION OR BILL

SEC. 6. (a) Any joint resolution or bill introduced pursuant to section 5(b) at least thirty calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in such section shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives or the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, as the case may be, and such committee shall report one such joint resolution or bill, together with its recommendations, not later than tAventy-four calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in such section, unless such House shall otherwise determine by the yeas and nays.

(b) Any joint resolution or bill so reported shall become the pending business of the House in question (in the case of the Senate the time for debate shall be equally divided between the proponents and the opponents), and shall be voted on within three calendar days thereafter, unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.

(c) Such a joint resolution or bill passed by one House shall be referred to the committee of the other House named in subsection (a) and shall be reported out not later than fourteen calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in section 5(b). The joint resolution or bill so reported shall become the pending business of the House in question and shall be voted on within three calendar days after it has been reported, unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.

(d) In the case of any disagreement between the two Houses of Congress with respect to a joint resolution or bill passed by both Houses, conferees shall be promptly appointed and the committee of conference shall make and file a report with respect to such resolution or bill not later than four calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in section 5(b). In the event the conferees are unable to agree within 48 hours, they shall report back to their respective Houses in disagreement. Notwithstanding any rule in either House concerning the printing of conference reports in the Record or concerning any delay in the consideration of such reports, such report shall be acted on by both Houses not later than the expiration of such sixty-day period.

CONGRESSIONAL PRIORITY PROCEDURES FOR CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

SEC. 7. (a) Any concurrent resolution introduced pursuant to section 5(c) shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives or the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, as the case may be, and one such concurrent resolution shall be reported out by such committee together with its recommendations within fifteen calendar days, unless such House shall otherwise determine by the yeas and nays.

(b) Any concurrent resolution so reported shall become the pending business of the House in question (in the case of the Senate the time for debate shall be equally divided between the proponents and the opponents) and| shall be voted on within three calendar days thereafter, unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.

(c) Such a concurrent resolution passed by one House shall be referred to the committee of the other House named in subsection (a) and shall be reported out by such committee together with its recommendations within fifteen calendar days and shall thereupon become the pending business of such House and shall be voted upon within three calendar days, unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.

(d) In the case of any disagreement between the two Houses of Congress with respect to a concurrent resolution passed by both Houses, conferees shall be promptly appointed and the committee of conference shall make and file a report with respect to such concurrent resolution within six calendar days after the legislation is referred to the committee of conference. Notwithstanding any rule in either House concerning the printing of conference reports in the Record or concerning any delay in the consideration of such reports, such report shall be acted on by both Houses not later than six calendar days after the conference report is filed. In the event the conferees are unable to agree within 48 hours, they shall report back to their respective Houses in disagreement.

INTERPRETATION OF JOINT RESOLUTION

Sec. 8. (a) Authority to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations wherein involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances shall not be inferred—

(1) from any provision of law (whether or not in effect before the date of the enactment of this joint resolution), including any provision contained in any appropriation Act, unless such provision specifically authorizes the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into such situations and states that it is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of this joint resolution; or

(2) from any treaty heretofore or hereafter ratified unless such treaty is implemented by legislation specifically authorizing the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into such situations and stating that it is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of this joint resolution.

(b) Nothing in this joint resolution shall be construed to require any further specific statutory authorization to permit members of United States Armed Forces to participate jointly with members of the armed forces of one or more foreign countries m the headquarters operations of high-level military commands which were established prior to the date of enactment of this joint resolution and pursuant to the United Nations Charter or any treaty ratified by the United States prior to such date.

(c) For purposcs of this joint resolution, the term "introduction of United States Armed Forces" includes the assignment of members of such armed forces to command, coordinate, participate in the movement of, or accompany the regular or irregular military forces of any foreign country or government when such military forces are engaged, or there exists an imminent threat that such forces will become engaged, in hostilities.

(d) Nothing in this joint resolution—

(1) is intended to alter the constitutional authority of the Congress or of the President, or the provisions of existing treaties; or

(2) shall be construed as granting any authority to the President with respect to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations wherein involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances which authority he would not have had in the absence of this joint resolution.

SEPARABILITY CLAUSE

SEC. 9. If any provision of this joint resolution or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the joint resolution and the application of such provision to any other person or circumstance shall not be affected thereby.

EFFECTIVE DATE

SEC. 10. This joint resolution shall take effect on the date of its enactment.

CARL ALBERT
Speaker of the House of Representatives.

JAMES O. EASTLAND
President of the Senate pro tempore.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, U.S.,
November 7, 1973.

The House of Representatives having proceeded to reconsider the resolution (H. J. Res. 542) entitled "Joint resolution concerning the war powers of Congress and the President", returned by the President of the United States with his objections, to the House of Representatives, in which it originated, it was

Resolved, That the said resolution pass, two-thirds of the House of Representatives agreeing to pass the same.

Attest:
W. PAT JENNINGS Clerk.

I certify that this Joint Resolution originated in the House of Representatives.

W. PAT JENNINGS
Clerk.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
November 7, 1973.

The Senate having proceeded to reconsider the joint resolution (H. J. Res. 542) entitled "Joint resolution concerning the war powers of Congress and the President", returned by the President of the United States with his objections to the House of Representatives, in which it originated, it was

Resolved, That the said joint resolution pass, two-thirds of the Senators present having voted in the affirmative.

Attest:
FRANCIS R. VALEO Secretary.

Under sec 1541 (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces" US forces have been attacked and killed by Iran's weapons for many years

Legally meaningless nonsense relative to the instant discussion. There was no imminent threat to the United States.

50 U.S.C. §1541(C)(3)

(c) Presidential executive power as Commander-in-Chief; limitation

The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.

Half the world has been attacked by American weapons. Lots of inner city utes have been attacked by Israeli weapons - Glocks.

Attacks made by anyone in yesteryear do not create the requisite imminent threat required to inject troops without coordinating with Congress today. Whatever attacks to which you may refer did not, as a matter of fact, create any emergency imminent threat requiring the insertion of U.S. Armed Forces at the time they may have occurred.

That a hospital treats military personnel is no excuse to target it. However, the Soroka Hospital was not directly hit and apparently was not the target. The apparent target which was directly struck was the IDF C41 HQ situated next to the hospital. See map at post #3. The hospital sustained collateral damage.

https://law.justia.com/codes/us/title-50/chapter-33/sec-1541/

2023 U.S. Code
Title 50 - War and National Defense
Chapter 33 - War Powers Resolution
Sec. 1541 - Purpose and policy

50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2023)

§1541. Purpose and policy

(a) Congressional declaration

It is the purpose of this chapter to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States and insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations.

(b) Congressional legislative power under necessary and proper clause

Under article I, section 8, of the Constitution, it is specifically provided that the Congress shall have the power to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution, not only its own powers but also all other powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.

(c) Presidential executive power as Commander-in-Chief; limitation

The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.

Source Credit

(Pub. L. 93–148, §2, Nov. 7, 1973, 87 Stat. 555.)

2nd, he specifically named the 57 , you are conflating the 43 , not him.

Believe whoever or whatever you like, but whatever you do, do not waste a minute of research trying to illuminate your burned out intellect. The guy in the video named the GBU-57 and incorrrectly called it a FOAB, Father of All Bombs. The Russian ODAB-9000 is reputed to exert the highest explosive power of all non-nuclear weapons, even greater than the similar mid-air detonated thermobaric MOAB. In contrast, the dissimilar GBU-57 has great penetration but far less explosive power. The GBU-57 features a total explosive payload of 5,342 pounds (2,423 kg) in a 30,000 pound munition.

https://www.armyrecognition.com/focus-analysis-conflicts/army/conflicts-in-the-world/ukraine-russia-conflict/has-russia-deployed-odab-9000-father-of-all-bombs-in-ukraine

Has Russia Deployed ODAB-9000 Father of All Bombs in Ukraine?

3 Oct, 2024 - 7:35

[excerpt]

The ODAB-9000 is a thermobaric bomb developed by Russia, often referred to as the "Father of All Bombs" due to its exceptional destructive power. This type of bomb uses ambient air oxygen to create an extremely violent explosion, generating a shockwave that destroys everything over a large area. With an explosive capacity equivalent to 44,000 kg of TNT, it is considered the most powerful non-nuclear bomb in the world. It was designed for large-scale missions, such as neutralizing large concentrations of troops, military equipment, and fortifications.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Father_of_All_Bombs

Aviation Thermobaric Bomb of Increased Power (ATBIP),[a] nicknamed "Father of All Bombs" (FOAB; Russian: "cyrillic characters"[b]), is a Russian-designed, bomber-delivered thermobaric weapon.

This weapon was claimed to be the most powerful conventional (non-nuclear) weapon in the world, more powerful than GBU-43/B Massive Ordnance Air Blast, which is often unofficially called "Mother of All Bombs" or MOAB.[1][2]

FOAB was successfully field-tested in the late evening of 11 September 2007.[3]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GBU-57A/B_MOP#Key_components

The GBU-57A/B MOP (Massive Ordnance Penetrator) is a 30,000-pound (13,600 kg) precision-guided "bunker buster" bomb developed for the United States Air Force (USAF).

[...]

The warhead assembly contains 4,590 pounds (2,082 kg) of AFX-757 and 752 pounds (341 kg) of PBXN-114, for a total explosive payload of 5,342 pounds (2,423 kg). These high-performance polymer-bonded explosives are optimized for controlled detonation in confined spaces. The bomb's casing is made from a high-density steel alloy engineered to survive the extreme stresses of deep penetration before detonation.

[...]

Combined, these components enable the GBU-57A/B to penetrate up to 60 meters into 5,000 psi reinforced concrete, and 8 meters into 10,000 psi reinforced concrete, making it the most powerful conventional bunker-penetrating weapon currently in the US arsenal.

About 25,000 pounds of steel alloy, combined with about 5,000 pounds of explosive material, make up the GBU-57.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TriASB-F5UY

BUNKER BUSTER BOMB Myth /MIT Prof Ted Postol & Lt Col Daniel Davis

Daniel Davis / Deep Dive

You are absolutely correct.

The GBU-57 is a MOP, Massive Ordnance Penetrator. The guy in the video messed up calling it a FOAB.

The GBU-43/B is the MOAB, Massive Ordnance Air Blast, more popularly known as the Mother of All Bombs, a take off of Saddam's Mother of All Wars.

The FOAB, Father of All Bombs was the Russian response to the American MOAB. Neither the MOAB, nor the FOAB, is a penetrator, bunker busting bomb. They are both thermobaric weapons, i.e. fuel air bombs. Each is detonated in mid-air, creates a huge pressure wave, and enormous vacuum.

Kennedy didn’t get the memo when dealing with George Wallace.

The troops were called up against George Wallace in 1965. LBJ was the president. LBJ did not rely on the authority of 10 U.S.C. 12406, and Trump alone has relied solely on a statute which procedurally requires that the orders "shall be issued through the governors of the States or, in the case of the District of Columbia, through the commanding general of the National Guard of the District of Columbia."

https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/executive-order-11207-providing-federal-assistance-the-state-alabama

Executive Order 11207—Providing Federal Assistance in the State of Alabama

March 20, 1965

WHEREAS, on March 20, 1965, I issued proclamation No. 3645, pursuant in part to the provisions of Section 334 of Title 10, United States Code; and

WHEREAS, the likelihood of domestic violence and obstruction of the execution and enforcement of the laws of the United States referred to therein continues:

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and laws of the United States, including Chapter 15 of Title 10 of the United States Code, particularly Sections 332, 333, and 334 thereof, and Section 301 of Title 3 of the United States Code, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. The Secretary of Defense is authorized and directed, for the period commencing with the signing of this order and ending as soon as practicable after the termination of the march referred to in the above-mentioned proclamation, to take all appropriate steps, including the provision of assistance to the law enforcement agencies of the State or Alabama, to remove obstructions to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the United States in that state, including the order of the court referred to in the above-mentioned proclamation, and to suppress domestic violence in any way related to the said march.

Sec. 2. In furtherance of the authorization and direction contained in Section 1 hereof, the Secretary of Defense is authorized to use such of the Armed Forces of the United States as he may deem necessary.

Sec. 3. I hereby authorize and direct the Secretary of Defense to call into the active military service of the United States, as he may deem appropriate to carry out the purposes of this order, any or all of the units or members of the Army National Guard and of the Air National Guard of the State of Alabama to serve in the active military service of the United States until relieved by appropriate orders. The Secretary of Defense is further authorized to recall any unit or member so relieved if he deems such recall appropriate to carry out the purposes of this order. In carrying out the provisions of Section 1, the Secretary of Defense is authorized to use the units, and members thereof, called or recalled into the active military services of the United States pursuant to this section.

Sec. 4. The Secretary of Defense is authorized to delegate to the Secretary of the Army or the Secretary of the Air Force, or both, any of the authority conferred upon him by this order.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

March 20, 1965

It appears clear that the administration has blown off complying with procedural requirements again, but I suspect that the appellate courts will find a way to keep the troops in California.

https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.cand.450934/gov.uscourts.cand.450934.64.0_2.pdf

Newsom v. Trump, CAND, Order on Ex Parte Application (12 Jun 2025)

At 24-25:

2. Section 12406’s Procedural Requirements

Shortly after enacting the Militia Act of 1903, Congress amended the Act to require that any orders issued under § 12406 be issued “through the governor of the respective State … from which State … such troops may be called.” Militia Act of 1908, Pub. L. No. 60-145, § 3, 35 Stat. 399, 400. Section 12406 maintains this requirement: “Orders for these purposes shall be issued through the governors of the States … .”

Plaintiffs assert that President Trump failed to comply with this procedural requirement. They explain that Governor Newsom first learned that President Trump had called 2,000 of California’s National Guard members into federal service when California’s adjutant general forwarded him the June 7 DOD Order. See Espíritu Decl. Ex. K. From that point on, the commander of U.S. Northern Command, not the Governor, has issued all orders to the federalized National Guard. See Espíritu Decl. Ex. J. Similarly, Secretary Hegseth—not Governor Newsom—issued the June 9 order calling another 2,000 National Guard members into federal service. See Espíritu Decl. Ex. S.

Defendants assert that they complied with § 12406 because written at the top of the June 7 and June 9 DOD Orders was the label “THROUGH: THE GOVERNOR OF CALIFORNIA.” Opp. at 17. True enough. But an interpretation of § 12406 that permits the President to federalize a state’s National Guard by typing the phrase “Through the Governor of [insert state here]” at the top of a document that the President never sends to the governor strains credibility, especially given that Congress specifically amended the statute to add the requirement that orders “shall be issued through the governors.” See Militia Act of 1908 § 3.

Defendants also argue that they complied with this requirement by sending the order to California’s adjutant general, who is tasked with issuing orders “in the name of the Governor.” Opp. at 17 (citing Cal. Mil. & Vet. Code § 163). But § 12406 specifically requires that orders federalizing the National Guard be issued “through the governor of the respective State,” not through a different state official (even one who can issue orders in the governor’s name). Indeed, when Congress has wanted to accommodate other state officials, it has done so expressly. For example, the Secretary of Defense may “order a member of a reserve component under his jurisdiction to active duty” except that members “may not be ordered to active duty … without the consent of the governor or other appropriate authority of the State concerned.” 10 U.S.C. § 12301(d) (emphasis added). And, in fact, § 12406 specifically provides for, “in the case of the District of Columbia,” orders to issue “through the commanding general of the National Guard of the District of Columbia.”

At 29-31:

4. Tenth Amendment

Plaintiffs’ second claim in their complaint is that President Trump’s federalization of the National Guard “infringes on Governor Newsom’s role as Commander-in-Chief of the California National Guard and violates the State’s sovereign right to control and have available its National Guard in the absence of a lawful invocation of federal power.” Compl. ¶ 95. Plaintiffs’ argument rests in part on their assertion that President Trump acted ultra vires when he federalized the National Guard, see id. ¶ 100, and in part on their allegation that using National Guard members to “quell” or “prevent” protests is an exercise of police power, which is traditionally reserved to the states, see id. ¶¶ 96–98. Focusing on the first piece of Plaintiffs’ argument, Defendants argue that the Tenth Amendment issue “is wholly derivative” of whether President Trump lawfully invoked § 12406. Opp. at 20. And because Defendants assert that they did not violate § 12406, they contend that there is no Tenth Amendment problem. Id.

Yet the Court has concluded that Defendants did violate § 12406, so their argument against Plaintiffs’ Tenth Amendment claim starts from a flawed premise. And even if that were not the case, Defendants fail to grapple with the second part of Plaintiffs’ Tenth Amendment claim—that their use of the National Guard and the Marines comes into conflict with California’s police power. It is well-established that the police power is one of the quintessential powers reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment. E.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618–19 (2000) (the reservation of police powers to the states is “one of the few principles that has been consistent since the [Constitution] was adopted”); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 203–04 (1824) (“No direct general power over these objects is granted to Congress; and, consequently, they remain subject to State legislation.”).

Although Defendants identify some stray violent incidents relating to the protests against ICE raids in Los Angeles, and from there boldly claim that state and local officials were “unable to bring rioters under control,” Opp. at 19–20, it is not the federal government’s place in our constitutional system to take over a state’s police power whenever it is dissatisfied with how vigorously or quickly the state is enforcing its own laws. Quite the contrary, the Founders reserved that power, and others, to the states in the Tenth Amendment. See Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U.S. 501, 504 (1878) (“Whether the policy thus pursued by the State is wise or unwise, it is not the province of the national authorities to determine. That belongs to each State, under its own sense of duty, and in view of the provisions of its own Constitution.”).

Of course, federal authority extends to protecting legitimate federal interests, such as protecting federal personnel and facilities. Plaintiffs do not contest this. See Mot. at 2. As discussed above, the parties vigorously dispute whether the National Guard and the Marines were deployed to Los Angeles merely to protect federal personnel and facilities or to engage in more routine law enforcement, and the Court does not at this point reach any conclusion on this issue. But with respect to the Tenth Amendment claim, that is not the only consideration at play; there is also the fact that the federalization of 4,000 members of California’s National Guard necessarily prevents Governor Newsom, as the commander-in-chief of his state’s National Guard, from deploying them as needed. Had Defendants complied with the substantive and procedural requirements of § 12406, the federal interests reflected by that statute may well override Governor Newsom’s interest in retaining his National Guard members. But they did not. So whether or not the National Guard is exercising illegitimate federal police power in Los Angeles, the unlawful federalization of those members has interfered with the state’s legitimate police power, and thus it violates the Tenth Amendment.

For the above reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their Tenth Amendment claim.

What the h3ll is he talking about?

In his memo of June 7, 2025 President Trump cited the authority of 10 U.S.C. 12406 and no other statutory authority, stating "In light of these incidents and credible threats of continued violence, by the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, I hereby call into Federal service members and units of the National Guard under 10 U.S.C. 12406....

https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title10-section12406&num=0&edition=prelim

10 USC 12406: National Guard in Federal service: call
Text contains those laws in effect on June 8, 2025
From Title 10-ARMED FORCES
Subtitle E-Reserve Components
PART II-PERSONNEL GENERALLY
CHAPTER 1211-NATIONAL GUARD MEMBERS IN FEDERAL SERVICE

10 U.S.C. §12406. National Guard in Federal service: call

Whenever-

(1) the United States, or any of the Commonwealths or possessions, is invaded or is in danger of invasion by a foreign nation;

(2) there is a rebellion or danger of a rebellion against the authority of the Government of the United States; or

(3) the President is unable with the regular forces to execute the laws of the United States;

the President may call into Federal service members and units of the National Guard of any State in such numbers as he considers necessary to repel the invasion, suppress the rebellion, or execute those laws. Orders for these purposes shall be issued through the governors of the States or, in the case of the District of Columbia, through the commanding general of the National Guard of the District of Columbia.

(Added Pub. L. 103–337, div. A, title XVI, §1662(f)(1), Oct. 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 2994 ; amended Pub. L. 109–163, div. A, title X, §1057(a)(5), Jan. 6, 2006, 119 Stat. 3440.

https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title10-section12406&num=0&edition=prelim

10 USC 12406: National Guard in Federal service: call
Text contains those laws in effect on June 8, 2025
From Title 10-ARMED FORCES
Subtitle E-Reserve Components
PART II-PERSONNEL GENERALLY
CHAPTER 1211-NATIONAL GUARD MEMBERS IN FEDERAL SERVICE

10 U.S.C. §12406. National Guard in Federal service: call

Whenever-

(1) the United States, or any of the Commonwealths or possessions, is invaded or is in danger of invasion by a foreign nation;

(2) there is a rebellion or danger of a rebellion against the authority of the Government of the United States; or

(3) the President is unable with the regular forces to execute the laws of the United States;

the President may call into Federal service members and units of the National Guard of any State in such numbers as he considers necessary to repel the invasion, suppress the rebellion, or execute those laws. Orders for these purposes shall be issued through the governors of the States or, in the case of the District of Columbia, through the commanding general of the National Guard of the District of Columbia.

(Added Pub. L. 103–337, div. A, title XVI, §1662(f)(1), Oct. 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 2994 ; amended Pub. L. 109–163, div. A, title X, §1057(a)(5), Jan. 6, 2006, 119 Stat. 3440.

- - - - - - - - -

https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.cand.450934/gov.uscourts.cand.450934.1.0.pdf

Newsom v Trump, CAND, COMPLAINT for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, (9 Jun 2025)

[Excerpts]

55. The Trump Memo states: “In light of these incidents and credible threats of continued violence, by the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, I hereby call into Federal service members and units of the National Guard under 10 U.S.C. 12406 to temporarily protect ICE and other United States Government personnel who are performing Federal functions, including the enforcement of Federal law, and to protect Federal property, at locations where protests against these functions are occurring or are likely to occur based on current threat assessments and planned operations.”

56. The Trump Memo further directs the Secretary of Defense “to coordinate with the Governors of the States and the National Guard Bureau in identifying and ordering into Federal service the appropriate members and units of the National Guard under this authority.” The Trump Memo specifies that the members and units called into federal services “shall be at least 2,000 National Guard personnel and the duration of duty shall be for 60 days or at the discretion of the Secretary of Defense.” Finally, the Trump Memo authorizes personnel to “perform those military protective activities that the Secretary of Defense determines are reasonably necessary to ensure the protection and safety of Federal personnel and property.”

59. Later in evening of June 7, Secretary Hegseth sent a memorandum (the “DOD Order”) to the Adjutant General of California, who leads the California National Guard but also holds a federal commission as a reserve of the United States Army. Secretary Hegseth attached the Trump Memo and called into federal service 2,000 members of the California National Guard for a period of 60 days.

60. The Adjutant General subsequently shared the DOD Order with the Governor’s Office; however, at no time did the Governor or his Office provide consent to the mobilization or issue orders through the Governor mobilizing the Guard members.

65. On June 9, 2025, Secretary Hegseth issued a second memorandum (June 9 DOD Order) ordering the federalization of 2,000 additional California National Guard members. Once again, this order was not issued through the Governor and did not provide any opportunity for the Governor to review or consent.

82. Section 12406 requires that orders pursuant to that section be “issued through the governors of the States or, in the case of the District of Columbia, through the commanding general of the National Guard of the District of Columbia.” 10 U.S.C. § 12406.

83. Section 12406 originated as part of the Militia Act of 1903. Publ. L. No. 57-33, 32 Stat. 775 (1903). The original section did not include this provision, but the statute was subsequently amended to include the requirement that orders be issued through the governor. Militia Act of 1908, ch. 204, 35 Stat. 399 (1908).

85. As discussed supra, Defendants did not notify Governor Newsom of the orders or attempt to obtain his consent. Nor did they issue their orders through the Governor as the statute directs. This circumvention deprived the Governor of the opportunity that compliance with the terms of the statute would have afforded him—at a minimum, consultation with the President or other federal officials not only as to whether the California National Guard should be called into federal service at all, but if so, which service members and in what number should be called, and for what purposes and what period of time.

86. President Trump’s Memo purporting to call into federal service members of the California National Guard under 10 U.S.C. § 12406 without issuing this order through Governor Newsom is contrary to law and outside of the authority granted to the President under that statute.

87. Secretary Hegseth’s orders purporting to federalize 4,000 members of the California National Guard without issuing these orders through Governor Newsom are contrary to law and outside of Secretary Hegseth’s authority.

88. Defendants’ actions are ultra vires for reasons beyond their failure to follow the procedural requirements of section 12406. Conditions in California did not fall under any of the situations set forth in section 12406 that would allow its invocation at the time it was invoked, nor do they now, nor is it reasonable to expect them to for the next 60 days. The statute authorizes the federalization of the National Guard to (1) repel invasion of the United States by a foreign nation, (2) suppress a rebellion or danger of rebellion against the authority of the Government of the United States; or (3) execute federal laws when the President is unable to do so with the regular forces. 10 U.S.C. § 12406(1)-(3).

89. The Trump Memo does not (and cannot) assert that California is being invaded or is in danger of invasion by a foreign power. Nor has the Trump Administration identified a “rebellion,” which is generally understood to connote “an organized attempt to change the government or leader of a country, [usually] through violence,” something much beyond mere protest or sporadic acts of disobedience and violence. Rebellion, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). The Trump Memo asserts that “[t]o the extent that protests or acts of violence directly inhibit the execution of the laws, they constitute a form of rebellion against the authority of the Government of the United States,” but primarily peaceful protests with some acts of violence or civil disobedience do not rise to the level of a rebellion. Indeed, nothing about the scale of the protests or acts of violence set these events apart from other recent periods of significant social unrest.

90. Defendants have also not shown that any of the protests have rendered the President “unable with the regular forces to execute the laws of the United States.” 10 U.S.C. § 12406(3). Indeed, Governor Newsom and Mayor Karen Bass both reported on June 7, 2025, that they had sufficient resources to respond to any potential unrest or threats to safety or property. A June 8 letter from the Office of Governor Newsom to Secretary Hegseth notes that as “demonstrated by the robust law enforcement response yesterday evening to protect federal facilities, local law enforcement resources are sufficient to maintain order.” And on both June 6 and 7, ICE officials were able to act on warrants and make arrests.

91. Violation of the Posse Comitatus Act is imminent, if not already underway.

92. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are entitled to a declaration that any action taken pursuant to the June 7, 2025 Presidential Memorandum is invalid, and an injunction prohibiting DOD Defendants from implementing the Memorandum.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

107. Wherefore, Plaintiffs request that the Court enter a judgment against Defendants and award the following relief: a. A declaration that the June 7, 2025 Presidential Memorandum calling into Federal service members and units of the National Guard under 10 U.S.C. § 12406 and Secretary Hegseth’s June 7 and June 9 Orders (and any future orders) calling the California National Guard into service under the stated authority of the President’s use of 10 U.S.C. § 12406 are unauthorized by and contrary to the laws of the United States;

b. Injunctive relief prohibiting the DOD Defendants from federalizing and deploying the California National Guard and military without meeting the requirements of 10 U.S.C. § 12406, which include that issuance shall be “through the Governor” and only for the reasons set forth in 10 U.S.C. § 12406 (1-3) and not to conduct domestic law enforcement activities;

c. Award the State of California its costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees; and

d. Such additional relief as the court deems proper and the interests of justice may require.

But apparently an “available step” is to indict his criminal ass, extradite him, and try him on 100 counts of human trafficking

Not exactly. The next step was to hold a press conference and talk a bunch of crap that is not in the two-count indictment.

As for "human trafficking," that is really alleged as one alleged incident of transporting undocumented aliens, and is Count Two, citing November 30, 2022, and not another 99 dates. You appear to have a vivid imagination, but little knowledge of the actual two-count indictment.

COUNT TWO

8 U.S.C. §1324 (a)(l)(A)(ii)

(Unlawful transportation of undocumented aliens)

31. The Grand Jury realleges paragraphs one through seven and ten through thitiy of this Indictment and further alleges the following.

32. On or about November 30, 2022, in the Middle District of Tennessee and elsewhere, KILMAR ARMANDO ABREGO GARCIA, aided and abetted by others known and unknown to the Grand Jury, did knowing and in reckless disregard of the fact that certain aliens had come to, entered, and remained in the United States in violation of law, did transport and move said aliens within the United States by means of transportation and otherwise in furtherance of such violation of law, with intent to further the unlawful presence of the aliens in the United States and for private financial gain, and did aid and abet the same.

In violation of Title 8, United States Code, Section 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) and 1324(a)(1)(B)(i), and Title 18, United States Code, Section 2.

I wonder who, in reckless disregard of the fact that certain aliens had come to, entered, and remained in the United States in violation of law, did transport and move said aliens within the United States by means of transportation and otherwise, in the greatest quantity? Was it Abrego Garcia or the U.S. Government?