Free Republic

MSB's are encouraged to be vigilant. "MSBs have not been, and are not currently, required to submit information to FinCEN pursuant to these Geographic Targeting Orders."

https://www.fincen.gov/system/files/FinCEN_Alert_Cross_Border_FINAL508.pdf

The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s (Treasury) Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) is issuing this Alert to urge money services businesses (MSBs)¹ to be vigilant in detecting, identifying, and reporting suspicious activity connected to cross-border funds transfers² involving illegal aliens, i.e., individuals without legal status in the United States.³

³. As used in this Alert, “illegal aliens” does not include: (1) U.S. citizens or nationals; (2) lawful permanent residents of the United States; (3) aliens whose presence in the United States is authorized by a visa or other permission to legally enter and remain in the United States and have not exceeded their authorization to remain in the United States; or (4) aliens whose employment in the United States is authorized by statute or regulation or who are otherwise specifically authorized to be employed in the United States.

- - - - -

6. FinCEN, Issuance of a Geographic Targeting Order Imposing Additional Recordkeeping and Reporting Requirements on Certain Money Services Businesses Along the Southwest Border, 90 FR 12106 (Mar. 14, 2025); FinCEN, Geographic Targeting Order Imposing Recordkeeping and Reporting Requirements on Certain Money Services Businesses Along the Southwest Border, 90 FR 43557 (Sept. 10, 2025). In accord with applicable court orders, MSBs under the jurisdiction of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California as well as certain Texas-based MSBs have not been, and are not currently, required to submit information to FinCEN pursuant to these Geographic Targeting Orders.

- - - - -

MSBs are generally required to file a suspicious activity report (SAR) for a transaction that involves at least $2,000 and that the MSBs know, suspect, or have reason to suspect is relevant to a possible violation of law or regulation; this includes the cross-border transfer of funds derived from unlawful employment or otherwise derived from funds the MSB knows, suspects, or has reason to suspect were illicitly obtained in the United States by illegal aliens.

As such, to support the filing of SARs reporting a possible violation of law or regulation connected to cross-border transfers of funds by illegal aliens, financial institutions should use the SAR key term “FIN-2025-Alert003” in SAR field 2 (“Filing Institutions Note to FinCEN”) and the narrative.

Dr. Lakin was sentenced to Ft. Leavenworth military prison. He was dishonorably discharged from service

Officers are not dishonorably discharged. They have no enlistment to be discharged from. They are dismissed.

A report at Military.com of June 28, 2011 by Bryant Jordan stated,

During his court-martial at Fort Meade, Md., in December, Lakin told the court that he was wrong not to report as ordered to Fort Campbell, Ky., despite concerns he had about the president's citizenship. He told the court he hoped he would be allowed to continue serving and that he was ready to deploy.

"As an officer, I certainly understand I don't have the right to ask for somebody's qualifications, the GPA or the level of training of an elected official," he said. "But I believe my oath as an officer allowed me to ask the question" about the president's eligibility.

In addition to being dismissed, when Lakin tried to resume his medical practice in Kansas, the state denied his application of a medical license.

The Kansas State Board of Healing Arts (KSBHA) held a hearing on October 21, 2011 regarding the application for a license by Dr. Terrence L. Lakin. On November 21, 2011 the Board rendered its Final Decision, therein stating:

IV. Conclusions

10. There is no dispute of the material facts by the parties in this matter.

11. Applicant's actions and conduct underlying his court-martial convictions constitute dishonorable conduct.

12. Applicant's refusal to deploy to Afghanistan to provide medical services In support of Operation Enduring Freedom due to his own personal beliefs represents a disregard for his professional duties and undermines the integrity of the medical profession. Of even more significance, Applicant's actions potentially jeopardized the health, safety and welfare of the military troops for which Applicant was employed to provide medical care.

13. Denial of Applicant's application for licensure is warranted due to the egregiousness of Applicant's conduct.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, BY THE KANSAS STATE BOARD OF HEALING ARTS that Applicant's application for licensure is hereby DENIED.

On December 7, 2011, Dr. Lakin filed a petition for reconsideration. On December 22, 2011 the KSBHA rendered its Order Granting Reconsideration in Part and Modifying Final Order Denying Application for Licensure, and Denying Reconsideration in Part, therein stating:

III. Conclusion

Based on the new evidence presented by Petitioner in Exhibit 1 to his Petition for Reconsideration, the Board reconsiders paragraph four (4) of the Final Order and finds that it should be modified to accurately reflect Petitioner's convictions. Furthermore, the Board finds that reconsideration should be denied as to the remainder of the Final Order because Petitioner had adequate notice and opportunity to be heard, and Petitioner's other arguments do not have sufficient merit to warrant reconsideration.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE KANSAS STATE BOARD OF HEALING ARTS that Petitioner's Petition for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED IN PART regarding the Board 's finding contained in paragraph four (4) of the Final Order Denying Application for Reconsideration.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that paragraph four (4) of the Final Order Denying Application for Licensure is hereby MODIFIED as follows:

4. Applicant was subject to a general court-martial in December of 2010, and was convicted of one (1) specification of missing movement, and three (3) specifications of failing to obey a lawful order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner's Petition for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED IN PART regarding the remainder of the findings, conclusions and order contained in the Board's Final Order Denying Application for Licensure.

IT IS SO ORDERED THIS 21st DAY OF DECEMBER, 2011, IN THE CITY OF TOPEKA, COUNTY OF SHAWNEE, STATE OF KANSAS.

who probably came into the U.S.A. illegally in that you are not allowed to marry your brother,

That is a bit of a mess. She came to the U.S. in 1995 at about age 12 as a refugee. It had nothing to do with her subsequent alleged marriage to her brother.

Omar's lawful entry into the United States is not in question.

Don't forget to mention that at least 3-4 times as many Russians also got killed.

As long as you believe that Ukraine is killing 3-4 times as many Russians, you should neither beg for a ceasefire, nor support an end to the slaughter of Russians. Let the war continue to the ultimate victory by Ukraine. Unless you have developed a love for Russians.

The person claiming to invalidate the acts of President Biden which were signed by Autopen would bear the burden of proof that President Biden did not authorize the use of the Autopen.

For the document setting forth the authority to use the autopen to approve a bill, there is the 30-page Memorandum Opinion for the Counsel to the President of July 7, 2005.

https://www.justice.gov/file/494411/dl?inline

Whether the President May Sign a Bill by Directing That His Signature Be Affixed to It

The President need not personally perform the physical act of affixing his signature to a bill he approves and decides to sign in order for the bill to become law. Rather, the President may sign a bill within the meaning of Article I, Section 7 by directing a subordinate to affix the President’s signature to such a bill, for example by autopen.

MEMORANDUM OPINION FOR THE COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT

You have asked whether, having decided to approve a bill, the President may sign it, within the meaning of Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution, by directing a subordinate to affix the President’s signature to it, for example by autopen. This memorandum confirms and elaborates upon our earlier advice that the President may sign a bill in this manner. See Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, from M. Edward Whelan III, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Signing of H.J. Res. 124 (Nov. 22, 2002) (“Whelan Memorandum”). We emphasize that we are not suggesting that the President may delegate the decision to approve and sign a bill, only that, having made this decision, he may direct a subordinate to affix the President’s signature to the bill.¹

¹ Practical reasons why the President might wish to proceed in this manner are apparent. For example, the President may be away from Washington, D.C., when Congress presents an enrolled bill to the White House, and he may wish it to take effect immediately (for example to prevent a government shutdown, to avoid lapses in authority, or to approve new authorities without delay).

[...]

Our understanding of the common law meaning of “sign” at the time the Constitution was drafted and ratified and during the early years of the Republic, as well as the opinions of Attorneys General and the Department of Justice applying the principle of signatures, lead us to conclude that the President may sign a bill within the meaning of Article I, Section 7 without personally affixing his signature to it with his own hand. Rather, consistent with the principle of signatures, the President may sign by directing a subordinate to affix the President’s signature to a bill that the President has approved and decided to sign.

We do not suggest that the President may delegate the decision whether to “approve[]” and “sign” a bill. U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. It has long been the view of the Executive Branch that the President may not delegate this decision. As Attorney General Cushing explained 150 years ago, “[The President] approves or disapproves of bills which have passed both Houses of Congress: that is a personal act of the President, like the vote of a Senator or Representative in Congress, not capable of performance by a Head of Department or any other person.” Relation of the President to the Executive Departments, 7 Op. Att’y Gen. 453, 465 (1855); see also Presidential Succession and Delegation in Case of Disability, 5 Op. O.L.C. 91, 94 (1981) (listing “[t]he power to approve or return legislation” among the “nondelegable functions of the President”); Memorandum for the Attorney General, from Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Delegation of Presidential Powers to the Vice President at 2 (June 22, 1961) (same); cf. Eber Bros. Wine & Liquor Corp. v. United States, 337 F.2d 624, 628 (Ct. Cl.) (“[The President] alone can approve or veto legislation; that authority cannot be delegated. Whatever the help a President may have, the ultimate decision must be his.”), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 950 (1964). And with respect to signing bills, this Office has likewise stated that “[t]here is no doubt that the responsibility is meant to be that of the President alone. He alone for the executive branch participates in the legislative process.” Wilkey Memorandum at 2. Thus, although the President generally has considerable discretion to delegate power conferred on him by the Constitution, see Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 117 (1926), or statute, see 3 U.S.C. §§ 301–303 (2000), we do not question the substantial authority supporting the view that the President must personally decide whether to approve and sign bills.

[...]

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the President need not personally perform the physical act of affixing his signature to a bill he approves and decides to sign in order for the bill to become law. Rather, the President may sign a bill within the meaning of Article I, Section 7 by directing a subordinate to affix the President’s signature to such a bill, for example by autopen.*

HOWARD C. NIELSON, JR.
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Office of Legal Counsel

* Editor’s Note: A footnote providing advice concerning implementation of the authority discussed in this opinion has been redacted.

He entered in 2021. He was granted asylum in April 2025.

The start of Thanksgiving, the national holiday.

https://quod.lib.umich.edu/l/lincoln/lincoln6/1:1027.1?rgn=div2;view=fulltext

Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln. Volume 6 [Dec. 13, 1862-Nov. 3, 1863].

October 3, 1863

By the President of the United States of America.

A Proclamation.

The year that is drawing towards its close, has been filled with the blessings of fruitful fields and healthful skies. To these bounties, which are so constantly enjoyed that we are prone to forget the source from which they come, others have been added, which are of so extraordinary a nature, that they cannot fail to penetrate and soften even the heart which is habitually insensible to the ever watchful providence of Almighty God. In the midst of a civil war of unequalled magnitude and severity, which has sometimes seemed to foreign States to invite and to provoke their aggression, peace has been preserved with all nations, order has been maintained, the laws have been respected and obeyed, and harmony has prevailed everywhere except in the theatre of military conflict; while that theatre has been greatly contracted by the advancing armies and navies of the Union. Needful diversions of wealth and of strength from the fields of peaceful industry to the national defence, have not arrested the plough, the shuttle or the ship; the axe has enlarged the borders of our settlements, and the mines, as well of iron and coal as of the precious metals, have yielded even more abundantly than heretofore. Population has steadily increased, notwithstanding the waste that has been made in the camp, the siege and the battle-field; and the country, rejoicing in the consciousness of augmented strength and vigor, is permitted to expect continuance of years with large increase of freedom. No human counsel hath devised nor hath any mortal hand worked out these great things. They are the gracious gifts of the Most High God, who, [497] while dealing with us in anger for our sins, hath nevertheless remembered mercy. It has seemed to me fit and proper that they should be solemnly, reverently and gratefully acknowledged as with one heart and one voice by the whole American People. I do therefore invite my fellow citizens in every part of the United States, and also those who are at sea and those who are sojourning in foreign lands, to set apart and observe the last Thursday of November next, as a day of Thanksgiving and Praise to our beneficent Father who dwelleth in the Heavens. And I recommend to them that while offering up the ascriptions justly due to Him for such singular deliverances and blessings, they do also, with humble penitence for our national perverseness and disobedience, commend to His tender care all those who have become widows, orphans, mourners or sufferers in the lamentable civil strife in which we are unavoidably engaged, and fervently implore the interposition of the Almighty Hand to heal the wounds of the nation and to restore it as soon as may be consistent with the Divine purposes to the full enjoyment of peace, harmony, tranquillity and Union.

In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States to be affixed.

[L.S.]

Done at the City of Washington, this Third day of October, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, and of the Independence of the United States the Eighty-eighth. ABRAHAM LINCOLN

By the President:

WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State.

You are not wrong.

I downloaded the following from DHS, Office of Homeland Security Statistics on 11/4/2025. Going back to it now it appears to say "Data available through November 2024" and all data from 2025 has been made to disappear.

The appearance is that they have made more arrests than deportations, and are warehousing the detainees in detention facilities. The Courts have apparently limited their ability to remove (deport) detainees without due process so they are merely holding many of them.

Below is the 2025 data that was published on the site a few weeks ago, but has since apparently been scrubbed.

Office of Homeland Security Statistics (OHSS), Department of Homeland Security

https://ohss.dhs.gov/topics/immigration/immigration-enforcement/monthly-tables

Due to the lapse in federal funding, this website will not be actively managed. This website was last updated on October 1, 2025 and will not be updated until after funding is enacted. As such, information on this website may not be up to date.

Removals are the compulsory and confirmed movement of an inadmissible or removable alien out of the United States based on an order of removal. An alien who is removed pursuant to a removal order has administrative or criminal consequences placed on subsequent reentry owing to the fact of the removal. DHS removals include removals completed by ICE/ERO and those completed by CBP.

Total 2025 (so far)

111,010

- - - - -

Removals 2025 (so far)

61,630

Returns are the compulsory and confirmed movement of an inadmissible or deportable alien out of the United States not based on an order of removal. Administrative returns are returns completed by OFO resulting from administrative encounters (see CBP Encounters by Type and Region tab), including withdrawn applications for admission in cases in which expedited removal or other immigration removal proceedings were not considered and foreign crew members without entry visas who are required to remain aboard their ships.

Enforcement Returns 2025 (so far)

35,070

Administrative Returns: The sum of Title 8 removals, Title 8 returns, and Title 42 expulsions of aliens to their country of citizenship or a third country.

Administrative Returns 2025 (so far)

14,310

Some background from scotusblog.com:

https://www.scotusblog.com/2025/09/how-birthright-citizenship-made-it-back-to-the-supreme-court/

SCOTUSBlog states accurately the status as of 9/29/2025.

Although Sauer had the option to ask the court to fast-track its petition, he chose not to. Accordingly, if the justices decide to take the case (for which four votes are needed), it will likely schedule oral arguments for sometime in 2026 and reach a decision at the end of the upcoming term – most likely in late June or early July.

The thread article is a load of bollocks.

The article dated November 21, 2025 falsely states that oral arguments were heard on Friday, presumably November 21, 2025. The only oral argument this year related to citizenship was heard on May 15, 2025.

As of 11/23, cert has not been announced as granted and there is nothing but a petition before the court.

The thread article claims:

Justices Zero In on 14th Amendment Text & Intent

During arguments, several justices pressed the challengers to explain why the United States should reward citizenship to individuals whose parents entered the country illegally or temporarily.

Justice Gorsuch questioned whether the Court has ever explicitly held that children of illegal aliens are guaranteed citizenship: “Show me the case where we have decided this question.”

Justice Thomas focused on Reconstruction-era debates showing overwhelming evidence that the authors did not intend universal, unconditional birth citizenship.

Meanwhile, the Court’s liberal bloc attempted to frame Trump’s order as discriminatory and destabilizing, warning of “statelessness” and “harm to families.”

But even Justice Kagan conceded that the Court was entering “largely uncharted” legal territory—an admission that the Left’s claims of settled law are far from accurate.

Maybe some AI hallucinated that stuff about a non-existent oral argument. The quotes do not exist in the oral arguments in Casa. I asked Co-Pilot if any of the quotes were made by any of the justices in any oral argument and was provided the following:

Direct answer: There is no evidence that the alleged statements attributed to Justices Gorsuch, Thomas, Kagan, or others were ever made in oral arguments. The Supreme Court has not yet held oral arguments on Trump’s birthright citizenship order; the case is still at the petition or preliminary stage. The quotes in Big League Politics appear to be fabricated or speculative rather than drawn from any official transcript.

Respondent's Brief at 7-10 provides a delightful review of U.S. Supreme Court precedent directly on point.

3. Precedent interpreting the Citizenship Clause

After the Fourteenth Amendment’s adoption, this Court in Elk v. Wilkins, addressed the Citizenship Clause’s meaning with respect to Native Americans born in the United States. Explaining why the Citizenship Clause was understood to exclude certain Native Americans, Justice Gray reasoned that tribes, despite being within the United States, “were alien nations, distinct political communities,” with whom the United States dealt through treaties or specific legislation. Elk, 112 U.S. at 99. As a result, tribal members “are no more ‘born in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,’ . . . than the children of subjects of any foreign government born within the domain of that government, or the children born within the United States, of ambassadors or other public ministers of foreign nations.” Id. at 102.

Fourteen years later, Justice Gray wrote this Court’s decision in Wong Kim Ark. The opinion exhaustively canvassed the Fourteenth Amendment’s text and history, English and early American common law, and the meaning of birthright citizenship to the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment. It held that the Citizenship Clause stood for “the fundamental rule of citizenship by birth within the dominion of the United States, notwithstanding alienage of parents[.]” Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 688, 692-93. Thus, Wong Kim Ark, a child born in San Francisco to Chinese parents who could not themselves become U.S. citizens, was an American citizen. Id. at 704.

This Court’s decision hinged on the meaning of the Amendment’s phrase “subject to the jurisdiction thereof.” The “real object” of that language was “to exclude, by the fewest and fittest words (besides children of members of the Indian tribes, standing in a peculiar relation to the national government, unknown to the common law), the two classes of cases . . . recognized [as] exceptions to the fundamental rule of citizenship by birth within the country.” Id. at 682. The sole exceptions are “children born of alien enemies in hostile occupation, and children of diplomatic representatives of a foreign state[.]” Id. This understanding was consistent with Elk, Justice Gray concluded, as that decision “concerned only members of the Indian tribes within the United States, and had no tendency to deny citizenship to children born in the United States of foreign parents . . . not in the diplomatic service of a foreign country.” Id. In emphasizing the broad scope of the citizenship grant, this Court explained that it “was not intended to impose any new restrictions upon citizenship, or to prevent any persons from becoming citizens by the fact of birth within the United States, who would thereby have become citizens according to the law existing before its adoption.” Id. at 676.

Since Wong Kim Ark, this Court has reiterated repeatedly that children born in this country are citizens without regard to their parents’ “primary allegiance” or domicile. See, e.g., Errico, 385 U.S. at 215 (explaining that a child had “acquired United States citizenship at birth” even though their noncitizen parents had entered the United States unlawfully); United States ex rel. Hintopoulos, 353 U.S. at 73 (stating that a child born to two “illegal[ly] presen[t]” noncitizens was “of course, an American citizen by birth”); see also Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129, 131 (1958); Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717, 720 (1952); Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 329 (1939); Ah How v. United States, 193 U.S. 65, 65 (1904). And in Plyler v. Doe, this Court unanimously rejected the argument that undocumented immigrants fall outside the “jurisdiction” of the United States within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. 457 U.S. at 211 n.10 (“[N]o plausible distinction with respect to Fourteenth Amendment ‘jurisdiction’ can be drawn between resident aliens whose entry into the United States was lawful, and resident aliens whose entry was unlawful.”); id. at 243 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (agreeing with this conclusion).

Neither Plaintiff's Petition, nor Reply Brief, addressed the precedential cases of Errico; Hintopoulos; Kawakita; Elg; Ah How, or Plyler.

The oral argument was directly addressing the issue of universal injunctions rather than birthright citizenship, but four precedents were brought up by Justice Sotomayor.

Oral Argument Transcript at 11-12:

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: No, we don't, because the argument here is that the president is violating an established -- not just one but, by my count, four established Supreme Court precedents. We have the Wong Ark case, where we said fealty to a foreign sovereign doesn't defeat your entitlement -- your parents' fealty to a foreign sovereign doesn't defeat your entitlement to citizenship as a child. We have another case where we said that even if your parents are here illegally, if you're born here, you're a citizen. We have yet another case that says, even if your parents came here and were stopped at the border and -- but you were born in our territory, you're still a citizen. And we have another case that says, even if your parents secured citizenship illegally, you're still a citizen. So, as far as I see it, this order violates four Supreme Court precedents.

IMO, and I am NOT a lawyer BUT this would be a difficult case to prosecute. These Aholes are stating current military law if I'm not mistaken. Serviceman don't have to follow ILLEGAL orders, do they?

You are not wrong. It is both current and long standing military law. Servicemen, such as Lt. Calley, can be prosecuted for following unlawful orders.

Since the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal, the claimed excuse of following orders provides no legal shield from personal and criminal responsibility for crimes against international law.

The military member disobeys orders at his peril. A judge may later find the order to have been lawful. Should he obey unlawful orders he may be prosecuted for his unlawful acts.

Gary D. Solis is a retired Professor of Law ofd the United States Military Academy, where he directed West Point's Law of War program for six years. Gary D. Solis, "The Law of Armed Conflict, International Humanitarian Law in War," Cambridge University Press, 2010, at page 354:

9.2 The Standard Applied: The Nuremberg IMT

The Nuremberg IMT's proeceural rules were a product of the London Agreement of August 1945. Article 89 of the IMT charter embodied the change initiated by Professor Lauterpacht four and a half years earlier, and incorporated in the U.S. Rules of Land Warfare less than nine months previously. Article 8 read: "The fact that the defendant acted pursuant to orders of his Government or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment..." The Nazis were to be held criminally responsible, personally responsible, for war crimes they comitted and for war crimes they ordered. Obedience to a superiors orders would be no legal shield.

Basically, service members have a duty to disobey an order that a man of ordinary sense and understanding would know to be illegal. For example, the order to Lt. William Calley to enter a Vietnamese village and and waste all the occupants provided him with no defense at trial.

https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/7716454/riggs-v-state/

Riggs v State, 43 Tenn 55 (1866), Opinion of the Court:

It is a well settled principle, a soldier is not bound to obey an illegal order. If he does, and commits an offense, it is no justification to him, and he is liable to be proceeded against and punished. This principle was settled in the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Mitchell vs. Harmon, 13 Howard, 129, in which it was held a military officer cannot rely on an apparently unlawful order of his superior, as a justification.

https://www.loc.gov/item/usrep054115/

Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 Howard) 115 (1852), Headnote:

The officer who made the seizure cannot justify his trespass by showing the orders of his superior officer. An order to commit a trespass can afford no justification to the person by whom it was executed.

https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/2023%20MCM%20(w_%20preface)%20(2023_09_15).pdf?ver=DYv_dgnVlSTjgwUwpO2piQ%3d%3d

Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM) 2023 Edition

Under "16. Article 90 (10 U.S.C. 890)—Willfully disobeying superior commissioned officer," at pages IV-23, IV-24.

[IV-23]

c. Explanation.

(1) Superior commissioned officer. The definition in subparagraph 15.c.(1) applies here.

(2) Disobeying superior commissioned officer.

(a) Lawfulness of the order.

(i) Inference of lawfulness. An order requiring the performance of a military duty or act may be inferred to be lawful, and it is disobeyed at the peril of the subordinate. This inference does not apply to a patently illegal order, such as one that directs the commission of a crime.

(ii) Determination of lawfulness. The lawfulness of an order is a question of law to be determined by the military judge.

(iii) Authority of issuing officer. The commissioned officer issuing the order must have authority to give such an order. Authorization may be based on law, regulation, custom of the Service, or applicable order to direct, coordinate, or control the duties, activities, health, welfare, morale, or discipline of the accused.

(iv) Relationship to military duty. The order must relate to military duty, which includes all

[IV-24]

activities reasonably necessary to accomplish a military mission, or safeguard or promote the morale, discipline, and usefulness of members of a command and directly connected with the maintenance of good order in the Service. The order may not, without such a valid military purpose, interfere with private rights or personal affairs. However, the dictates of a person’s conscience, religion, or personal philosophy cannot justify or excuse the disobedience of an otherwise lawful order. Disobedience of an order which has for its sole object the attainment of some private end, or which is given for the sole purpose of increasing the penalty for an offense which it is expected the accused may commit, is not punishable under this article.

(v) Relationship to statutory or constitutional rights. The order must not conflict with the statutory or constitutional rights of the person receiving the order.

[...]

Russia's still grinding, not steamrolling.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2k0C0qiDTYc

"New Russian Offensive STEAMROLLING Ukraine in Zaporizhia"

History Legends
November 19, 2025

Those who have recently left Ukraine for some reason or other.

Volodymyr Zelensky (Pianist)
Andriy Yermak (Chief of Staff)
Svitlana Hrynchuk (Minister of Energy)
Rustam Umarov (Minister of Defence, Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council)
Timur Mindich (co-owner of Kvartal 95 film studio).

I believe the Court will rule that the President exceeded his authority using the IEEPA in this manner.

I believe that is what should happen based on the the law; however Scotus sometimes gets creative. I'm thinking of Obamacare where a penalty under the Commerce Clause was found unconstitutional; but an alternate reading resulted in a tax under the Taxing power, and that was constitutional. I thought they would just rule it unconstitutional, in blatant violation of the Commerce Clause.

I listened to the oral arguments today and Gorsuch-Sauer was interesting on constitutional issues. Generally, the justices seemed skeptical of the government argument.

Audio of the complete oral argument [2 hr 39 min] is available here:

https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2025/24-1287

Transcript ewxcerpt of Gorsuch-Sauer is below: https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-1287_097c.pdf

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Pages: 1 through 189

Place: Washington, D.C.

Date: November 5, 2025

[63]

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice Gorsuch?

JUSTICE GORSUCH: General, just a few questions following up on the major questions discussions you've had.

You say that we shouldn't be so concerned in the area of foreign affairs because of the President's inherent powers. That's the gist of it, as I understand it, why we should disregard both major questions and nondelegation.

So could Congress delegate to the President the power to regulate commerce with

[64]

foreign nations as he sees fit -

GENERAL SAUER: We don't -

JUSTICE GORSUCH: --to lay and collect duties as he sees fit?

GENERAL SAUER: We --we don't --we don't assert that here. That would be a much harder case. Now, in 1790 -

JUSTICE GORSUCH: Isn't that the logic of your --of your view, though?

GENERAL SAUER: I don't think so, because we're dealing with a statute that was a carefully crafted compromise. It does have all the limitations that I just talked about.

JUSTICE GORSUCH: But you're saying we shouldn't look -

GENERAL SAUER: He has broad powers in this very narrow assignment.

JUSTICE GORSUCH: --we shouldn't be concerned with --I want you to explain to me how you draw the line, because you say we shouldn't be concerned because this is foreign affairs, the President has inherent authority, and so delegation off the books more or less.

GENERAL SAUER: Or at least -

JUSTICE GORSUCH: And if that's true,

[65]

what would --what would prohibit Congress from just abdicating all responsibility to regulate foreign commerce, for that matter, declare war to the President?

GENERAL SAUER: We don't contend that he could do that. If it did -

JUSTICE GORSUCH: Why not?

GENERAL SAUER: Well, because we're dealing with a statute, again, that has a whole list of limitations.

JUSTICE GORSUCH: I'm not asking about the statute. General, I'm not asking about the statute. I'm asking for your theory of the Constitution and why the major questions and nondelegation, what bite it would have in that case.

GENERAL SAUER: Yes. I would say by then you would move from the area where there's enormous deference to the President in actually both the political branches, where, here, there's inherent authority, and pile on top of that there's a broad delegation of the duty and -

JUSTICE GORSUCH: You're saying there's inherent authority in foreign affairs,

[66]

all foreign affairs, so regulate commerce, duties and --and --and --and tariffs and war. It's inherent authority all the way down, you say. Fine. Congress decides tomorrow, well, we're tired of this legislating business. We're just going to hand it all off to the President.

What would stop Congress from doing that?

GENERAL SAUER: That would be different than a situation where there are metes and bounds, so to speak. It would be a wholesale abdication.

JUSTICE GORSUCH: You say we --we -we are not here to judge metes and bounds when the foreign affairs. That's what I'm struggling with. You'd have to have some test. And if it isn't the intelligible principle test or something more --with more bite than that, you're saying it's something less. Well, what is that less?

GENERAL SAUER: I think what the Court has said in its opinions is just that it applies with much less force, more limited application in this context.

[67]

So perhaps the right way to approach it is a very, very deferential application of the intelligible --intelligible principle test, that --that sort of wholesale abdication of -

JUSTICE GORSUCH: All right. So now you're admitting that there is some nondelegation principle at play here and, therefore, major questions as well, is that right?

GENERAL SAUER: If so, very limited, you know, very, very deferential -

JUSTICE GORSUCH: Okay.

GENERAL SAUER: --and limited is what --and, again, the phrase that Justice Jackson used is it just does not apply, at least -

JUSTICE GORSUCH: I know, but that's where you started off, and now you've retreated from that as I understand it.

GENERAL SAUER: Well, I think we would as our frontline position assert a stronger position, but if the Court doesn't accept it, then, if there is a highly deferential version -

[68]

JUSTICE GORSUCH: Can you give me a reason to accept it, though? That's what I'm struggling and waiting for. What's the reason to accept the notion that Congress can hand off the power to declare war to the President?

GENERAL SAUER: Well, we don't contend that. Again, that would be -

JUSTICE GORSUCH: Well, you do. You say it's unreviewable, that there's no manageable standard, nothing to be done. And now you're --I think you --tell me if I'm wrong. You've backed off that position.

GENERAL SAUER: Maybe that's fair to say.

JUSTICE GORSUCH: Okay. All right. Thank you.

(Laughter.)

GENERAL SAUER: Because that would be, I think, an abdication. That would really be an abdication, not a delegation.

JUSTICE GORSUCH: I'm delighted to hear that, you know. Okay. All right.

Your globalist free traitor dna is showing.

Your communist dictatorial dna is showing. Advocating serial rape of the Constitution is no way to go through life. The People, globalist free traitors all, saw fit by the Constitution to delegate certain powers to Congress: Article 1, Section 8 - "The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States; but all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States ... To regulate commerce with foreign nations."

The Executive has no constitutional power to lay taxes, duties, imposts or excises. What statutory power the Executive has is delegated to it by the Legislature. Take it up with the globalist free traitor Framers who wrote that crap.

I’m afraid you are missing the point. The trade imbalance itself is not the emergency.

The thread article states: "Trump said the nation’s 'persistent' balance of payments deficit over five decades was such an 'unusual and extraordinary threat.'"

That is what was stated as the point.

None of what you posted changes the fact that Garcia entered the country illegally and therefore must and will be deported.

No one disputes the fact that he entered the country illegally. I don’t know why this is so hard for you.

None of what you puke up changes the fact that Abrego has been lawfully present in the United States since 2019, he has constitutional rights, including due process, and nobody is time traveling to his original date of entry to effect a removal.

Abrego Garcia v. Noem, 4th Circuit No. 25-1345 (7 Apr 2025)

THACKER, Circuit Judge, with whom Judge KING joins, concurring:

The panel unanimously agrees that the district court’s order requiring the Government “to facilitate and effectuate the return of Plaintiff Kilmar Armando Abrego Garcia to the United States by no later than 11:59 PM on Monday, April 7, 2025,” should not be stayed.

The Government’s motion to stay is, therefore, denied. I write to explain my view.

The United States Government has no legal authority to snatch a person who is lawfully present in the United States off the street and remove him from the country without due process. The Government’s contention otherwise, and its argument that the federal courts are powerless to intervene, are unconscionable.

I.

Abrego Garcia is an El Salvadoran national who has been lawfully present in the United States since 2019, when he was granted withholding of removal to El Salvador. Abrego Garcia has no criminal history and has never even been charged with a crime in the United States, El Salvador, or any other country. On March 12, 2025, agents with United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) took Abrego Garcia into custody without authority. Although ICE agents told Abrego Garcia that his “status had changed,” S.A. 19; 147, that was not true. On March 15, 2025, in what the Government has conceded was “an administrative error,” the Government flew Abrego Garcia from the United States to Tecoluca, El Salvador. Dist. Ct. Op. at 2 n.3 (citing Hr’g Tr., Apr. 4, 2025, at 19:11-13 (Mr. Reuveni: “This person should -- the plaintiff, Abrego Garcia, should not have been removed. That is not in dispute.”)).

Erez Reuveni was the attorney representing the Department of Justice.

At 7, footnote 3: "the Government attorney; appearing before the district court at the April 4 hearing candidly admitted that no order of removal is part of the record in this case. Dist. Ct. Op. at 14 (citing Hr'g Tr. Apr. 4, 2025, at 20 (counsel admitting no order of removal is part of the record), and id. at 22 (counsel confirming that "the removal order" from 2019 "cannot be executed" and is not part of the record))."

Abrego Garcia v. Noem, 4th Circuit No. 25-1345 (7 Apr 2025)

At 14-15:

Finally, I turn to the Government’s assertion that the public interest favors a stay because Abrego Garicia is a “prominent” member of MS-13 and is therefore “no longer eligible for withholding relief.” Mot. for Stay at 14–15. Whatever the merits of the 2019 determination of the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) regarding Abrego Garcia’s connection to MS-13,⁸ the Government presented “[n]o evidence” to the district court to “connect[] Abrego Garcia to MS-13 or any other criminal organization.” Dis.t Ct. Op. at 22 n.19; see also id. at 2 n.2 (“Invoking such theories for the first time on appeal cannot cure the failure to present them before this Court.”). Indeed, such a fact cannot be gleaned from this record, which shows that Abrego Garcia has no criminal history, in this country or anywhere else, and that Abrego Garcia is a gainfully employed family man who lives a law abiding and productive life. Tellingly, the Government “abandon[ed]” its position that Abrego Garcia was “a danger to the community” at the hearing before the district court. Dist. Ct. Op. at 22 n.19. The balance of equities must tip in the movant’s favor based on the record before the issuing court. An unsupported -- and then abandoned -- assertion that Abrego Garcia was a member of a gang, does not tip the scales in favor of removal in violation of this Administration’s own⁹ withholding order. If the Government wanted to prove to the district court that Abrego Garcia was a “prominent” member of MS-13, it has had ample opportunity to do so but has not -- nor has it even bothered to try. The Government’s argument that there is a public interest in removing members of “violent transnational gangs” from this country is no doubt true, but it does nothing to help the Government’s cause here. As noted, the Government has made no effort to demonstrate that Abrego Garcia is, in fact, a member of any gang, nor did the Government avail itself of the “procedural mechanism under governing regulations to reopen the immigration judge’s prior order[] and terminate its withholding protection.” Mot. for Stay at 16–17.

⁸ Even then, the Government’s “evidence” of any connection between Abrego Garcia and MS-13 was thin, to say the least. The Government’s claim was based on (1) Abrego Garcia “wearing a Chicago Bulls hat and hoodie,” and (2) “a vague, uncorroborated allegation from a confidential informant claiming he belonged to MS-13’s ‘Western’ clique in New York—a place he has never lived.” S.A. 146 n.5; Mot. for Stay Add. at 10–11.

⁹ Of note, the IJ’s 2019 decision, which granted Abrego Garcia withholding of removal to El Salvador pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) because he faced threats to his life from an El Salvadoran gang that had targeted him and his family, was during President Trump’s 2016–2020 term in office. That decision became final on November 9, 2019, and was not appealed by this Administration.

Trump Admin To Cut Food Stamps, Only Pay Out 50%....

As ordered by the Court. After a TACO, they decided following the ORDER of the Court was preferable to receiving a subpoena to appear and explain why they should not be held in contempt.

https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.rid.60750/gov.uscourts.rid.60750.19.0_3.pdf

U.S. DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

[...]

- - - - -

[2]

ORDER

The Defendants in their “Emergency Motion for a Written Order on Motion for

Temporary Restraining Order” (ECF No. 18) have stated that:

Defendants are expeditiously attempting to comply with the Court’s order while also considering whether any emergency relief is required. Given the operational difficulties set forth in Defendants’ declaration, Doc. No. 14-2, clarity as to the Court’s ruling is critical to ensure that Defendants can comply with the Court’s order while avoiding an operational collapse as described in that declaration.

ECF No. 18 at 2. Also, the President of the United States stated Friday evening that:

I do not want Americans to go hungry . . . [I] ask the Court to clarify how we can legally fund SNAP as soon as possible. . . . If we are given the appropriate legal direction by the Court, it will BE MY HONOR to provide the funding . . .

Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Truth Social (Oct. 31, 2025, at 6:10 PM).¹

So, here’s the ORDER and here’s the legal direction from the Court.² Having reviewed the Complaint, Motion, Memorandum of Law, Declarations, and evidence in support of the Motion, as well as the papers filed in opposition to this Motion, and

____________________

¹ The Court greatly appreciates the President’s quick and definitive response to this Court’s Order and his desire to provide the necessary SNAP funding.

² Given the geographic diversity of Plaintiffs and their membership as well as the injuries certain Plaintiffs suffer from the elimination of SNAP in their communities, a limited order would not provide complete relief. Trump v. CASA, Inc., 606 U.S. 831, 853–54 (2025).

- - - - -

[3]

after conducting a hearing on the matter, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, and for good cause shown, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs have satisfied the requirements for the issuance of a temporary restraining order because: (1) Plaintiffs have established a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) Plaintiffs will be irreparably harmed absent a temporary restraining order; and (3) the public interest and balance of the equities strongly favor entry of a temporary restraining order.3

It is therefore ORDERED:

1. In the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2024, Congress appropriated more than $122 billion for the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (“SNAP”). Pub. L. No. 118-42, 138 Stat. 25, 93. Of that sum, Congress directed that $3 billion, “to remain available through September 30, 2026, shall be placed in reserve for use only in such amounts and at such times as may become necessary to carry out program operations.” (emphasis added). Congress maintained those funding levels for the SNAP program in the Full-Year Continuing Appropriations and Extensions Act of 2025, meaning that an additional $3 billion was put aside in a reserve available through September 30, 2027. Pub. L. No. 119-4, 139 Stat. 9, 13 (collectively referred to here as “contingency funds”). Because of the lack of appropriations for Fiscal Year 2026 (i.e., “the shutdown”), use of those contingency funds has now become required because available funding is necessary to carry out the program operations, i.e., to

_____________________

³ The Court incorporates its oral order and reasoning stated in the hearing on this matter October 31, 2025, at 1 p.m. The Court recorded the hearing.

- - - - -

[4]

pay citizens their SNAP benefits. There is no question that the congressionally approved contingency funds must be used now because of the shutdown; in fact, the President during his first term issued guidance indicating that these contingency funds are available if SNAP funds lapse due to a government shutdown.⁴

2. Because the contingency funds do not equal the total amount necessary to make November’s SNAP benefit payments, the Government has posited that implementing a partial allotment for the entire country “would be exceedingly difficult, highly disruptive, and delayed, requiring a reworking of every State system to recognize and set forward a reduced benefit.” ECF No. 14-1 at 12.

3. Congress created SNAP as an entitlement: The statute provides that “[a]ssistance under this program shall be furnished to all eligible households who make application for such participation.” 7 U.S.C. § 2014(a); see also Barry v. Lyon, 834 F.3d 706, 717 (6th Cir. 2016) (finding that this provision “grants a right to food assistance to households that meet federally-established eligibility criteria”); Garnett v. Zeilinger, 323 F. Supp. 3d 58, 71-72 (D.D.C. 2018) (“[S]ection 2014(a) … mandates that eligible households receive benefits.”).

4. Therefore, to ensure the quick, orderly, and efficient implementation of the Court’s Order, to fulfill the statute designation of SNAP as an entitlement, and to alleviate the irreparable harm that the Court found exists without timely payment of

____________________

⁴ During President Trump’s first administration, USDA advised regional partners that funding from the contingency reserves was available to provide SNAP benefits. See, e.g., Letter from Jessica Shahin to FNS Regions, Early Issuance of February 2019 SNAP Benefits – Questions & Answers #2 (Jan. 14, 2019), https://perma.cc/9HCL5GCU.

- - - - -

[5]

SNAP benefits, the Government should, within its discretion, find the additional funds necessary (beyond the contingency funds) to fully fund the November SNAP payments.⁵ Funds available for this include a fund created by section 32 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act amendments of 1935—that had over $23 billion in it as of October 8, 2025. See OpenOMB, State Child Nutrition Programs, https://perma.cc/39Y3-4K9F. USDA is authorized under 7 U.S.C. § 2257 to use a percentage of appropriated funds “interchangeably” for certain expenditures. If the Government chooses to make the full payment, then it must do so by the end of the day Monday, November 3, 2025.

5. If the Government does want to use its discretion to use funds available to make a full payment of SNAP benefits for November 6, then it must expeditiously resolve the administrative and clerical burdens it described in its papers (see ECF

____________________

⁵ The Defendants point out that a partial payment would involve delay and potential error: “USDA has never implemented a reduction in SNAP benefits under 7 C.F.R. 271.7. Because no template, processes, or past experience exist to inform a reduction in benefits, there are multiple variables which could lead to significant problems in attempting to reduce benefits for every SNAP household in the country.” ECF No. 14-2 at 6.

⁶ Any decision by the agency on use of this discretion must be made in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act and cannot be arbitrary or capricious.

- - - - -

No. 14-2 at 6), but under no circumstances shall the partial payments be made later than Wednesday, November 5, 2025.

6. The Government will report to the Court on or before Noon on Monday, November 3, 2025, what it will do to comply with this Court’s Order.

7. The Defendants, their agents, and all persons acting in concert or participation with Defendants are enjoined from terminating any able-bodied adults without dependents (“ABAWD”) waivers before the waivers’ expiration dates on the ground that the waivers were approved due to lack of sufficient jobs in the relevant geographic area.

8. In summary, the Government must make the full SNAP benefit payments by Monday, November 3, 2025. If they chose to use their discretion and not use other funds in additional to the contingency funds to make a full payment, then they must make a partial payment of the total amount of the contingency funds, and they must do this by Wednesday, November 5, 2025.⁷

IT IS SO ORDERED
s/John J. McConnell, Jr.

_________________________________
s/John J. McConnell, Jr.
Chief Judge
United States District Court

⁷ The Court GRANTS the Government’s Motion for a Written Order. ECF No. 18.

- - - - -

November 1, 2025

"Barton holds no formal credentials in history or law"

That's a feature.

Not a bug.

As quoted in the post to which you pretend to respond:

In 2012, Barton's New York Times bestseller The Jefferson Lies: Exposing the Myths You've Always Believed About Thomas Jefferson (published April 10, 2012) was voted "the least credible history book in print" by the users of the History News Network website. A group of ten conservative Christian professors reviewed the work and reported negatively on its claims, saying that Barton misstated facts about Jefferson.

In August 2012, Christian publisher Thomas Nelson withdrew the book from publication and stopped production, announcing that they had "lost confidence in the book's details" and "learned that there were some historical details included in the book that were not adequately supported". A senior executive said that Thomas Nelson could not stand by the book because "basic truths just were not there."

That is a record of accomplishment few published authors ever achieve. It appears you aspire to win an award as least credible poster.

Trump said the nation’s “persistent” balance of payments deficit over five decades was such an “unusual and extraordinary threat.”

Something which has persisted for five decades is as unusual as breathing for fifty years.

A balance of payments deficit for fifty consecutive years is not an extraordinary threat. It has been an ordinary, every day occurrence for fifty years.

An emergency is not defined by the time that a condition has been ongoing but by the condition of the patient (Country) at the time the emergency is declared. Most emergencies develop over time.

The Country is clearly in a state of emergency caused by the trade paradigm that has been allowed to develop through weakness & corruption. Our economy is disastrously weakened and our lack of robust supply chain puts US at acute risk.

A trade imbalance is neither unusual nor extraordinary. It may rise to levels that threaten the economy but that does not make it unusual or extraordinary.

A persistent condition which has continued for over fifty years can hardly qualify as unusual. That's like saying the Dallas Cowboys missing out on the Super Bowl is unusual.

Before the Court, the IEEPA is the only claim of Executive power to impose tariffs and it does not say anything about tariffs. The IEEPA, if applicable, authorizes the President to “regulate” a variety of international economic transactions, including imports.

The International Emergency Economic Powers Act does not bestow emergency powers to the Executive branch for that which has been going on for the past fifty years and which will continue going on for the foreseeable future. There is no emergency which cannot be addressed by the Congress to whom the power to impose tariffs is bestowed by the Constitution.

The Supreme Court should address this shortly. Trump had planned to attend oral argument but then he decided he would not.

How can he simultaneously be lawfully present in 2019 and be issued a final deportation order?

Abrego Garcia v. Noem, 4th Circuit No. 25-1345 (7 Apr 2025)

Erez Reuveni was the attorney representing the Department of Justice, at 7, footnote 3:

... the Government attorney; appearing before the district court at the April 4 hearing candidly admitted that no order of removal is part of the record in this case. Dist. Ct. Op. at 14 (citing Hr'g Tr. Apr. 4, 2025, at 20 (counsel admitting no order of removal is part of the record), and id. at 22 (counsel confirming that "the removal order" from 2019 "cannot be executed" and is not part of the record

No amount of judge shopping for activists and resisters can pull some sort of legal gymnastics to override our immigration laws.

The real kicker are those Trump-appointed judges. Why did he appoint activists and resisters to tell him as judges that he was violating the law?

https://www.politico.com/news/2025/10/31/trump-administration-mandatory-detention-deportation-00632086

More than 100 judges have ruled against the Trump admin’s mandatory detention policy

A POLITICO review of the rulings shows judges appointed by every president since Ronald Reagan have rebuked the administration’s new interpretation of immigration law.

By Kyle Cheney
10/31/2025 04:29 PM EDT

More than 100 federal judges have now ruled at least 200 times that the Trump administration’s effort to systematically detain immigrants facing possible deportation appeared to violate their rights or was just flatly illegal, according to a POLITICO review.

The rulings come from judges appointed by every president since Ronald Reagan, including 12 appointed by President Donald Trump. One of those appointees took the bench just last month.

[...]

Since July 8, when Immigration and Customs Enforcement reversed 30 years of practice and determined that ICE must lock up everyone facing deportation — even if they’ve lived in the country for decades and have no criminal record — federal courts have issued increasing warnings. The new ICE policy, they note, doesn’t just subject millions more people to detention while they fight deportation, it also bars them from even asking an immigration judge to consider releasing them on bond.

“Courts around the country have since rejected the government’s new interpretation,” U.S. District Judge Kyle Dudek, a Florida-based Trump appointee, ruled Wednesday. “This Court now joins the consensus.”

Other Trump-appointed judges who have ruled against the administration’s position include Terry Doughty in Louisiana, Nancy Brasel in Minnesota, J.P. Hanlon in Indiana and Jason Pulliam in Texas.

Pulliam ruled Oct. 21 that one ICE detainee, who had been held without any “individualized assessment” of his dangerousness, was deprived of his constitutional due process rights.

Only dedicated comunists, such as yourself, support the serial rape of the Constitution.

Abrego Garcia v. Noem, 4th Circuit No. 25-1345 (7 Apr 2025)

At 14-15:

Finally, I turn to the Government’s assertion that the public interest favors a stay because Abrego Garicia is a “prominent” member of MS-13 and is therefore “no longer eligible for withholding relief.” Mot. for Stay at 14–15. Whatever the merits of the 2019 determination of the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) regarding Abrego Garcia’s connection to MS-13,⁸ the Government presented “[n]o evidence” to the district court to “connect[] Abrego Garcia to MS-13 or any other criminal organization.” Dis.t Ct. Op. at 22 n.19; see also id. at 2 n.2 (“Invoking such theories for the first time on appeal cannot cure the failure to present them before this Court.”). Indeed, such a fact cannot be gleaned from this record, which shows that Abrego Garcia has no criminal history, in this country or anywhere else, and that Abrego Garcia is a gainfully employed family man who lives a law abiding and productive life. Tellingly, the Government “abandon[ed]” its position that Abrego Garcia was “a danger to the community” at the hearing before the district court. Dist. Ct. Op. at 22 n.19. The balance of equities must tip in the movant’s favor based on the record before the issuing court. An unsupported -- and then abandoned -- assertion that Abrego Garcia was a member of a gang, does not tip the scales in favor of removal in violation of this Administration’s own⁹ withholding order. If the Government wanted to prove to the district court that Abrego Garcia was a “prominent” member of MS-13, it has had ample opportunity to do so but has not -- nor has it even bothered to try. The Government’s argument that there is a public interest in removing members of “violent transnational gangs” from this country is no doubt true, but it does nothing to help the Government’s cause here. As noted, the Government has made no effort to demonstrate that Abrego Garcia is, in fact, a member of any gang, nor did the Government avail itself of the “procedural mechanism under governing regulations to reopen the immigration judge’s prior order[] and terminate its withholding protection.” Mot. for Stay at 16–17.

⁸ Even then, the Government’s “evidence” of any connection between Abrego Garcia and MS-13 was thin, to say the least. The Government’s claim was based on (1) Abrego Garcia “wearing a Chicago Bulls hat and hoodie,” and (2) “a vague, uncorroborated allegation from a confidential informant claiming he belonged to MS-13’s ‘Western’ clique in New York—a place he has never lived.” S.A. 146 n.5; Mot. for Stay Add. at 10–11.

⁹ Of note, the IJ’s 2019 decision, which granted Abrego Garcia withholding of removal to El Salvador pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) because he faced threats to his life from an El Salvadoran gang that had targeted him and his family, was during President Trump’s 2016–2020 term in office. That decision became final on November 9, 2019, and was not appealed by this Administration.