Kissinger's work was decidedly more nuanced than your portrayal. He didn't want either side to win decisively, and tried to downplay the US's arming options to try and keep the Arab states from writing off the US entirely: When the war broke out, Nixon and Kissinger wanted to make sure that Israel did not lose, but they favored a low profile for the U.S. role, so as not to anger Arab countries that were already suspicious of U.S. policy. Moreover, Kissinger wanted to calibrate supply availabilities to influence Israeli war aims. The telcons from 13 October 1973 are especially revealing because they illustrate Kissinger’s suspicion that the Pentagon was “sabotaging” supply operations, which could risk putting “the whole goddamn strategy out of whack.” After Nixon decided in favor of a large-scale U.S. airlift of supplies, Kissinger told Leonard Garment that “we are going to wind up with the Arabs mad.”
This is also ignoring the greater dynamic of the Cold War and the Soviet Union's influence, as we apparently came close to nuclear confrontation because Israel tried to push for more than America wanted them to.



