Posted on 02/28/2022 8:10:18 PM PST by Mariner
A Russian military convoy that was outside of Ivankiv, Ukraine, on Sunday has since made it to the outskirts of Kyiv, satellite images show.
On Sunday, the convoy was roughly 40 miles northwest of the Ukrainian capital, according to images provided by Maxar Technologies.
Maxar said that roughly 17 miles of roadway is chocked full of the convoy, which consists of armored vehicles, tanks, towed artillery and other logistical vehicles.
The private US company said the convoy was located on the T-1011 highway at Antonov air base around 11:11 a.m local time.
Antonov is roughly 17 miles from the center of the Ukrainian capital.
(Excerpt) Read more at cnn.com ...
The Russian military is reportedly abusing Serbian nationals whom Russian officials have recruited to serve in Russian formations in Ukraine. A Serbian volunteer reportedly serving in the separate “Wolf” unit of the Russian 119th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) claimed that Russian commanders order Serbian fighters to conduct assaults under threat of violence and withhold provisions and ammunition from them.[74] ISW previously observed reports that the Russian military had recruited up to several hundred Serbian nationals to the separate “Wolf” unit and that Cuban and Nepali nationals are serving in VDV formations, including the 106th VDV Division.[75] Elements of the 106th VDV Division have been operating near Bakhmut since at least April 2023 and have likely suffered heavy personnel losses.[76] The Russian military may have assigned foreign volunteers to the 106th VDV Division to offset these losses.
full report: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-9-2024
The Kremlin's effort to use the mythos of the Great Patriotic War (Second World War) to prepare the Russian public for a long war in Ukraine is at odds with Russia's current level of mobilization and Russian President Vladimir Putin's rhetorical attempts to reassure Russians that the war will not have lasting domestic impacts. St. Petersburg outlet Fontanka published an interview with Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairman Andrei Kartapolov on January 9 wherein Kartapolov stated that even in the “victorious years of 1944 to 1945” the Soviet forces faced difficulties, prompting the interviewer to ask Kartapolov if Russia was now figuratively in 1944-1945 (i.e. nearing the end of the war in Ukraine).[1] Kartapolov attempted to expand the erroneous analogy between the Soviets’ fight against Nazi Germany and Russia's unprovoked invasion of Ukraine by claiming that Russia is currently figuratively somewhere in December 1943 and moving into 1944.[2] The Soviet military launched a series of successful offensive operations following its defensive victory at the battle of Kursk in July 1943 and by December 1943 had reached the banks of the Dnipro River and Kyiv in Ukraine. Kartapolov explained his logic by claiming that Ukrainian forces failed in the summer 2023 counteroffensive in Zaporizhia Oblast in a way similar to Nazi Germany's losses in battles in 1943.[3] Kartapolov’s analogy makes little sense, particularly given the fact that the Russian forces have not gained notable ground in recent months as the Soviet forces did in the months before December 1943.[4] The interviewer asked Kartapolov if his analogy suggests that Russia's war in Ukraine will end in 2024, forcing Kartapolov to admit that Russia's war in Ukraine and the Second World War cannot be literally compared.[5] Kartapolov nevertheless continued to use allusions to the Second World War to claim that the Russian military would continue the war in Ukraine until it installed a “banner over the Reichstag” (i.e. complete victory in Ukraine that achieves all of Putin's maximalist objectives).[6]
full report: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-10-2024
Russia may be setting information conditions for future escalations against Latvia by threatening to punish Latvia for closing a likely base of Russian informational influence in Latvia. The Latvian parliament adopted a bill on January 11 to transfer the “Moscow House” business and cultural center in Riga, owned by the Russian government, to Latvian state ownership in order to “guarantee Latvia's security.”[35] The Latvian parliament reported that the Russian government has been using the “Moscow House” to support Russian influence operations in Latvia.[36] The Russian Embassy in Latvia responded to the transfer by claiming that this “hostility” will result in ”serious consequences.”[37] The Russian Embassy in Latvia also accused the Latvian government of systematically oppressing “Russian speakers“ in Latvia due to a recent Latvian law requiring Russian citizens with Latvian residence permits to pass a Latvian language exam.[38] The Russian accusation likely deliberately equates all Russian speakers in Latvia with Russian citizens residing in Latvia in an attempt to exacerbate tensions between local Russian speakers and ethnic Russians and Latvian speakers. Russian officials have been increasingly asserting Russia's right to protect “compatriots abroad,” intentionally loosely defined as ethnic Russians and Russian speakers and not limited to Russian citizens. Russia may be setting conditions aimed at destabilizing Latvia by exacerbating linguistic tensions and framing itself as a protector of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers.
full report: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-11-2024
Actors in the Russia-backed breakaway republic of Transnistria may be setting information conditions for a possible false-flag operation in Transnistria as part of wider Kremlin efforts to destabilize Moldova.
The Transnistrian Ministry of State Security (MGB) issued a press release on January 12 claiming that Moldovan special forces are training “special combat groups” of more than 60 people to destroy critical facilities, sabotage military installations, and capture or destroy senior Transnistrian officials and law enforcement officers.[19] ISW previously reported that the MGB is a Russian-dominated organization that is commonly understood to be a ”department of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB)” that likely takes orders directly from Moscow.[20] The MGB and Transnistrian officials have previously made similar, less escalatory claims likely also as part of the Kremlin's efforts to set informational conditions aimed at destabilizing Moldova and justifying any future Russian campaigns in the region by framing Russia as a protector of allegedly threatened Russian-language speakers in Moldova.[21]
full report: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-12-2024
That road out of Kuwait was hit by two F15Es.....not A-10s as I recall.
In recent days, there has been a lot of discussion about the arrival in Russia of 10 thousand workers from Kenya, who have already begun to appear in Moscow . As it turns out, this news has a direct bearing on the [invasion of Ukraine].
According to our interlocutors from among Yevgeny Prigozhin’s close associates, former “Wagnerites” (who left the PMC and signed contracts with the Ministry of Defense) opened two special training camps - in Kenya and Mali. There they recruit locals and prepare them to participate in the [invasion of Ukraine] in order to “strengthen our army in several difficult sectors of the front.”
One group of such fighters (about 500 people, by the way, among them there are both men and women) has already arrived in Russia under the guise of workers. For cover, they took staged photos in janitor uniforms and will soon be sent to the front - most likely to the Avdeevka area and the Zaporozhye region. Several more groups are on the way; in total, it is planned to train approximately 10 thousand African fighters.
Some Africans were well trained and offered contracts - they will be paid from 300 to 500 thousand rubles per month (they will be paid, of course, in dollars). At the same time, not all new fighters are well prepared, but “there are enough of them to go on assaults,” our interlocutors say. In general, new fighters will be paid different amounts depending on their skills and abilities.
“To be honest, a lot of people laugh at these fighters. They have even been given a nickname - “black wipers”. (черные дворники) Oh, if Evgeny Viktorovich could see this,” said one of the sources. By the way, our interlocutors at the Ministry of Defense confirmed to us the training of African fighters for the [invasion of Ukraine]. But they refused to provide any details.
https://t.me/kremlin_secrets/3437
A recent video appeal by a Serbian mercenary addressed to Russian President Vladimir Putin has unleashed discussions about an ongoing “clan war” within the Kremlin and the Russian information space against the backdrop of the Russian presidential campaign. Serbian sniper Dejan Beric (also known as “Deka”) – who has reportedly fought with Russian forces in Ukraine since Russia's initial invasion in 2014, conducts Russian mercenary recruitment in Serbia, and became a member Putin's election team – published a video appeal on January 8 wherein he accused military commanders of the Russian 119th Guards Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th Guards VDV Division) of mistreating Serbian mercenaries in the “Wolves” (Volki) detachment.[1] Elements of the 119th Guards VDV Regiment are currently operating on Bakhmut’s southern flank near Klishchiivka.[2] Beric claimed that commanders of the 119th VDV Regiment forced Serbian mercenaries to conduct an assault without sufficient weapons, which prompted the entire detachment to refuse to continue attacks and demand a transfer to the nearby Chechen “Akhmat” Spetsnaz units.[3] Beric stated that Russian military officials and police declared that the Serbian mercenaries were deserters and war criminals, disarmed them, pushed them out of their trenches, and forced them to admit that they were spies.
A Russian political insider source – who routinely discusses specific details of Russian political and military command changes – claimed that Beric’s appeal is a direct indication that a “clan war” has broken out among some Russian strongmen (siloviki) within Putin's inner circles.[4] The source claimed that Beric’s appeal is likely a part of widely discussed informational attacks against a group of Russian milbloggers who are independent and openly critical of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and that these informational attacks are part of an organized campaign against VDV commanders and their patrons. The source claimed that Beric’s appeal was part of a retaliatory attack executed on behalf of Secretary of the Russian Security Council Nikolai Patrushev’s and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s respective factions within the Kremlin against the faction of Igor Sechin – Putin's “de facto deputy” and CEO of Russian state oil company Rosneft. The source specified that Tula Oblast Governor Alexei Dyumin is an active member of Sechin’s faction and the patron of the 106th VDV Division and assessed that the Beric’s public attack against 119th VDV Regiment's command was likely an attempt to undermine Dyumin, 106th VDV Division Commander Major General Vladimir Seliverstov, and Russian VDV and “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky. Dyumin, Teplinsky, and Seliverstov have previously been involved in feuds with the Russian MoD and affiliated themselves with the Wagner Group and opposition to Shoigu.[5] The source implied that Sechin’s faction launched public attacks on Patrushev’s faction by amplifying problems with Russian egg supplies, which had been inadequately handled by Russian Minister of Agriculture Dmitry Patrushev – who is also Patrushev’s son.[6] Shoigu’s faction had also faced similar public attacks on its inability to deal with the collapse of the communal infrastructure in Moscow Oblast and problems with the Defenders of Fatherland Foundation. Putin notably recently obliquely criticized Dmitry Patrushev and Shoigu for their respective failures.[7] The source implied that factions are attempting to discredit each other in Putin's eyes to ensure that they can secure new positions within the Kremlin following the presidential election. Another insider source claimed that First Deputy of the Main Directorate of the Russian General Staff (GRU) Lieutenant General Vladimir Alekseyev approved Beric’s appeal to bring Putin's attention to the lack of supplies within the military amidst rumors about Alekseyev's dismissal.[8]
In-fighting and factional dynamics within the Kremlin are not new phenomena and do not indicate the imminent collapse of Putin's regime, particularly because power verticals are the foundation of Putin's regime. ISW has routinely assessed that Putin deliberately creates an environment in which officials within his inner circle must compete for his favor, largely to ensure that his lieutenants remain loyal to him and his regime.[9] ISW also observed that Putin has an affinity for rotating officials and military commanders instead of outright dismissing them to prevent any single individual from amassing too much political influence and to maintain support among competing factions.[10] Putin is unlikely to change this system and eliminate these power verticals as they serve as a foundation of his rule. ISW has also observed numerous instances of Russian officials and commanders using the Russian information space to attract Putin's attention, discredit an opposing faction, and influence changes within Putin's inner circle.[11] Such factional feuds have notable but not dispositive battlefield effects. They can damage cohesion between Russian forces and demoralize Russian personnel but are unlikely to lead to mass conflict within the Russian ranks or wider society. A Russian “Storm-Z” assault unit instructor observed in response to Beric’s appeal that numerous Russian detachments and units are facing problems similar to those experienced by the Serbian mercenaries and implied that the Russian military has systematic issues that are prevalent outside of factional dynamics.[12] Permanent friction among the different factions that play roles in Putin's war in Ukraine can impede Russia's decision-making, however, and limit the Kremlin's ability to bring coherence and efficiency to the Russian military.
full report: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-13-2024
The Kremlin continues to undertake measures to undermine the Republic of Tatarstan’s autonomy within the Russian Federation and cultural heritage despite the republic's sacrifices on behalf of the Russian war in Ukraine. Russian Tatar activist and political scientist Ruslan Aisin reported that Russian officials cut funding for the state program for preservation, study, and development of Tatarstan’s state languages by 12.5 percent in 2023.[22] Aisin stated that officials originally planned to spend 126.8 million rubles (around $1.4 million) on the program but cut the funding by 15.8 million rubles (about $180,000). Aisin argued that these cuts are likely related to the Kremlin's efforts to finance the war effort in Ukraine and undermine Tatarstan’s identity. Aisin observed that Tatarstan backed away from its state policy on strengthening its identity alongside the country-wide Russian identity in the fall of 2023 and argued that the Kremlin likely had seen an opportunity to save money on Tatarstan’s efforts to preserve its culture, language, and identity. Aisin also implied that the Kremlin is favoring an all-Russian identity. The Kremlin directed Tatarstan officials in January 2023 to abolish the title of the republic's president and refer to Tatarstan’s leader as “glava” (regional head).[23] Tatarstan has been supporting the Russian war effort by forming and financing the recruitment of regional volunteer battalions, some of which suffered tremendous losses on the battlefield in 2022 and 2023.[24] BBC's Russian Service and independent Russian outlet Mediazona also confirmed that at least 922 servicemen from Tatarstan died in Ukraine — a number that is likely significantly higher — as of January 11.[25]
full report: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-14-2024
In this thread, I will explain why we are much closer to war with Russia than most people realize and why our time window for rearmament is shorter than many believe. In my opinion, we have at best 2-3 years to re-establish deterrence vis-à-vis Russia. Here’s why 👇 1/20
https://twitter.com/FRHoffmann1/status/1746589423251403236
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