Actors in the Russia-backed breakaway republic of Transnistria may be setting information conditions for a possible false-flag operation in Transnistria as part of wider Kremlin efforts to destabilize Moldova.
The Transnistrian Ministry of State Security (MGB) issued a press release on January 12 claiming that Moldovan special forces are training “special combat groups” of more than 60 people to destroy critical facilities, sabotage military installations, and capture or destroy senior Transnistrian officials and law enforcement officers.[19] ISW previously reported that the MGB is a Russian-dominated organization that is commonly understood to be a ”department of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB)” that likely takes orders directly from Moscow.[20] The MGB and Transnistrian officials have previously made similar, less escalatory claims likely also as part of the Kremlin's efforts to set informational conditions aimed at destabilizing Moldova and justifying any future Russian campaigns in the region by framing Russia as a protector of allegedly threatened Russian-language speakers in Moldova.[21]
full report: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-12-2024
A recent video appeal by a Serbian mercenary addressed to Russian President Vladimir Putin has unleashed discussions about an ongoing “clan war” within the Kremlin and the Russian information space against the backdrop of the Russian presidential campaign. Serbian sniper Dejan Beric (also known as “Deka”) – who has reportedly fought with Russian forces in Ukraine since Russia's initial invasion in 2014, conducts Russian mercenary recruitment in Serbia, and became a member Putin's election team – published a video appeal on January 8 wherein he accused military commanders of the Russian 119th Guards Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th Guards VDV Division) of mistreating Serbian mercenaries in the “Wolves” (Volki) detachment.[1] Elements of the 119th Guards VDV Regiment are currently operating on Bakhmut’s southern flank near Klishchiivka.[2] Beric claimed that commanders of the 119th VDV Regiment forced Serbian mercenaries to conduct an assault without sufficient weapons, which prompted the entire detachment to refuse to continue attacks and demand a transfer to the nearby Chechen “Akhmat” Spetsnaz units.[3] Beric stated that Russian military officials and police declared that the Serbian mercenaries were deserters and war criminals, disarmed them, pushed them out of their trenches, and forced them to admit that they were spies.
A Russian political insider source – who routinely discusses specific details of Russian political and military command changes – claimed that Beric’s appeal is a direct indication that a “clan war” has broken out among some Russian strongmen (siloviki) within Putin's inner circles.[4] The source claimed that Beric’s appeal is likely a part of widely discussed informational attacks against a group of Russian milbloggers who are independent and openly critical of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and that these informational attacks are part of an organized campaign against VDV commanders and their patrons. The source claimed that Beric’s appeal was part of a retaliatory attack executed on behalf of Secretary of the Russian Security Council Nikolai Patrushev’s and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s respective factions within the Kremlin against the faction of Igor Sechin – Putin's “de facto deputy” and CEO of Russian state oil company Rosneft. The source specified that Tula Oblast Governor Alexei Dyumin is an active member of Sechin’s faction and the patron of the 106th VDV Division and assessed that the Beric’s public attack against 119th VDV Regiment's command was likely an attempt to undermine Dyumin, 106th VDV Division Commander Major General Vladimir Seliverstov, and Russian VDV and “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky. Dyumin, Teplinsky, and Seliverstov have previously been involved in feuds with the Russian MoD and affiliated themselves with the Wagner Group and opposition to Shoigu.[5] The source implied that Sechin’s faction launched public attacks on Patrushev’s faction by amplifying problems with Russian egg supplies, which had been inadequately handled by Russian Minister of Agriculture Dmitry Patrushev – who is also Patrushev’s son.[6] Shoigu’s faction had also faced similar public attacks on its inability to deal with the collapse of the communal infrastructure in Moscow Oblast and problems with the Defenders of Fatherland Foundation. Putin notably recently obliquely criticized Dmitry Patrushev and Shoigu for their respective failures.[7] The source implied that factions are attempting to discredit each other in Putin's eyes to ensure that they can secure new positions within the Kremlin following the presidential election. Another insider source claimed that First Deputy of the Main Directorate of the Russian General Staff (GRU) Lieutenant General Vladimir Alekseyev approved Beric’s appeal to bring Putin's attention to the lack of supplies within the military amidst rumors about Alekseyev's dismissal.[8]
In-fighting and factional dynamics within the Kremlin are not new phenomena and do not indicate the imminent collapse of Putin's regime, particularly because power verticals are the foundation of Putin's regime. ISW has routinely assessed that Putin deliberately creates an environment in which officials within his inner circle must compete for his favor, largely to ensure that his lieutenants remain loyal to him and his regime.[9] ISW also observed that Putin has an affinity for rotating officials and military commanders instead of outright dismissing them to prevent any single individual from amassing too much political influence and to maintain support among competing factions.[10] Putin is unlikely to change this system and eliminate these power verticals as they serve as a foundation of his rule. ISW has also observed numerous instances of Russian officials and commanders using the Russian information space to attract Putin's attention, discredit an opposing faction, and influence changes within Putin's inner circle.[11] Such factional feuds have notable but not dispositive battlefield effects. They can damage cohesion between Russian forces and demoralize Russian personnel but are unlikely to lead to mass conflict within the Russian ranks or wider society. A Russian “Storm-Z” assault unit instructor observed in response to Beric’s appeal that numerous Russian detachments and units are facing problems similar to those experienced by the Serbian mercenaries and implied that the Russian military has systematic issues that are prevalent outside of factional dynamics.[12] Permanent friction among the different factions that play roles in Putin's war in Ukraine can impede Russia's decision-making, however, and limit the Kremlin's ability to bring coherence and efficiency to the Russian military.
full report: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-13-2024