The Kremlin's effort to use the mythos of the Great Patriotic War (Second World War) to prepare the Russian public for a long war in Ukraine is at odds with Russia's current level of mobilization and Russian President Vladimir Putin's rhetorical attempts to reassure Russians that the war will not have lasting domestic impacts. St. Petersburg outlet Fontanka published an interview with Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairman Andrei Kartapolov on January 9 wherein Kartapolov stated that even in the “victorious years of 1944 to 1945” the Soviet forces faced difficulties, prompting the interviewer to ask Kartapolov if Russia was now figuratively in 1944-1945 (i.e. nearing the end of the war in Ukraine).[1] Kartapolov attempted to expand the erroneous analogy between the Soviets’ fight against Nazi Germany and Russia's unprovoked invasion of Ukraine by claiming that Russia is currently figuratively somewhere in December 1943 and moving into 1944.[2] The Soviet military launched a series of successful offensive operations following its defensive victory at the battle of Kursk in July 1943 and by December 1943 had reached the banks of the Dnipro River and Kyiv in Ukraine. Kartapolov explained his logic by claiming that Ukrainian forces failed in the summer 2023 counteroffensive in Zaporizhia Oblast in a way similar to Nazi Germany's losses in battles in 1943.[3] Kartapolov’s analogy makes little sense, particularly given the fact that the Russian forces have not gained notable ground in recent months as the Soviet forces did in the months before December 1943.[4] The interviewer asked Kartapolov if his analogy suggests that Russia's war in Ukraine will end in 2024, forcing Kartapolov to admit that Russia's war in Ukraine and the Second World War cannot be literally compared.[5] Kartapolov nevertheless continued to use allusions to the Second World War to claim that the Russian military would continue the war in Ukraine until it installed a “banner over the Reichstag” (i.e. complete victory in Ukraine that achieves all of Putin's maximalist objectives).[6]
full report: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-10-2024
Russia may be setting information conditions for future escalations against Latvia by threatening to punish Latvia for closing a likely base of Russian informational influence in Latvia. The Latvian parliament adopted a bill on January 11 to transfer the “Moscow House” business and cultural center in Riga, owned by the Russian government, to Latvian state ownership in order to “guarantee Latvia's security.”[35] The Latvian parliament reported that the Russian government has been using the “Moscow House” to support Russian influence operations in Latvia.[36] The Russian Embassy in Latvia responded to the transfer by claiming that this “hostility” will result in ”serious consequences.”[37] The Russian Embassy in Latvia also accused the Latvian government of systematically oppressing “Russian speakers“ in Latvia due to a recent Latvian law requiring Russian citizens with Latvian residence permits to pass a Latvian language exam.[38] The Russian accusation likely deliberately equates all Russian speakers in Latvia with Russian citizens residing in Latvia in an attempt to exacerbate tensions between local Russian speakers and ethnic Russians and Latvian speakers. Russian officials have been increasingly asserting Russia's right to protect “compatriots abroad,” intentionally loosely defined as ethnic Russians and Russian speakers and not limited to Russian citizens. Russia may be setting conditions aimed at destabilizing Latvia by exacerbating linguistic tensions and framing itself as a protector of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers.
full report: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-11-2024