Posted on 12/26/2025 1:41:37 PM PST by Libloather
Attorneys representing Tina Peters filed a motion seeking to have the former Colorado county clerk released from jail and for an appellate court to recognize a pardon recently issued by President Donald Trump.
Tina Peters, who was pardoned by President Donald Trump earlier this month, spent her Christmas in a Colorado prison after being convicted in October 2024 as the state resists the pressure from Trump.
The motion, obtained by Fox News Digital, was filed Dec. 23 and outlined why Peters should be released.
"There is no question that the Pardon forgave federal offenses," the motion states. "However, the Pardon also forgave Colorado state court convictions for actions Clerk Peters ‘may have committed or taken part in related to election integrity and security’ during the applicable time period."
Peters was a Republican law clerk who was convicted of official misconduct, conspiracy and influencing a public servant, according to Colorado state law, after she allowed unauthorized access to voting equipment on suspicions that the 2020 election may have been stolen from Trump.
She was sentenced by a Colorado judge to nine years in prison in October 2024.
Trump issued a pardon in early December 2025, stating on Truth Social that Peters is "a Patriot who simply wanted to make sure that our Elections were Fair and Honest."
"Instead of protecting Americans and their Tax Dollars, Democrats chose instead to prosecute anyone they can find that wanted Safe and Secure Elections," Trump posted. "Democrats have been relentless in their targeting of TINA PETERS, a Patriot who simply wanted to make sure that our Elections were Fair and Honest.
(Excerpt) Read more at foxnews.com ...
Yeah I think this is going to the same Colorado judge so I wish them good luck.
Pretty clear that a President cannot issue pardons for violations of state law, even if the cause of action overlaps with a violation of federal law.
The state used the federal government to convict her. Trump needs to send in the Marshalls. Or the military.
Three presidents have used the military.
Put herin federal custody as one of many whistleblowers in the imminent prosecutions regarding Cartel del Sol buying US officials to enable their theft of US elections via Dominion
Colorado has gone feral.
POTUS is certainly trying but also keeping her name in the arena of public memory which is very important as well.
This Colorado judge committed at least one but probably multiple federal crimes in his actions against Tina Peters.
Those around the judge are complicit. They will all be prosecuted.
Many will also be sued into oblivion.
TINA’S CASE WAS FEDERAL FROM THE BEGINNING. SHE WAS HANDLING FEDERAL DOCUMENTS.
(Documents for the election of federal officials. To the conspirators I ask one thing: Get it now?)
Can you cite any case law that supports that conclusion?
And President Trump may also!
Well, there is first the Constitution itself:
"...he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States,
Without language such as "and the several States", that seems pretty clearly limited to federal crimes because the Constitution is pretty specific when referring to the individual states v. the federal government.
One case confirming this would be Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87 at 113 (1924).:
"We have given the history of the clause to show that the words "for offences against the United States" were inserted by a Committee on Style, presumably to make clear that the pardon of the President was to operate upon offenses against the United States as distinguished from offenses against the States.
How did the King’s pardon work? Could Ireland, Wales, Scotland or England hold someone against the King’s pardon?
Well sir, I do have to tip my hat to you. Your argument was well reasoned. Much better than I am accustomed to here. Thank you for taking some time to put forth a compelling argument.
In response, if we dive deeper into Grossman, we find that the court stated “Hence, when the words to grant pardons were used in the Constitution, they conveyed to the mind the authority as exercised by the English crown, or by its representatives in the colonies. At that time both Englishmen and Americans attached the same meaning to the word pardon. In the Convention which framed the Constitution, no effort was made to define or change its meaning, although it was limited in cases of impeachment.’ “The king of England before our Revolution, in the exercise of his prerogative, had always exercised the power to pardon contempts of court” In Grossman the case was actually about a pardon of a contempt charge which resulted in committing Grossman to the Chicago House of Correction.
Let’s go on.
The Court wrote: “We have given the history of the clause to show that the words ‘for offenses against the United States’ were inserted by a Committee on Style, presumably to make clear that the pardon of the President was to operate upon offenses against the United States as distinguished from offenses against the states. It cannot be supposed that the Committee on Revision by adding these words, or the Convention by accepting them, intended sub silentio to narrow the scope of a pardon from one at common law or to confer any different power in this regard on our executive from that which the members of the Convention had seen exercised before the Revolution.”
“So it is clear to us that the language of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments and of other cited parts of the Constitution are not of significance in determining the scope of pardons of ‘offenses against the United States’ in article 2, § 2, cl. 1, of the enumerated powers of the President. We think the arguments drawn from the common law, from the power of the king under the British Constitution, which plainly was the prototype of this clause, from the legislative history of the clause in the Convention, and from the ordinary meaning of its words, are much more relevant and convincing.”
Grossman while discussing pardon powers also touches on the interesting requirement that the President is to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. I think that plays heavily into Tina Peters case. Also, her case is well steeped in federal election law and questions. It would be a very interesting case for SCOTUS to hear. I would love to hear John Sauer argue for the good guys on that one.
Grossman was granted his Petition for Habitus Corpus and the court clearly recognized an “enhanced” pardon power by the Executive. This case also dabbled with some interesting questions and seemed to find that Presidential pardon power came directly from the power vested in the King and that it could drift into State Court issues. This question needs to be further litigated but there is little question that Grossman leaves the door wide open for the Roberts Court to more clearly explain the pardon power held by the Executive. There is certainly precedent in Grossman to take it to the same level that the King of England enjoyed at common law.
I believe that liberals will cry over the outcome of this case if it is taken up by SCOTUS.
This case also dabbled with some interesting questions and seemed to find that Presidential pardon power came directly from the power vested in the King and that it could drift into State Court issues
I don't see anything in that opinion supporting the bolded claim at all. Literally the only time state law was referred to at all was in the language I quoted saying that the phrase "offenses against the United States" was intended to limit the President's power only in terms of state/federal law, not in any other way such as excluding contempt.
But while I think that particular Court clearly stands on the side of "the President can only pardon for federal crimes", that language is technically only dicta, and not part of the holding. So, the current Supreme Court could more easily pick a different option if it so chooses.
But I do think that based on the Constitutional language, the Grossman Court was right about what the "offenses against the United States" means, and I think the current Supreme Court would agree.
Once again my FRiend, I appreciate your approach to disagreement in the forum and I also appreciate your obvious intellect. I would love to dig deeper into this discussion but the depth of your argument would require me to do some actual work to overcome and I have much too much to do in the real world right now. Perhaps, if this question makes it to the Thomas Court, er, I meant to say the Roberts Court, we may resume our FR amicus joust. I would hope to have more time to address a worthy adversary such as yourself.
I wish for you a very happy New Year!
A question : Is Tina being held in prison because she will not give up the data storage device that the proof is on ?
I keep noticing mention of her getting this data, but have not heard a peep about where it is.
The presidential pardon power in Article II, Section 2, Clause 1—"to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment"—was deliberately modeled on the English monarch's prerogative of mercy, a plenary authority to extend grace in criminal matters. William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765–1769) described this royal power as the king's exclusive right to pardon offenses against the Crown, reflecting that crimes were wrongs against the sovereign who could forgive them.
At the 1787 Constitutional Convention, the Founders adapted this prerogative into a republican form, vesting it solely in the President to ensure decisive mercy without legislative delays. Alexander Hamilton, in Federalist No. 74, defended its breadth: "Humanity and good policy conspire to dictate, that the benign prerogative of pardoning should be as little as possible fettered or embarrassed." He emphasized its utility in crises, such as insurrections, where "a well-timed offer of pardon...may restore the tranquility of the commonwealth.
"In Federalist No. 69, Hamilton contrasted the President's power with the King's absolute authority (unlimited even post-impeachment) and state governors' broader clemency (including over impeachments in some cases), noting the President's was cabined only by the impeachment exception—a deliberate restraint to prevent abuse while preserving plenary scope for federal offenses. The Framers rejected proposals requiring Senate approval for most pardons, affirming executive independence. This Founding-era view positioned the pardon as a tool for national reconciliation in matters of federal significance, such as electoral disputes or rebellions implicating dual jurisdictions.
Historical Precedent Supports Extension to Intersecting State Offenses in National Crises
Early practice reflects this broad intent. President George Washington pardoned participants in the 1794–1795 Whiskey Rebellion, where resistance to federal excise taxes involved acts prosecutable under both federal treason laws and state offenses (e.g., assault, rioting). Washington's proclamations granted amnesty to rebels, including those facing state-level consequences, to restore national tranquility—mirroring Hamilton's rationale in Federalist No. 74.
Peters' actions, though prosecuted under state law, directly implicated federal electoral integrity in a presidential election. Trump's pardon aligns with this precedent, addressing a perceived national crisis in election confidence.
The Supreme Court has affirmed the pardon's expansiveness: In Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 380 (1866), the Court described it as "unlimited" (except impeachment), extending "to every offence known to the law" and exercisable at any time, blotting out guilt and punishment. While later cases refined its effects (e.g., not erasing factual history for collateral purposes), the core plenary nature remains.
Federal Nexus and Supremacy Clause Warrant Application Here.
Peters' conduct involved state-managed equipment but targeted alleged fraud in a federal presidential election, governed by federal laws like the Help America Vote Act and the Elections Clause (Art. I, § 4). This creates a profound federal interest, analogous to dual-sovereignty cases where federal authority predominates.
Under the Supremacy Clause (Art. VI, Cl. 2), federal executive acts prevail in national matters. Denying the pardon's effect risks state interference with federal clemency in electoral integrity—a core "Offence against the United States" when viewed through the Founders' lens of reconciliation. This is bolstered (albeit in reverse of the instant case) by Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964), where the Supreme Court held that immunity granted by one sovereign (a state) must extend to protect against prosecution or use of evidence by another sovereign (federal) to safeguard Fifth Amendment rights. By analogy, a presidential pardon—rooted in federal executive authority—should similarly preclude state enforcement when the underlying conduct implicates federal constitutional interests like election oversight, preventing a "clash of sovereignties" as warned in Murphy. The Overwhelming Federal Nexus and Supremacy Clause Demand Application, Bolstered by Compelling Analogous Case Law
Peters' conduct, while involving state equipment, was inextricably linked to alleged fraud in a federal presidential election, regulated by statutes like the Help America Vote Act and the Elections Clause (Art. I, § 4)—creating an overriding federal interest that eclipses state claims. Under the Supremacy Clause (Art. VI, Cl. 2), federal executive actions like this pardon must triumph over conflicting state proceedings in matters of national electoral sanctity.
This principle echoes Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896), equating federal immunity to "general amnesty," bridging jurisdictional divides for justice's sake.
Modern Context and Comity
Trump's pardon, like Washington's, promotes unity amid division over 2020 election claims. State courts should accord comity, recognizing the pardon and releasing Peters. Of course, given the Colorado Court's recent record, they will not. Ultimate resolution will likely reach the U.S. Supreme Court.
Conclusion
President Trump's pardon of Tina Peters is not merely valid but constitutionally imperative, enforceable against her state convictions through the Founders' embrace of the King's sweeping prerogative (Blackstone; Federalist Nos. 69, 74), Washington's Whiskey Rebellion amnesties bridging dual jurisdictions, the inescapable federal nexus to elections, and supremacy doctrines reinforced by Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, Brown v. Walker, Ex parte Garland, Burdick v. United States, and United States v. Wilson.
No, this is just straight up political persecution, not unlike what the Dems did to J-6ers. The radical Colorado government wants to make an example out of Tina Peters, to strike fear in anyone that might try to expose them. There is nothing that she could give them that would make them back off, except maybe her life. They would probably still hang her from a lamp post if they could. These people are evil.
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