This case also dabbled with some interesting questions and seemed to find that Presidential pardon power came directly from the power vested in the King and that it could drift into State Court issues
I don't see anything in that opinion supporting the bolded claim at all. Literally the only time state law was referred to at all was in the language I quoted saying that the phrase "offenses against the United States" was intended to limit the President's power only in terms of state/federal law, not in any other way such as excluding contempt.
But while I think that particular Court clearly stands on the side of "the President can only pardon for federal crimes", that language is technically only dicta, and not part of the holding. So, the current Supreme Court could more easily pick a different option if it so chooses.
But I do think that based on the Constitutional language, the Grossman Court was right about what the "offenses against the United States" means, and I think the current Supreme Court would agree.
Once again my FRiend, I appreciate your approach to disagreement in the forum and I also appreciate your obvious intellect. I would love to dig deeper into this discussion but the depth of your argument would require me to do some actual work to overcome and I have much too much to do in the real world right now. Perhaps, if this question makes it to the Thomas Court, er, I meant to say the Roberts Court, we may resume our FR amicus joust. I would hope to have more time to address a worthy adversary such as yourself.
I wish for you a very happy New Year!
The presidential pardon power in Article II, Section 2, Clause 1—"to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment"—was deliberately modeled on the English monarch's prerogative of mercy, a plenary authority to extend grace in criminal matters. William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765–1769) described this royal power as the king's exclusive right to pardon offenses against the Crown, reflecting that crimes were wrongs against the sovereign who could forgive them.
At the 1787 Constitutional Convention, the Founders adapted this prerogative into a republican form, vesting it solely in the President to ensure decisive mercy without legislative delays. Alexander Hamilton, in Federalist No. 74, defended its breadth: "Humanity and good policy conspire to dictate, that the benign prerogative of pardoning should be as little as possible fettered or embarrassed." He emphasized its utility in crises, such as insurrections, where "a well-timed offer of pardon...may restore the tranquility of the commonwealth.
"In Federalist No. 69, Hamilton contrasted the President's power with the King's absolute authority (unlimited even post-impeachment) and state governors' broader clemency (including over impeachments in some cases), noting the President's was cabined only by the impeachment exception—a deliberate restraint to prevent abuse while preserving plenary scope for federal offenses. The Framers rejected proposals requiring Senate approval for most pardons, affirming executive independence. This Founding-era view positioned the pardon as a tool for national reconciliation in matters of federal significance, such as electoral disputes or rebellions implicating dual jurisdictions.
Historical Precedent Supports Extension to Intersecting State Offenses in National Crises
Early practice reflects this broad intent. President George Washington pardoned participants in the 1794–1795 Whiskey Rebellion, where resistance to federal excise taxes involved acts prosecutable under both federal treason laws and state offenses (e.g., assault, rioting). Washington's proclamations granted amnesty to rebels, including those facing state-level consequences, to restore national tranquility—mirroring Hamilton's rationale in Federalist No. 74.
Peters' actions, though prosecuted under state law, directly implicated federal electoral integrity in a presidential election. Trump's pardon aligns with this precedent, addressing a perceived national crisis in election confidence.
The Supreme Court has affirmed the pardon's expansiveness: In Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 380 (1866), the Court described it as "unlimited" (except impeachment), extending "to every offence known to the law" and exercisable at any time, blotting out guilt and punishment. While later cases refined its effects (e.g., not erasing factual history for collateral purposes), the core plenary nature remains.
Federal Nexus and Supremacy Clause Warrant Application Here.
Peters' conduct involved state-managed equipment but targeted alleged fraud in a federal presidential election, governed by federal laws like the Help America Vote Act and the Elections Clause (Art. I, § 4). This creates a profound federal interest, analogous to dual-sovereignty cases where federal authority predominates.
Under the Supremacy Clause (Art. VI, Cl. 2), federal executive acts prevail in national matters. Denying the pardon's effect risks state interference with federal clemency in electoral integrity—a core "Offence against the United States" when viewed through the Founders' lens of reconciliation. This is bolstered (albeit in reverse of the instant case) by Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964), where the Supreme Court held that immunity granted by one sovereign (a state) must extend to protect against prosecution or use of evidence by another sovereign (federal) to safeguard Fifth Amendment rights. By analogy, a presidential pardon—rooted in federal executive authority—should similarly preclude state enforcement when the underlying conduct implicates federal constitutional interests like election oversight, preventing a "clash of sovereignties" as warned in Murphy. The Overwhelming Federal Nexus and Supremacy Clause Demand Application, Bolstered by Compelling Analogous Case Law
Peters' conduct, while involving state equipment, was inextricably linked to alleged fraud in a federal presidential election, regulated by statutes like the Help America Vote Act and the Elections Clause (Art. I, § 4)—creating an overriding federal interest that eclipses state claims. Under the Supremacy Clause (Art. VI, Cl. 2), federal executive actions like this pardon must triumph over conflicting state proceedings in matters of national electoral sanctity.
This principle echoes Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896), equating federal immunity to "general amnesty," bridging jurisdictional divides for justice's sake.
Modern Context and Comity
Trump's pardon, like Washington's, promotes unity amid division over 2020 election claims. State courts should accord comity, recognizing the pardon and releasing Peters. Of course, given the Colorado Court's recent record, they will not. Ultimate resolution will likely reach the U.S. Supreme Court.
Conclusion
President Trump's pardon of Tina Peters is not merely valid but constitutionally imperative, enforceable against her state convictions through the Founders' embrace of the King's sweeping prerogative (Blackstone; Federalist Nos. 69, 74), Washington's Whiskey Rebellion amnesties bridging dual jurisdictions, the inescapable federal nexus to elections, and supremacy doctrines reinforced by Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, Brown v. Walker, Ex parte Garland, Burdick v. United States, and United States v. Wilson.